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In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present :The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
and
The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
Case No.
In the matter of :
FA 46 of 2024
BRATATI GHOSH (DUTTA)
…Appellant
VS.
SANTANU DUTTA
…Respondent
For the Appellant/Wife
:
Mr. Chittapriya Ghosh
Mr. Goutam Acharya
….Advocates
For the Respondent/Husband
:
Mr. BalaramPandit
Mr. Krishna Deo Das
….Advocates
Heard on
:
15.07.2026
Judgment on
:
July 15, 2026.
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. :1.
The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/wife
against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, whereby the
appellant‟s suit for divorce was dismissed.
Page 2
2.
Learned counsel for appellant contends that as per the findings of
the learned Trial Judge, the marriage was only a “pomp show”,
which was evident when the wife stated in her cross-examination
that the marriage was solemnized on a Thursday, she went to her
matrimonial house on Friday, and on Sunday next, she returned
to her paternal house. It was even stated on oath by the wife that
she took three days‟ casual leave in August, 2015 and resided at
her matrimonial house but did not think it necessary to stay a
little further in her matrimonial home or take some more leaves,
she being a government employee and not a new recruit. It was
also recorded by the learned Trial Judge that the Court could not
find anything from the evidence which goes to show that the
respondent/husband had ever persuaded the petitioner/wife to
remain in his house for a longer period or about his not being
comfortable with the condition or his interest in trying to spend
time together with the petitioner.
3.
The Trial Court went on to find that there was no warmth in the
matrimonial relationship and it was cold from the very initiation.
4.
However, since the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage
is not contained within the four corners of the statute, i.e., the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the learned Trial Judge refused to
grant a decree of divorce.
Page 3
5.
Learned counsel for the appellant/wife places reliance on a
judgment passed on the self-same day as the divorce suit;
whereby a suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the
respondent/husband was dismissed.
6.
While dismissing the said suit, the learned Trial Judge came to
the conclusion that the petitioner therein, i.e., the present
respondent (husband), lacked interest in the marriage and from
his conduct it was very clear that he had no intention in resuming
his conjugal right with the respondent (wife) after being
separated.
7.
Learned counsel argues that in view of the restitution suit having
been dismissed on such findings, no useful purpose would be
subserved in keeping the marriage alive.
8.
In such context, learned counsel places reliance on a judgment
passed by this Court in the matter of Dr. Soma Mandal Debnath
Vs. TanmoyDebnath, reported at 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 165, where,
by placing reliance on the judgment of Rakesh Raman Vs. Kavita,
reported at (2023) 17 SCC 433, this Court held that although
irretrievable breakdown of marriage
is
not a ground
for
dissolution of marriage, but cruelty has been incorporated via the
route of irretrievable breakdown of marriage into the definition
of „cruelty‟ as contemplated in the matrimonial laws of India.
Page 4
9.
Learned counsel also places reliance on the judgment of the Apex
Court in Rakesh Raman (supra) for the self-same proposition that
where a marital relationship has become bitter and acrimonious
over the years, it does nothing but inflict cruelty on both sides.
To keep the facade of this broken marriage alive would be doing
injustice to both the parties. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court went on
to observe that a marriage which has broken down irretrievably
spells cruelty to both the parties, as in such a relationship each
party is treating the other with cruelty. More crucially, it was
observed that it is, therefore, a ground for dissolution of
marriage under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
10.
In view of the findings of the learned Trial Judge as to the
marriage between the parties having broken down irretrievably, it
is argued that the same should be dissolved by granting a decree
of divorce.
11.
Learned counsel reiterates that factually, the marriage took place
on July 23, 2015 and the parties separated in the year 2016 and,
since then, they are living separately.
12.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/husband, after
conclusion of arguments of the appellant, suggests to the Court
that the matter may be sent for mediation.
Page 5
13.
However, learned counsel for the appellant/wife denies such
suggestion, primarily on the ground that a previous effort of
mediation by the Mediation Committee of this Court had failed.
14.
That apart, we find that the suggestion being made in the midst
of hearing of the appeal, particularly, in view of the appellant
having disagreed to the same, is apparently for the sole purpose
of showing that the husband is still agreeable to continue the
marriage; otherwise, such suggestion ought to have come much
earlier.
15.
Be that as it may, on merits, learned counsel for the respondent
argues that the factual matrix of Rakesh Raman (supra)was
different from the present case.
16.
Learned counsel submits that in the said case, the parties had
been living separately for over 25 years and as such, since the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court had observed that there were multiple
litigations between the parties, the relationship was embittered
and the marriage had broken down irretrievably.
17.
As opposed thereto, in the present case, from the evidence it
would be clear that the respondent/husband all along tried to
reconcile.
Page 6
18.
Efforts at resolution of the issue by intervention of other wellwishers were also taken by the respondent/husband but failed
due to the resistance of the appellant/wife. Thus, it is submitted
that
the
respondent
was
never
willing
to
part
with
the
appellant/wife. Hence, it cannot be said that merely due to the
adamant attitude of the wife, the marriage between the parties
has broken down irretrievably.
19.
Upon hearing learned counsel, the primary question which arises
is whether the learned Trial Judge was justified in refusing to
grant a decree of divorce, despite virtually having held that the
marriage between the parties has broken down beyond repair,
only on the ground that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is
not spelt out as a ground in terms in the Hindu Marriage Act or,
for that matter,in any other matrimonial law in India.
20.
Such conundrum has been resolved by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in its judgment, Rakesh Raman (supra).
21.
Paragraph nos.20, 22 and 23 of the said judgment would be
germane in the context and are reproduced below:“...20. Matrimonial cases before the courts
pose a different challenge, quite unlike any other, as
we are dealing with human relationships with its
bundle of emotions, with all its faults and frailties. It
is not possible in every case to pinpoint to an act of
Page 7
“cruelty” or blameworthy conduct of the spouse. The
nature of relationship, the general behaviour of the
parties towards each other, or long separation
between the two are relevant factors which a court
must
take
into
consideration.
In Samar
Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh [Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh,
(2007) 4 SCC 511] a three-Judge Bench of this Court
had dealt in detail as to what would constitute
cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act. An
important guideline in the above decision is on the
approach of a court in determining cruelty. What
has to be examined here is the entire matrimonial
relationship, as cruelty may not be in a violent act
or acts but in a given case has to be gathered from
injurious
reproaches,
complaints,
accusations,
taunts, etc. The Court relied on the definition of
cruelty in matrimonial relationships in Halsbury's
Laws of England (Vol. 13, 4th Edn., Para 1269, p.
602) which must be reproduced here:
“The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that
the
entire
matrimonial
relationship
must
be
considered, and that rule is of special value when
the cruelty consists not of violent acts but of
injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or
taunts. In cases where no violence is averred, it is
undesirable to consider judicial pronouncements
with a view to creating certain categories of acts or
conduct as having or lacking the nature or quality
which renders them capable or incapable in all
Page 8
circumstances of amounting to cruelty; for it is the
effect of the conduct rather than its nature which is
of paramount importance in assessing a complaint
of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been guilty of
cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact
and previously decided cases have little, if any,
value. The court should bear in mind the physical
and mental condition of the parties as well as their
social status, and should consider the impact of the
personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind
of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels
between the spouses from that point of view;
further, the conduct alleged must be examined in the
light of the complainant's capacity for endurance
and the extent to which that capacity is known to the
other spouse. Malevolent intention is not essential to
cruelty but it is an important element where it
exists.”
...
22. Irretrievable breakdown of a marriage
may not be a ground for dissolution of marriage,
under the Hindu Marriage Act, but cruelty is. A
marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce,
inter alia, on the ground when the other party “has,
after the solemnisation of the marriage treated the
petitioner with cruelty” [ Section 13(1)(i-a) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955] .
23. In
our
considered
opinion,
a
marital
relationship which has only become more bitter and
Page 9
acrimonious over the years, does nothing but inflict
cruelty on both the sides. To keep the façade of this
broken marriage alive would be doing injustice to
both the parties. A marriage which has broken down
irretrievably, in our opinion spells cruelty to both
the parties, as in such a relationship each party is
treating the other with cruelty. It is therefore a
ground for dissolution of marriage under Section
13(1)(i-a) of the Act”
22.
From the above discussions, it is crystal clear that the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held that a marital relationship, which has only
become bitter and acrimonious over the years, does nothing but
inflict cruelty on both the sides. To keep the facade of the broken
marriage alive would be doing injustice to both the parties. Thus,
irretrievable breakdown of marriage, in the opinion of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, spells cruelty to both the parties, and, as
such, amounts to cruelty by the parties to each other. On such
premise, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court brought the irretrievable
breakdown concept within the ambit of cruelty as envisaged in
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
23.
From a meaningful reading of the said judgment, it is evident that
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in the said case, did not merely
invoke Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete
justice between the parties but laid down the law on the subject
Page 10
upon taking into consideration several previous judgments
holding the field and the provisions in question. Hence, the ratio
laid down in Rakesh Raman (supra) tantamounts to a precedent
within the contemplation of Article 141 of the Constitution of
India and has the same force as statute law.
24.
It is precisely such proposition which was recognized in Dr. Soma
Mandal Debnath (supra) by this Court.
25.
In such view of the matter, in the teeth of the multiple
observations of the learned Trial Judge to the effect that the
marriage between the parties has in fact been a non-starter from
the very beginning and never fructified in a conjugal relationship
between the parties worth the name and since the relationship
between the parties, even if any, is long past its twilight, the
parties being separate for more than ten years, there is no reason
as to why the proposition laid down in Rakesh Raman (supra)
should not be applied to the present case as well.
26.
The respondent/husband argues that the appellant/wife cannot
take advantage of her own wrong in not coming back to the
matrimonial home and residing with the husband despite the
respondent/husband seeking a reunion of the parties.
Page 11
27.
However,
since
no
challenge
has
been
preferred
by
the
respondent/husband to the dismissal of the respondent‟s suit for
restitution of conjugal rights, it is evident that the conduct of the
husband is entirely devoid of animus revertendi.
28.
In the absence of any desire to resume their conjugal rights on
the part of the husband as well, as was explicitly found by the
learned Trial Judge in the judgment dismissing the husband‟s suit
for restitution of conjugal rights, it is clear that both parties
participated in the severance of the conjugal bond between
themselves.
29.
The
learned
Trial
Judge,
conspicuously,
observed
in
the
impugned judgment that there was nothing from the evidence to
show that the husband had ever persuaded the appellant/wife to
remain in his house for a longer period and that the parties were
comfortable with the condition that the wife would only
occasionally visit the matrimonial home. Hence, it cannot be said
that it was one-sided stonewalling by the appellant/wife which
resulted in the breakdown of the marriage between the parties.
Such breakdown, to say the least, has been participatory on the
part of both parties.
30.
In such view of the matter, we find no useful purpose to be
subserved in keeping the dead marriage between the parties alive
Page 12
merely due to legal technicalities. Even otherwise, in view of the
proposition laid down in Rakesh Raman(supra), it has been
recognized by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that irretrievable
breakdown of marriage between the parties for a considerable
period without any chance of restitution itself tantamounts to
cruelty by the parties to each other, coming within the ambit of
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, thus entitling the
parties to a divorce decree against each other.
31.
Before parting with the matter, we also take note of the fact that
by not preferring any appeal against the dismissal of his own suit
for restitution of conjugal rights, the respondent/husband had
acceded to the parties parting ways with each other.
32.
Thus, in view of the above observations, FA No.46 of 2024 is
allowed on contest by setting aside the impugned judgment and
decree dated August 24, 2023 passed by the learned Additional
District Judge, Second Court at Contai, District – PurbaMedinipur
in Matrimonial Suit No.93 of 2017; thereby decreeing the said suit
by
granting
a
divorce
to
the
appellant/wife
respondent/husband.
33.
There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
34.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
against
the
Page 13
35.
A formal decree be drawn up accordingly.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
15.07.2026
Item no. DL 7
Court No. 16
Asraf, A.R.(Ct.)
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