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VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Digitally signed
by VED PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Date: 2026.10.09
11:35:20 +0530
CGHC010370512026
2026:CGHC:43800
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 1266 of 2026
1 - Brijkishore Tiwari S/o Late Ramdulare Tiwari, Aged About 80 Years R/o
09 Anand Nagar Road No.28 Near Smriti Nagar Junwani, Bhilai Durg (C.G.)
2 - Rashmi Tiwari D/o Shri Brijkishore Tiwari, Aged About 47 Years R/o 09
Anand Nagar Road No.28 Near Smriti Nagar Junwani, Bhilai Durg (C.G.)
3 - Swati Tiwari D/o Shri Brijkishore Tiwari Aged About 50 Years R/o 09
Anand Nagar Road No.28 Near Smriti Nagar Junwani, Bhilai Durg (C.G.)
4 - Deep Kishore Tiwari S/o Brijkishore Tiwari, Aged About 46 Years R/o 09
Anand Nagar Road No.28 Near Smriti Nagar Junwani, Bhilai Durg (C.G.)
... Petitioners
versus
1 - Smt. Reeta Tiwari W/o Shri Vicek Tiwari, C/o Vivek Tiwari, Assistant
Teacher, Government Primary School, Hiranagar, Sirgitti, Bilha Block,
Block, Bilaspur (C.G.) (Address Mentioned In Impugned Order Is No Longer
Is Existence, Owing To House Lock)
2 - Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited (C S P D C L ),
Through Its Managing Director, Head Office Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Assistant Engineer Link Road Zone, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh State Power
Distribution Company Limited Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners
:
Mr. Sunil Kumar Soni, Advocate
For Respondents No.2 & 3
:
Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
28/09/2026
Heard.
1.
The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India by the petitioner, assailing the order dated
03.01.2026 passed by the learned 7th Civil Judge, Junior Division,
Bilaspur (C.G.) in M.J.C. Civil No. 29/2021, whereby the application
seeking restoration of the civil suit has been allowed. The petitioner
prayed for the following reliefs in the writ petition:“In view of the above submission, the petitioner
prays for the following relief(s) :a) Issue appropriate writ, order, or direction,
quashing the impugned order dated 03.01.2026
passed by the learned 7th Civil Judge, Junior
Division,
Bilaspur
(C.G.)
in
the
restoration
proceedings(MJC Civil No. 29/2021), as the same
is illegal, perverse, and bad in law;
(b) Hold and declare that the restoration of the
Civil Suit (A) No. 143/2018, which had become
infructuous upon the permanent dismantling of
the electricity connection on 02.06.2018, is an
abuse of the process of law and legally
unsustainable;
(c)
Consequently
dismiss
the
restoration
application filed by the Respondent No. 1, and
thereby uphold the dismissal of the Civil Suit (A)
No.
143/2018,
which
had
already
become
infructuous;
(d) Pass any other order or direction as this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
interest of justice, equity, and good conscience;
and
(e) Award costs of the present proceedings to the
Petitioners, as they have been unnecessarily
dragged into protracted litigation despite the
absence of any surviving cause of action.
(f) That the entire record of the case may kindly
be called for elucidation of the facts of the case.
(g) Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court
deems
fit
and
proper
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case.”
2.
The case of the petitioners, in brief, is that petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 are
the owners of the land bearing Khasra No. 5/50, admeasuring 4360
sq. ft., over which a house exists. The property originally belonged to
their mother, late Smt. Sharddha Tiwari, who purchased the same by
registered sale deed dated 26.04.1985. After her death on
30.11.2019, the property was mutated in favour of petitioner Nos. 2 to
4 by order dated 06.03.2021 passed by the Naib Tehsildar, Bilaspur.
It is further pleaded that respondent No.1, Smt. Reeta Tiwari, had
obtained an electricity connection bearing Service No. 1006141714
on the basis of an alleged consent letter dated 15.09.2016. The said
electricity connection was directed to be disconnected by the
Electricity Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, Bilaspur, vide
order dated 06.09.2017, as corrected on 14.09.2017, and the appeal
preferred by respondent No. 1 before the Electricity Ombudsman,
Raipur, was also dismissed vide judgment dated 03.05.2018.
According to the petitioners, the said orders attained finality as they
were not challenged before this Court.
3.
It is further the case of the petitioners that, instead of pursuing the
remedy in accordance with law, respondent No. 1 instituted Civil Suit
(A) No. 143/2018 on 28.05.2018 against the mother of petitioner Nos.
2 to 4, seeking restraint against disconnection of the aforesaid
electricity connection. However, pursuant to the orders passed by the
Electricity Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and the Electricity
Ombudsman, the electricity connection was permanently dismantled
on 02.06.2018, i.e. within five days of institution of the civil suit. By
reason of such permanent dismantling, the very subject matter of the
suit ceased to exist, and the relief claimed therein became incapable
of being granted, thereby rendering the suit completely infructuous.
Despite this, respondent No. 1 continued to prosecute the said suit
until 16.03.2021, when it was ultimately dismissed for want of
prosecution. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 initiated restoration
proceedings, in which the petitioners entered appearance and
opposed the prayer for restoration.
4.
The petitioner’s further case is that throughout the restoration
proceedings they repeatedly brought to the notice of the learned
Court below that the original suit had already become infructuous on
account of permanent dismantling of the electricity connection. An
application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC was filed on 08.07.2022,
which was rejected, and the matter was proceeded with for evidence.
Thereafter, on 23.11.2023, the petitioners specifically informed the
Court regarding the permanent dismantling, but the said application
was rejected on 14.05.2025. Their subsequent application under
Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was also rejected on 05.07.2025. On
09.09.2025, the petitioners again moved an application under Order
7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC, relying upon the judgment of
“Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers and
Others” reported in (2004) 11 SCC 168, and bringing to the Court's
notice the circumstances which, according to them, had rendered the
suit infructuous. The said application was rejected on 03.11.2025.
The petitioners thereafter preferred a transfer application under
Section 24 CPC before the Principal District Judge, Bilaspur, but,
despite intimation thereof, the learned Trial Court proceeded with the
matter and ultimately, on 03.01.2026, passed the impugned order
restoring the suit. The learned Trial Court, despite being apprised of
the extinction of the subject matter, has revived a litigation which had
ceased to have any surviving cause or effective relief, resulting in
perpetuation of an infructuous proceeding and abuse of the process
of the Court.
5.
Mr. Sunil Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that
the learned Trial Court has committed a serious error in restoring the
civil suit, which had already become infructuous on account of a
subsequent event. It is submitted that the electricity connection was
the very subject matter of Civil Suit (A) No. 143/2018, which was
permanently dismantled on 02.06.2018 in compliance with the order
dated 06.09.2017 passed by the Electricity Consumer Grievance
Redressal
Forum,
Bilaspur,
as
affirmed
by
the
Electricity
Ombudsman, Raipur, vide judgment dated 03.05.2018. Thus, the
relief sought in the suit, namely, restraint against disconnection of the
electricity connection, had become impossible to be granted and the
subject matter of the suit stood extinguished. Despite the said fact
being specifically brought to the notice of the learned Trial Court, the
suit was permitted to remain pending and was ultimately dismissed
for want of prosecution on 16.03.2021. The restoration of a
proceeding which had already become infructuous amounts to
reviving a dead litigation and constitutes an abuse of the process of
the Court.
6.
It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to consider
the aforesaid subsequent event despite the petitioners having
repeatedly placed the relevant material on record, including the
Permanent Dismantling Panchnama dated 02.06.2018 and the RTI
information dated 05.09.2023. Learned counsel would submit that the
petitioners had also moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11
read with Section 151 CPC on 09.09.2025, relying upon the judgment
of Machado Brothers (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has recognised that the parties may bring to the notice of the Court,
by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC, the facts
and circumstances which have rendered a pending litigation
infructuous. It is argued that instead of examining whether the suit
had, in fact, become infructuous, the learned Trial Court mechanically
rejected the application by referring to the earlier rejection order of
the Order 7 Rule 11 application, although the earlier application
concerned the alleged bar of jurisdiction under Section 145 of the
Electricity Act, 2003 and was not directed to the subsequent event
rendering the suit infructuous.
7.
Learned counsel would further submit that the manner in which the
restoration proceedings were conducted also suffers from serious
procedural irregularities. It is submitted that the restoration
application was initially instituted under Order 9 Rule 7 CPC,
whereas an application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC is also found on
the record; without clarifying the legal basis of the restoration
proceedings, the learned Trial Court passed the order. It is further
submitted that the petitioners had informed the learned Trial Court on
06.11.2025 regarding the filing of a transfer application under Section
24 CPC before the Principal District Judge, Bilaspur, yet the matter
was proceeded with by treating the said date as the last opportunity
for arguments. The petitioners also point out that the subsequent
order dated 02.01.2026 allegedly denied the filing of the transfer
application
despite
the
earlier
intimation.
The
proceedings
culminating in the impugned order dated 03.01.2026, including the
alleged discrepancies in the order sheets and absence of signatures,
demonstrate that the matter was proceeded with in an irregular and
predetermined manner. It is also submitted that the observations
made against the petitioners in the order dated 03.11.2025 were
based on a misreading of their application and reflect a failure to
properly appreciate the issue raised by them.
8.
Lastly, learned counsel would submit that the learned Civil Court
lacked jurisdiction to entertain or restore the suit in view of the
express bar contained in Section 145 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The
original suit itself related to the electricity connection and sought an
injunction against its disconnection, notwithstanding the orders
already passed by the competent electricity grievance redressal
authorities. The application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC raising the
statutory bar was not properly considered and was rejected without
appreciating the effect of Section 145 of the Electricity Act. Learned
counsel, therefore, submits that a suit which was otherwise barred by
law and, in any event, had become completely infructuous by reason
of permanent dismantling of the electricity connection, could not have
been restored. The impugned order dated 03.01.2026 is perverse,
legally unsustainable and an abuse of the process of the Court,
warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of
his submissions, he would rely upon the judgments of “Punjab State
Electricity Board and Another v. Ashwani Kumar” 1997 (5) SCC
120, “Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers
and Others” 2004 (11) SCC 168, “A.R.V. Jagadeeshan v. The
Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board” 2011 SCC
OnLine Mad 140, and “Super Auto Centre v. BSES Rajdhani
Power Ltd.” decided by Delhi High Court on 14.09.2011, in RFA (OS)
No. 66/2011.
9.
Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2
and 3, opposed the submissions of the petitioner’s counsel and
submitted that it is a property dispute between the petitioner and the
respondent No. 1. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have already
disconnected the electricity connection of the subject premises in the
year 2018 itself. He would submit that all the objections raised by the
petitioner are about maintainability of the suit and the present is a
petition against restoration of the suit which was dismissed for
default. The petitioner may raise their objection in the proceedings of
the suit. In the present case, the plaintiff satisfied the learned trial
court regarding the cause of her non-appearance in the proceedings,
and the suit is restored. The suit is for two separate reliefs, i.e., for
restraining
the
defendants
from
disconnection
of
electricity
connection and also for permanent injunction of her dispossession
from the subject premises. Though one relief of the suit is rendered
infructuous, the second relief of permanent injunction from
dispossession is still survived, and the entire suit cannot be
dismissed as infructuous. Therefore, there is no merit in the petition
and the same is liable to be dismissed.
10.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival
submissions and perused the documents annexed with the petition.
11.
The question which arises for consideration is whether, in the facts of
the present case, the learned Trial Court was justified in restoring
Civil Suit (A) No. 143/2018, particularly when it is the specific case of
the petitioners that the electricity connection, which formed the
subject matter of the relief of injunction, had already been
permanently dismantled on 02.06.2018. The material placed before
this Court shows that the Electricity Consumer Grievance Redressal
Forum, Bilaspur, had directed disconnection of the electricity
connection vide order dated 06.09.2017, as corrected on 14.09.2017,
and the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 was dismissed by the
Electricity Ombudsman, Raipur, on 03.05.2018. Thereafter, the
electricity connection was permanently dismantled on 02.06.2018,
whereas the civil suit had been instituted on 28.05.2018. Thus, so far
as the relief seeking restraint against disconnection of the electricity
connection is concerned, there can hardly be any dispute that the
event of permanent dismantling occurred during the pendency of the
suit and rendered that particular relief incapable of being granted.
The said factual position is also specifically pleaded by the petitioners
and is supported by the Permanent Dismantling Panchnama dated
02.06.2018.
12.
The legal position about a proceeding becoming infructuous on
account of subsequent events is no longer res integra. In Machado
Brothers (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering the
scope of Section 151 CPC, held that where, by reason of a
subsequent event, the original proceeding has become infructuous,
ex debito justitiae it is the duty of the Court to take such action as is
necessary in the interest of justice, which includes disposing of
infructuous litigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that
the parties can bring such subsequent facts to the notice of the Court
by an application under Section 151 CPC, and the Court is required
to enquire whether the pending litigation has, in fact, become
infructuous. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:“25. Thus it is clear that by the subsequent event
if the original proceeding has become infructuous,
ex debito justitiae, it will be the duty of the court to
take such action as is necessary in the interest of
justice, which includes disposing of infructuous
litigation. For the said purpose it will be open to
the parties concerned to make an application
under Section 151 CPC to bring to the notice of
the court the facts and circumstances which have
made the pending litigation infructuous. Of
course, when such an application is made, the
court will enquire into the alleged facts and
circumstances to find out whether the pending
litigation has in fact become infructuous or not.
26. Having thus understood the law, we will now
consider whether the courts were justified in
rejecting the application filed by the appellant
herein for dismissing the suit on the ground that
the same had become infructuous. In this
process, we have already noticed that there
seems to be no dispute that the original
termination notice based on which first suit OS
No. 4212 of 1995 was filed, has since ceased to
exist because of the subsequent termination
notice issued on 23-8-2001, validity of which has
already been challenged by the respondent in the
third suit.”
13.
However, the aforesaid principle has to be applied to the actual
reliefs claimed in the suit and not merely to one of them. In the
present case, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have submitted that although
the electricity connection was disconnected in the year 2018, the
original suit did not contain only the prayer relating to electricity
connection; according to them, the suit also contained a prayer for
permanent injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing
respondent No. 1 from the subject premises. It is their specific
contention that while the relief concerning electricity connection may
have become infructuous, the relief concerning protection against
dispossession continues to survive. This contention cannot be
brushed aside at the stage of restoration proceedings, particularly
when determination of whether the entire suit has become
infructuous would require examination of the pleadings and the
nature and scope of each relief claimed therein. The principle laid
down in Machado Brothers (supra) itself requires the Court, upon
such an application, to enquire into the alleged subsequent facts and
determine whether the pending litigation has actually become
infructuous. Therefore, the mere fact that one of the reliefs has
ceased to survive does not, by itself, establish that the entire suit has
become infructuous.
14.
It is necessary here to note the relief claimed in the suit, which
appears from the copy of the plaint filed by the petitioner in the
present petition as Annexure P-8. In para 14 of the plaint, the plaintiff
has claimed the following reliefs:“14. यह कि वादिनी माननीय न्यायालय से निम्नलिखित
अनुतोष की याचना करती है :(अ) प्रतिवादी क्र. 01 एवं 02 के विरुद्ध इस आशय का शाश्वत
व्यादेश जारी किया जावे कि प्रतिवादी क्र. 01 एवं 02, वादिनी
के काबिज विवादित परिसर के मकान पर लगे हुए विद्युत मीटर
एवं कनेक्शन को विच्छेदित न करे।
(ब) प्रतिवादी क्र. 03 के विरुद्ध इस आशय का शाश्वत व्यादेश
जारी किये जाने योग्य है कि प्रतिवादी क्र. 03 वादिनी के काबिज
विवादित परिसर के मकान पर स्वयं या अन्य किसी व्यक्ति के
सहयोग से बिना न्यायालयीन आदेश के शांतिपूर्ण कब्जा को
प्रभावित न करे।
(स) वादिनी को प्रतिवादीगण से वाद व्यय दिलायी जावे।
(द) अन्य सहायता जो माननीय न्यायालय उचित समझे।”
15.
The proceedings for restoration of a suit dismissed for default have a
limited scope. Under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC, the consideration is
whether the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause from
appearing when the suit was called for hearing. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has recognised that the scope of a restoration
proceeding is distinct from an adjudication of the merits of the suit. In
Nathuprasad v. Singhai Kapurchand, AIR 1976 MP 136 (FB), the
Madhya Pradesh High Court held that in a restoration proceeding the
applicant has to establish sufficient cause for non-appearance and
the scope of such proceeding is different from an appeal on
merits. Consequently, while a defendant may certainly bring to the
notice of the Trial Court a subsequent event which may have a
bearing upon the maintainability of the suit, the question whether the
entire suit has become infructuous, particularly where another
substantive relief is asserted to be surviving, ordinarily requires
adjudication in the suit itself and cannot necessarily be treated as
conclusively determinative of the plaintiff's entitlement to restoration.
The learned Trial Court, therefore, cannot be said to have committed
jurisdictional error merely because it restored the suit after being
satisfied regarding the plaintiff's explanation for non-appearance.
16.
In the present case, the record further indicates that the petitioners
had, during the restoration proceedings, raised objections concerning
the alleged bar under Section 145 of the Electricity Act, 2003 as well
as the subsequent event of permanent dismantling. Their application
under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC was rejected, and thereafter they
again brought the alleged subsequent event to the notice of the
learned Trial Court by an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with
Section 151 CPC. The latter application was rejected on 03.11.2025.
The petitioners' grievance that the learned Trial Court ought to have
finally adjudicated the question of infructuousness before restoring
the suit cannot, however, be accepted in its entirety because the
respondent's assertion that the suit contains an independent relief of
protection against dispossession raises a factual and legal issue
concerning the survival of the entire cause of action. The contention
regarding Section 145 of the Electricity Act also relates to the
maintainability of the suit and is a matter which can appropriately be
considered in the substantive proceedings. The material placed
before this Court does not establish that, merely because the
electricity
connection
was
permanently
dismantled,
no
relief
whatsoever survived in the suit.
17.
As regards the other allegations concerning the manner in which the
proceedings were conducted, including the alleged irregularities in
the order sheets, the filing of the transfer application under Section
24 CPC, absence of signatures and the observations made in the
order dated 03.11.2025, this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution, is required to examine whether the
impugned order suffers from patent jurisdictional error, perversity or
such material irregularity as would warrant supervisory interference.
The power under Article 227 is supervisory and is not intended to
substitute the view of this Court for that of the Trial Court merely
because another view may be possible. In the present case, the
learned Trial Court considered the restoration application and, upon
being satisfied with the explanation furnished by the plaintiff for her
non-appearance, restored the suit. The petitioners' objections
regarding the ultimate survival of the cause of action and the bar
under Section 145 of the Electricity Act remain available to them in
the substantive suit. Therefore, notwithstanding the force in the
petitioners' submission that the relief relating to the electricity
connection has become incapable of enforcement, the restoration of
the suit cannot, on the present material, be characterised as an
exercise of jurisdiction wholly without jurisdiction or as an order so
perverse as to warrant interference under Article 227.
18.
The decision in Machado Brothers (supra) does not advance the
petitioners' case to the extent contended. The said decision
undoubtedly recognises that continuation of a suit which has
completely become infructuous by disappearance of the cause of
action amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. But the same
judgment also makes it clear that the Court must enquire whether the
pending litigation has, in fact, become infructuous. Here, the
respondent's submission is that the suit contains a separate and
surviving prayer for protection against dispossession. Thus, the Court
cannot proceed on the assumption that the disappearance of the
electricity connection has necessarily extinguished every relief
claimed in the suit. The question whether such relief is legally and
factually sustainable is required to be decided on the pleadings and
evidence in the suit.
19.
The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners,
namely, Ashwani Kumar (supra), Machado Brothers (supra),
A.R.V. Jagadeeshan (supra), and Super Auto Centre (supra), do
not render any assistance to the petitioners in the facts of the present
case. In Ashwani Kumar (supra), the issue was essentially about
the maintainability of a civil proceeding in relation to an electricity
dispute and the availability of remedy under the statutory mechanism;
whereas in the present case, the impugned order is one restoring a
suit dismissed for default and an independent relief of protection
against dispossession continues to survive. Likewise, Machado
Brothers (supra) lays down the principle that where, on account of
subsequent events, the entire subject matter and cause of action of a
pending proceeding have completely disappeared, the Court may, in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, bring such infructuous litigation to
an end; it does not lay down that restoration of a suit is impermissible
merely because one of the reliefs claimed therein has become
infructuous. The decisions in A.R.V. Jagadeeshan (supra) and
Super Auto Centre (supra) are also distinguishable on their
respective facts and do not deal with a situation where, despite the
extinction of one relief, another substantive relief claimed in the suit is
asserted to be surviving. Consequently, no benefit can be extended
to the petitioners on the basis of the aforesaid judgments.
20.
Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned
Trial Court has not committed such jurisdictional error or perversity in
passing the order dated 03.01.2026 as would justify interference
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition,
therefore, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.
21.
The petitioners shall, however, be at liberty to raise all their
objections in the suit before the learned Trial Court, which shall
consider the same in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any
observation made herein.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved
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