Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
CONTEMPT CASE NO.4802 OF 2024
Between:
1. BODDU RATTAIAH, S/O. LATE KOTESWARA RAO, AGE. 63 YEARS,
RETIRED DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
BOSE ROAD, TENALI, R/O. D.NO.2-9-2, GANDHI NAGAR, TENALI, 522201
...PETITIONER
AND
1. R R SINGH, CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE ORIENTAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, CORPORATE OFFICE, BLOCK NO.4 - PLATE A,
NBCC OFFICE COMPLEX, KIDWAI NAGAR EAST, NEW DELHI-110023
2. SRI TARUN KANTI MOHANTY, DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER (H.R), THE
ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, CORPORATE OFFICE, BLOCK NO.4PLATE A 1 NBCC OFFICE COMPLEX, KIDWAI NAGAR EAST, NEW
DELHI-110023.
3. SRI KOTA KOTESWARA RAO, DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, THE
ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, REGIONAL OFFICE, D.NO.28-1-1,
2ND FLOOR, SRI NITYA COMPLEX,
RAMA TALKIES ROAD, CBM
COMPOUND,
DWARAKA NAGAR, VISAKHAPATNAM,
ANDHRA
PRADESH, 530003
4. P SATISH BABU, REGIONAL MANAGER PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO
REGIONAL OFFICER NEAR RAMA
TALKIES DWARAKA NAGAR VISAKHAPATNAM A P 530016 R4 IS
IMPLEADED AS PER COURT ORDER DATED 03 02 2025 VIDE I A NO 1 OF
2025 IN CC NO 4802 OF 2024
...CONTEMNOR(S):
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 31.12.2025
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals?
Yes/No
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
_____________________________________
JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
* HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
+ CONTEMPT CASE NO.4802 OF 2024
% 31.12.2025
# BODDU RATTAIAH, S/O. LATE KOTESWARA RAO, AGE. 63 YEARS, RETIRED
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, BOSE ROAD,
TENALI, R/O. D.NO.2-9-2, GANDHI NAGAR, TENALI, 522201
.. Petitioner
Vs.
$ R R SINGH, CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE ORIENTAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, CORPORATE OFFICE, BLOCK NO.4 - PLATE A,
NBCC OFFICE COMPLEX, KIDWAI NAGAR EAST, NEW DELHI-110023 and
three others
.. Contemnors
! Counsel for petitioner: Sri P V RAMANA
^ Counsel for respondents: Sri P BHASKAR
? CASES REFERRED:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
(2020) 17 SCC 305
AIR 2002 SCC 2215
AIR 2014 SUPREME COURT 950
AIR 2002 Supreme Court 2215
AIR 2014 SUPREME COURT 950
APHC010589532024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
[3329]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY,THE THIRTY FIRST DAY OF DECEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU
NIMMAGADDA
CONTEMPT CASE NO: 4802/2024
Between:
1. BODDU RATTAIAH, S/O. LATE KOTESWARA RAO, AGE. 63
YEARS, RETIRED DEVELOPMENT OFFICER,
ORIENTAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, BOSE ROAD, TENALI, R/O. D.NO.29-2, GANDHI NAGAR, TENALI, 522201
...PETITIONER
AND
1. R R SINGH, CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE
ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, CORPORATE OFFICE,
BLOCK NO.4 - PLATE A, NBCC OFFICE COMPLEX, KIDWAI
NAGAR EAST, NEW DELHI-110023
2. SRI TARUN KANTI MOHANTY, DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER
(H.R), THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, CORPORATE
OFFICE, BLOCK NO.4-PLATE A 1 NBCC OFFICE COMPLEX,
KIDWAI NAGAR EAST, NEW DELHI-110023.
3. SRI KOTA KOTESWARA RAO, DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER,
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, REGIONAL OFFICE,
D.NO.28-1-1, 2ND FLOOR, SRI NITYA COMPLEX, RAMA
TALKIES ROAD, CBM COMPOUND,
DWARAKA NAGAR,
VISAKHAPATNAM, ANDHRA PRADESH, 530003
4. P SATISH BABU, REGIONAL MANAGER
PERSONNEL
DEPARTMENT THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO REGIONAL
OFFICER
NEAR RAMA TALKIES
DWARAKA NAGAR
VISAKHAPATNAM A P 530016 R4 IS IMPLEADED AS PER
COURT ORDER DATED 03 02 2025 VIDE I A NO 1 OF 2025 IN
CC NO 4802 OF 2024
...CONTEMNOR(S):
Petition under Sections 10 to 12 of Contempt of Courts Act 1971
praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit file herein the
High Court may be pleased to be pleased to summon and punish the
Respondents under Sections 10 and 12 of Contempt of Courts Act to
the extent not granting interest for intentionally and willfully not
implementing the orders of this Court passed in W.RNo.24837/2021
dated 28-3-2023 to the extent of interest at the rate of 12 per cent per
annum while paying a total amount of Rs.17,75,559/- under Sections 10
and 12 of Contempt of Courts Act and to pass
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. P V RAMANA
Counsel for the Contemnor(S):
1. P BHASKAR
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
CONTEMPT CASE No.4802 of 2024
This Court made the following
ORDER:1.
This Contempt Case has been filed against the orders dated
28.03.2023 in W.P.No.24837 of 2021 to the extent of interest at the rate
of 12% per annum while paying a total amount of Rs.17,75,559/- under
Sections 10 to 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
2.
W.P.No.24837 of 2021 is filed claiming the following relief:
“..to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more in the nature of Writ of
Mandamus declaring the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority in
Ref No.VPRO-CDA/CL- II/01/2017 dated 16.04.2018 "reduction of
basic pay to the minimum in the cadre of Development Officer GradeI", Orders passed by the Appellate Authority in Ref.No.590-A dated
05.07.2019 "modifying the punishment to that of reduction of basic pay
to 5 increments permanently" and the orders passed by the Revisional
Authority Ref No.495-M dated 22.04.2020 modifying the punishment to
that of "reduction of basic pay by 3 increments permanently" as illegal,
arbitrary and violation of Articles 14, 16, 21 and 311 (2) of Constitution
of India and consequently declare that the entire orders imposed are
without power and jurisdiction and the petitioner is entitled to all the
regular pay benefits without there being any reduction in the pay with
interest @ 12% on arrears and to pass such other order or orders..”
3.
On 28.03.2023, this Court allowed the writ petition with the
following direction:
“Accordingly this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order
passed by the Revisional Authority dated 22.04.2020 and order of
Appellate Authority dated 05.07.2019 and orders passed by the
Disciplinary Authority dated 16.04.2018 are hereby set aside and the
Petitioner is entitled to all the regular pay benefits in accordance with
law. No costs.”
4.
It is submitted that, the order passed by the learned single Judge
was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.581 of
2023 dated 22.01.2024.
Thereafter, the matter was carried to the
Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of SLP No.10556 of 2024 and the same
was dismissed on 26.06.2024. It is submitted that, in view of the initial
punishment order of Reduction of Basic Pay to the Minimum Time Scale
in the cadre of Development Officer Grade-I vide order dated
16.04.2018, the pay of the petitioner was reduced to minimum in the
cadre of Development Officer Grade-I till 05.07.2019 and the
punishment was modified to that of reduction of basic pay to 5
increments permanently. The said order was implemented till the
Revisional Authority modified the punishment on 22.04.2020 to that of
Reduction of Basic Pay by 3 increments permanently and the said
punishment was implemented till the retirement of the petitioner in the
month of June, 2022. The respondents calculated the incremental
arrears from the date of original punishment orders i.e. 16.04.2018 and
arrived at Rs.10,53,376/- and paid the same. The earlier pensionary
benefits like Gratuity, Earned Leave Encashment and Commuted Value
of Pension were paid without counting incremental arrears, should also
be revised. He submits that the differential amounts viz., Earned Leave
Encashment of Rs.2,49,796/-; Commuted Value of Pension Rs.98,966/; pension arrears of Rs.1,25,898/- and other differential amounts of
rs.79,523/-; thus totaling to Rs.17,75,559/- was paid to the petitioner in
the month of July, 2024.
5.
Respondent Nos.1 to 4 filed common counter affidavit, wherein it
is stated that, the petitioner had categorically admitted that a total
amount of Rs.17,75,559/- is paid and the petitioner had filed contempt
only for the interest portion which is not granted by the Courts, thus the
Contempt, as alleged by the petitioner is not maintainable. The
petitioner is claiming interest basing on his own understandings and
perceptions. A reading of the directions issued by the Courts does not
direct the respondents to pay the interest, except setting aside the
orders of the Revisional Authority, Appellate Authority and Disciplinary
Authority, while directing the petitioner that he is entitled to all regular
pay benefits in accordance with law. It is prayed that, since there is no
deliberate or intentional disobedience on the part of the respondents,
requested this Court to close the contempt proceedings against the
respondents.
6.
During hearing, Sri P.V. Ramana, learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that since the writ petition is allowed which includes
payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum, the action of the
respondents in only paying the differential amounts, without granting
12% interest are in violation of the orders of this Court. He further
submits that the respondents having suffered orders before the learned
single judge and confirmed by the Division Bench and confirmed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court allowing the W.P, W.A and SLP with interest
@12%, the question of denying the said interest portion is an act of
intentional and willful disobedience of the orders of this Court.
In
support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed
reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Bihar
vs. Meera Tiwary1, Dr. Poornima Advani vs. Government of NCT
[Civil Appeal No.2643 of 2025 dated 18.02.2025], Laxmikant Sharma
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & others [SLP (Civil) No.18907 of
2025] and judgment of High Court of Allahabad in Shiv Shankar
Mishra vs. State of U.P [SAD No.10 of 2015 dated 15.01.2015] to
(2020) 17 SCC 305
contend that appellant is entitled to the payment of interest from the
date of filing the writ petition and the appellant would also be entitled to
the payment of interest on the pensionary payment which was
unlawfully withheld and that the interest shall be admissible to the
appellant @9% p.a. With the above submissions, learned counsel for
the petitioner contended that the respondents have not complied with
the orders of this Court, obviously for reasons best known to them,
which amounts to contempt, as defined under Section 2(b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and that the respondents are liable for
punishment as per Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and
requested to punish them in accordance with law.
7.
On the other hand, Sri P. Bhaskar, learned counsel for the
respondents contended that the matter has been carried in Writ Appeal
and also before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and nowhere, there is a
direction to pay the interest as sought for in the prayer by the petitioner
herein, as such, the petitioner cannot invoke jurisdiction of this Court
under the contempt proceedings.
8.
In support of this contention, learned counsel for the respondents
placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Jharesar Prasad Paul vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly2 and Sudhir
Vasudeva, Chairman and MD, ONGC vs. M. George Ravishekaran 3.
On the strength of the principle laid in the above judgments, he could
contend that, the court has to consider the direction issued in the
judgment or order and not consider the question as to what the
judgment or order should contain. Further, if the judgment or order
does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is
any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to
direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for
clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt
jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original
proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the
judgment or order and requested to close the contempt proceedings.
9.
Heard the submissions of the respective counsel and perused the
material available on record, and also the judgments relied by the
counsels.
10.
For determination of the issues in this Contempt Case,
the following points arise for consideration:
2 AIR 2002 SCC 2215
3 AIR 2014 SUPREME COURT 950
(1) Whether once the writ petition is allowed which
amounts to allowing the entire prayer of the writ
petition in the writ petition or not ?
(2) Whether if the respondents are directed to pay all
regular pay benefits in accordance with law is
includes interest or not ?
(3) Whether non-payment of interest along with arrears /
withhold amount by the respondents is amounts to
contempt or not ?
11.
POINT No.1
It is better for the sake of discussion to extract the orders of this
Court as below:
“Accordingly this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order
passed by the Revisional Authority dated 22.04.2020 and order of
Appellate Authority dated 05.07.2019 and orders passed by the
Disciplinary Authority dated 16.04.2018 are hereby set aside and the
Petitioner is entitled to all the regular pay benefits in accordance with
law. No costs.”
The order of this Court as extracted above is expressly clear,
categorical and straightaway allowed the writ petition by setting aside all
the proceedings, due to which the petitioner’s pensionary benefits were
withheld by the respondents is contrary to law. It is settled principle of
law that once the writ petition is allowed, it means that allowing the
entire prayer in the writ petition. Therefore, it is better to extract the
prayer in the writ petition which reads as under:
“..to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more in the nature of Writ of
Mandamus declaring the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority
in Ref No.VPRO-CDA/CL- II/01/2017 dated 16.04.2018 "reduction of
basic pay to the minimum in the cadre of Development Officer GradeI", Orders passed by the Appellate Authority in Ref.No.590-A dated
05.07.2019 "modifying the punishment to that of reduction of basic
pay to 5 increments permanently" and the orders passed by the
Revisional Authority Ref No.495-M dated 22.04.2020 modifying the
punishment to that of "reduction of basic pay by 3 increments
permanently" as illegal, arbitrary and violation of Articles 14, 16, 21
and 311 (2) of Constitution of India and consequently declare that the
entire orders imposed are without power and jurisdiction and the
petitioner is entitled to all the regular pay benefits without there being
any reduction in the pay with interest @ 12% on arrears and to pass
such other order or orders..”
The prayer in the writ petition is specifically praying not only
withheld amount as entitled by the petitioner but that to be paid along
with interest @ 12% p.a and also for compensation. The admitted case
of both parties is that the respondents paid all the pensionary benefits
as entitled by the petitioner but not paid the interest as prayed. The
case of the respondents herein is that while passing orders does not
neither specifically directed nor observed about the entitlement of
interest along with regular benefits to be entitled by the petitioner. In
the absence of specific direction regarding the entitlement of interest the
petitioner is not entitled any interest even though he prayed in the writ
petition. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled only regular benefits but not
interest. The said contention of the respondents is certainly contrary to
jurisprudence under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which
explains once the writ petition is allowed, which means allowing the
prayer of the writ petition in toto.
Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered against the respondents.
12.
POINT No.2
On perusal of the 2nd limb, the order of this Court specifically
directed the respondents to pay all regular benefits in accordance with
law.
Therefore, payment of regular benefits in accordance with law
should be paid without interest or along with interest. As contended by
learned counsel for the petitioner, in view of ratios laid down by Hon’ble
Apex Court as well this Court, the settled law is that the pensionary
benefits which were erroneously withheld by the respondents should be
paid along with interest only. The said contention was upheld by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Dr. Poornima Advani vs. Government of NCT
which reads thus:
16. The concept of awarding interest on delayed payment has been
explained by this Court in the case of Authorised Officer Karnataka
Bank v. M/s R.M.S. Granites Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. in Civil Appeal No.
12294 of 2024, we quote the following observations:“It may be mentioned that there is misconception about interest.
Interest is not a penalty or punishment at all, but it is the normal
accretion on capital. For example if A had to pay B a certain
amount, say ten years ago, but he offers that amount to him today,
then he has pocketed the interest on the principal amount. Had A
paid that amount to B ten years ago, B would have invested that
amount somewhere and earned interest thereon, but instead of
that A has kept that amount with himself and earned interest on it
for this period. Hence equity demands that A should not only pay
back the principal amount but also the interest thereon to B. [See:
Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India : AIR 2007 SC 1198.]”
17. Thus, when a person is deprived of the use of his money to
which he is legitimately entitled, he has a right to be compensated
for the deprivation which may be called interest or compensation.
Interest is paid for the deprivation of the use of money in general
terms which has returned or compensation for the use or retention
by a person of a sum of money belonging to other.
18. As per Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edn.): “interest” is the
compensation fixed by agreement or allowed by law for use or
detention of money or for the loss of money of one who is entitled
to its use, especially, the amount owned to a lender in return for the
use of the borrowed money.
20. In the case of Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of
Orissa v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508, a Constitution Bench of this
Court opined that a person deprived of use of money to which he is
legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the
deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest,
compensation or damages. This is also the principle of Section 34
of the Civil Procedure Code.
25. If on facts of a case, the doctrine of restitution is attracted,
interest should follow. Restitution in its etymological sense
means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or
reversal of a decree or order what has been lost to him in
execution of decree or order of the Court or in direct
consequence of a decree or order. The term “restitution” is
used in three senses, firstly, return or restoration of some
specific thing to its rightful owner or status, secondly, the
compensation for benefits derived from wrong done to
another and, thirdly, compensation or reparation for the loss
caused to another.
26. In Hari Chand v. State of U.P., 2012 (1) AWC 316, the
Allahabad High Court dealing with similar controversy in a
stamp matter held that the payment of interest is a necessary
corollary to the retention of the money to be returned under
order of the appellate or revisional authority. The High Court
directed the State to pay interest @ 8% for the period, the
money was so retained i.e. from the date of deposit till the
date of actual repayment/refund.
31.The respondents are directed to pay an amount of
Rs.4,35,968/- (Rupees. Four Lakh Thirty Five Thousand Nine
Hundred Sixty Eight Only) towards interest within a period of
two months from today without fail.
Similarly, in State of Bihar vs. Meera Tiwari (Supra 1) Hon’ble
Apex Court observed as under:
“12. We are unable to accept the argument of the learned ASG
that the High Court modified or expanded the scope of the
original order in the writ proceedings in contempt. The concerned
authorities were directed to fully redress the grievances of the
petitioner, and/or in other words, to release the retiral dues of late
Sh. Amardeo Tiwari in full. The dues necessarily had to be
computed having regard to the salary and allowances pertaining
to the post which Sh. Amardeo Tiwari, since deceased, had held
at the time of his retirement.
15. In proceedings for contempt, the High Court is entitled to
pass orders for effective enforcement of an order of which
violation is alleged. By the order dated 21.9.2004, the High Court
directed the authorities to finalize the retiral dues on account of
Shri Amardeo Tiwari, since deceased. The High Court directed
release of the retiral dues of Shri Amardeo Tiwari, since
deceased, in entirety and not in part.”
In Shiv Shankar Mishra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others
(Supra) a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court explains the service
law, the claim of interest on delayed payment of arrears of salary as
well as pensionary benefits under Article 226 of Constitution of India as
under:
6. The present case is an unfortunate instance where an employee
has been left in the lurch after having rendered long years of service.
Both the arrears on account of salary as well as pensionary dues have
not been paid on time. When the appellant had moved a writ petition
before the Court, an order was passed on 11 September 2013
directing the payment of the admitted arrears within four months and
for immediate steps to determine the pensionary dues. This order was
not complied with following which, he was constrained to file contempt
proceedings. It is only thereafter that on 18 March 2014 the payment
of arrears of salary from August 2010 until February 2013 was made.
It was only then that the appellant was also paid arrears on account of
gratuity, pension and other retiral dues. There was no reason or
justification to withhold the payment of salary during the period when
the appellant had worked when salary fell due for payment or for the
non payment of pensionary and retiral dues, the latter within a
reasonable period of retirement. There was no lapse on the part of the
appellant. The paucity of funds cannot surely be held up as an excuse
not to pay the salary of an employee who had worked for the period
for which his salary is due. Similarly, pensionary dues constitute a
rightful entitlement of an employee. The State cannot be heard to say
that it would fail to pay the pension on time and yet excuse itself from
the liability to pay interest.
7. In the case of State of Kerala Vs M Padmanabhan Nair and Som
Prakash1, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"Pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed
by the Government to its employees on their retirement but have
become, under the decisions of this Court, valuable rights and
property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and
disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment
of interest at the current market rate till actual payment."
9.
We, therefore, have come to the conclusion that the learned
Single Judge was not justified in declining the prayer for the payment
of interest. Insofar as the payment which was made to the appellant
on 18 March 2014 is concerned, the appellant was clearly entitled to
the payment of interest from the date of the filing of the writ petition in
2010 (Writ -A No. 47141 of 2010). The appellant would also be
entitled to the payment of interest on the pensionary payment which
was unlawfully withheld from March 2014 until actual payment is
made. We direct that interest shall be admissible to the appellant at
the rate of 9% per annum from the date on which the respective
payments on account of arrears of salary, or as the case may be,
towards pensionary dues became due and payable as directed earlier.
Interest shall be computed in terms of the aforesaid directions within a
period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of
this order. The order of the learned Single Judge declining interest
shall to that extent stand set aside and be substituted by the aforesaid
directions.
As contended by learned counsel for respondents that the
judgment or order does not contain any order regarding a matter or if
there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein, then it will be
better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of for
clarification of the order instead of exercising contempt jurisdiction, for
which he relied upon the judgment in Jhareswar Prasad Paul and
another vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly and others4 which reads as under:
“The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether
there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court
and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such
disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt
jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been
dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is
alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued
in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what
the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition
be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is
primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the
party, which alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying
with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order
does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is
any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to
direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for
clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt
jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original
proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the
judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms
which are sometimes leveled against the courts exercising contempt of
court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting
substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without
proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This
will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is
AIR 2002 Supreme Court 2215
prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt
proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to
challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation
arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty
and image of courts. Judging the case in hand on the touchstone of the
principles noted above, we find that the directions issued by the
Division Bench in the impugned judgment in effect granted substantive
reliefs not covered by the judgment/order passed in the original
proceeding. In the judgment no direction was issued by the High Court
that the writ petitioners will be admitted to the cadre of Upper Division
Clerks/Assistants in the Directorate. As noted earlier, they have all
along been holding the posts of Clerk- cum-Cash Collector which are
ex-cadre posts. Entry of such persons into the cadre of Upper Division
Clerk/Assistants has to be considered taking into account various
aspects of the matter.
As contended by learned counsel for respondents, this Court
should not go beyond four corners of the order alleged to be flouted in
view of ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sudhir Vasudeva,
Chairman and MD, ONGC vs. M. George Ravishekaran and others5
which reads as under:
“15B. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to
punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both
under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb
the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt.
The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to
exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is
also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt
plea involves a process of self determination of the sweep,
meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is
alleged. Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners
of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into
questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment
or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions
which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self evident
ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as
to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of
AIR 2014 SUPREME COURT 950
the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of
equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while
considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in
other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched
upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already
expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising
jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is
more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as
noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the
cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the bar, namely,
Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly and
Others[3], V.M.Manohar Prasad vs. N. Ratnam Raju and
Another[4], Bihar Finance Service House Construction Cooperative
Society Ltd. vs. Gautam Goswami and Others[5] and Union of
India and Others vs. Subedar Devassy PV[6].”
On perusal of judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the
petitioner, it is clear and categorical that the jurisprudence of service law
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India demands claim of interest
on delayed payment of arrears of salary as well as delayed payment of
pensionary benefits in spite of direction of this Court and petitioner is
entitled for regular benefits in accordance with law.
Therefore the
jurisprudence of service law mandates payment of interest on delayed
payment of pensionary benefits. It is settled law that the pensionary
benefits of an employee like petitioner is statute right equal to the
fundamental right as defined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
i.e., right to livelihood.
Therefore, the term “regular benefits in
accordance with law” certainly includes interest. The ratio laid down by
learned counsel for the respondents since there is no specific direction,
the Court should not go beyond the orders of this Court in contempt
jurisdiction or contempt jurisprudence is not available for the
respondents since the direction is regular benefits in accordance with
law. Therefore, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for
respondents are not applicable. This Court certainly is determining the
issue within the terms of the order of this Court.
Hence Point No.2 is answered against the respondents.
13.
POINT No.3
Having held Point Nos.1 and 2 against the respondents as stated
supra, the impugned action of the respondents is contrary to the
jurisprudence of service law in view of settled principle of law as held by
Hon’ble Apex Court that pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty
to be distributed by the Government to its employees on their retirement
but have become, under the decisions of this Court, valuable rights and
property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and
disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of
interest at the current market rate till actual payment. Therefore, the
action of the respondents certainly amounts to deviation to the orders of
this Court and the respondents not complied with the orders of this
Court in true spirit as directed. Hence the respondents are liable for
punishment under Sections 10 and 12 of Contempt of Court Act, 1971.
14.
In view of forgoing discussions, Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are
liable to pay Rs.2,000/- each as costs for violation of law to be payable
in favour of the Member Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Legal
Services Authority, High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi within
a period of four (04) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order and after such payment the cost memo shall be filed with the
Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati within
one (01) week thereafter.
15. Accordingly, the Contempt Case is allowed.
Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this
contempt case shall stand closed.
_____________________________________
JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
Date:31.12.2025
krk
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
CONTEMPT CASE NO.4802 of 2024
NOTE: LR copy to be marked
Date:31.12.2025
W
krk
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review