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Page No.# 1/16
GAHC040005472026
2026:GAU-AP:599
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : CRP/26/2026
Bomli Basar Son of Tobom Basar, permanent resident of Gori III Village, PO and PS
Basar, Leparada District, Arunachal Pradesh.
VERSUS
Minjom Bagra Son of Late Imin Bagra, permanent resident of Village Lipu Bagra, PO
and PS Aalo, West Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh.
Advocate for the Petitioner : Rintu Saikia, Sr. Adv, Gopi Bam,Muchi Mele,Mindo Taso,K
Bam,Idak Bam,Ligam Nochi
Advocate for the Respondent : Kemo Lollen, Maryum Sora,Geli Taye,D Ado
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BUDI HABUNG
1. Date on which judgment is reserved: 25.05.2026
2. Date of pronouncement of judgment: 16.06.2026
3. Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? NO
4. Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? YES
JUDGMENT & ORDER(CAV)
Heard Mr. Rintu Saikia, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. Idak Bam,
learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Kemo
Lollen, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the sole respondent.
2.
The present Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, is directed against the order dated 13.03.2026, passed by the learned
Civil Judge(Senior Division), West Siang District, Aalo, whereby, the appeal filed
by the respondent under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts
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(Amendment) Act, 2022, read with Section 96 and Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, has been admitted. The petitioner has also challenged the
order dated 13.03.2026 filed by the respondent under order 41 Rule 5 read with
section 151 of Civil Procedure code passed in Misc. Case No. 18/2026 in Civil
Appeal No. 04/2026, passed without jurisdiction and stayed the operation of the
keba decision dated 21.02.2026 passed by the Inter Village Territorial Customary
Council, Basar, has been suspended.
3.
The brief facts leading to the filing of the present civil revision petition is
that the dispute relates to ownership and decision of a plot of ancestral land
situated within the jurisdiction of Basar area.
4.
The petitioner lodged a complaint dated 22.05.2025 before the Deputy
Commissioner, Basar, alleging that the respondent had illegally sold his ancestral
property/land by fraudulently obtaining the Land Possession Certificates(LPCs)
and requested for settlement of the dispute through village level keba.
5.
Based on the aforesaid compliant, the Deputy Commissioner, Basar, vide
order dated 26.05.2025, forwarded the complaint to the Head Gaon Burah/Village
Authority under Section 4 of the Assam Frontier(Administration of Justice)
Regulation, 1945, for adjudication. Pursuant thereto, the Head Gaon Burah, GoriIII, Ango village issued Parwana/summons to the parties on 27.05.2025 and
05.06.2025, respectively.
6.
On 28.06.2025, the HGB Gori-III, passed Order directing both the parties to
maintain status quo over the land. The respondent, thereafter, submitted a
representation dated 30.10.2025, asserting that the land, in question, was in
possession of her deceased mother by virtue of the Land Possession Certificate
issued in her name and had, thereafter, further transferred to his maternal Uncle
Shri Minjom Bagra, the present respondent and accordingly, sought for deletion of
his name. Subsequently, on having found the status-quo having been violated,
the petitioner by his further communication, informed the police regarding alleged
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violation of the status-quo order passed by the village authority. Thereupon, the
village authority also informed the police on 16.06.2025, regarding alleged breach
of its order. The petitioner also lodged a FIR dated 17.06.2025, against the illegal
activities by one Shri Santo Chetry and others in violation of the status-quo order.
7.
The Deputy Commissioner, Basar, on 19.06.2025, also passed an order
directing both the parties to maintain status-quo over the disputed land.
Thereafter, summons were issued by the village authority/Customary Court of
Gori-III to the parties and upon consideration of the rival claims; passed its
decision dated 16.07.2025 holding, inter alia, that the land purchased from Late
Nguto Basar by Late Minsa Bagra, mother of Shri Santo Chetry, belongs to Shri
Minjom Bagra, while observing that since the entire land had not been sold, a
portion thereof, was liable to be restored to the petitioner.
8.
Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Inter Village
Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court against the said Keba decision
dated 16.07.2025, on 18.07.2025. The respondent also preferred an appeal
under Section 3(III)(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act,
2022, on 24.07.2025, against the Keba decision dated 16.07.2025 of the village
authority.
9.
During the pendency of the appeal proceedings, the respondent approached
this Court by way of filing a Civil Revision Petition being CRP 94/2025 seeking
appropriate direction regarding constitution of the appellate forum. By order
dated 26.09.2025, passed in CRP NO. 94/2025, this Court directed the appellate
authority to include equal representation from both sides and proceed with the
appeal. In compliance of the said direction, fresh notices were issued and the
Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court heard both the
parties. By judgment dated 21.02.2026, the appellate Inter Village Territorial
Customary Court/Apex Customary Court held that the entire land was not sold by
Late Nguto Basar but only half of an acre of the land had been sold by him to Shri
Minjom Bagra and accordingly, declared that half an acre of the land belonged to
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late Minsa Bagra and remaining part of the land would belong to Shri Bomli Basar.
10.
Thereafter, the respondent initially filed an appeal before the learned
Additional District Judge, Basar, which was dismissed with liberty. Subsequently,
the respondent instituted Civil Appeal No. 04/2026 before the learned Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Aalo, under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts
(Amendment) Act, 2022, read with Section 96 and Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. Along with the appeal, Misc. Case No. 18/2026 under
Order 41 Rule 5 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was
also filed by the respondent, seeking stay of the judgment dated 21.02.2026
passed by the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court,
Basar. The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aalo, admitted the appeal and
granted interim protection.
11.
Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present Civil Revision Petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
12.
Mr. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, submits that civil
dispute within the State of Arunachal Pradesh, are governed by the provisions of
the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021 (amended from time to time); Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice)
Regulation, 1945. It is contended that under Section 2(f) of the Assam Frontier
(Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, as amended in 2023; the village
authority includes the traditional village council or Inter Village Territorial Council,
or, the Apex Council, or, by whatever name called including Head Gaon Bura,
Head Gaon Buri, Gaon Bura, Gaon Buri and traditional village head. Reference is
also made to Section 2(b) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021, which
includes the Customary Court and village authority within the definition of Courts
exercising civil jurisdiction. According to the learned senior counsel for the
petitioner, prior to enactment of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021, an
appeal from the decision of the village authority were governed by Section 46 of
the Assam Frontier(Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945. However, by
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virtue of Section 27 of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021, the said
provision has been deleted and a new appellate structure has been introduced
under Section 15 of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021.
13.
Mr. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, submits that Section
15(4) inserted by the amendment Act i.e. the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts
(Amendment) Act, 2022, and modified in 2023, creates an appellate forum before
the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court against the
decisions rendered by the village authority.
14.
The learned senior counsel for the petitioner argues that the Inter Village
Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court while deciding such appeals,
functions as a first appellate authority and not as a Court of original jurisdiction.
The learned senior counsel further contends that on that basis, once, the Inter
Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court has exercised its
appellate jurisdiction and rendered its decision on 21.02.2026, any further
challenge to that order by the respondent can be made only by way of filing a
“Second Appeal” under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before
the High Court. The respondent having already availed a first appeal remedy
before the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court under
Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022,
could not file another appeal before the learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), Aalo,
by invoking Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts(Amendment) Act,
2022, read with Section 96 and Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.
15.
Mr. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, further submits that
proviso to Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act,
2022, must be construed as applicable only where the Inter Village Territorial
Customary Court/Apex Customary Court exercises its original jurisdiction.
According to the learned senior counsel, permitting a further appeal before the
Civil Judge(Senior Division) against an appeal decision of the Inter Village
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Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court, would virtually create a “first
appeal” rendering Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, redundant.
16.
The learned senior counsel for the petitioner also submits that the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, including Section 100, stands adopted and applicable
within the State of Arunachal Pradesh and that the Legislation of State cannot be
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the enactment of the law by the
Parliament.
17.
In support of his submissions, Mr. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner, placed reliance upon Article 254(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India,
to contend that Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts(Amendment)
Act, 2022, cannot be construed as impliedly repealing or overriding the provisions
of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Further reliance has been
placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. v. Gurdial Singh Mann
(Dead) by LRs. & Ors., reported in (2001) 4 SCC 262, to contend that a State
legislation cannot override or create a remedy inconsistent with Section 100 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and that, in case of repugnancy, Parliament
legislation must prevail. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:
“Paragraph-13, Article 254 thus maintains Parliamentary supremacy in
matters under List I and List III (List I Union List and List III Concurrent List).
And It is on this score that Mr. Mehta was very eloquent that doctrine of
implied repeal will have its true impact on the situation and thus resultantly
negatived the effect of Section 41 of the Punjab courts Act. Mr. Mehta
contended that Section 100 of the Code and Section 41 of the Punjab Act
without any pale of controversy have a common objective viz. authority and
jurisdiction to hear Second Appeals and thus both operate on the same field
and by reason of the factum of the Punjab Act being non-complimentary to
Section 100 of the Code, it cannot but be said to be repugnant and hence the
doctrine of repugnancy will have its full play in the matter of declaration of
the Punjab Act being void.
14.
On the doctrine of implied repeal, Mr. Mehta contended that procedural
law must be having a meaningful existence without being in conflict with a
parliamentary legislation. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of implied repeal is not
to be favoured but where a particular provision cannot co-exist or intended to
subsist in the event of there being the repugnancy between central and State
Legislature the courts cannot but declare it to be so on the ground of repeal by
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implication. Uniformity of law, being the basic characteristics of Indian
jurisprudence cannot be termed to be at sufferance by reason of a State
Legislation which runs counter to the Central Legislation. It is not necessary
that one legislation should be on the positive side whereas the other one in the
negative: Such a stringent requirement is not the requirement in order to bring
home the issue of repugnancy, but all the same it might result when both the
legislations cover the same field. This observation find support from the
decision of this Court in Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of Bombay [1955 (1)
SCR 799] wherein this Court observed:
It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under Article 254
(1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no
question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of implied
repeal rests, namely, that if the subject-matter of the later legislation is
identical with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand
together; then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be
equally applicable to a question under Article 254 (2) whether the
further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as
that of the State law. We must accordingly hold that section 2 of
Bombay Act NO.XXXVI of 1947 cannot prevail as against section 7 of the
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act No.XXIV of 1946 as amended
by Act No.LII of 1950. (vide page 809).
15.
In Zaverbhai case (supra) this Court in no uncertain terms laid down
that the important thing to consider is whether the legislation is in respect of
the same matter and it is on this score true effect of Article 254 (2) has been
said to the effect that if both the Centre and the State though competent to
enact the same, the law of the Centre should prevail over that of the State.
There cannot be any divergence of views on this score having regard the
language of the Article 254 and this is irrespective of the factum that
constitutionality of a statute being always presumed in affirmative rather
than in the negative. It is in this context that a Constitution Bench of this
Court in the decision in Karunanidhi [M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India &
Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 431] stated that before any repugnancy can arise the
following conditions must be satisfied:
(a) That there is clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act
and the State Act;
(b) That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable;
(c) That the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of
such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each
other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one
without disobeying the other.
17.
The submission for the Respondent further proceeded to the effect that
on a plain reading of this Section it depicts that in the event of there being
any inconsistency, the special or local laws will have the precedence over the
Code but in the event, there is no inconsistency between the two, the Code will
prevail rather an attractive submission but on a closer scrutiny the same
pales into insignificance. As aforesaid the special or local law as contained
in Section 41 of the Punjab Code was in pari materia with unamended Section
100 so then there was no inconsistency. It is only after the amendment could
be said to an inconsistency have developed between the two provisions, which
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is submitted to be saved by the aforesaid Section 4. While it is true, on its
plain reading at the first glance local law seems to have been saved but we
have to examine this in the light of Article 254 of the Constitution of India
and the doctrine of repugnancy read with Section 97 of the Amending Act as
noticed in the earlier part of this judgment. Incorporation of the Civil
Procedure Code Amendment Act in the statute book is by virtue of conferment
of power under Entry 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
The Constitution is the parent document and is supreme which has a binding
effect on all and by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution, parliamentary
supremacy in regard to the adaptation of laws if within the area of operation
as provided under List I or List III is recognised.
18. Article 254 makes it unequivocal of the supremacy of the Parliament in
the matter of repugnancy of any matter falling under List I or List III. There is
one exception carved under Clause (2) to a matter falling under the Concurrent
List III. This supremacy is further reinforced by the proviso of this Clause (2),
which records;
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from
enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including
a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the
Legislature of the State. (Noticed again for convenience).
20.
It is in this context a decision of this Court (I.T.C. & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka & Ors :1985 (Suppl) SCC 476) may also be noted, wherein this
Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment (see page 496) had the following to
state:
Thus, in my opinion, the five principles have to be read and construed
together and not in isolation where however, the Central and the State
legislation cover the same field then the Central legislation would
prevail. It is also well settled that where two Acts, one passed by the
Parliament and the other by a State Legislature, collide and there is no
question of harmonising them, then the Central legislation must prevail.
27.
Now we proceed to examine Section 97 (1) of the Amending Act and the
amendment of Section 100 CPC by the said 1976 Act. Through this
amendment right to Second Appeal further restricted only to lie where, the
case involves a substantial question of law. This introduction definitely is in
conflict with Section 41 of the Punjab Act which was pari materia with
unamended Section 100 CPC. Thus so long there was no specific provision to
the contrary in this Code Section 4 CPC saved special or local law. But after it
comes in conflict Section 4 CPC would not save, on the contrary its language
implied would makes such special or local law applicable. We may examine
now the submission for the respondent based on language of Section 100
(1) CPC even after the said amendment. The reliance is on the following words:
“100. (1)
Save as otherwise expressly provided by any other law for
the time being in force….”
These words existed even prior to the amendment and is unaffected by
the amendment. Thus so far it could legitimately be submitted that,
reading this part of the Section in isolation it saves the local law. But
this has to be read with Section 97(1) of the Amending Act, which reads:
“97. (1)
Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the
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principal Act by a State Legislature before the commencement of this
Act shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision is consistent
with the provision of the principal Act as amended by this Act, stands
repealed. (Noticed again for convenience).”
18.
The petitioner also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Secretary to the Government of Kerala, Irrigation Department & Ors. v.
James Varghese & Ors., reported in (2022) 9 SCC 593. In paragraphs 63 and
64, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
“63.
It could thus be seen that this Court has observed that the subject of
arbitration finds place in Entry 13 of List III, i.e., the Concurrent List of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. It has been held that the
legislation pertaining to the said entry could be made either by the
Parliament or the State Legislature. It has been held that since the subject of
arbitration is in the Concurrent List, the State can also make a law with
regard to the same. The only requirement is that to validate such a law, it is
necessary to reserve the same for consideration of the President of India and
obtain his assent. When such an assent is obtained, the provisions of the
State Law or Act so enacted would prevail in the State concerned,
notwithstanding its repugnancy with an earlier Parliamentary enactment
made on the subject. It is not in dispute that in the present case also, the
State Act was reserved for consideration of the President of India and the
assent of the President of India has been obtained. As such, the State Act so
enacted would prevail in the State of Kerala.
64.
It will further be pertinent to note that in the case of MP Rural 2012,
the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (State enactment)
provided for mandatory statutory arbitration in the State of M.P. irrespective
of the arbitration agreement in respect of works contracts in the State of M.P.
or its instrumentalities. An argument was sought to be made on behalf of the
claimants that the State Act was repugnant to the 1996 Act and that in view
of Section 85 of the 1996 Act, the M.P. Act, 1983 stood impliedly repealed.
There was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges on the
Bench. A.K. Ganguly, J., on the Bench, observed thus:
“38. The argument of repugnancy is also not tenable. Entry 13 of the
Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution runs as
follows:
“13. Civil procedure, including all matters included in the Code of
Civil Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution,
limitation and arbitration.” In view of the aforesaid entry, the
State Government is competent to enact laws in relation to
arbitration.
39. The M.P. Act of 1983 was made when the previous Arbitration Act of
1940 was in the field. That Act of 1940 was a Central law. Both the
Acts operated in view of Section 46 of the 1940 Act. The M.P. Act, 1983
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was reserved for the assent of the President and admittedly received the
same on 17101983 which was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette
Extraordinary dated 12 101983. Therefore, the requirement of Article
254(2) of the Constitution was satisfied. Thus, the M.P. Act of 1983
prevails in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Thereafter, the AC Act, 1996
was enacted by Parliament repealing the earlier laws of arbitration of
1940. It has also been noted that the AC Act, 1996 saves the provisions
of the M.P. Act, 1983 under Sections 2(4) and 2(5) thereof. Therefore,
there cannot be any repugnancy. (See the judgment of this Court in T.
Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe [(1983) 1 SCC 177 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 143 :AIR 1983
SC 150].)
40.
In this connection the observations made by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India are very
pertinent and the following observations are excerpted: (SCC p. 450,
para 37)
“37… It is, therefore, clear that in view of this clear intention of
the legislature there can be no room for any argument that the
State Act was in any way repugnant to the Central Acts. We have
already pointed out from the decisions of the Federal Court and
this Court that one of the important tests to find out as to
whether or not there is repugnancy is to ascertain the intention of
the legislature regarding the fact that the dominant legislature
allowed the subordinate legislature to operate in the same field
pari passu the State Act.”
41. It is clear from the aforesaid observations that in the instant case
the latter Act made by Parliament i.e. the AC Act, 1996 clearly showed
an intention to the effect that the State law of arbitration i.e. the M.P.
Act should operate in the State of Madhya Pradesh in respect of certain
specified types of arbitrations which are under the M.P. Act, 1983. This
is clear from Sections 2(4) and 2(5) of the AC Act, 1996. Therefore, there
is no substance in the argument of repugnancy and is accordingly
rejected.”
19.
Per contra, Mr. Lollen, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the
appellate structure provided under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil
Courts(Amendment) Act, 2022, is a special statutory provision governing
customary adjudicatory institutions in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The
learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the right of appeal under the
said provision being a creature of statute, its form and extent are controlled by a
statute forming such rights under the Civil Courts Act. He also submits that the
amendment of Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts(Amendment)
Act, 2022, specifically provides that against the decision of the Inter Village
Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court, an appeal shall lie before the
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ordinary Civil Courts, namely, Civil Judge(Junior Division), Civil Judge(Senior
Division), Additional District Judge, or, District Judge, as the case may be
depending upon the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. He further submits that
as Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, creates such a special
appellate forum and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Civil
Judge(Senior Division), in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by the Statute, does
not call for interference. Hence, Mr. Lollen, learned counsel for the respondent,
prays for dismissal of the instant Civil Revision Petition.
20.
In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent has
relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh & Anr. v. Commercial Engineers and Body Building Company
Limited, reported in 2022 Supreme (SC) 1053. Paragraph 6 of the said
decision reads as under:
“Paragraph 6- The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special
procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial
institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filling
of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be
allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly
barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the
jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution,
nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence
demands that the court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said
constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not
have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should
have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism
provided by the Act.”
21.
Upon consideration of the pleadings and the submissions advanced by the
learned
counsel
for
the
parties;
the
principal
question
that
arises
for
determination by this Court is:
(i) whether after adjudication by the Inter Village Territorial Customary
Court/Apex Customary Court while exercising the appellate jurisdiction over
the decision of a village authority/Customary Court, a further appeal lies
before the Civil Judge(Senior Division) under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal
Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, or, whether only a “Second
Appeal” under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, lies before the
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High Court.
22.
For proper consideration and appreciation of the matter at hand, Section
15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, assumes
significance and therefore, the same is reproduced hereinbelow, for ready
reference:
“(iii) After the fourth proviso to sub-section (3) of section 15, the following subsection shall be inserted, (4) An appeal from the village Authority, if agreed to by the parties,
shall lie before the inter-village territorial Customary Court or Apex
Customary Court, by whatever name called, which shall settle the case
as per the local Territorial customary laws under the provisions of
section 40 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation,
1945.
Provided that, an appeal against the order of the inter-village
territorial court or Apex Customary Court shall lie before the Courts of
Civil Judge Junior Division, the Courts of Civil Judge Senior Division,
the Courts of Additional District Judge or the Courts of District Judge,
as the case may be, as per their territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction.
Provided further that, the courts of Civil Judge Junior Division,
the Courts of Civil Judge Senior Division, the Courts of Additional
District Judge or the Courts of District Judge, as the case may be, shall
not set aside an appeal so filed merely on technical ground or
procedural lapses but in the interest of justice shall dispose of the same
as may be deemed appropriate or proceed with the case de novo.”
23.
The above proviso inserted by the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts
(Amendment) Act, 2022, and further, amended in 2023, specifically provides that:
(i).
an appeal from the village authority/Customary Court shall lie before
the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court;
and
(ii).
an appeal against the order of the Inter Village Territorial Customary
Court/Apex Customary Court shall lie before the Civil Courts, namely,
Civil Judge(Junior Division), Civil Judge(Senior Division), Additional
District Judge, or, District Judge, as the case may be depending upon
the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction.
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24.
It is seen that the language employed by the Legislature is explicit and
unambiguous.
25.
The statute itself creates a separate hierarchy concerning decisions
rendered by the village authority and the Customary Courts. The contention of
the petitioner is that since the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex
Customary Court exercised the appellate jurisdiction in the present case, the
subsequent appeal filed by the respondent before the Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Aalo, amounts to a “Second Appeal”, which under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, would lie only before the High Court. In view of the
observation made above that the provision under sub-section (4) of the Section
15 of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022 is clear and
unambiguous, that the appeal against the order passed by the Inter Village
Territorial Customary Court/Apex Court shall lie before the Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Civil Judge (Senior Division), Additional District Judge, or, District
Judge, as the case may be depending upon the territorial and pecuniary
jurisdiction; this contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted.
26.
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applies to “Second
Appeal” arising from the appellate order/decrees passed under the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by Courts subordinate to the High Court.
However, the appellate authority/ structure created under Section 15(4) of the
Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, is a special statutory
provision governing customary adjudicatory institutions in the State of Arunachal
Pradesh. The right of appeal being a creature of statute, its form and extent are
controlled by statute forming such rights under the Civil Courts Act.
27.
The amended Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts
(Amendment) Act, 2022, specifically provides that a statutory appeal against the
decision of the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court
whatever name called, shall lie before the ordinary Civil Courts, namely, Civil
Judge (Junior Division), Civil Judge(Senior Division), Additional District Judge, or,
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District Judge, depending upon the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. The
provisions do not distinguish whether the Inter Village Territorial Customary
Court/Apex Customary Court exercised original or appellate jurisdiction. Had the
Legislature intended that orders passed by the Inter Village Territorial Customary
Court/Apex Customary Court in appellate jurisdiction, would be directly amenable
to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before the High Court; the
statute would have expressly so provided. However, on the contrary, the proviso
clearly demonstrates the legislative intent that even orders of the Inter Village
Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court are open to challenge before
the regular Civil Courts, as the case may be, constituted under the Act. Thus,
merely, because the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary
Court possesses both original and appellate jurisdiction does not ipso facto attract
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The nomenclature “Second
Appeal” under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, cannot override the special
appeal provision expressly provided and enacted under Section 15(4) of the
Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts(Amendment) Act, 2022.
28.
This Court has carefully considered the authorities cited by the learned
senior counsel for the petitioner viz. Kulwant Kaur(supra) and James Varghese
(supra). However, the said judgments do not support the case of the petitioner.
Both the decisions primarily deal with the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254
of the Constitution of India and the circumstances in which an enactment of the
State legislature may be held inconsistent with a Parliamentary law operating in
the same field. In the present case, no such irreconcilable inconsistency arises. As
observed earlier, Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, creates
a special statutory appellate mechanism governing the decisions of the village
authorities and customary Courts. The Act expressly provides the forum of
appeal. Therefore, the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions are
distinguishable and do not establish any repugnancy between Section 15(4) of
the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act and Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
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29.
It is also a settled law that where the special statute provides for a
particular forum and procedure of appeal, the same prevails over the general
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the learned Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Aalo, committed no jurisdictional error in entertaining the
appeal preferred by the respondent under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh
Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, read with Section 96 and Order 41 Rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
30.
In view of the above, the interim order staying the operation of the
impugned order dated 21.02.2026, passed by the Inter Village Territorial
Customary Court (Keba)/Apex Customary Court, Basar, is also an interlocutory
order passed within the jurisdiction and no patent perversity or jurisdictional error
is made-out warranting interference of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
31.
Accordingly, this Court holds that:
(i).
The appeal preferred by the respondent before the learned Civil
Judge(Senior Division), Aalo, against the order of the Inter Village
Territorial Customary Court(Keba), is maintainable under Section
15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022;
(ii). Such appeal cannot be treated as a “Second Appeal” under Section
100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, directly maintainable before
the High Court; and
(iii). The order dated 13.03.2026, admitting the appeal and granting
interim stay, does not suffer from any jurisdictional error warranting
interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.
32. Consequently, the instant Civil Revision Petition stands dismissed. However,
there shall be no order as to costs.
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33.
The learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), Aalo, shall proceed with the appeal
preferred by the respondent, in accordance with law.
34.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
JUDGE
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