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Serial No. 07
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.A.No.3/2011 with
Crl.M.C.No.75/2022
Date of order: 03.10.2023
Union of India
vs.
Shri Atindranath Sarkar & ors
Biplob Haldar
vs.
Union of India (Customs)
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
: Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. K. Gurung, Adv
For the Respondents : Mr. S. Kumar, Adv with
Ms. R. Kharkongor, Adv
Ms. N. Kharsahnoh, Adv
i)
Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
The short question that arises in this appeal is as to the effect of
admitted non-compliance with the condition laid down in the second
proviso to Section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 and the impact of such non-compliance on the
seizure.
2.
By the judgment and order impugned dated February 22, 2011,
the two accused persons were acquitted by the trial court primarily on
the ground that the sanctity of the seizure of contraband could not be
accepted and on an incidental ground that Section 55 of the said Act had
also not been complied with.
3.
The Union, through the Customs Department, is in appeal since
it was a Customs official who had made the alleged recovery.
According to the Union, there was substantial compliance with the
relevant provision and, in any event, since the recovery was made from
a vehicle in a public place, the trial court ought to have read the
situation in the light of Section 43 of the said Act instead of Section 42
thereof. As to the incidental ground indicated in the impugned judgment
pertaining to Section 55 of the said Act, the Union claims that such
provision would have no manner of application since the seizure in this
case was not by the police but by Customs authorities. The Union
submits that the appropriate provision in this case, instead of Section 55
of the Act, would have been Section 52(3)(b) thereof. However, the
Union contends that in the light of the much larger issue as to whether
the conditions precedent to the applicability of Section 42 of the Act
were complied with, it is only upon the Union succeeding on such
aspect would it be necessary to go into the incidental aspect, whether
under Section 55 or under Section 52(3)(b) of the Act.
4.
It is, thus, that the matter is taken up for consideration, primarily
as to whether it was necessary to comply with Section 42 of the Act or
the conditions precedent to its application; or, whether by virtue of
Section 43 of the Act, the strict rigours of Section 42 of the Act need
not have been adhered to.
5.
Sections 42 and 43 of the said Act have to be seen in the context
of Section 41 thereof and as distinct situations which are exceptions to
the rule which is recognised in Section 41 of the Act. Section 41 of the
Act is the first provision in Chapter V of the said Act. The relevant
chapter covers Sections 41 to 68 and is intituled as “Procedure”. Such
chapter is followed by an entire chapter which has been incorporated by
an amendment and covers forfeiture of illegally acquired property.
6.
Section 41 of the Act recognises the power to issue a warrant
and authorisation, inter alia, for the arrest and for the search, whether by
day or by night, of any building, conveyance or place, in certain
circumstances. In either case of issuing a warrant or authorisation, it is a
high official as a designated magistrate or a gazetted officer who must
have reason to believe that action in terms of such provision is required
to be taken.
7.
Section 41(1) of the Act authorises a metropolitan magistrate or
a magistrate of the first class or any magistrate of the second class
specially empowered by the State government to issue a warrant,
whether the purpose for issuance of the warrant is for the arrest of any
person whom such magistrate has reason to believe to have committed
any offence punishable under the Act or for the search of any building,
conveyance or place in which such magistrate has reason to believe that
any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in
respect of which an offence punishable under the Act has been
committed is kept or concealed. The search can be by day or by night
pursuant to such warrant. In addition, the search-warrant authorised by
such provision may pertain to any document or other article which may
furnish evidence of the commission of any offence under the Act or any
illegally acquired property and may also relate to any article which may
furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is
liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of the Act.
8.
Sub-section (2) of Section 41 of the Act confers similar
authority on a gazetted officer, whether of the Central government or of
the State government, and from various departments as long as such
official is empowered in such behalf by a special or general order by the
appropriate government.
9.
Section 41(3) of the Act gives authority to the officer in whose
favour a warrant under Section 41(1) of the Act is issued or authority
under Section 41(2) of the Act is conferred to have all the powers of an
officer acting under Section 42 of the Act.
10.
It is now necessary to see the entirety of Section 42 of the Act
and even refer to Section 43 thereof since certain judgments have been
cited on behalf of the Union which, on the face of it, appear to have
been in serious confusion as to the applicability of Sections 42 and 43 of
the Act and have, quite erroneously, used the two provisions as
interchangeable. Sections 42 and 43 are set out:
“42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without
warrant or authorisation.– (1) Any such officer (being an
officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the
departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue
intelligence or any other department of the Central Government
including para-military forces or armed forces as is empowered
in this behalf by general or special order by the Central
Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior in
rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs
control, excise, police or any other department of a State
Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special
order of the State Government, if he has reason to believe from
personal knowledge or information given by any person and
taken down in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic
substance, or controlled substance in respect of which an
offence punishable under this Act has been committed or any
document or other article which may furnish evidence of the
commission of such offence or any illegally acquired property or
any document or other article which may furnish evidence of
holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for
seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act is
kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed
place, may between sunrise and sunset,–
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
enter into and search any such building, conveyance
or place;
in case of resistance, break open any door and
remove any obstacle to such entry;
seize such drug or substance and all materials used
in the manufacture thereof and any other article and
any animal or conveyance which he has reason to
believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act
and any document or other article which he has
reason to believe may furnish evidence of the
commission of any offence punishable under this
Act or furnish evidence of holding any illegally
acquired property which is liable for seizure or
freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act;
and
detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any
person whom he has reason to believe to have
committed any offence punishable under this Act:
Provided that in respect of holder of a licence for manufacture of
manufactured drugs or psychotropic substances or controlled
substances, granted under this Act or any rule or order made
thereunder, such power shall be exercised by an officer not
below the rank of sub-inspector:
Provided further that if such officer has reason to believe that a
search warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without
affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility
for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such
building, conveyance or enclosed place at any time between
sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief.
(2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing
under sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the
proviso thereto, he shall within seventy-two hours send a copy
thereof to his immediate official superior.”
“43. Power of seizure and arrest in public place.– Any officer
of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 may–
(a)
(b)
seize in any public place or in transit, any narcotic
drug or psychotropic substance or controlled
substance in respect of which he has reason to
believe an offence punishable under this Act has
been committed, and, along with such drug or
substance, any animal or conveyance or article liable
to confiscation under this Act, any document or
other article which he has reason to believe may
furnish evidence of the commission of an offence
punishable under this Act of any document or other
article which may furnish evidence of holding any
illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure
of freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this
Act;
detain and search any person whom he has reason to
believe to have committed an offence punishable
under this Act, and if such person has any narcotic
drug or psychotropic substance or controlled
substance in his possession and such possession
appears to him to be unlawful, arrest him and any
other person in his company.
Explanation.– For the purposes of this section, the expression
“public place” includes any public conveyance, hotel, shop, or
other place intended for use by, or accessible to, the public.”
11.
Section 42 of the Act permits any officer above the rank of
peon, sepoy or constable of the State and Central governments, if
empowered in such regard by the appropriate government by any
general or special order, “if he has reason to believe from personal
knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in
writing” that any substance in respect of which an offence punishable
under the Act has been committed or any document or other article
which may furnish such evidence or any illegally acquired property or
any other document or other article which may furnish evidence of
holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or
freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of the Act is kept concealed in
any building, conveyance or enclosed place; to undertake the acts and
activities enumerated in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the sub-section,
provided that such act or activity is conducted between sunrise and
sunset. The only pre-condition is that the relevant official must record
the information given by any other person in writing that gives him the
reason to believe that any offence under the Act has been committed or
any incriminating material may be discovered or contraband recovered.
12.
For the present discussion, the first proviso to Section 42(1) of
the Act is not relevant. The second proviso to Section 42(1) of the Act
has carved out an exception from the substantive provision by
indicating the special procedure to be followed if the search or the like
is to be conducted between sunset and sunrise. The additional
requirement in such a scenario is that the concerned official should have
recorded the grounds of his belief as to why a search warrant or
authorisation, in accordance with Section 41 of the Act, could not have
been obtained without compromising the purpose of the exercise. In
other words, as long as an official above the rank of peon, sepoy or
constable is empowered generally or specially to carry out a search
under the Act, such person would have the authority to do the things
indicated in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1) of the Act during the
period of daylight hours between sunrise and sunset, on personal
knowledge or upon receiving information from which he has reason to
believe that any offence under the Act has been committed or such
information pertains to anything which ought to be seized or frozen or
forfeited under Chapter VA of the Act. As long as the relevant person is
empowered, as long as such person records the information received
from another and as long as any of the activities indicated in clauses (a)
to (d) of Section 42(1) of the Act is to be conducted by such official
between sunrise and sunset, he can go ahead and do the same.
13.
However, if the activities indicated in clauses (a) to (d) of
Section 42(1) of the Act were to be undertaken at a time not between
sunrise and sunset but between sunset and sunrise, the additional duty
cast upon the relevant official is to record reasons of his belief that
unless such search was conducted at such hour, the purpose of the
exercise would be defeated or the evidence would be lost. The second
proviso to Section 42(1) of the Act mandates that when a search or like
activity under Section 42(1) of the Act is to be conducted between
sunset and sunrise, a warrant or an authorisation in terms of Section 41
of the Act would have to be obtained. The need to record reasons to
dispense with such requirement is the ground of practicality, when there
may not be enough time for the same. The recording of the grounds of
impracticality or inadequacy of time is in lieu of the warrant or
authorisation.
14.
There is a further duty cast on the concerned official referred to
in the relevant provision. Such official is free to do all that he is
otherwise empowered under Section 42(1) of the Act and also at a time
between sunset and sunrise as long as he complies with the second
proviso to Section 42(1) of the Act and, in addition, within 72 hours of
making the recording under such provision, such official forwards
whatever he was required to record to his immediate official superior.
15.
It is evident, therefore, on a plain reading of the relevant
provision that it is only when some information is received by an
empowered official that he can enter into any building, conveyance or
enclosed place between sunrise and sunset for the purpose of searching
or seizing or arresting without any warrant or authorisation in terms of
Section 41 of the Act. By virtue of the second proviso to Section 42(1)
of the Act, he is further empowered to do all such activities between
sunset and sunrise, ordinarily, by obtaining a prior warrant or
authorisation; or, in extraordinary circumstances, only upon recording
his belief or reasons as to why it is imperative so to do without
obtaining any warrant or authorisation. The only additional requirement
is to communicate such recording of grounds to his superior within 72
hours of recording the same in terms of Section 42(2) of the Act.
16.
In a manner of speaking, the strict requirements under Section
41 of the Act are diluted to meet the exigencies of the situation if a
scenario in terms of Section 42(1) of the Act arises and it leaves a small
window of time to take action. Further, the additional restriction
between sunset and sunrise has also been removed upon a suitable
condition in respect thereof being provided by virtue of the second
proviso to Section 42(1) of the Act and the safeguard in Section 42(2)
thereof.
17.
Now to turn to Section 43 of the Act. There is no doubt that
Section 43 of the Act, and even Section 49 of the Act that comes later,
are also exceptions to the general rule in Section 41 of the Act just as
Section 42 of the Act is another species of exception to the general rule
in Section 41 of the Act. However, Section 42 of the Act can never be
mixed up with Section 43 of the Act though Section 43 and Section 49
of the Act may be of a somewhat similar nature.
18.
On the one hand, Section 42 of the Act envisages action on the
basis of personal knowledge or information being received but
contemplates that despite receipt of such knowledge or information,
there may not be enough time to either obtain a warrant or obtain an
authorisation in terms of Section 41 of the Act. In such a scenario, an
empowered officer is permitted to go ahead and do whatever he could
have done upon obtaining a warrant or an authorisation under Section
41 of the Act, provided that the search or other activity that he
undertakes is within daylight hours between sunrise and sunset. The
legislature then contemplated that there could also be a scenario where
it was necessary to intervene during night hours or between sunset and
sunrise and the time available may not be sufficient to obtain either a
warrant or an authorisation in terms of Section 41 of the Act.
Accordingly, the legislature added an additional condition in such
regard to the other condition already included in the substantive part of
Section 42(1) of the Act by way of the second proviso thereto. As long
as in a search or the like activity being conducted between sunrise and
sunset, the fact that the information has been received that leads to
reason to believe is recorded, the empowered official has all the
authority as if he was supported either by a warrant or by an
authorisation in terms of Section 41 of the Act. Where such search or
other activity has per force to be conducted between sunset and sunrise,
or else the evidence would be lost, upon recording the additional reason,
the search or other activity may be conducted by the empowered official
without obtaining any warrant or authorisation as long as all the grounds
are forwarded, within 72 hours of the recording, to the immediate
official superior of the empowered official.
19.
Section 43 of the Act is not based on personal knowledge or any
information being received as to any offence under the Act having been
committed or as to anything that may be seized or frozen or forfeited
under Chapter VA of the Act or pertaining to any illegally acquired
property in terms of the Act.
20.
Section 43 of the Act covers what is come to be known as a
chance recovery. When an empowered official undertakes checking
activities in a public place, say, looking for an escaped convict or for
extremists or for illegal arms or in course of security operations
pertaining to any high official and incidentally comes across any
prohibited substance in respect of which he has reason to believe that an
offence under the Act has been committed, he may proceed to seize any
incriminating material, or detain and search any person if he has reason
to believe such person may have committed any offence. Such
empowered official also has the authority to recover anything
contraband from any person‟s possession. Section 49 of the Act extends
the similar provision to any animal or conveyance which is used to ferry
contraband, though such provision is not confined to any public place.
Further, like Section 42 of the Act, Section 49 of the Act also requires
the previous reason to suspect that the animal or conveyance is or is
about to be used to transport any contraband.
21.
The distinction between the scenario covered by Section 42 of
the Act and that under Section 43 thereof is obvious: in the first, the
concerned official has some reason to believe of any offence under the
Act having been committed and there is likelihood of discovery of any
material to substantiate the suspicion. In the second case, there is no
suspicion as to the commission of any offence under the Act. It is only
in course of conducting another activity that a concerned official has
reason to believe, incidentally, of the commission of an offence under
the Act of 1985 that Section 43 of the Act is triggered off. The two
distinct situations covered by the differently worded provisions of
Section 42 and Section 43 of the Act cannot be seen in the same light or
even compared.
22.
Indeed, the very kind of places indicated in Section 42 and the
kind of places indicated in Section 43 of the Act show the extent of
distinction sought to be made by the legislature in such regard. No one
would have, or ought to have, any reason to enter into any building or
like place unless there is an element of reasonable suspicion. The
number of places covered by Section 42 of the Act has been extended to
conveyance, in addition to building and has generally been kept open,
without being exhaustive, in the use of the word “place” at the end. But
the suspicion has to be there and the place can even be a packet left
hanging from somewhere as long as there is some reason to believe
based on personal knowledge of the empowered official or on the
information in such regard received from any other person, which
information is recorded in writing.
23.
Section 43 of the Act, however, is extended to public places
since the general screening or combing or scrutiny would be conducted
in a public place and may, generally, not involve entering into a
building or the like. Thus, the larger sense that the word “conveyance”
conveys both in Sections 42 and 43 of the Act would include vehicles.
But in terms of Section 42 of the Act, the vehicle could be parked inside
any premise or within a garage and there may be information of some
contraband therein. In the Section 43 scenario, however, this can never
be as the vehicle has to be in a public place and must have been stopped
in the usual course of the checking or the combing operation undertaken
by the authorities or the concerned official.
24.
In short, nothing in Section 42 of the Act can take colour from
anything contained in Section 43 thereof and vice versa as they cover
mutually exclusive situations.
25.
There is a cardinal principle that when a law requires a certain
thing to be done in a certain manner, such thing has to be done in such
manner or not at all. The rule attaches with greater force when there are
harsh consequences for committing a particular act. In such a case,
when the procedure established by a particular provision in the relevant
statute requires adherence thereto, the failure to comply with the
relevant conditions will free the accused of the harsh consequence of the
statute.
26.
There are several provisions in the Act of 1985 that would
require strict compliance. The search and seizure provision would
require a degree of seriousness to be attached thereto. The Act
recognises that since the activity of producing, manufacturing and
transporting drugs is generally clandestine, any delay in taking steps
may result in the delayed steps being futile. It is for such purpose that
the rule has been enunciated in Section 41 of the Act before the general
exigencies have been recognised in Section 42 thereof and a special
exigency in the second proviso to Section 42(1) of the Act and, as a
consequence, the rule in Section 41 of the Act has been relaxed.
27.
There is also a purpose for providing a different provision as in
Section 43 of the Act for an accidental or chance recovery which is not
based on any prior information or suspicion or reason to believe in the
commission of an offence under the Act. Even the limited rigours under
Section 42 of the Act, thus, stand relaxed and are absent from a scenario
covered by Section 43 of the Act.
28.
But that does not mean that the two provisions are
interchangeable and when a recovery is made from a vehicle, the fact
that previous information may or may not have been available is
irrelevant. That would make a mockery of the statute and the relevant
provisions. There is a clear distinction in what is to be done upon
information being received and upon having reason to suspect an
offence under the Act having been committed and in a situation where
there is no such reason to believe or harbour any suspicion in such
regard.
29.
In a sense, Section 43 of the Act is the residuary provision
pertaining to the rule in Section 41 of the Act. Such residuary provision
cannot be resorted to, as is the sacrosanct principle in statutory
interpretation, when there is a specific provision in such regard. Section
49 of the Act is a special provision confined to modes of transportation
used for ferrying any prohibited substance.
30.
In the present case, it is the admitted position that information
pertaining to a particular truck carrying drugs was received by the
concerned Customs official, who examined himself as PW-8 at the trial,
at 4:30 am on March 20, 2009. The information received was that the
truck had or was about to leave Silchar at that time and that such truck
was carrying some prohibited substance.
31.
Such Customs official, who was otherwise empowered under
Section 42 of the Act, proceeded to record in writing the information
that he received. However, at the trial, such official candidly and
unreservedly admitted that though the relevant truck was apprehended
at or about 1 am on March 21, 2009, he had not recorded any grounds
for proceeding with the search between sunset and sunrise without
seeking any warrant or authorisation or run the risk of missing the truck
altogether.
32.
Once so much was admitted that the search was conducted
between sunset and sunrise and the additional condition required in the
second proviso to Section 42(1) of the Act was not complied with, the
entire search operation would be suspect and would be otherwise than in
accordance with law and, consequently, vitiated. As a result of the
concerned official not complying with the additional requirement in the
second proviso to Section 42(1) of the Act, there was no vetting of the
requisite grounds in terms of Section 42(2) of the Act by any immediate
official superior.
33.
Since the general rule as to search and seizure is recorded in
Section 41 of the Act and an exception is carved out therefrom in
Section 42(1) thereof, the exception would be limited to all that is
covered by Section 42(1) thereof and nothing beyond. When a further
exception, in addition to the general exception under Section 42(1) of
the Act, is made out in the application of the general rule recognised in
Section 41 of the Act, and a condition imposed for such further
exception to apply, the non-adherence to the condition would not permit
the provision as to the additional exception to be availed of. This is
elementary in interpreting the effect of a statute and its provisions.
34.
The circumstances that revealed themselves at the trial rightly
attracted the attention of the Court. The trial court was justified in
coming to the conclusion that since the condition precedent to the
additional exception envisaged by the second proviso to Section 42(1)
of the Act had not been complied with, the concerned official had no
authority to undertake the search or any related exercise. In the absence
of such authority and the statutory bar as a consequence of Section 41 of
the Act, all that followed had to be regarded as irrelevant.
35.
It is in such circumstances that the Union submits that if the
Union‟s contention on substantial compliance of Section 42 of the Act
is not upheld, the further ground under Section 55 of the Act would not
be required to be looked into.
36.
In addition, the Union fairly submits, as is expected of such
exalted litigant, that though the trial court overlooked the matter, it is
also the admitted position that Section 52A of the Act was also not
complied with in the present case.
37.
The Union has referred to three judgments in support of its
contention that when it was a vehicle that was being searched and such
search was conducted in a public place, the strict conditions under
Section 42 of the Act would not apply.
38.
In the first of the cases cited, reported at (2006) 9 SCC 170
(Union of India v. Major Singh), there is the following paragraph 4 from
the report which is placed:
“4. Turning now to Section 42(2) of the Act, in this regard, it
may be stated that from the prosecution case and evidence it
would be clear that the search and seizure was made of a public
carrier at a public place and 127 bags of poppy straw (opium)
were seized from a public carrier. This point is also concluded
by a judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Jarnail Singh
in which it has been categorically laid down that if a public
conveyance is searched in a public place, the officer making the
search is not required to record his satisfaction as contemplated
by the proviso to Section 42 for searching the vehicle between
sunset and sunrise. In the case in hand the search was made of a
public conveyance at a public place between sunrise and sunset.
Therefore, the provisions of Section 42(2) of the Act shall have
no application to the case. This being the position, the High
Court was not justified in acquitting the respondents and the trial
court was quite justified in convicting them.”
39.
However, the relevant order cited runs into just about a page and
spills over five paragraphs without the basic facts being revealed
therein. It is not indicated in the report whether the relevant case was
one based on personal knowledge or information received as to the
commission of offence or as a case of chance recovery only.
40.
Accordingly, the dictum, so to say, may not be read as wide as
canvassed by the appellant, in the absence of the relevant facts being
evident.
41.
A Punjab and Haryana judgment has next been brought by the
Union which is reported at 2002 SCC OnLine P&H 762 (Dharminder
Kumar v. State of Punjab). The facts in such case are recorded at
paragraph 2 of the report. In that case, some secret information was
received and within a short time of receipt of the information, the
vehicle carrying the contraband was apprehended and the offending
material recovered therefrom. An argument was made that Section
42(2) of the Act had not been complied with in that case. Upon noticing
such requisite condition, a Division Bench of the High Court referred to
both Sections 42 and 43 of the Act before recording as follows at
paragraph 10 thereof:
“10. While Section 42 empowers the officers of the specified
departments to carry out search, seizure and arrest in any
building, conveyance or enclosed place, Section 43 deals with
the similar power of seizure and arrest in public places. Powers
under both these sections can be exercised if the concerned
officer has reason to believe that some offence relating to
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances has been committed.
Section 49 is another section in the series which empowers
officers to stop and search animals and conveyance used for
illegal transport of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
The words building, conveyance and enclosed place as used in
Section 42 have been used for the specific purpose of protecting
the persons who are living in the buildings, conveyance and
enclosed place. The Legislature in its wisdom considered proper
to draw a demarcating line between building, conveyance and
enclosed place on one side and public place or in transit on the
other side. The words have been specifically mentioned to show
the demarcating line between the two otherwise, the legislature
could have used any place instead of narrating the words
„building, conveyance or enclosed place‟. Even a private open
place does not fall within the purview of Section 42 unless it is
enclosed. So, this demarcating line will have to be kept in mind.
Under Section 43 of the Act, the words used are „any public
place or in transit‟. The requirement of recording of information
in writing and communicating it to superiors is intended to
protect the possible harassment to residents and to maintain
personal liberty and human dignity. The term conveyance used
in Section 42 is to be understood as ejusdum generis to the terms
building or enclosed place. It is not every conveyance whether
in public or private that would fall within the scope of Section
42 of the Act. A conveyance in a public place would fall within
Section 43 of the Act and Section 49 gives power to the
empowered officer to stop such conveyance for the purpose of
search.”
42.
With respect, the judgment failed to see the distinction between
the scenario covered by Section 42 of the Act and the completely
different circumstances in which Section 43 of the Act would operate.
Despite it being evident that this was a case where secret information
had been received as to the particular vehicle, merely because the search
was conducted in a public place, the High Court erroneously applied
Section 43 of the Act when such provision had no manner of application
in the case. As indicated earlier, Section 42 of the Act covers a situation
where a search is conducted upon a reason to believe that an offence
under the Act has been committed pursuant to information in such
regard being received. On the other hand, Section 43 of the Act comes
into play when the object of the search is something quite removed from
the 1985 Act and, incidentally, in course of the search, there is reason
for the searching official to believe that an offence under the 1985 Act
may had been committed. Since the two provisions as indicated more
fully hereinabove operate in two distinct situations, the view expressed
in paragraph 10 of the report is found exceptionable and contrary to the
statute.
43.
In the last of the precedents cited, it was also a case covered by
Section 42 of the Act. Though the ratio of the judgment is found at
paragraph 19 thereof and there is a comparison of Sections 42 and 43 of
the Act though it is a comparison between apples and oranges, the end
result, however erroneously arrived at, may be justified on the facts
indicated in paragraph 2 of the report. However, to the extent that
Sections 42 and 43 of the Act have been put on the same pedestal and
compared inter se, such approach is, with respect, found to be erroneous
and contrary to the purposes and objects of the two distinct provisions
and the independent areas of their operation.
44.
The distinction between Section 42 of the Act and Section 43
thereof is not merely in where the search takes place and whether it is a
public place or not. The real distinction is in whether there is a reason to
believe that an offence under the Act has been committed that leads to
the search or like activity in the first place; or, whether upon an exercise
in the nature of a search for some other purpose having commenced, the
conducting official gets a reason to believe that an offence under the
Act may have been committed. Such distinction is palpable.
45.
The need to comply with the conditions, particularly in Section
42 of the Act, is indispensable both when it is appreciated that Sections
42 and 43 of the Act are exceptions to the general rule in Section 41
thereof and in the context of Section 35 of the Act. Section 35 of the
Act provides for a presumption as to the culpable mental state of the
accused and goes against the grain of the general philosophy in criminal
law that a person is innocent unless proven guilty. In the light of such
presumption, the procedure laid down for conducting a search or the
like has to be followed to the hilt; or else, the presumption will not
arise.
46.
For the reasons aforesaid, the mistake committed by the relevant
Customs official in this case of not adhering to the condition indicated
in the second proviso to Section 42 of the Act has to be regarded as
fatal. No search or like activity could have been conducted by such
official between sunset and sunrise without complying with the
condition precedent as indicated in the relevant proviso and the
conditions subsequent as mandated in Section 42(2) of the Act. Since
the very search in this case was erroneous, however much the quantity
of seizure may be claimed to be, such argument of prejudice cannot
influence the Court.
47.
The appellants claim that the seizure in this case was of 18
packets containing a total of 511 kg of ganja. The only silver lining may
be in such ganja, if it is assumed to have been recovered, may have been
dealt with in accordance with law and taken off the streets. However,
upon the procedure for search not being followed in terms of Section 42
of the Act which is an exception to the general rule in Section 41
thereof, the prosecution‟s case has been rightly rejected by the trial
court. The reasons indicated in such regard in the impugned judgment
do not call for any interference.
48.
Crl.A.No.3 of 2011 is dismissed.
49.
Crl.M.C.No.75 of 2022 is disposed of.
50.
A line of explanation has to be furnished as to why this matter
remained pending for nearly 12 years. One of the questions that initially
came up in the appeal was whether a statement recorded by a Customs
official was admissible in evidence and, as such, the matter was kept
pending till the judgment in Tofan Singh reported at (2021) 4 SCC 1
was delivered.
(B. Bhattacharjee)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
03.10.2023
“Lam DR-PS”
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