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Serial No. 16
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 377 of 2019
Date of Decision: 08.05.2023
Vs.
Smti Binoni Sangma
The Garo Hills Autonomous
District Council & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. K.S. Kynjing Sr. Adv. with
Ms. A.D. Syiem, Adv.
Ms. B. Rapsang, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. S. Dey, Adv. (For R. 1-3)
Mr. P.T. Sangma, Adv. (For R 4&5)
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
1.
This writ petition is directed against the order dated
05.07.2019 passed in GHADC-REV/Appeal No. 9/A/C of 2018 by the
respondent No. 2 (Chief Executive Member, Garo Hills Autonomous
District Council, West Garo Hills, Tura). The grievance of the writ
petitioner is that by the impugned order, a case which had been
decided is sought to be re-opened by the respondents, which would
lead to reviving the proceedings, which had been finally concluded as
far back in 1935.
2.
A brief narration of the facts is that there existed an
Akhing known as Marakapara Akhing, which originally belonged to
one (L) Ranji Mechik of Nengmenji clan and (L) Asin Marak of
Mrong clan. From the facts as placed, it appears that a huge debt was
incurred by the son of the aforementioned persons, one Shri Arong
Sangma, who mortgaged the said Akhing, taking to the brink of it
being alienated. Thereafter, this matter came to be adjudicated by the
Deputy Commissioner, Garo Hills in a Political Case being Political
Case No. 12 of 1935, wherein the said Arong Sangma of Marakapara
Akhing, was arrayed as the opposite party. When the matter was
pending before the Deputy Commissioner’s Court, the question of
succession to the said Akhing also arose, inasmuch as, 2(two)
daughters who were to be successors in interest namely; one Smti Gari
Mechik and one Smti Rensi Mechik, were married to persons
belonging to the Chambugong clan, which was not approved by the
Chachis and Mahari, thereby leaving the said Akhing without valid
successors.
3.
With regard to the said loan amount which had been taken
by Arong Sangma, one Shri Manseng Marak, who was married to
Jade Mechik the Nokma of the adjacent Akhing i.e. Kharijora Akhing
re-paid the said amount. As such, in the situation where the 2(two)
successor daughters were married to persons belonging to another clan
namely; Chambugong clan, which did not find favour with the
Chachis and Mahari, and in view of the fact that the land was saved by
Shri Manseng Marak, from being alienated, the Chachis and Mahari
were in favor of giving over the said Marakapara Akhing to Shri
Manseng Marak, who was the Nokma of the adjacent Akhing namely
Kharijora Akhing. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner vide the
order dated 31.07.1935, merged the 2 Akhings, and ordered for
preparation of accurate boundaries showing merger of Marakapara
Akhing and Kharijora Akhing.
4.
Mr. K.S. Kynjing, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms.
B. Rapsang, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that with the
adjudication of the matter in view of the lack of a successor, and to
preserve the Akhing, the Chachis and Maharis were in favour of the
said merger, which was duly noted and recorded, and made an order
of the Court by the order dated 31.07.1935, by the then Deputy
Commissioner. The learned Senior counsel has referred to the order in
question and submits that, the same being a final adjudication, the
matter was set at rest.
5.
The learned Senior counsel further submits that though
this was the settled position as regard the Akhing, however on
10.05.1961, one Shri Jangding Marak and Smti Jangde Mechik filed
an application before the Executive Member, i/c Revenue, GHADC
for recovery of Marakapara Akhing, which they alleged was under the
custody of Shri Manseng Marak, Nokma. The Court of the Executive
Member, i/c Revenue, he submits then by the order dated 05.06.1961
dismissed the said application, since it was a settled matter and that no
appeal had ever been preferred against the order dated 31.07.1935.
6.
The learned Senior counsel then submits that thereafter a
further attempt was made by one Shri Mollen Marak, who again reagitated the issue, which matter came to be dismissed on 13.09.2018,
by the Executive Member, i/c Land & Revenue. Against the said order
he submits, an appeal was preferred, which was disposed of with a
direction to the Executive Member, i/c Land & Revenue to reappreciate the entire matter by taking evidence and examining
witnesses. The learned Senior counsel submits that this matter is
squarely covered by the principles of res judicata, apart of the
antiquity of the order, from which the respective rights of the parties
have been settled. As such, he contends the impugned order suffered
from grave irregularities and was bad in law.
7.
Mr. S. Dey, learned Standing counsel for the GHADC
(respondents Nos. 1 to 3) submits that the basis on which the merger
was effected was not as per the Garo Customary law and practice,
inasmuch as, firstly a Nokma possesses no right, customary or
otherwise, to mortgage the Akhing for personal gain, and secondly
even that, there is no question of
the rights of the 2 successor
daughters being extinguished just because they have been married
outside the clan, from which the Nokmas were to be selected.
8.
Mr. P.T. Sangma, learned counsel for the private
respondents Nos. 4 and 5, has submitted that leaving aside whatever
proceedings that had occurred, prior to the pending matter before the
Chief Executive Member, the case should have reached its logical
conclusion, to determine the rights of the contesting parties. He
contends that the objections of the petitioner at this stage is premature,
because the orders are yet to be final orders, in the present
proceedings. Apart from tracing the history of the Marakapara
Akhing, to try to impress the Court that the issue is still alive, he
prayed that the matter be remanded back for adjudication as per law,
and in the light of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure as
prescribed in the case of Dore Sangma.
9.
Heard the learned counsels for the parties.
10.
It is firstly noted that this matter is not before this Court
today on the interpretation of customs and as to whether the
arrangement arrived at by the first order dated 31.07.1935, has been
based on the particular correct custom. Within a limited compass, in
the considered view of this Court, the challenge of the petitioner is
based only on the fact that a matter that has been settled for over 80
years, and where the competing rights and claims have been decided
and apportioned, cannot be allowed to be dug up and re-agitated at the
whims and caprices of the respondents, time and again.
11.
This Court has examined the order dated 31.07.1935, and
the relevant portion thereof are reproduced hereinbelow:“The Chachis and Maharis except for Mingre Mechik
and Manji Mechik and her daughters all wish to give
Marakhapara Akhing to Manseng Marak who has
married Jadi Mechik. Jade is Nengminja clan and
Manseng is of Mrong clan and is already Nokma of
Kharijora village holding it for Nengminja clan.
Consequently as Ranji is dead without heir and
Mengri and Wan have married into other clans than
mrong which is looked on as Nengminja (Women’s)
clan’s mating clan for custody of Nengminja clan’s
property by right of marriage 1 give the Akhing of
Marakhapara to property by right of marriage 1 give
the Akhing of Marakhapara to Jadi Mechik who is of
Nengminja clan and who grand daughter of Dongre
Mechik younger sister of Ginse Mechik of Nengminja
clan as desired by all the Chachis and Maharies of
Nengminja clan. M’dar to prepare lineage and Rev.
Office to correct boundary papers.”
12.
A perusal of the extract quoted above, shows the finality
in the proceedings, inasmuch as, it has been categorically held that the
Akhing of Marakapara was given to Jadi Mechik, who was of the
Nengminja clan, to preserve the Akhing land.
13.
As submitted by the learned Senior counsel for the
petitioner the matter was sought to be re-agitated again in the year
1961, but the same was rejected in view of the final order dated
31.07.1935. Thereafter, another attempt in 2018 was rejected vide the
order dated 13.09.2018 by the Executive Member, i/c Land and
Revenue holding that the prayer had been earlier rejected by order
dated 05.06.1961, was also barred by the principles of res judicata.
14.
On a plain reading of the impugned order, however,
passed on an appeal preferred against the order dated 13.09.2018, the
same, has in a manner re-opened the dispute by directing that the
matter be re-appreciated, and evidence of witnesses be recorded for a
final decision.
15.
Looking into the entire sequence of the events, though
maybe valid arguments may have been raised with regard to the
interpretation and application of the Customary laws, at the time when
the matter was heard by the Deputy Commissioner, the undisputable
fact however, that cannot be ignored is that, categorical findings had
been arrived at, and that no appeal had ever been preferred therefrom.
The antiquity of the order, being of 13.07.1935 vintage, attains great
significance, inasmuch as, at this late stage there can be no question of
the same being re-appreciated or re-examined to arrive at any other
conclusion, that what has been decided therein.
16.
The subsequent challenges made in 1961 and in 2018
have also been disposed of by the successive Executive Members i/c
Land and Revenue in the correct manner, but the impugned order by
allowing re-examination of the issue which has long been settled is
squarely hit by the principles of res judicata. The submissions of the
learned counsel for the respondents that due process and fair trial
should be allowed is therefore of no relevant consequence, when
looking at the facts and circumstances of the entire case.
17.
In this view of the matter, the impugned order stands set
aside and quashed and the writ petition stands allowed, and is
accordingly disposed of.
18.
No order as to costs.
JUDGE
Meghalaya
08.05.2023
“V. Lyndem-PS”
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