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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 25th May, 2026
Pronounced on: 09th September, 2026
+
RFA 937/2017
BPCL
.....Appellant
Through:
Mr. Anil Kumar Batra, Ms. Shashi
Bala and Mr. Dhruv Kumar, Advs.
Mob: 7838865667
Email: legal.advshashi@gmail.com
versus
D.P DHALL (THR HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
.....Respondent
Through: Ms. Sonia Mathur, Sr. Adv. with Ms.
Aditi Gupta, Ms. Shubhi Bhardwaj,
Ms. Safeena Khan, Ms. Manasi
Sridhar, Ms. Nikita Gill, Mr.
Akashdeep, Ms. Lavanya Bhardwaj
and Mr. Amandeep Joshi, Advs.
Mob: 9811046710 & 9211607982
Email: aditigupta29@gmail.com a
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
JUDGMENT
MINI PUSHKARNA, J.
INTRODUCTION
1.
The present Regular First Appeal (“RFA”) has been filed under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), thereby,
challenging the judgment and decree dated 09th June, 2017 (“impugned
judgment”), passed by the Additional District Judge-03 (Central), Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi, in the suit bearing CS No. 99/2016, titled as Sh. D.P.
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Dhall Versus Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited. There is a further
prayer seeking dismissal of the suit as having abated on the death of the
respondent/plaintiff.
2.
The aforesaid suit was filed by the respondent/plaintiff for recovery of
damages for coercive eviction from the residential accomodation allotted by
the appellant/defendant, in the sum of Rs. 20,00,000/-, along with costs,
future and pendente-lite interest @24% per annum, with effect from 25th
October, 2004, until full payment was made by the appellant/defendant. The
damages were sought, inter alia, in respect of loss of cash, jewellery and
other valuable household goods, as well as mental agony, torture,
harassment, loss of prestige, extreme inconvenience, and cost of changing
residence.
3.
The Trial Court vide the impugned judgment decreed the suit in
favour of the respondent/plaintiff and held that he was entitled to a total sum
of Rs. 15,30,000/-, out of which Rs. 10,00,000/- was awarded under the
heads of mental agony, loss of prestige and inconvenience caused to the
respondent/plaintiff; Rs. 4,80,000/- was awarded on account of loss of cash,
jewellery and other valuables and household goods; and Rs. 50,000/- was
awarded for the balance repair of damaged household goods. The
respondent/plaintiff was also held entitled to pendente-lite and future interest
@12% per annum, on the total awarded amount of Rs. 15,30,000/-, and the
cost of the suit, being Rs. 22,278/-.
BRIEF FACTS
4.
The brief facts, relevant for adjudication of the present appeal, as
culled out from the impugned judgment and the pleadings on record, are as
follows:
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4.1.
The appellant/defendant, i.e., Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited
(“BPCL”), is a Government of India undertaking having its registered office
in Mumbai.
4.2.
The respondent/plaintiff, i.e., Mr. D.P. Dhall, was employed by the
appellant/defendant as the General Manager, and retired from service on 30th
April, 2005. At the time of retirement, he was placed on deputation with the
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, New Delhi.
4.3.
As per the service regulations with effect from November, 1996, the
appellant/defendant provided residential accommodation to employees who
were at the level of Manager and above.
4.4.
Accordingly, the respondent/plaintiff was allotted a residential
accommodation bearing no. A-10, First Floor, South Extension-II, New
Delhi (“subject premises”), which was taken on lease from its
owner/lessor, i.e., Mrs. Reeta Sachdeva, at the monthly rate of Rs. 500/- vide
Lease Deed dated 16th March, 1968, and the said Lease Deed was renewed
from time to time, by separate lease deeds.
4.5.
The subject premises were allotted to the respondent/plaintiff by the
appellant/defendant in the year 1994, for residential purposes. The lease was
thereafter renewed by the appellant/defendant for a further period of two
years, commencing from 01st March, 1998, vide Lease Deed dated 23rd
February, 1998, at a monthly rent of Rs. 4,200/-. The appellant/defendant
deducted
occupational
charges
from the
monthly
salary
of
the
respondent/plaintiff in respect of accommodation in the subject premises.
4.6.
Thereafter, the owner/lessor of the subject premises filed a suit, being
CS No. 742/2002, against the appellant/defendant for possession of the
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subject premises, which was decreed in her favour vide judgment dated 16th
April, 2004, passed by the Civil Judge, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
4.7.
In respect of the said decree, execution proceedings, being Ex. Pet.
97/2009, were initiated, whereby, a warrant of possession was issued.
Pertinently, the respondent/plaintiff was neither a party to the proceeding in
CS No. 742/2022 nor to the proceedings in Ex. Pet. 97/2009.
4.8.
Pursuant to the aforesaid order, on 25th October, 2004, the
owner/lessor took possession of the subject premises through her power of
attorney and bailiff, by breaking open the lock of the subject premises and
removing the belongings of the respondent/plaintiff in his absence. In this
regard, a First Information Report (“FIR”), being FIR 669/2004, was
registered at the instance of the respondent’s/plaintiff’s wife, i.e., Mrs. Indira
Dhall, in the Police Station (“PS”), Defence Colony, New Delhi.
4.9.
The respondent/plaintiff vide E-mail dated 11th November, 2004,
addressed to the Director (Human Resources) and Director (Refineries) of
the appellant/defendant made a claim towards losses suffered by him,
amounting to a total sum of Rs. 4,48,000/-, comprising of Rs. 4,00,000/towards missing jewellery, and Rs. 48,000/- towards loss of cash.
4.10. The appellant/defendant replied to the said E-mail on 14th February,
2005, explaining that it was not liable to pay any compensation to the
respondent/plaintiff and that the loss or damage, as claimed, had been
caused by the actions of the owner/lessor.
4.11. Aggrieved by the aforesaid response, the respondent/plaintiff filed a
suit on 19th October, 2005, being CS No. 99/2016.
4.12. During the pendency of the proceedings in CS No. 99/2016, the
respondent/plaintiff expired on 30th January, 2016, and an application under
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Order XXII Rule 3 of the CPC was moved by the wife and children of the
respondent/plaintiff, seeking their substitution in place of the deceased
respondent/plaintiff. By way of order dated 21st March, 2016, the Trial Court
allowed the application, and the Legal Representatives (“LRs”), i.e., Mrs.
Indira Dhall/wife, Mr. Devashish Dhall/son and Mrs. Debika Dhall/daughter
of the respondent/plaintiff, were brought on record.
4.13. The Trial Court framed two issues vide order dated 22nd January,
2007, which were as follows –
“xxx xxx xxx
1. Whether the Plaintiff is required to claim any amount from the
Defendant? If so, what that amount is? OPP
2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim interest, if so, on what
amount, at what rate and for what period? OPP
3. Relief.
xxx xxx xxx”
4.14. The Trial Court answered both the aforesaid issues in favour of the
respondent/plaintiff, and passed the impugned judgment on 09th June, 2017.
4.15. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the appellant/defendant has
preferred the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT/DEFENDANT
5.
Before this Court, the appellant/defendant has raised the following
contentions:
5.1.
The appellant/defendant has submitted that it was desirous to continue
the Lease Deed dated 23rd February, 1998, as the subject premises had been
occupied by the respondent/plaintiff for many years. However, the
owner/lessor vide letters dated 09th July, 1999, and 01st March, 2000, in
violation of Clause 22 of the Lease Deed, requested the appellant/defendant
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to pay an increased rental amount of Rs. 25,000/- per annum for renewal of
the Lease Deed for a further period of two years.
5.2.
The appellant/defendant vide letter dated 16th March, 2000, offered an
enhancement @14% over the existing rent, which was not accepted by the
owner/lessor. Therafter, the owner/lessor served a Legal Notice dated 01st
May, 2000, upon the appellant/defendant for terminating the tenancy.
5.3.
The appellant/defendant replied to the said Legal Notice vide reply
dated 26th July, 2000, requesting renewal of the Lease Deed. However, the
owner/lessor filed a suit for possession against the appellant/defendant,
being CS No. 742/2002, which was decreed in her favour by way of
judgment dated 16th April, 2004, and executed in Ex. Pet. 97/2009. The
appellant/defendant filed a Regular Civil Appeal, being RCA 16/2004, in this
regard, but the same was dismissed vide order dated 31st August, 2004,
passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi.
5.4.
It is submitted that the respondent/plaintiff was intentionally not
impleaded as a party to the said suit by the owner/lessor, which proved
detrimental to his interests as an occupant of the subject premises.
5.5.
Upon hearing of the eviction of the respondent/plaintiff from the
subject premises, the officials of the appellant/defendant reached the subject
premises and provided all possible assistance to the respondent/plaintiff and
his family members, including arrangement for an alternative three-bedroom
company accommodation, located at S-191 Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi
(“GK-II property”), with all facilities, to enable them to shift immediately.
5.6.
Since the respondent/plaintiff was not willing to shift his belongings
from the roadside adjacent to the subject premises, the appellant/defendant,
in the interregnum, provided security guards for the safety of the belongings.
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Further arrangements were made for the respondent/plaintiff and his family
to stay at an alternative accomodation, which was a guest house of the
appellant/defendant, located at 10 C, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi
(“guest house”).
5.7.
The appellant/defendant advised the respondent/plaintiff to lodge an
FIR in respect of his allegations that some of his household goods and other
valuables had been lost, but the respondent/plaintiff was not agreeable to do
the same and thus, an opportunity was lost to recover the goods alleged to
have been stolen during the process of eviction. However, the
appellant/defendant lodged a police complaint dated 25th October, 2004,
against the power of attorney of the owner/lessor in this regard.
5.8.
On 26th October, 2004, the appellant/defendant made arrangements
for shifting certain belongings of the respondent/plaintiff to the GK-II
property, and the remaining belongings to the guest house, where the
appellant/defendant
undertook
to
bear
the
costs
for
the
respondent’s/plaintiff’s stay. Subsequently, on 15th November, 2004, the
respondent/plaintiff shifted to the GK-II property.
5.9.
The appellant/defendant had also worked out a compromise on 26th
October, 2004, to get possession of the subject premises with the help of the
advocate of the owner/lessor. However, during negotiations for the same, the
respondent/plaintiff refused to sign an affidavit to the satisfaction of the
advocate of the owner/lessor.
5.10. It is the case of the appellant/defendant that the Trial Court failed to
appreciate that the suit for recovery of damages instituted against the
appellant/defendant abated on the death of the respondent/plaintiff in light of
Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (“Succession Act”).
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5.11. It is contended that, in the event of the death of the
respondent/plaintiff during the pendency of the suit, the suit would abate,
and his LRs should not have been brought on record in view of the principle
of actio personalis moritur cum persona embodied under Section 306 of the
Succession Act.
5.12. It is further contended that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the
applicability of the aforesaid principle, which means that a personal action
dies when the party to the cause of action also dies. The said principle has
been applied in cases where a plaintiff dies during the pendency of the suit
filed seeking damages for personal injuries sustained by him, and is also
recognized by Section 306 of the Succession Act.
5.13. The Trial Court failed to appreciate that two simultaneous legal
proceedings, viz., the Objection Petition filed by the respondent/plaintiff
through his wife in Ex. Pet. 97/2009, and the present suit filed by the
respondent/plaintiff, pertain to the same relief, arise from the same alleged
cause of action, and are thus, barred by res judicata.
5.14. It is submitted that vide order dated 23rd October, 2009, the aforesaid
Objection Petition had been dismissed by the Executing Court, however, the
Trial Court failed to appreciate that the said dismissal was deemed to be a
decree under Order XXI Rule 103 of the CPC. It became absolute by
necessary
implication
of
law,
accruing
no
right
in
favour
of
respondent/plaintiff, and operating as res judicata to the subsequent suit, i.e.,
CS No. 99/2016.
5.15. The Trial court erred in not appreciating the fact that the suit was
liable to be dismissed because of non-joinder of the necessary party, i.e., the
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owner/lessor, whose actions were the reason for the loss suffered by the
respondent/plaintiff.
5.16. Further, the Trial Court erred in deciding the quantum of
compensation without considering the fact that no evidence had been placed
on record by the respondent/plaintiff in order to substantiate his claim, and
assess the actual loss suffered by him.
5.17. Additionally, the Trial Court failed to appreciate that it had been
established, on the available evidence, that the appellant/defendant was
unaware about the process of eviction carried out on 25th October, 2004, and
therefore, no negligence could be made out on the part of the
appellant/defendant. In view of these facts and circumstances, exemplary
compensation awarded to the respondent/plaintiff, on account of tortious
liability, is not justified.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF
6.
Rebutting
the
contentions
of
the
appellant/defendant,
the
respondent/plaintiff has raised the following arguments before this Court:
6.1.
The respondent/plaintiff expired on 30th January, 2016, and his LRs
were taken on record vide order dated 21st March, 2016, passed by the Trial
Court in CS No. 99/2016. The said order was never challenged by the
appellant/defendant.
6.2.
Evidence of the respondent/plaintiff, being PW-1 and PW-2, i.e., Mr.
Dhall and Mrs. Dhall, respectively, stood concluded as per the order dated
27th November, 2008, passed by the Trial Court. Evidence of the
appellant/defendant was also concluded, as recorded in the order dated 29th
October, 2013, and the matter was listed for final hearing. Thereafter, the
matter was delayed through no fault of the respondent/plaintiff.
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6.3.
The respondent/plaintiff and his family had been residing at the
subject premises for almost ten years. They enjoyed respect and regard in
the society and neighborhood, as both the respondent/plaintiff and his wife
held respectable positions in their respective spheres of employment. Since
both were employed and their son was a student, the subject premises
usually remained locked during the day.
6.4.
The respondent/plaintiff and his family members were never informed
of
any
pending
litigation
between
the
owner/lessor
and
the
appellant/defendant, nor were they ever impleaded in any of these
proceedings. During the absence of the respondent/plaintiff and his family
members, the bailiff forcibly executed the eviction by breaking open the
locks of the subject premises, following which their personal belongings
were removed from the subject premises and left on the road.
6.5.
The appellant/defendant was not prepared to handle the situation as it
was made aware of the said forcible eviction by Mrs. Dhall. On being
informed, the appellant/defendant shifted the respondent/plaintiff and his
family to the guesthouse, before shifting them again, to the GK-II property.
The respondent/plaintiff placed reliance on the cross examination of DW-2
and DW-3, i.e., Sh. Mukesh Nangia, Senior Manager (Benefits and
Administration), BPCL, and Mukesh Kumar Jain, Chief Manager (Legal),
respectively, to submit that this interim accommodation was a guest house,
and not ready for immediate shifting and for housing a family.
6.6.
The belongings of the respondent/plaintiff and his family members
remained on the road outside the subject premises for about two to three
days, and were only shifted after a valuation was conducted by a
Government registered valuer appointed by the appellant/defendant.
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6.7.
The household goods were shifted to two different locations,
including at a makeshift godown, which was contended to be nothing but a
servant quarter. The transfer was undertaken without any proper packaging
to the said godown, which did not have appropriate storage facilities. This
resulted in not only severe damage to household goods, but also theft of the
household goods and valuables including cash and jewellery, which is
evident from the FIR 669/2004, whereby, it was revealed that a person
involved in the eviction itself had stolen a mobile phone belonging to the
respondent/plaintiff.
6.8.
It is submitted that cash amounting to Rs. 48,000/-, jewellery worth
over Rs. 4,00,000/-, and other valuables were left locked in the built-in
almirahs inside the subject premises.
6.9.
Besides the aforesaid, several priceless goods, such as family photo
albums and important personal documents, were either destroyed or
mutilated. Since the partial eviction had been conducted in the absence of
the respondent/plaintiff and his family members, the total loss was difficult
to determine. Furthermore, they were not given any opportunity to enter the
subject premises after the eviction.
6.10. It has also come on record that at the time of the eviction, the
respondent’s/plaintiff’s son’s examinations were scheduled to commence
from 1st November, 2004, while his daughter and son-in-law were scheduled
to arrive from the United Kingdom on 29th October, 2004, to visit the family
during Diwali. In these circumstances, the eviction, carried out without any
prior notice, caused severe disruption to the respondent’s/plaintiff’s family
and subjected them to immense pain and suffering.
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6.11. It is submitted that the decretal amount awarded by the Trial Court has
become part of the estate of respondent/plaintiff, and passes on to his LRs.
6.12. Further, the jewellery worth Rs. 4,00,000/-, has appreciated over time
and is now valued at approximately Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. However, despite the
current
value
of
the
loss
being
nearly
Rs.
1,00,00,000/-,
the
respondent/plaintiff is only being given Rs. 4,00,000/-.
6.13. It is contended that the appellant/defendant was negligent and failed
to discharge its duty and responsibility to ensure proper accommodation for
the family of its employee, thereby, exposing an unprofessional attitude
towards
its
duties.
Instead
of
acknowledging
its
fault,
the
appellant/defendant, vide reply dated 14th February, 2005, inter alia, denied
any obligation towards the respondent/plaintiff and stated that expenses
towards accommodation in the guest house, transportation, deployment of
security personnel, repairs, etc., were otherwise payable by the
respondent/plaintiff, but were being waived as a special case.
6.14. The loss suffered by the respondent/plaintiff and his family is also
evident from the testimony of the parties, inasmuch as it was stated in the
cross examination of DW-1, i.e., Sh. Arun Singh, Electrical Contractor, that
there were four Air conditioners (“ACs”) at the subject premises, of which
one was a split AC given by the appellant/defendant, while the other three
were window ACs. There was also one cooler, one TV, two refrigerators, one
of which was very old, and two washing machines, one of which was used
by the respondent/plaintiff, and the other was brought by him to give to his
daughter. There was also a packed TV for gifting to the daughter. The
witness further deposed that, to his knowledge, one cooler was fixed at the
subject premises and was not evacuated during the process. Therefore, it is
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contended that the eviction process was incomplete, and loss has evidently
been suffered by the respondent/plaintiff.
6.15. The cross-examination of DW-2 reveals, the high-handed attitude of
the appellant/defendant. The witness deposed that, considering the plight of
the respondent/plaintiff, the counsel for the owner/lessor was requested to
permit re-entry into the subject premises and had agreed to the same, subject
to an affidavit being furnished to the effect that the subject premises would
be handed back by August, 2005. He further deposed that the
appellant/defendant was well aware of the theft of the belongings of the
respondent/plaintiff. The allegation that Mrs. Dhall derailed the negotiations
is falsified by the admission that only an affidavit from the
appellant/defendant was required for the subject premises to be restored to
the respondent/plaintiff till August, 2005.
6.16. The cross-examination of DW-2 further elucidated that the
respondent/plaintiff and his family members would remain outside the
subject premises during working hours on weekdays and, as such, could not
have known about the eviction proceedings under any circumstances.
Further, the appellant/defendant falsely deposed that the respondent/plaintiff
and his family members were entitled to claim damages from the
owner/lessor, failing to appreciate that it was the appellant’s/defendant’s
own callousness and negligence that caused the respondent/plaintiff to suffer
humiliation, theft of household goods, including, a mobile phone, and loss
of belongings, some of which, including, the air cooler and other household
goods, were left attached to the subject premises.
6.17. It is submitted that the principle of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to
the present case. Once it is held that the respondent/plaintiff has established
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the injury suffered, the onus would then shift upon the appellant/defendant
to explain the circumstances and demonstrate whether it took the requisite
care to avoid a foreseeable event. Once the presumption of the appellant’s/
defendant’s negligence begins to operate, the burden of proof lies upon the
appellant/defendant.
6.18. It is further submitted that the existence of liability for negligence
depends on whether a duty of care was owed by the appellant/defendant to
the respondent/plaintiff. Such a duty of care exists in the present case, as it
was
reasonably
foreseeable
to
the
appellant/defendant
that
the
respondent/plaintiff would suffer injury or damage by an act or omission of
the appellant/defendant.
6.19. The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, as stipulated under
Section 306 of the Succession Act, is inapplicable, since the wrong
committed
had
tangibly
affected
the
estate
of
the
deceased
respondent/plaintiff. Further, since his LRs were brought on record without
any objection and obtained a decree in their favour, it cannot be said that the
suit ought to have abated. In any event, the pleadings had been completed,
the respondent’s/plaintiff’s evidence stood closed on 27th November, 2008,
as well as the appellant’s/defendant’s evidence which stood closed on 29th
October, 2013, whereafter the matter was listed for final hearing on 15 th
November, 2013. Thereafter, Mr. D.P. Dhall expired on 30th January, 2016,
and his LRs were brought on record vide order dated 21st March, 2016.
6.20. The Objection Petition dated 30th October, 2004, filed in Ex. Pet.
97/2009, by the respondent/plaintiff through his wife, was primarily directed
against
the
owner/lessor
and
the
bailiff,
and
not
against
the
appellant/defendant.
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6.21. The said Objection Petition was dismissed on the ground that the
objector, i.e., Mrs. Dhall, could sue the appellant/defendant for neglecting its
duty to inform the respondent/plaintiff regarding the Court proceedings. It is
contended that the said dismissal of the Objection Petition does not bar the
filing of the suit for damages against the appellant/defendant, nor does it
amount to res judicata. Regardless, the appellant/defendant is liable for
damages on account of the forcible eviction of respondent/plaintiff from the
subject premises without any notice.
6.22. In the instant case, the loss suffered by the respondent/plaintiff was
not only on account of the forcible eviction, but also due to the negligence
on the part of the appellant/defendant in failing to take due precautions in
time, which could have avoided, if not entirely prevented, some loss or
damage. In the peculiar facts of the present case, the respondent/plaintiff and
his family members were placed in a situation where their household goods
were thrown onto the road in their absence, making it impossible to ascertain
the full extent of the belongings that were lost or missing.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
7.
This Court vide order dated 10th November, 2017, stayed the
operation of the impugned judgment and decree dated 09 th June, 2017,
subject to the appellant/defendant depositing 50% of the decretal amount
with the Registrar General of the Court, within a period of four weeks, from
the date of the said order.
8.
Thereafter, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff moved an
application, being CM APPL. 46430/2017, seeking vacation of the aforesaid
order dated 10th November, 2017, which stayed the operation of the
impugned judgment. By way of order dated 10 th April, 2018, the said
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application was dismissed, holding that the main appeal would become
infructuous if the interim order was vacated.
Vide order dated 02nd March, 2020, this Court noted that against the
9.
amount directed to be deposited under the order dated 10 th November, 2017,
the appellant/defendant had deposited only half thereof, by way of Demand
Draft
dated
02nd
November,
2017. On
04th
March, 2020,
the
appellant/defendant submitted that the balance amount, together with
interest, would be deposited. Pursuant thereto, a further sum of Rs.
13,31,549.95/- was deposited by way of Demand Draft dated 16 th March,
2020, taking the total amount deposited to Rs. 20,96,549.95/-. The said
amounts were kept in two Fixed Deposit Receipts (“FDRs”) in the name of
the Registrar General.
10.
The Registrar General by way of order dated 21st March, 2024, noted
that the total amount deposited with the Registry, along with accrued interest
was Rs. 25,66,622.95/-, as on 08th December, 2023. It was further noted that
the respondent/plaintiff’s wife, i.e., Mrs. Dhall, had furnished FDRs issued
by Punjab National Bank, along with her property, bearing no. 32, Duplex I,
Block A, Rajat Vihar, Sector-62, Noida, Uttar Pradesh, as security for the
release of the deposited amount along with accrued interest, in terms of the
orders dated 04th April, 2022, 31st October, 2023, and 28th November, 2023
passed in the present proceedings. In respect of the said property, Mrs.
Dhall, who appeared in person before the Court, submitted that she was the
owner and the same was in her possession. She further placed on record an
affidavit dated 01st December, 2023, stating therein that during the pendency
of this appeal, she would not alienate, mortgage, or create any encumbrance
or any third-party interest in the property.
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11.
Accordingly, the Registrar General directed that the total amount
deposited with Registry be released to Mrs. Dhall, in terms of the previous
orders passed by this Court. The Registrar General further noted that the
earlier statement given by Mrs. Dhall, as recorded in the order dated 01st
December, 2023, in respect of furnishing her Senior Citizen Savings Scheme
Account as security, stood withdrawn as the same had not been accepted.
12.
Subsequently, vide order dated 02nd April, 2024, this Court, in view of
the application filed by Mrs. Dhall, being CM APPL. 19364/2024, directed
that she shall not be bound by her statement that she shall not create any
third-party rights in respect of her property, as recorded in the order dated
21st March, 2024.
13.
Further, vide order dated 19th September, 2024, the Court recorded the
submission of the counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff that Mrs.
Dhall, at this stage, was not interested in receiving the money deposited by
the appellant/defendant, which was directed to be released in her favour, as
she had difficulty in furnishing the necessary surety desired by the Court.
Accordingly, the Court directed that Mrs. Dhall was no longer bound by any
affidavit furnished by her in compliance of the interim direction, for release
of the deposited amount.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
27.
I have heard learned counsels for the parties and have perused the
record.
Suit Of Respondent/Plaintiff Not Barred By Res Judicata
28.
The first issue to be decided by the Court is whether the suit filed by
the respondent/plaintiff before the Trial Court was barred by the principle of
res judicata.
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29.
The contention raised by the appellant/defendant is that the
respondent/plaintiff filed an Objection Petition dated 30th October, 2004,
through his wife before the Executing Court, claiming damages for the
alleged loss of reputation, cash, jewellery and other household goods. The
said Objection Petition was dismissed vide order dated 23rd October, 2009.
30.
Thus, the appellant/defendant has contended that the Trial Court failed
to appreciate that the two simultaneous legal proceedings, first being the
Objection Petition in Ex. Pet. 97/2009 and second, being the suit bearing CS
No. 99/2016, filed by the respondent’s/plaintiff’s wife and himself,
respectively, for the same relief on the alleged cause of action, are hit by
Section 11 of the CPC. The final decision dated 23rd October, 2009, in the
previously instituted Objection Petition filed in Ex. Pet. 97/2009 would
operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit.
31.
Reading of the judgment passed by the Trial Court, clearly brings to
the fore that the Executing Court simply dismissed the Objection Petition
filed by the wife of the respondent/plaintiff on the ground that since
possession was given to the decree holder, i.e., the owner/lessor, in due
process of law, if the objector had any grievance, she could sue the
appellant/defendant-BPCL for neglecting its duty to inform the objector
about the proceedings of the Court. However, the decree holder/landlady
was not held liable for any loss caused to the objector or her husband, i.e.,
the respondent/plaintiff.
32.
As noted by the Trial Court, it has specifically been held in the order
passed by the Executing Court that liability, if any, for damages caused to
the respondent/plaintiff lay against the appellant/defendant. Moreover, it is
to be noted that the order dated 23rd October, 2009, passed by the Executing
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Court did not bar the respondent/plaintiff from seeking a remedy qua the
grievance regarding manner of eviction against the appellant/defendant and
only held that the decree holder/landlady was not liable.
33.
The position of law in this regard is very clear that for res judicata to
apply, the previous suit should have been decided on merits. However, the
Objection Petition was not decided on merits and was rather dismissed on
the
ground
that
the
respondent’s/plaintiff’s
wife
could
sue
the
appellant/defendant-BPCL for neglecting its duty to inform her regarding
the proceedings of the Court.
34.
Thus, it is apparent that such dismissal of the Objection Petition, did
not operate as res judicata in filing a suit against the appellant/defendant,
nor was there any legal bar for filing a suit for damages by the
respondent/plaintiff against the appellant/defendant.
35.
In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment in the case of
Prem Kishore and Others Versus Brahm Prakash and Others, (2023) 19
SCC 244, wherein, the Supreme Court held that the general principle of res
judicata under Section 11 of the CPC contains rules of conclusiveness of
judgment. However, for res judicata to apply, the matter directly and
substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must be the same matter which
was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit. Further, the suit
should have been decided on merits, and the decision should have attained
finality. The relevant extracts are as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
34. The general principle of res judicata under Section 11
CPC contain rules of conclusiveness of judgment, but for res
judicata to apply, the matter directly and substantially in issue
in the subsequent suit must be the same matter which was
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directly and substantially in issue in the former suit. Further,
the suit should have been decided on merits and the decision
should have attained finality. Where the former suit is
dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for
default of the plaintiff’s appearance, or on the ground of nonjoinder or mis-joinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the
ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a
technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to
produce probate or letter of administration or succession
certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the
plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs,
or on the ground of improper valuation, or for failure to pay
additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued, or for
want of cause of action, or on the ground that it is premature
and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision,
not being on the merits, would not be res judicata in a
subsequent suit.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
36.
Accordingly, the plea of the appellant/defendant that the suit filed by
the respondent/plaintiff before the Trial Court, was barred by the principle of
res judicata, does not hold any merit. The same is accordingly, rejected.
Suit Not Liable To Be Dismissed For Non-Joinder Of Owner/Lessor
37.
The next plea raised by the appellant/defendant is that the suit was
liable to be dismissed because of non-joinder of the necessary party, i.e., the
owner/lessor, whose actions were the reason for the loss suffered by the
respondent/plaintiff. In this regard, reference may be made to the provision
of Order I Rule 9 of the CPC which deals with misjoinder and non-joinder
of parties. The said provision reads as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
9. Misjoinder and non-joinder.—No suit shall be defeated by
reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court
may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as
regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it:
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[Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to non-joinder of a
necessary party.]
xxx xxx xxx”
38.
Under Order I Rule 9 of the CPC, no suit is to be defeated by reason
of the non-joinder of parties, save in respect of a party whose presence is
necessary for the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the
issues raised in the suit. The present suit did not seek any relief against the
owner/lessor or adjudication of any right, title or interest qua the
owner/lessor. The case of the respondent/plaintiff before the Trial Court
rested entirely upon the negligence of the appellant/defendant in not
informing the respondent/plaintiff about the decree and pending execution
concerning the subject premises in occupation of the respondent/plaintiff.
The said issue is capable of adjudication as between the respondent/plaintiff
and the appellant/defendant alone. The owner’s/lessor’s presence was not
necessary for deciding the said issue. Accordingly, no merit is found in the
said ground and the same is accordingly rejected.
Liability Of The Appellant/Defendant For Negligence
39.
The next issue to be considered by this Court is whether the
appellant/defendant can be held liable for negligence on account of tortious
liability.
40.
Challenging the finding of the Trial Court regarding negligence, the
appellant/defendant has submitted that the respondent/plaintiff has a rightful
claim for damages in respect of his household goods, loss of cash and
jewellery against the owner/lessor only, who is responsible for such loss and
who got the subject premises vacated in the absence of the
respondent/plaintiff through her power of attorney and bailiff, while fully
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being aware of the fact that the subject premises are under the occupation of
the respondent/plaintiff and that they return home daily in the evening from
work. It is submitted that the appellant/defendant was itself not aware about
the eviction proceedings and the same has also come on record during
evidence. The appellant/defendant has provided the respondent/plaintiff
complete and immediate assistance in re-settling them and the displaced
household goods, and incurred all expenditure required at that time, as well
as at a later stage, till they shifted to a new accommodation.
41.
This Court notes that the respondent/plaintiff had been allotted the
residential accomodation by the appellant/defendant. As noted by the Trial
Court, one implied term of allotment of premises to the employee by
employer is that such employee will occupy the premises till the allotment is
lawfully determined or terminated. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of
the present case, it was the duty of the appellant/defendant to inform the
respondent/plaintiff, in writing, that it has suffered an eviction decree from
the Court in a suit filed by the owner/lessor of the subject premises. Though
the witness of the appellant/defendant, i.e., DW-2, has deposed that he had
informed the respondent’s/plaintiff’s wife telephonically about the eviction
decree and the execution proceedings, however, the same has been
categorically denied by the respondent/plaintiff and his wife. This Court
notes that besides the oral deposition of the said witness that the
respondent’s/plaintiff’s wife had been orally informed about the pendency of
the eviction and the execution proceedings, there is no document on record
to substantiate the same.
42.
The appellant/defendant has contended that the respondent/plaintiff
retired as the General Manager of the appellant/defendant-BPCL and was
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also
on
their
Management
Committee
to
contend
that
the
respondent/plaintiff would have been aware of the eviction proceedings.
However, nothing has been brought on record as to the scope of the subjects
that were under the authority of the Management Committee, and as to
whether issues regarding pendency or contest of court cases were within the
domain of the decision of the Management Committee. Merely because the
respondent/plaintiff was a General Manager, would not mean that he would
be aware of the eviction proceedings, especially, when it has come on record
that he was on deputation with the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas,
Government of India, at the time of his retirement.
43.
It is also to be noted that no evidence was produced by the
appellant/defendant that any alternative accommodation had been offered to
the respondent/plaintiff owing to the pendency of the eviction or execution
proceedings, prior to the eviction of the respondent/plaintiff from the subject
premises. Further, there is no documentary evidence on record which could
impute knowledge of the eviction proceedings to the respondent/plaintiff or
his family members.
44.
Moreover, it has come on record that it was the case of the
appellant/defendant that even it was not aware of the execution proceedings
or
that
any
bailiff
had
been
appointed.
Submission
of
the
appellant/defendant in this regard in the appeal is as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
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xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
45.
When the appellant/defendant itself has admitted that it was not aware
about the execution proceedings, it is clear that no information in this regard
could have been given by the appellant/defendant to the respondent/plaintiff.
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The relevant portion of the pleadings of the appellant/defendant in the
present appeal in this regard is reproduced as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
46.
Further,
DW-4,
i.e.,
Manoj
Singh,
Advocate
for
the
appellant/defendant, vide letter dated 25th October, 2004, addressed to the
Station House Officer (“SHO”), PS, Defence Colony, New Delhi, lodged a
police complaint against Mr. Charunpal Singh, attorney of the owner/lessor,
alleging trespass under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”),
and damage to the subject premises. The said letter, exhibited as DW-2/30
and PW-1/24 before the Trial Court, stated, inter alia, that no notice had
been received before breaking open the lock of the subject premises, and
that no local authority had been informed before the household goods and
other belongings of the respondent/plaintiff were removed therefrom. Thus,
the appellant/defendant itself acknowledged that the respondent/plaintiff had
not been given any notice prior to his eviction from the subject premises.
47.
The aforesaid categorically points to the clear stand of the
appellant/defendant that it was itself unaware of the execution proceedings.
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48.
Accordingly, in the absence of information by the appellant/defendant
to the respondent/plaintiff regarding the execution proceedings, it is evident
that
the
appellant/defendant
was
negligent
in
that
regard.
The
appellant/defendant ought to have communicated to the respondent/plaintiff,
in clear terms, with regard to the eviction decree and the impending
execution proceedings. Further, steps ought to have been taken for allotment
of an alternate accommodation with clear communication to the
respondent/plaintiff in this regard.
49.
This Court takes note of the submission of the respondent/plaintiff
that the existence of liability for negligence depends on whether a duty of
care was owed to one person by the other. A duty of care exists when it is
reasonably foreseeable to one person that an act or omission by them, would
result in the other suffering injury or damage.
50.
The Trial Court took note that it had been proved on record that the
respondent/plaintiff and his family remained unaware about passing of the
eviction decree or the issuance of the warrant of possession in the execution
proceedings. Thus, it was held that the respondent/plaintiff had been able to
establish negligence on the part of the appellant/defendant and therefore, the
appellant/defendant bears tortious liability.
51.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds no
infirmity in such finding of the Trial Court that would warrant interference.
This Court accordingly upholds the finding of the Trial Court in this regard
that the appellant/defendant owed a duty of care on account of the proximity
of their relationship with the respondent/plaintiff. Failure to discharge the
duty resulted in the respondent/plaintiff suffering injury and damages.
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Compensation Awarded To Respondent/Plaintiff
52.
The next question to be considered by this Court is whether the Trial
Court erred in deciding the quantum of compensation awarded to the
appellant/defendant, on the ground that no evidence had been placed on
record by the respondent/plaintiff in order to substantiate his claim and to
assess the actual loss suffered by him.
Compensation Towards Repair Of Damaged Household Goods
53.
The respondent/plaintiff has submitted that their belongings remained
on the road outside the subject premises for almost two to three days, and
were shifted after the valuation conducted by the valuer appointed by the
appellant/defendant.
54.
It is submitted that the household goods were shifted to two different
locations, including a makeshift godown, which was nothing but a servant
quarter. The transfer was without any proper packaging to a makeshift
godown without proper storage. This not only resulted in severe damage to
the household goods, but also theft of the other valuables including cash and
jewellery, which is evident from FIR 669/2004, whereby, it was revealed
that a person involved in the eviction itself had stolen a mobile phone
belonging to the respondent/plaintiff.
55.
Per contra, it is the case of the appellant/defendant that the quantum
of loss, as claimed by the respondent/plaintiff, is exaggerated and the suit
was a result of an afterthought.
56.
In this regard, it is to be noted that the valuer appointed by the
appellant/defendant carried out the inspection of the household goods on
27th October, 2004, and assessed the damages to the household goods to the
tune of Rs. 1,43,000/-. The appellant/defendant claims to have already
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provided assistance to the tune of Rs. 1,20,000/-, which is stated by them in
the letter dated 14th February, 2005. Additionally, the appellant/defendant
had placed on record before the Trial Court a total number of 30 bills which
were towards various works done including repair of household goods and
other modifications at the GK-II property. The Trial Court, without going
into
the
quantification
of
bills,
specifically
incurred
by
the
appellant/defendant towards repair of damaged household goods, has
awarded a lumpsum amount of Rs. 50,000/-.
57.
It is to be noted that though bills have been placed on record by the
appellant/defendant purportedly towards repair of the damaged household
goods of the respondent/plaintiff, however, majority of the said bills are
towards the work done in the alternate accommodation, i.e., the GK-II
property provided to the respondent/plaintiff. The details of the bills placed
on record by the appellant/defendant, as enumerated in the evidence
affidavit of DW-2, is reproduced as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
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xxx xxx xxx”
58.
Perusal of the aforesaid details clearly brings forth that only a
miniscule amount was spent towards repair/restoration of the damaged
household goods. This Court takes into account that the valuer appointed by
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the appellant/defendant had assessed the damages to the tune of Rs.
1,43,000/-. The Trial Court has awarded only a sum of Rs. 50,000/- towards
the said claim. Therefore, considering the fact that the negligence on the part
of the appellant/defendant stands established, the loss suffered therein would
have to be compensated.
59.
Considering the evidence on record, this Court finds no error in the
award of Rs. 50,000/- towards repair of damaged household goods to the
respondent/plaintiff. Thus, the challenge by the appellant/defendant in this
regard, is rejected.
Compensation Towards Loss Of Cash And Jewellery
60.
The next head under which compensation has been awarded in favour
of the respondent/plaintiff is Rs. 4,48,000/- towards loss of cash and
jewellery. The Trial Court has upheld the exact amount as claimed by the
respondent/plaintiff under the said claim, on account of the peculiar facts of
the case.
61.
In this regard, this Court notes that FIR 669/2004 filed by the wife of
the respondent/plaintiff in the PS, Defence Colony, New Delhi, on 07th
December, 2004, did not explicitly record any claim with respect to the loss
of cash amounting to Rs. 48,000/- or loss of jewellery worth Rs. 4,00,000/-.
62.
Furthermore, the respondent/plaintiff has admitted in his cross-
examination that the complaint made to the police did not mention the loss
of cash and jewellery since he was worried about his dispossession and
humiliation. The deposition of the respondent/plaintiff, i.e., PW-1, dated 24th
May, 2007, in this regard, is reproduced as under:
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“xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
63.
Accordingly, considering the evidence on record, it is pertinent to note
that firstly, the respondent/plaintiff has not placed on record any bank
withdrawal slip, payment bill, jewellery purchase bill or any other document
to show that they were in possession of cash amounting to Rs. 48,000/- and
jewellery worth Rs. 4,00,000/-, as on the date of eviction.
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64.
Secondly, though the FIR 669/2004 filed by the wife of the
respondent/plaintiff on 07th December, 2004, mentioned the loss of a phone,
no claim regarding loss of cash or jewellery was stated therein. In the
absence of any documentary evidence, no amount can be awarded in favour
of the respondent/plaintiff, merely based on the peculiar circumstances of
their case.
65.
Thirdly, in the Objection Petition filed by the respondent’s/plaintiff’s
wife in Ex. Pet. 97/2009, she had claimed a sum of Rs. 30,000/- on account
of missing cash and Rs. 60,00,000/- to Rs. 70,00,000/- as loss suffered
against certain articles and other assets. The aforesaid submission of the
respondent’s/plaintiff’s wife reflects a contradictory stance in respect of the
purported monetary losses suffered against loss of cash and jewellery and
other valuable assets.
66.
Accordingly, the Trial Court has erred in awarding compensation of
Rs. 4,48,000/- to the respondent/plaintiff towards loss of cash and jewellery,
in the absence of any evidence on record. In view of the same, the award of
compensation of Rs. 4,48,000/- under the said head, is set aside.
Compensation Towards
Inconveniences
67.
Mental
Agony,
Loss
Of
Prestige
And
The Trial Court has further awarded compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/-
towards mental agony, loss of prestige and inconvenience caused to the
respondent/plaintiff. The same has been challenged by the appellant/
defendant on the ground that on account of death of the original
respondent/plaintiff during the pendency of the suit, compensation under the
said claim could not have been awarded.
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68.
It is to be noted that the respondent/plaintiff expired during the
pendency of the suit and his LRs were brought on record vide order dated
21st March, 2016, which, though opposed, was not challenged by the
appellant/defendant.
69.
The appellant/defendant has challenged the impugned judgment on
the ground that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that in the event of the
abatement of the suit due to death of the respondent/plaintiff during the
pendency of the suit, the LRs could not have been ordered to be brought on
record based on the principle of actio personalis moritur cum persona
enshrined under Section 306 of the Succession Act.
70.
It may be noted that this question was not raised before the Trial
Court. However, the said question being a purely legal issue, can be raised in
the present proceedings.
71.
In this regard, reference may be made to Section 306 of the
Succession Act, which reads as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
306. Demands and rights of action of, or against deceased
survive to and against executor or administrator.—All demands
whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or
special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at
the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or
administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault,
as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries
not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where,
after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be
enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
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72.
The words ‘other personal injuries not causing the death of the party’
have been read ejusdem generis with ‘defamation’ and ‘assault’, to cover
any injury to a person’s dignity, reputation, mental agony and the like.
Accordingly, in terms of Section 306 of the Succession Act, relief for
personal injuries such as mental agony, etc. do not survive upon the death of
the person concerned. Thus, clarifying the distinction between an
individual’s personal right and the proprietary rights relating to his estate,
the Supreme Court in the case of Kumud Lall Versus Suresh Chandra Roy
(Dead) Through LRs and Others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 797, held as
follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
60. This Court in Vinayak Purshottam Dube v. Jayashree
Padamkar Bhat, while deciding the liability of legal heirs of the
deceased opposite party-developer to provide completion
certificate, conveyance deed etc., to the complainant in addition
to the monetary payment arising out of a development
agreement, made the following classification between
proprietary and personal rightsProprietary rights
Personal rights
1.
Proprietary rights mean a
person’s right in relation to his
own
property.
Proprietary
rights have some economic or
monetary value.
Personal rights are rights arising out
of any contractual obligation or
rights that relate to status.
2.
Proprietary rights are valuable.
Personal rights are not valuable in
monetary terms.
3.
Proprietary rights are
residual in character.
Personal rights are the residuary
rights which remain after proprietary
rights have been subtracted.
not
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4.
Proprietary
transferable.
rights
are
Personal rights are not transferable.
5.
Proprietary rights are the
elements of wealth for man.
Personal rights are merely elements
of his well-being.
6.
Proprietary rights possess not
merely judicial but also
economic importance.
Personal rights possess
judicial importance.
merely
In the light of the above, it is clear that in distinction to an
individual’s personal right which is attached to his status, the
proprietary right relates to his estate. On the other hand,
personal right or claim usually includes damages for loss of
reputation, pain, and suffering, etc.
xxx xxx xxx
64. What falls from the above discussion are as underi. The common law maxim ‘actio personalis moritur cum persona’
in India has been statutorily modified by various statutory
instruments such as Fatal Accidents’ Act of 1855, Legal
representatives’ Suits Act of 1855, Indian Succession Act of
1925, etc.;
ii. That the legal representative of the deceased can institute a
fresh suit or be sued afresh in terms Legal Representatives
Suits Act, 1855 or in terms of Section 306 of Indian
Succession Act, 1925;
iii. Continuation of suit by or against the legal representative of
the deceased has to be in terms of Section 306 of Indian
Succession Act, 1925 (substantive law);
iv. Procedural prescription under Order XXII of CPC, concerning
substitution of legal representative of the deceased party
should be harmoniously construed with Section 306 of Indian
Succession Act.
v. The continuation of ‘right to sue’ under Order XXII Rule 2 read
with Rule 4 is to be seen on the date of death.
vi. Generally, all rights and liabilities to maintain a suit are
carried
to
the
legal
representative
under
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Section 306 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. However, when
adjudicating claims under 1st exception to Section 306 of
the Indian Succession Act, 1925, personal injury claims
abate, while claims for or against the estate of the deceased
survive.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
73.
Likewise, the Supreme Court, in the case of M. Veerappa Versus
Evelyn Sequeira and Others, (1988) 1 SCC 556, has held the maxim of
actio personalis cum moritur persona to be inapplicable only in those cases
where the injury caused to the deceased person has tangibly affected his
estate or has caused an accretion to the estate of the wrong doer. If the entire
suit claim is founded on torts, the suit would undoubtedly abate. If the action
is founded partly on torts, and partly on contract, then such part of the claim
as relates to torts would stand abated and the other part would survive. If the
suit claim is founded entirely on contract, then the suit has to proceed to trial
in its entirety and be adjudicated upon. Thus, it has been held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
10. The maxim “actio personalis cum moritur persona” has
been applied not only to those cases where a plaintiff dies
during the pendency of a suit filed by him for damages for
personal injuries sustained by him but also to cases where a
plaintiff dies during the pendency of an appeal to the appellate
court, be it the first appellate court or the second appellate
court against the dismissal of the suit by the trial court and/or
the first appellate court as the case may be. This is on the
footing that by reason of the dismissal of the suit by the trial
court or the first appellate court as the case may be, the
plaintiff stands relegated to his original position before the trial
court. Vide the decisions in Punjab Singh v. Ramautar
Singh [AIR 1920 Pat 841: (1919) 4 Pat LJ 676],
Irulappa v. Madhava [(1916) 31 MLJ 772] Maniramlala v.
Chattibai [AIR 1937 Nag 216 : ILR 1938 Nag 280],
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Baboolal v. Ramlal [AIR 1952 Nag 408] and Melepurath
Shankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty [(1986) 1
SCC 118 : AIR 1986 SC 411] . In Palaniappa Chettiar v. Rajah
of Ramnad [ILR 49 Mad 208], and Motilal v. Harnarayan [AIR
1923 Bom 408 : 25 Bom LR 435 : ILR 47 Bom 716] it was held
that a suit or an action which has abated cannot be continued
thereafter even for the limited purpose of recovering the costs
suffered by the injured party. The maxim of actio personalis
cum moritur persona has been held inapplicable only in those
cases where the injury caused to the deceased person has
tangibly affected his estate or has caused an accretion to the
estate of the wrong-doer vide Rustomji Dorabji v. W.H.
Nurse [ILR 44 Mad 357] and Ratanlal v. Baboolal [AIR 1960
MP 200] as well as in those cases where a suit for damages for
defamation, assault or other personal injuries sustained by the
plaintiff had resulted in a decree in favour of the plaintiff
because in such a case the cause of action becomes merged in
the decree and the decretal debt forms part of the plaintiff ’s
estate and the appeal from the decree by the defendant becomes
a question of benefit or detriment to the estate of the plaintiff
which his legal representatives are entitled to uphold and defend
(vide Gopal v. Ramchandra [ILR 26 Bom 597] and Melepurath
Sankunni v. Thekittil [(1986) 1 SCC 118 : AIR 1986 SC 411] ).
xxx xxx xxx
15. Having regard to the nature of the claim we are not able to
comprehend how without any enquiry and recording of evidence
the trial court and the High Court have proceeded on the basis
that the suit claim is based only on tortious liability though the
two courts have reached different conclusions about the
abatement of the suit. The learned counsel for the respondent
placed reliance upon the summary of the averments in the plaint
set out above and argued that the plaintiff had suffered loss of
over Rs 20,000 due to the closure of the business and hence the
restricted claim of Rs 4500 is really towards loss suffered by the
estate and not a claim made on the basis of the loss of
reputation, mental agony, worry etc. suffered by the plaintiff. He
further stated that the claim of Rs 1500 under three heads of Rs
500 each also related to the loss suffered by the estate of the
deceased and hence the suit has to proceed for the entire suit
claim. Since no discussion has been made and no finding has
been rendered on this question and since we cannot render any
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finding on the basis of the materials on record whether the suit is
based on the personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff or upon
the loss suffered by the estate, we think the proper course would
be to allow the judgment under appeal to stand even though we
do not approve the reasoning of the High Court and dismiss the
appeal. We leave the matter open for the trial court to decide
whether the suit is founded entirely on torts or on contract or
partly on torts and partly on contract and deal with the matter
according to law. If the entire suit claim is founded on torts the
suit would undoubtedly abate. If the action is founded partly on
torts and partly on contract then such part of the claim as
relates to torts would stand abated and the other part would
survive. If the suit claim is founded entirely on contract then
the suit has to proceed to trial in its entirety and be adjudicated
upon.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
74.
Further, in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd., Trichy P.R.I. 11,
[Haritha Finance Extn. Gounder 0. 2/7, Pudukotai Road. Pin Code-620
020] Versus Sivabakkiyam (Deceased). 1. Balakrishnan and Others, 2018
SCC OnLine Mad 14935, it was held that the LRs of the deceased cannot
succeed to the compensation awarded towards personal injuries and pain
suffering of the deceased, even though such amount would have enriched
the estate of the deceased during her lifetime. Thus, it was held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
24. In M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Sequeira, (1988) 1 SCC 556 : AIR
1988 SC 506, the distinction was drawn between action
“founded entirely on torts” and “entirely on contract”. In the
former case, it would abate while in the later it would not and
survive to legal representatives. If action is founded partly on
Contract and partly on torts then it would survive to the extent,
it is based on Contract, rest would abate.
25. In Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil
Geopalankutty Nair, 1986 ACJ 440, the Supreme Court said that
the right to sue where maxim “ ction personalis moritur cum
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persona”” applies, does not survive to the legal representatives;
therefore, they were not entitled to prosecute the claim.
26. Thus, it is clear that the legal representatives/Legal Heirs of
the deceased Sivabakkiyam cannot succeed to the
Compensation awarded towards “Personal Injuries” and “Pain
& Suffering” of the deceased even though such amount would
have enriched the estate of the deceased during her life time.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
75.
Similarly, delving into the scope of Section 306 of the Succession Act,
this Court in the case of Daljit Singh and Another Versus Yogeshwar
Prasad, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 438, held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
16. I may here refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of M. Veerappa (supra) wherein after examining the maxim
“ ction personalis cum moritur persona” it was held that in
such cases where the plaintiff dies during the pendency of the
suit or an appeal, the plaintiff stands relegated to his original
position before the trial court. However, it was held that this
doctrine would not apply where injury caused to the deceased
person had tangibly affected his estate or had caused an
accretion to the estate of the wrongdoer. In this regard the
Supreme Court approved of the observations made by the
Madras High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in Rustomji Devabji v. W.H. Nurse reported in AIR 1921 Mad 1
and Ratanlal v. Baboolal reported in AIR 1960 MP 200.
17. The maxim “actio personalis cum moritur persona” has not
been accepted in India as one of universal application. It
operates in a limited class of actions ex delicto and not every
action where on death of a party relief cannot be claimed or
granting the same would be futile. There are also exceptions to
the said maxim even in cases of personal injuries (See Section 37
of the Contract Act, 1872, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 and Section 50 of the Code). Care must be taken not to
extend this maxim beyond what is specified in Section 306 Of the
Indian Succession Act, 1923 to actions founded on an obligation,
contract, debt, covenant or any other duty to be performed.
Digitally Signed
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18. Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1923 provides
that all rights to prosecute or - defend any action in favour of
or against a person shall survive inspite of death of any of the
parties except where cause of action are for defamation,
assault or other personal injuries not causing death of a party
or cases where after the death of a party, relief cannot be
enjoyed or granting it would be negatory. The term “personal
injury” has been construed as edjusdem (sic) generis and
therefore takes its colour and meaning from the earlier two
words: “defamation and assault”. In Margarida v. Neckintu
reported in AIR 1968 Bom 328, Section 306 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1923 was examined and it was held that the
term “other personal injuries” must be construed with
reference to the preceding words, namely, defamation and
assault. However, it may be clarified that the term “personal
injury” need not refer only to physical injuries but also mental
injuries as it happens in the case of defamation
(See Mahajan v. Baboolal reported in AIR 1960 MP 666). In the
case of Margarida (supra) the Bombay High Court that the legal
representatives of a plaintiff are entitled to continue with a suit
filed for compensation of damage caused to goods as it was a
case of damage caused to the estate and not merely a personal
right that perished and corroded with the death of the original
plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
76.
Considering the law as discussed hereinabove, it is evident that the
compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- awarded by the Trial Court towards mental
agony, loss of prestige and inconvenience caused to the respondent/ plaintiff,
are not tangible as to form a part of his estate. Accordingly, compensation of
Rs. 10,00,000/- could not have been granted in favour of the LRs of the
deceased respondent/plaintiff, on account of the right to sue for such claim
having abated on the death of the respondent/plaintiff.
77.
Thus, the award of compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- towards mental
agony, loss of prestige and inconvenience, is set aside.
Digitally Signed
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Costs Of The Suit
78.
The Trial Court has decreed the suit of the respondent/plaintiff along
with costs of the suit amounting to Rs. 22,278/-. This Court has held the
appellant/defendant to have acted in a negligent manner, and thus, no error is
found in the costs of the suit having been awarded in favour of the
respondent/plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
79.
The judgment and decree dated 09th June, 2017, passed by the learned
Additional District Judge (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, in CS No. 99/2016, is
accordingly, modified to the following extent:
i.
The award of Rs. 4,80,000/- for loss of cash, jewellery and valuable
goods, is set aside.
ii.
The award of Rs. 10,00,000/- towards mental agony, loss of prestige
and inconvenience, is set aside.
iii.
The award of Rs. 50,000/- towards balance repair of damaged goods,
together with interest awarded therein, is upheld.
iv.
The award of Rs. 22,278/- towards cost of the suit, is upheld.
80.
The decree sheet be drawn up accordingly.
81.
The present appeal is allowed partly in terms of the aforesaid.
MINI PUSHKARNA
(JUDGE)
SEPTEMBER 9, 2026/Kr/Ak/Sk
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
23:01:03
RFA 937/2017
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