The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
7. Now, cross-appeal has been filed on behalf of the claimant. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, interest rate awarded by the Claims Tribunal is enhanced to 7.5% per annum. Accordingly, the cross-appeal of the claimant stands disposed of.
8. Cross-appeal has also been filed on behalf of the Insurance Company/respondent No.3 herein. Since the drivers of both the vehicles have been prosecuted for offence under Section 304A of the IPC, the cross-appeal of respondent No.3 herein stands dismissed.
9. The appeal stands disposed of and the impugned award is modified to the extent indicated herein-above. Soma Sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
(MAC No.118/2020)
CGHC010451012019
Digitally
signed by
SISTA
SOMAYAJULU
SISTA
SOMAYAJULU Date:
2026.07.24
16:03:49
+0530
2026:CGHC:31596
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MAC No. 118 of 2020
{Arising out of award dated 15-11-2017 passed by the 3rd Additional
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ambikapur, District Surguja in MACT
No.179/2016}
Bharti AXA General Insurance Company Limited, Through
Authorized Signatory Ramesh Kumar Sinha, Aged about 32 years,
R/o Sixth Floor, Mega Mall Road, Kanpur, U.P.
(Non-Applicant No.4)
... Appellant
versus
1. Smt. Priyanka Sinha, W/o Lt. Sunil Kumar Sinha, Aged about 24
years,
2. Prem Prassad Sinha (Died and Deleted) as per Hon'ble Court Order
dated 30/03/2026
(Claimant No.1 & 2)
3. Branch
Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited,
Ambedkar Chowk, Ambikapur, P.S. and Tahsil Ambikapur, District
Sarguja, Chhattisgarh.
(Non-Applicant No.1)
4. Jainullah Khan, S/o Nasrullah Khan, Aged about 26 years, R/o
Village Kundi, Post Ketat, P.S. Rehla, District Gadwa, Jharkhand,
Present Address: C/o Rajesh Agrawal, Lakhanpur, District Sarguja,
Chhattisgarh.
(Non-Applicant No.2)
5. Rajesh Kumar Agrawal, S/o Chandiram, Aged about 45 years, R/o
Juna, Lakhanpur, P.S. and Tahsil Lakhanpur, District Sarguja,
Chhattisgarh.
(Non-Applicant No.3)
(MAC No.118/2020)
6. Jatan Das, S/o Dhuran Das, Aged about 31 years, R/o Village
Bhittikala, P.S.
Chhattisgarh.
and
Tahsil
Ambikapur,
District
Sarguja,
(Non-Applicant No.5)
... Respondents
For Appellant
: Mr. Palash Agrawal, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Shekhar
Rao Saheb Amin, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1 : Ms. Priyanka Mehta, Advocate
For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Pravesh Sahu, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Dashrath
Gupta, Advocate.
Single Bench:Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Judgment on Board
23/07/2026
1. The appellant herein/Insurance Company has preferred this appeal
against the impugned award dated 15-11-2017 passed by the 3 rd
Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ambikapur, District
Surguja in MACT No.179/2016, by which a compensation of ₹
11,71,804/- has been awarded to the claimant/respondent No.1
herein by fastening liability upon the appellant herein/Insurance
Company to pay half of it i.e. ₹ 5,85,902/-.
2. Mr. Palash Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant herein/Insurance Company, would submit that driver and
owner of the offending vehicle truck were solely responsible for the
accident and therefore the appellant herein/Insurance Company may
be exonerated from the liability from payment of compensation.
3. Ms. Priyanka Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
claimant/respondent No.1 herein, and Mr. Pravesh Sahu, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company of the Car/
(MAC No.118/2020)
respondent No.3 herein, would support the impugned award and
oppose the appeal and submit that the impugned award does not call
for any interference.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the
record with utmost circumspection.
5. Before proceeding with the case in hand to decide the lis between the
parties, it would be appropriate to notice the decision of the Supreme
Court in the matter of Khenyei v. New India Assurance
Company Limited and others1 regarding composite and
contributory negligence in which their Lordships held as under: “15. There is a difference between contributory and
composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence,
a person who has himself contributed to the extent cannot
claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the
accident to the extent of his own negligence; whereas in the
case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has
not contributed to the accident but the outcome of
combination of negligence of two or more other persons. This
Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan2 has held that in case of
contributory negligence, injured need not establish the extent
of responsibility of each wrong doer separately, nor is it
necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of
each wrong doer separately. It is only in the case of
contributory negligence that the injured himself has
contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of his
negligence is required to be determined as damages
recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be
reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The
relevant portion is extracted hereunder: (SCC pp.750-51,
paras 6-7)
“6. 'Composite negligence' refers to the negligence
on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is
1 (2015) 9 SCC 273
2 2008 (3) SCC 748
(MAC No.118/2020)
injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or
more wrong doers, it is said that the person was injured
on account of the composite negligence of those
wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer, is jointly
and severally liable to the injured for payment of the
entire damages and the injured person has the choice of
proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case,
the injured need not establish the extent of
responsibility of each wrong-doer separately, nor is it
necessary for the court to determine the extent of
liability of each wrong- doer separately. On the other
hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the
negligence on the part of another person or persons,
and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the
negligence of the part of the injured which contributed
to the accident is referred to as his contributory
negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some
negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated
merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the
damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries
stands reduced in proportion to his contributory
negligence.
7.
Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an
accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation
from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other
driver denies negligence or claims that the injured
claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes
necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was
negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly
responsible for the accident and the extent of his
responsibility, that is his contributory negligence.
Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the
principle of 'composite negligence' will not apply nor
can there be an automatic inference that the negligence
was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The
Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of
contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby
avoided confusion between composite negligence and
contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to
correct the said error.”
The decision in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan (supra) has been
relied upon in A.P. SRTC v. K. Hemlatha3.
3 2008 (6) SCC 767
(MAC No.118/2020)
16. In Pawan Kumar v. Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal 4, the
decisions in T.O. Anthony (supra) and Hemlatha (supra) have
been affirmed, and this Court has laid down that where
plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be negligent jointly and
severally, liability cannot arise and the plaintiff’s claim to the
extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have
to be severed. He is entitled to damages not attributable to
his own negligence. The law/distinction with respect to
contributory as well as composite negligence has been
considered by this Court in Machindranath Kernath Kasar v.
D.S. Mylarappa5 and also as to joint tortfeasors. This Court
has referred to Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence as to
cause of action in regard to joint tortfeasors thus:
(Machindranath Kernath Kasar case (supra), SCC p. 212,
para 42)
“42. Joint tortfeasors, as per 10th Edn. of Charlesworth
& Percy on Negligence, have been described as under :
‘Wrongdoers are deemed to be joint tortfeasors,
within the meaning of the rule, where the cause of
action against each of them is the same, namely, that
the same evidence would support an action against
them, individually….. Accordingly, they will be
jointly liable for a tort which they both commit or
for which they are responsible because the law
imputes the commission of the same wrongful act to
two or more persons at the same time. This occurs
in cases of (a) agency; (b) vicarious liability; and (c)
where a tort is committed in the course of a joint act,
whilst pursuing a common purpose agreed between
them.”
17.
The question also arises as to the remedies available to
one of the joint tortfeasors from whom compensation has
been recovered. When the other joint tortfeasor has not been
impleaded, obviously question of negligence of nonimpleaded driver could not be decided apportionment of
composite negligence cannot be made in the absence of
impleadment of joint tortfeasor. Thus, it would be open to
the impleaded joint tort feasors after making payment of
compensation, so as to sue the other joint tort feasor and to
recover from him the contribution to the extent of his
negligence. However, in case when both the tortfeasors are
before the court/tribunal, if evidence is sufficient, it may
42014 (3) SCC 590
5 2008 (13) SCC 198
(MAC No.118/2020)
determine the extent of their negligence so that one joint
tortfeasor can recover the amount so determined from the
other joint tortfeasor in the execution proceedings, whereas
the claimant has right to recover the compensation from both
or any one of them.”
6. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the Claims Tribunal has
clearly recorded a finding that owner & driver of both the vehicles
tractor and car and the Insurance Company/appellant herein are
responsible and thus, they would pay the compensation to the extent
of 50% of the total award amount and ordered for payment of 50% of
the compensation awarded. Since the appellant Insurance Company
did not lead any evidence to demonstrate that the driver of the other
offending vehicle is solely negligent for the accident, liability is
fastened upon the appellant herein/Insurance Company.
7. Now, cross-appeal has been filed on behalf of the claimant. However,
considering the facts and circumstances of the case, interest rate
awarded by the Claims Tribunal is enhanced to 7.5% per annum.
Accordingly, the cross-appeal of the claimant stands disposed of.
8. Cross-appeal has also been filed on behalf of the Insurance
Company/respondent No.3 herein. Since the drivers of both the
vehicles have been prosecuted for offence under Section 304A of the
IPC, the cross-appeal of respondent No.3 herein stands dismissed.
9. The appeal stands disposed of and the impugned award is modified
to the extent indicated herein-above.
Soma
Sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge
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