Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15782/2025
CNR: RJHC020894432025 | URN: CW / 35899U / 2025
1.
Buddalal S/o Prabhudayal
2.
Matadeen S/o Prabhudayal
3.
Hanuman S/o Prabhudayal
4.
Girraj S/o Basantaram
5.
Rohitash S/o Basantaram
6.
Motilal S/o Basantaram
7.
Mahesh S/o Basantaram
8.
Suresh S/o Basantaram
9.
Rajesh S/o Basantaram
10.
Roshan S/o Basantaram
11.
Jagdish S/o Santosh Kumar
12.
Kaluram S/o Santosh Kumar
13.
Banwarilal S/o Panchuram
14.
Laxminarayan S/o Panchuram
15.
Hanuman Prasad S/o Buddalal
16.
Jagdish S/o Buddalal
17.
Gaurishankar S/o Buddalal
18.
Kalicharan S/o Buddalal
19.
Ramkishore S/o Buddalal
All Are Resident Of Village Dhuarmala, Tehsil Thanagazi,
District Alwar (Rajasthan)
All The Petitioners Through Power of Attorney Holder Shri
Babulal Prajapat S/o Banwari Lal Prajapat, Aged About 25
Years, R/o Dhuhar Chougan, Tehsil Thanagazi, District
Alwar (Rajasthan)
----Petitioners
Versus
1.
Union of India, through its Secretary, Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways, Government of India, New Delhi.
2.
The Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Forest,
Government Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
3.
The District Collector, Alwar (Rajasthan)
(2 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
4.
The
Project
Director-Cum-Executive
[CW-15782/2025]
Engineer,
Public
Works Department-National Highway, Division-I, Jaipur
(Rajasthan)
5.
The Competent Authority-Cum-Land Acquisition Officer
and Sub-Divisional Officer, Thanagazi,
District Alwar
(Rajasthan)
6.
The Deputy Conservator of Forest, Tiger Project Sariska,
Alwar-Jaipur Road, Sariska-301022 (Rajasthan)
7.
The Tehsildar, Tehsil Thanagazi, District Alwar (Rajasthan)
----Respondents
For Petitioners
:
Akshay Sharma Advocate.
For Respondents
:
Mr. Sandeep Pathak Advocate with Mr.
Arnav Singh Advocate.
Mr. Dheeraj Tripathi Additional
Government Counsel.
Mr. Aditya Singh Deputy Government
Counsel.
Mr. Vidhyadhar Gathala Additional
Government Counsel and Ms. Vijay
Laxmi Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
11/08/2026
1.
The instant writ petition has been preferred by the
petitioners, who are residents of Village Dhuarmala, Tehsil
Thanagazi, District Alwar, questioning the legality of order dated
06.10.2025
passed
by
the
Competent
Authority-cum-Sub-
Divisional Officer, Thanagazi (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the
competent authority’), whereby their objections under Section 3C
of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Act of 1956’) came to be rejected. The petitioners have also
questioned the consequential action of the respondent authorities
(3 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
proposing to establish a Rest Area at Km.36/00 on NH-248A
(Shahpura-Alwar
section)
over
the
land
situated
in
Village
Dhuarmala and also prayed for quashing of the impugned order
and the acquisition proceedings to the extent they concern the
proposed Rest Area and a direction to the respondents to relocate
the Rest Area to an alternative site.
2.
The case set up by the petitioners is that they are
holding agricultural land in Village Dhuarmala under different
khasra numbers and certain portions of their holdings have been
brought within the acquisition process pursuant to Notification
dated 29.10.2024 issued under Section 3A of the Act of 1956 for
the purpose of building, widening, maintenance, management and
operation
of
NH-248A
in
the
stretch
from
Km.24.200
to
Km.58.950 in District Alwar. According to the petitioners, a
declaration under Section 3D of the Act of 1956 was thereafter
issued in respect of the land required for widening of the highway,
but
the
notification
specifically
acquiring
the
land
for
establishment of the proposed Rest Area had not been separately
issued.
3.
The
petitioners
submitted
objections
before
the
competent authority, inter alia, pointing out that the proposed site
at Km.36/00 falls within the protected forest/Critical Tiger Habitat
of
Sariska
Tiger
Reserve.
Their
objections
were
thereafter
forwarded by the competent authority to the concerned authorities
for
examination.
Significantly,
the
inter-departmental
correspondence placed on record demonstrates that the issue was
not treated by the authorities as a mere objection concerning the
petitioners' private rights. Rather, the competent authorities
(4 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
themselves examined the environmental and legal status of the
proposed site and considered the possibility of shifting the Rest
Area to an alternative location.
4.
In this regard, the competent authority sought a
detailed inspection and report. Vide letter dated 31.01.2025, the
Revenue/Land
Acquisition
Officer
specifically
informed
the
concerned authorities that the proposed land for the Rest Area
falls within one kilometre of the Critical Tiger Habitat of Sariska
Tiger Reserve and referred to the Government of Rajasthan's
order dated 31.03.2015 restricting new commercial and industrial
activities and land conversion within the prescribed zone. The
same communication recommended that, in view of the objections
raised by the petitioners, it would be feasible to shift the proposed
Rest Area to another site.
5.
Thereafter, vide communication dated 13.02.2025, the
concerned Executive Engineer requested that a fresh proposal for
alternative land be submitted. The subsequent correspondence
dated 19.02.2025 and 06.03.2025 also proceeded on the basis
that the land initially proposed for the Rest Area should be
excluded and an alternative site should be identified. Thus, the
record, according to the petitioners, clearly demonstrates that the
authorities themselves initially accepted the substance of the
objection and proceeded to explore an alternative site.
6.
aforesaid
The
petitioners
material,
the
further
pleaded
National
that
Highways
despite
the
Authorities
subsequently sought to revive the proposal at the very site
objected to. Reliance was placed upon the communication dated
14.05.2025 of the Regional Officer, Ministry of Road Transport and
(5 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
Highways, according to which the proposed Rest Area was stated
to be a public utility facility comprising restrooms, parking,
drinking-water, emergency, kiosk, petrol pump and other facilities.
On that basis, the authorities proceeded on the assumption that
the proposal would not violate the order dated 31.03.2015.
7.
The petitioners contend that this approach ignored the
subsequent communication of the Forest Department dated
17.09.2025,
whereby
it
reiterated
that,
in
terms
of
the
Government order dated 31.03.2015, new commercial, industrial
and land-conversion activities within one kilometre of the Critical
Tiger Habitat/protected area boundary of Sariska Tiger Reserve
stood restricted. The record further discloses that the District
Collector
thereafter
directed
the
authorities
to
revisit
the
possibility of shifting the Rest Area. A committee inspected
alternative sites on 23.09.2025 and unanimously recommended
Khasra No.1933 situated in Village Bandrole as being more
suitable for development of the Rest Area.
8.
Despite the aforesaid recommendation, the concerned
National Highways Authority addressed communication dated
01.10.2025 to the Regional Officer, MoRTH, requesting consent to
proceed with the Rest Area at the original site, notwithstanding its
location within the one-kilometre zone of the Critical Tiger Habitat.
Thereafter, vide communication dated 03.10.2025, the authorities
directed further action for development of the Rest Area at the
original site. Ultimately, on 06.10.2025, the competent authority
rejected the objections of the petitioners.
9.
The
petitioners
have
specifically
relied
upon
the
Notifications dated 28.12.2007 and 06.07.2012 issued by the
(6 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
Forest Department, Government of Rajasthan, whereby the
concerned area of Village Dhuarmala was notified as protected
forest and included within the protected landscape/Critical Tiger
Habitat of Sariska Tiger Reserve. They have also relied upon the
Government order dated 31.03.2015 restricting new commercial
and industrial activities and land-conversion activities within one
kilometre of the protected area boundary. Their contention is that
the authorities could not, by merely describing the proposed Rest
Area as a “public utility facility”, disregard binding environmental
and forest restrictions.
10.
It is further pleaded that the petitioners' objections
were not directed merely against the acquisition of their land as
such. Their principal objection was against the use of the land for
establishing the Rest Area at a site where such activity was legally
impermissible and where, according to the authorities' own
reports, an alternative site was available and had been found
more suitable. The petitioners, therefore, contend that their
objection squarely fell within the limited statutory right conferred
by Section 3C of the Act of 1956.
11.
In
reply,
primarily
contended
the
National
that
the
Highways
writ
petition
Authorities
raises
have
disputed
questions of fact and is, therefore, not amenable to adjudication
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been asserted
that
the
Competent
Authority-cum-Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Thanagazi, passed order dated 06.10.2025 after publication of the
notification under Section 3A of the Act of 1956 and after
considering the objections submitted under Section 3C of the Act
of 1956. According to the respondents, Notifications dated
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
(7 of 18)
[CW-15782/2025]
28.12.2007 and 06.07.2012 issued by the Forest Department do
not prohibit acquisition of land under the Act of 1956.
12.
The respondents have relied upon the distinction
between acquisition and subsequent use of the land and have
contended that the Forest Department's order dated 31.03.2015
prohibits land conversion, allotment and commercial or industrial
activities but does not prohibit acquisition of land under the Act of
1956. It is, therefore, submitted that the proposed acquisition
cannot be invalidated merely because the land falls within the
Critical Tiger Habitat.
13.
The respondents further contend that the proposed
Rest Area is a public utility facility forming part of highway
infrastructure and is not a commercial establishment in the
manner alleged by the petitioners. It has been stated that the
Rest Area is intended to provide essential facilities such as
restrooms, parking, drinking water and emergency facilities to
highway users and that the Ministry of Road Transport and
Highways had clarified that the proposed facility would not violate
the order dated 31.03.2015.
14.
As regards the various communications suggesting
relocation, the respondents submit that the same were merely
inter-departmental and administrative in nature and did not create
any vested right in favour of the petitioners. Similarly, the report
of the committee dated 23.09.2025 recommending an alternative
site was stated to be advisory and not binding upon the
competent authority. The respondents contend that the competent
authority was entitled to independently decide the objections
under Section 3C of the Act of 1956.
(8 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
15.
[CW-15782/2025]
It is also submitted that the question of obtaining forest
clearance or any other environmental permission is governed by a
separate statutory mechanism, and such question could not be
adjudicated by the competent authority while deciding objections
under
Section
3C
of
the
Act
of
1956.
According
to
the
respondents, impugned order is a reasoned order passed after
hearing
the
petitioners
and,
therefore,
does
not
warrant
interference in writ jurisdiction.
16.
The respondents have further relied upon the fact that
the acquisition is for a public purpose and that compensation
would be payable to the affected landholders in accordance with
law. It has been argued that the petitioners cannot insist upon a
particular site merely because an alternative site was suggested
during the administrative process. On these premises, dismissal of
the writ petition has been sought.
17.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that
the present case is not one where the petitioners seek to prevent
acquisition merely on the ground of personal inconvenience or
inadequacy of compensation. The objection is specifically to the
use of their land for establishment of a Rest Area at a location
which falls within the restricted zone of the Critical Tiger Habitat of
Sariska Tiger Reserve. It is argued that Section 3C of the Act of
1956 itself confers upon an interested person a statutory right to
object to the use of the land for purposes other than those
contemplated by Section 3A of the Act of 1956.
18.
Learned counsel has drawn attention to the admitted
official correspondence, particularly the communication dated
31.01.2025, whereby the Revenue/Land Acquisition Officer himself
(9 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
recorded that the proposed site falls within the one-kilometre zone
of the Critical Tiger Habitat and recommended shifting of the Rest
Area.
It
is
submitted
that
the
same
authority
could
not
subsequently reject the objection without satisfactorily explaining
why the legal impediment earlier noticed by it had ceased to exist.
19.
It is further submitted that the Forest Department, the
authority responsible for protection of the concerned protected
area, again communicated on 17.09.2025 that the restrictions
under the order dated 31.03.2015 continued to operate. Yet, on
the very same day, the National Highways Authorities directed
disposal of the objections and proceeded towards acquisition.
According to learned counsel, this demonstrates a complete failure
to apply the statutory and environmental restrictions to the facts
of the case.
20.
Learned counsel has also relied upon the Division Bench
judgment of this Court at its Principal Seat, Jodhpur, in Rituraj
Singh Rathore vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, (D.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 10096/2021 decided on 16.03.2022)
wherein the Division Bench of this Court considered the very same
Government
order
dated
31.03.2015
and
recognised
the
prohibition against new construction activities within one kilometre
of protected forest boundaries, subject to the limited exceptions
noticed therein.
21.
Learned counsel has lastly submitted that the proposed
site is not even the only possible site. The committee constituted
at the instance of the District Collector inspected alternative sites
and unanimously found Khasra No.1933 in Village Bandrole more
suitable. Therefore, the respondents are not confronted with a
(10 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
choice between public utility and no public utility; rather, the
public utility can be achieved by selecting a site which does not
come into conflict with the applicable environmental restrictions.
The insistence upon acquiring private agricultural land at the
prohibited site is consequently arbitrary and contrary to the
doctrine of proportionality.
22.
Per
contra,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
respondents has submitted that the scope of Section 3C of the Act
of 1956 is limited and the competent authority is required only to
consider
whether
the
land
is
required
for
the
purpose
contemplated by Section 3A of the Act of 1956. It is urged that
the petitioners cannot use the proceedings under Section 3C of
the Act of 1956 as a means to challenge the acquisition on
environmental grounds or to dictate the choice of alignment or
site to the National Highways Authorities.
23.
Learned counsel further submitted that order dated
31.03.2015 does not prohibit acquisition of land under the Act of
1956 and that there is a distinction between acquisition and
construction.
Even
assuming
that
forest
or
environmental
clearance may subsequently be necessary, the same cannot
render the acquisition proceedings void at their inception. It has
also been argued that the proposed Rest Area is a public utility
facility forming part of highway infrastructure and cannot be
equated with a private commercial project.
24.
Learned counsel, thus, submitted that the competent
authority considered all relevant objections and passed the
impugned order within the jurisdiction conferred by Section 3C of
the Act of 1956. It is urged that this Court should not substitute
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
(11 of 18)
[CW-15782/2025]
its opinion for that of the specialised highway authorities in
matters relating to planning and selection of sites and that the
writ petition deserves dismissal.
25.
Having considered the rival submissions, perused the
pleadings and the material placed on record and examined the
statutory scheme of the Act of 1956, this Court finds it relevant to
examine the precise nature of the right available to the petitioners
under Section 3C of the Act of 1956. Section 3A of the Act of 1956
empowers the Central Government, where it is satisfied that land
is required for a public purpose for building, maintenance,
management or operation of a National Highway or part thereof,
to declare its intention to acquire such land. Section 3C of the Act
of 1956, however, specifically provides an opportunity to an
interested person to object to the use of the land for the purpose
or purposes mentioned in Section 3A of the Act of 1956. The
objection is required to be considered after hearing the objector
and the competent authority is required to pass an order allowing
or disallowing the objection.
26.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Competent Authority
vs. Barangore Jute Factory & Others, (2005) 13 SCC 477,
while considering the scheme of Sections 3A and 3C of the Act of
1956, has held that the right of objection under Section 3C of the
Act of 1956 constitutes a substantive statutory right concerning
the use of the land. The Apex Court further emphasised that
“…..Section 3-C(1) of the National Highways Act gives a very
limited right to object. The objection can be only to the use of
land under acquisition for the purposes other than those under
sub-section 3-A(1).” The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed
(12 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
that “…….Under this Act there is no right to object to acquisition of
the land except on the question of its user.”
27.
Thus, while this Court would ordinarily be slow to
interfere with the technical decision of a highway authority
regarding alignment or land requirement, such restraint cannot
extend to a situation where the proposed use of the land is
demonstrably
inconsistent
with
an
applicable
statutory
or
governmental restriction relating to the protection of a protected
forest or wildlife habitat. The power under Section 3A of the Act of
1956 is undoubtedly wide, but it is not an unregulated or
unfettered power. The acquisition must be for a lawful public
purpose and the consequential use must be capable of being
undertaken in accordance with the law governing the land and the
proposed activity.
28.
It would also be relevant to refer that in the case of
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai
& Others, (2005) 7 SCC 627, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that land acquisition laws are expropriatory in nature and
hence, are required to be construed strictly. The Apex court
further held that the objections submitted by landowners cannot
be dealt with mechanically or as a mere formality. The competent
authority is required to examine the same carefully and provide an
effective hearing to the land owner. The competent authority is
under a legal obligation to deal with substance of the objections
and record proper reasons in the report submitted to the
Government.
The
Government
is
required
to
independently
consider such report and Government’s satisfaction cannot be
merely formal or mechanical.
(13 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
29.
[CW-15782/2025]
In the present case, Land Acquisition Authority itself, by
communication dated 31.01.2025, recorded that the proposed
Rest Area falls within one kilometre of the Critical Tiger Habitat of
Sariska Tiger Reserve and specifically referred to the Government
order dated 31.03.2015. More importantly, the said authority
recommended that, in view of the objections, it would be feasible
to shift the proposed Rest Area to another location. Thereafter, by
communications
dated
13.02.2025
and
06.03.2025,
the
administrative process itself proceeded towards identification of an
alternative site.
30.
The
aforesaid
material
assumes
considerable
significance because the respondents cannot simultaneously rely
upon the official record when it supports the acquisition and
disown the same record when it records the existence of an
environmental
or
legal
impediment.
Administrative
decision-
making must exhibit consistency, transparency and application of
mind. If the competent authorities, after examining the relevant
material, initially concluded that an alternative site should be
explored because the proposed site falls within a restricted zone, a
subsequent decision to revive the original site necessarily required
cogent reasons explaining the change of position.
31.
Subsequent letter dated 17.09.2025 of the Forest
Department
assumes
even
greater
significance.
The
Forest
Department did not state that the restriction under the order
dated 31.03.2015 had ceased to operate. On the contrary, it
reiterated the restriction applicable to the one-kilometre zone of
the Critical Tiger Habitat/protected area boundary. The said
communication was issued by the department concerned with the
(14 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
protection and management of the forest and wildlife area. In
these circumstances, the National Highways authorities could not
simply brush aside the said communication by obtaining an
administrative clarification that the proposed Rest Area was a
public utility facility.
32.
Bare perusal of letter dated issued by the Executive
Engineer, NHAI would reveal that the respondents intend to
construct Fuel Station and Kiosks also in the alleged public utility
areas, which are apparently commercial purposes. The expression
“public utility” cannot by itself operate as a legal solvent capable
of dissolving all statutory restrictions. The character of an activity
has to be determined by its actual nature, its location and the
regulatory framework applicable thereto. Even a project serving a
public purpose must comply with the law relating to forests,
wildlife, environment and land use. Public purpose is a condition
for exercising the power of compulsory acquisition; it is not an
exemption from compliance with other applicable laws.
33.
The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court at
Principal Seat, Jodhpur in Rituraj Singh Rathore (supra) deals
with the Government order dated 31.03.2015 restricting new
commercial and other construction activities within one kilometre
of protected forest boundaries. The Division Bench directed
constitution of a Monitoring Committee headed by the District
Collector
and
comprising
the
concerned
forest
officer
and
representatives of civil society; directed that new commercial and
other construction activities within the one-kilometre zone be
prohibited. The Court further directed that construction activities
beyond
the
one-kilometre
periphery,
except
repairs
and
(15 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
maintenance, be undertaken only after prior approval of the
Monitoring Committee and the local body concerned.
34.
The ratio and approach adopted in Rituraj Singh
Rathore (supra) is equally applicable in the present case and
demonstrates
that
the
Government's
own
environmental
restrictions have to be respected by all instrumentalities of the
State and that development activities in the vicinity of protected
forests cannot be undertaken in disregard of the regulatory
framework.
35.
Another aspect which cannot be overlooked is that the
impugned order dated 06.10.2025 does not satisfactorily deal with
the material circumstances which had emerged during the
proceedings. The petitioners had specifically pointed out the
location of the proposed site within the restricted zone. The
Revenue authorities had acknowledged the same. The Forest
Department had reiterated the restriction. The District Collector
had directed reconsideration of alternative sites. A committee had
inspected alternative locations and recommended Khasra No.1933
in Village Bandrole as more suitable. Yet, the final order does not
demonstrate a meaningful examination of these circumstances.
36.
The function of the competent authority under Section
3C of the Act of 1956 is not discharged merely by reproducing the
objections and recording a conclusion that they are rejected. The
statutory
requirement
of
consideration
necessarily
implies
application of mind to the substance of the objections and
communication of reasons showing why the objections do not
merit acceptance. Section 3C of the Act of 1956 permits an
objection concerning the use of the land. Where such an objection
(16 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
is
supported
Government
by
official
departments
[CW-15782/2025]
documents
emanating
from
and
reports
committees
by
of
other
constituted by the administration itself, the competent authority is
required to deal with such material in a rational and intelligible
manner.
37.
The argument that environmental or forest clearance
can be obtained at a later stage also does not justify the
impugned order. Before proceeding to acquire private agricultural
land for a specified project, the authorities were required to
ascertain whether the project was legally feasible at the proposed
site. The record instead shows that the respondents were aware of
the restriction, sought an NOC from the Forest Department,
received a communication reiterating the restriction, and yet
proceeded with the original site without obtaining the required
clearance.
38.
this
There is yet another circumstance which weighs with
Court.
The
respondents
have
not
demonstrated
any
compelling reason why the Rest Area must necessarily be
established at Km.36/00 in Village Dhuarmala. On the contrary,
the record indicates that alternative sites were examined and that
the committee found Khasra No.1933 in Village Bandrole more
suitable. Whether that land can ultimately be utilised is a matter
for the competent authorities to decide in accordance with law.
But once a legally less vulnerable alternative is available, the
respondents cannot ignore it without recording cogent reasons
and insist upon compulsory acquisition of private agricultural land
situated within a protected/restricted zone.
(17 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
39.
[CW-15782/2025]
This court is conscious of the limitation of judicial
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In writ
jurisdiction courts do not ordinarily sit in appeal over decisions
concerning
highway
planning,
alignment
or
infrastructural
requirements. Judicial review is concerned with legality, procedural
fairness
and
rationality
rather
than
administrative
wisdom.
However, where the decision-making authority ignores a binding
or admittedly applicable restriction, fails to consider relevant
material and rejects an available alternative without adequate
reasons, judicial intervention is not only permissible but necessary
to preserve the rule of law.
40.
For
the
aforesaid
reasons,
this
Court
is
of
the
considered opinion that the impugned order dated 06.10.2025
cannot be sustained. The order suffers from non-application of
mind to material circumstances, failure to adequately consider the
Forest Department's restrictions, failure to meaningfully consider
the recommendation for relocation and an erroneous approach
that the proposed public utility character of the Rest Area, by
itself, neutralises the restrictions applicable to the site.
41.
Consequently, the writ petition deserves to succeed and
the same is hereby allowed. Order dated 06.10.2025 passed by
the Competent Authority-cum-Sub-Divisional Officer, Thanagazi,
rejecting the petitioners' objections under Section 3C of the Act of
1956,
is
hereby
quashed
and
set
aside.
The
acquisition
proceedings initiated pursuant to Notification dated 29.10.2024
are also quashed to the limited extent that the respondents seek
to utilise the petitioners' land at Km.36/00 in Village Dhuarmala
(18 of 18)
[2026:RJ-JP:32576]
[CW-15782/2025]
for establishment/development of the proposed Rest Area ignoring
the notified critical tiger habitat.
42.
It is, however, clarified that this judgment shall not
preclude
the
competent
authorities
from
proceeding
with
acquisition of land strictly in accordance with the Act of 1956 for a
lawful
purpose,
including
highway
construction,
widening,
maintenance or operation, nor shall it prevent the authorities from
identifying and acquiring an alternative site for the Rest Area in
accordance with law. Any such exercise shall necessarily be
preceded
by
verification
of
all
applicable
forest,
wildlife,
environmental, land-use and other statutory restrictions and
obtaining
the
requisite
approvals/clearances
before
the
acquisition/use is finalised.
43.
Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI/117
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review