The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
47. In view of the above observations, we do not find any illegality or legal or factual error in the impugned order to justify interference by this court.
48. Accordingly, FMA 259 of 2026 is dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the impugned order dated August 26, 2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, First Court at Alipore, District- South 24 Parganas in Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 2017.
49. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026 is also dismissed.
50. There will be no order as to costs.
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
14th July,
(AK)
F.M.A. 259 of 2026
IA No: CAN 1 of 2026
Smt. Bipasha Paria @ Mondal
Vs.
Sri Kanak Kanti Paria
Mr. Hafizur Rahaman
Ms. Santi Das
Mr. V.K. Raj
...for the appellant.
Mr. Piush Chaturbedy, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Debasish Purkait
...for the respondent.
1.
In view of sufficient arguable questions having been
raised, the appeal is admitted, to be heard on the
grounds taken in the Memorandum of Appeal.
2.
Since the conspectus of the appeal is short, we take
up the appeal itself for adjudication along with the
connected application.
3.
The present challenge has been preferred against
an order whereby an application filed by the
appellant/wife under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, for setting aside ex parte divorce
decree obtained by the respondent/husband, was
itself dismissed on contest.
4.
Learned counsel for the appellant argues that from
the annexures to the supplementary affidavit as
well as the stay application filed in connection with
the present appeal, it would be evident that
immediately
after
obtaining
matrimonial
decree,
the
the
ex
parte
respondent/husband
issued an eviction notice to the New Town address
of the appellant/wife, where she was residing then,
thus proving that the respondent/husband all
along had knowledge of the wife’s residence at the
New Town address.
5.
Despite the same, no summons of the suit was
served at the said address.
6.
Learned counsel submits that the recording in the
impugned order to the effect that the appellant/wife
was served at both addresses was erroneous.
7.
It is next argued by the appellant that the Order IX
Rule 13 application was filed late due to the
appellant/wife
having
no
knowledge,
nor
any
summons of the suit having been served on her
during the relevant period.
8.
Upon acquiring such knowledge, the appellant/wife
immediately preferred the application under Order
IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9.
Learned counsel submits that the learned Trial
Judge erroneously proceeded on the premise that
the appellant/wife admitted in her evidence in
connection with the Order IX Rule 13 application
that
her
husband
had
mentioned
about
the
pendency of the divorce proceedings in his written
objection filed in Case No.33 of 2013, which is the
maintenance application filed by the appellant/wife
under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
10. In reality, it is contended, despite the matrimonial
suit having been renumbered on the said date, the
respondent/husband had erroneously given the
original number of the suit, thereby misleading the
appellant/wife, which prevented her from taking
information regarding the suit.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant next argues that
the
learned
Trial
Judge
did
not
take
into
consideration that Order V Rule 20 of the Code was
resorted to at the stage of hearing of the suit
without
prior
compliance
under
the
previous
provisions of Order V, which were mandatory prerequisites for resorting to substituted service.
12. It is further argued that the court bailiff/process
server was not examined at all in order to ascertain
whether due service of summons was effected on
the appellant/wife, thus vitiating the entire alleged
service of summons on the appellant.
13. In such view of the matter, it is argued that the
impugned order ought to be set aside and an
opportunity to be given to the wife to contest the
suit on merits.
14. Learned
senior
counsel
appearing
for
the
respondent/husband places reliance on the second
proviso to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in conjunction with Parimal vs. Veena
alias Bharti, reported at (2011) 3 SCC 545, where
the principles laid down in the second proviso were
reiterated and the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
pleased to observe that the Legislature, in its
wisdom, made the second proviso mandatory in
nature and thus, it is not permissible for the court
to allow the application under Order IX Rule 13 in
utter
disregard
of
the
terms
and
conditions
incorporated in the second proviso thereto.
15. Learned senior counsel also cites the self-same
judgment for the proposition that in order to
determine an application under Order IX Rule 13,
the test that has to be applied is whether the
defendant
honestly
and
sincerely
intended
to
remain present when the suit was called on for
hearing and did his best to do so.
16. In the present case, the appellant/wife, despite
having knowledge of pendency of the suit, did not
making any endeavour to contest the same.
17. Thus, the benefit of Order IX Rule 13 ought not to
be granted to her.
18. Learned senior counsel further places reliance on
the copy of the written objection filed by the
respondent/husband
in
the
maintenance
proceeding of the wife, from which it is evident that
a copy of the written objection was served on the
appellant/wife on August 28, 2014, whereas the
application under Order IX Rule 13 was filed only
in the year 2017.
19. Thus, the delay in filing the application remains
unexplained.
20. Learned senior counsel argues that the orders of
the learned trial Judge in connection with the
matrimonial
proceeding,
also
annexed
to
the
supplementary affidavit filed by the appellant/wife,
indicate that vide Order No.8 dated July 4, 2014,
the Trial Court had recorded its satisfaction that
due efforts were made to serve summons on the
appellant in due process of law and that service
was required to be made by the mode of substituted
service under Order V Rule 20 of the Code.
21. In view of the appellant having not preferred any
challenge against the said order, the same, it is
submitted, has attained finality and cannot be
reopened.
22. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, we
find sufficient force in the arguments of the
respondent.
23. The premise of the present challenge is that the
appellant/wife did not have any knowledge of the
suit at the relevant juncture.
24. However, such stand of the appellant is belied by
the copy of the written objection filed by the
respondent/husband in connection with Case No.
M-93 of 2013 before the Judicial Magistrate at
Baruipur, that is, the application filed by the
appellant/wife
under
Section
125,
Criminal
Procedure Code.
25. From the very first page thereof, it is clear that a
copy thereof was served on the learned Advocate for
the appellant, from whose custody the said written
objections comes, on August 28, 2014, about two
and a half years prior to filing of the application
under Order IX Rule 13.
26. In paragraph no.16 of the said written objection,
the respondent/husband had mentioned in no
uncertain terms that one matrimonial suit vide
no.2465/2013 was pending before the learned
District Judge at Alipore against the appellant/wife.
27. We find from the orders passed in the suit that the
self-same suit, the number of which was given in
the written objection, had in the meantime been renumbered as Matrimonial Suit no.174/2013, upon
the
same
being
transferred
to
the
learned
Additional District Judge, First Court at Alipore for
adjudication.
28. However, the argument of the appellant that the
previous number was disclosed erroneously even
after the suit was re-numbered is specious and
cannot be accepted.
29. Merely by searching in the Alipore court with the
previous
number
of
the
suit,
anybody
and
everybody could obtain information as to the
current number thereof and its current status.
30. Hence, since the correct original filing number of
the suit was disclosed by the respondent/husband
to the appellant/wife as long back as on August 28,
2014, the appellant/wife cannot feign ignorance of
the pendency of the suit at that juncture itself and
could very well ascertain the current number and
status of the said suit and have contested the
same.
31. However,
despite
such
opportunity,
the
appellant/wife waited till the suit was decreed ex
parte before filing the present application under
Order IX Rule 13 of the Code.
32. The second proviso to Order IX Rule 13, as
reiterated in Parimal vs. Veena (supra), is couched
in mandatory negative language, stipulating that no
court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte
merely on the ground that there has been an
irregularity in the service of summons, if it is
satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date
of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and
answer the plaintiff’s claim.
33. Although
the
specific
knowledge
of
the
defendant/appellant about the date of hearing is
not
found
from
the
materials
before
us,
nonetheless, it has been established beyond doubt
that the appellant had knowledge of the pendency
of the suit at least in the year 2014, from the
written objection filed by the respondent to her
maintenance application.
34. Hence, the mere irregularity in compliance of the
pre-requisites under Order V Rule 19 and the prior
provisions cannot be resorted to by the appellant to
have an order under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code
in view of the second proviso thereto.
35. In Parimal vs. Veena (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court
categorically
observed
that
it
is
not
permissible for the court to allow the application in
utter
disregard
of
the
terms
and
conditions
incorporated in the second proviso to Order IX Rule
13.
36. In the said report, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
further took into consideration the presumption of
service by registered post and burden of proof and
held that the High Court in the said case erred in
not appreciating the facts in the correct perspective
as substituted service is meant to be resorted to
serve the notice at the address known to the parties
where the party had been residing last.
37. It was further held that it was nobody’s case that
the respondent/wife in the said case made any
attempt to establish that there had been a fraud
and collusion between the appellant and the
postman and not a single document had been
summoned from the post office nor was any
attempt made by the respondent/wife to examine
the postman.
38. The factual scenario as discussed in the cited
report is similar to the present case, where the
appellant/wife seeks to take shelter under alleged
non-examination of the postal peon but herself did
not make any endeavour to have the postal peon
examined.
39. In view of the appellant having chosen not to
appear in the suit and contest the service of
summons at the relevant juncture, there was no
occasion for the court to examine the postal peon.
40. Thus, the substituted service under Order V Rule
20 of the Code, effected in respect of the summons
of the suit in the present case, cannot be vitiated
merely due to non-examination of the postal peon,
for which no occasion had arisen at that juncture.
41. Rather, the law of evidence in India attaches a
presumption of correctness to judicial acts.
42. In
the
present
case,
such
presumption
of
correctness of the observations made by the court,
while accepting due attempts on the part of the
plaintiff/husband to serve summons and directing
substituted service, has not been rebutted in any
manner whatsoever.
43. Even otherwise, such allegations are confined to the
domain of “irregularities” in service of summons at
best, thus coming within the mischief of the second
proviso to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code.
44. As such, the argument of the appellant regarding
no service of summons having been shown to be
effected at her New Town Address is neither here
nor there, since it was the Baruipur address of the
appellant/wife at which service of summons was
duly sought to be effected and substituted service
was also effected.
45. The
Baruipur
address
was
disclosed
by
the
appellant/wife herself in her application under
Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which was never amended by her.
46. Thus, the ratio laid down in Parimal vs. Veena
squarely applies to the present case.
47. In view of the above observations, we do not find
any illegality or legal or factual error in the
impugned order to justify interference by this court.
48. Accordingly, FMA 259 of 2026 is dismissed on
contest, thereby affirming the impugned order
dated August 26, 2025 passed by the learned
Additional District Judge, First Court at Alipore,
District- South 24 Parganas in Miscellaneous Case
No. 2 of 2017.
49. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026 is also dismissed.
50. There will be no order as to costs.
51. Urgent photostat copies of this order, if applied for,
be given to the parties upon compliance of all
requisite formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
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