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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Judgment reserved on: 09.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 29.05.2026
+
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025, I.A. 31139/2025 (Stay), I.A.
31141/2025 (Delay of 16 days in Re-filing the petition) & I.A.
31142/2025 (Seeking permission to file Long and detailed list
of dates)
BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICAL LIMITED
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Shyam D.
Nandan, Mr. Rohit Bohra and
Ms.
Nandana
Menon,
Advocates.
versus
ANAND ENGINEERING LIMITED
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. P. Chidambaram & Mr.
Gaurab
Banerji,
Senior
Advocates with Mr. Aman
Vachher, Mr. Ashutosh Dubey,
Mr. Dhiraj, Mr. Upendra
Prasad, Mr. Brij Mohan, Ms.
Abhiti Vachher and Mr. Akshat
Vachher, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition, has been filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeking the setting aside of
the Arbitral Award dated 26.07.20252, rendered by a three-member
Arbitral Tribunal in the Arbitral proceeding titled “Bharat Heavy
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
Act
Impugned Award
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Electricals Limited and Bajaj Infrastructure Development Company
Limited (BIDCO) now known as Anand Engineering Limited”. The
learned Arbitral Tribunal comprised of Hon‘ble Justice D.K. Jain, as
the Presiding Arbitrator, along with Hon‘ble Justice Deepak Verma
and Hon‘ble Justice Badar Durrez Ahmed, as Co-Arbitrators.
2.
By way of the Impugned Award, various claims and counter-
claims came to be adjudicated upon, some having been allowed while
others were rejected, ultimately culminating in a net monetary award
in favour of the Respondent, along with costs quantified at Rs.
1,00,00,000/-.
BRIEF FACTS:
3.
The present Petition has been preferred by Bharat Heavy
Electricals Limited3, a Public Sector Undertaking of the Government
of India. The Petitioner is engaged, inter alia, in the business of
design,
engineering,
manufacture,
construction,
testing,
commissioning and servicing of a wide range of products catering to
the core industrial sectors, including power generation and
transmission.
4.
The Respondent, Anand Engineering Limited (erstwhile
‘Bajaj Infrastructure Development Company Limited’) 4 , is an
Engineering, Procurement and Construction Management Company
primarily engaged in the execution of Infrastructure Projects in the
Power Sector.
Background of Project and Contractual Chain
5.
The Lalitpur Power Generation Company Limited 5 was
undertaking the development of a Super Thermal Power Project6 at
Petitioner
Respondent
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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LPGCL
STPP
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Lalitpur, Uttar Pradesh. For execution of the said Project, LPGCL
opted for the International Competitive Bidding, dividing the project
into
two
Packages,
namely,
Boiler
Turbine
Generator
Works/Package7 and Balance of Plants Works/Package8.
6.
LPGCL, based on the offers received from various bidders,
selected one, M/s Carberry Infrastructure PTE Ltd. 9 , as the
successful bidder and awarded the BOP Package to it. CIPL, in turn,
for execution of the BOP Package, assigned procurement, civil
construction and erection works to the Respondent.
7.
The Respondent, in order to execute the said BOP Package,
issued a Notice Inviting Tenders published on 05.12.2011 10 for
design, engineering, manufacture, procurement, supply, transportation
to Lalitpur project site for 275 MVA Generator Transformer11, 105
MVA Interconnecting Transformer 12 and two types of Reactors,
i.e., 80 MVAR Reactor13 and 110 MVAR Reactor14. The Petitioner
emerged as the successful bidder pursuant to the said Tender process.
8.
Consequently, the Respondent issued two Letters of Award,
namely, Supply LOA and Services LOA, both dated 29.08.201215.
9.
The
contract
value
under
the
Supply
LOA
was
Rs.1,76,97,23,526/- (exclusive of the taxes and duties), and under the
Services LOA was Rs. 3,82,50,000/- (inclusive of service tax).
Scope of Work and Original Contractual Structure
10.
Pursuant to the LsOA, the scope of work of the Petitioner was
structured into multiple lots. As per the two Original LsOA, each lot
BTG Package
BOP Package
CIPL
NIT
GT
IT
80R
Digitally Signed
110R
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
LsOA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
had different quantities of products. Further, each lot had a distinct
timeline for ex-works, supply and commissioning of the products.
11.
The scope of work as per the two Original LsOA is represented
vide Table-I produced herein below. Further, the initial timeline, as
per the said LsOA, for each activity of the said lots, represented in
Table-I, is represented vide Table-II produced hereinafter.
Table-I
Lots
GTs
ICTs
-
80R
-
110R
-
Lot-1
17 Months
18 Months
Lot-2
20 Months
21 Months
Lot-3
23 Months
24 Months
22 Months
25 Months
28 Months
Table-II
Activity
Ex-works
Receipt at
Lalitpur site
Commissionin
g
12.
The Supply LOA, specifically Clause 6.2 thereof, further
provides that the aforementioned timeline has to be reckoned from the
‗Effective Date‘. Further, Clause 20 of both the LsOA, where were
identically worded, provides for the effective date of the start of the
contract, i.e., Zero Date, as to be the date of award of the LsOA.
Therefore, the effective date for the start of the Contract was
29.08.2012.
13.
Thereafter, pursuant to the award of LsOA, three distinct
Agreements, being the Supply Contract Agreement, Erection Contract
Agreement and a Wrap-up Contract Agreement, all of them dated
26.12.2012, were entered into between the parties.
14.
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BHATIA
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The crux and effect of the Wrap-up contract, admittedly, was
that any default in the Supply Contract Agreement would be treated as
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
a default in the Erection Contract Agreement and vice versa. It is the
case of the Petitioner that both the Agreements, i.e., the Supply
Contract Agreement and Erection Contract Agreement, by their nature
and content, were meant to work synergistically and seamlessly.
Therefore, for the sake of convenience and clarity, except wherever
required otherwise, the Supply Contract Agreement and Erection
Contract Agreement 16 would be collectively referred to as the
―Contract‖.
15.
The Petitioner entered into a technical consultancy Agreement
with USA-based Global PT Corporation17, as per the requirement of
the Respondent. The LsOA prescribed that the Petitioner was to
procure the complete detailed design for manufacturing the GTs, ICTs
and 80Rs. Further, the GPT was to vet the design of 110R.
16.
The said GPT, as per the technical requirements of the project,
was to provide support to the Petitioner by deputing experts for
manufacturing supervision upto testing. Technical support and expert
advice were also to be received from the GPT during erection and
commissioning as well. Also, the GPT was to inspect the First GT and
the 80R and 110R and rate them at every critical stage of
manufacturing and testing.
17.
The project itself qualified as a Power Project under the Mega
Power Policy of the Government of India, and therefore, the
equipments and parts imported for installation and use in the said
project were exempted from import and excise duty.
18.
Under Clause 4.0 of the Supply LOA, the Respondent was
obligated to facilitate issuance of the requisite Certificates to the
Petitioner to avail the zero-duty facility, including the Project
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
Contract
GPT
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Authority Certificate 18 and the Central Electricity Authority’s
Mega Power Certificate 19 . As per the aforesaid Clause, the said
Certificates were to be provided to the Petitioner within 6 months
from the date of the Supply LOA, i.e., 29.08.2012. Therefore, the
various Certificates, inter alia, the PAC and CEA, were to be issued to
the Petitioner on or before 01.03.2013, as per the said Clause.
Amendments to the LsOA and Change in Scope of Work
19.
Further, it is not in dispute that various amendments were made
to the LsOA from time to time, resulting in a change in the scope of
work, including a change in quantities and configuration of
equipments, which were communicated by way of various Letters
addressed to the Petitioners. The information, with respect to all the
relevant amendments to the LsOA vis-à-vis the scope of work, and
thereafter changes in scope of work otherwise, are represented in a
consolidated table produced herein below, being Table-III, for the
sake of clarity.
Table-III
Original LOA/
Amendment/
Letters
Date
Original LOA
29.08.2012
1st Amendment
10.10.2012
2nd Amendment
26.06.2013
Addition of Lot-4, vide the 3rd
Amendment
Part Lot Lot
Lot 3
Total
of
Work
GT
ICT
80R
110R
Only Conditions for Insurance
included in the LsOA, no change in
scope of work.
GT
ICT
80R
80R removed from the scope of work.
110R
Lot Lot Lot Lot Tot
al
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BHATIA
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PAC
CEA
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
3rd Amendment
4th Amendment
Communication
by Letter
Communication
by Letter
30.10.2013
01.07.2015
13.11.2015
29.04.2016
GT
ICT
R
GT
ICT
R
GT
ICT
R
GT
ICT
R
-
-
-
-
PAC/CEA Timeline and Subsequent Commencement of Supply
20.
On 18.10.12, the Petitioner received a sum of 8.84 crores under
the Supply LOA and Rs. 0.18 crores under the Services LOA, as an
advance payment upon the submission of requisite bank guarantees
and other documents.
21.
Further, on 15.11.2012, the Petitioner requested the Respondent
to issue the PAC. The Respondent, in order to seek exemption from
Excise duty, filed a Bank Guarantee and an undertaking with the
Central Excise Department on 22.03.2013.
22.
Consequently, the Respondent provided the PAC for exemption
from customs and excise duty only on 10.12.2013, while, as stated
herein-above, the said Certificates were to be provided by the
Respondent to the Petitioner, on or before 01.03.2013. Pursuant to
this, the Petitioner applied for the Import License for import at NIL
customs duty and the same was issued to the Petitioner by the Director
General of Foreign Trade on 05.03.2014.
23.
Subsequently, the Petitioner commenced the supply and
dispatched the First GT to the project site on 11.12.2014. Thereafter,
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
certain units were commissioned in time for synchronisation of the
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
LPGCL to the Power Grid. On 09.06.2015, the first unit of the
LPGCL was synchronised with the Power Grid through 3 GTs and 3
ICTs.
Revision of Timelines and Grant of Extensions
24.
The timelines for completion of the contractual works came to
be revised from time to time during the subsistence of the contract.
The record reflects that extensions were granted on multiple
occasions, having regard to the evolving scope of work, changes in
quantities and scheduling requirements, as well as requests made on
that behalf. These revisions materially altered the original completion
schedule.
25.
For the sake of clarity, the chronology of the original timelines
and subsequent extensions is set out herein after. It is important to
emphasise that these successive extensions and revisions to timelines
form a significant aspect of the dispute between the parties.
Table-IV
Original
Timeline/
Extension
Original
LOA
3rd
Amendment
to LOA
1st Extension
2nd Extension
3rd Extension
4th Extension
5th Extension
6th Extension
Date
Lot 1
Lot 2
Lot 3
Lot 4
29.08.2012
22 months
25 months
28 months
-
30.10.2013
22 months
25 months
28 months
31 months
05.04.2015
04.08.2016
23.08.2016
01.09.2016
29.01.2017
24.05.2018
47 months
52 months
58 months
31.12.2016
31.03.2017
31.01.2019
47 months
52 months
58 months
31.12.2016
31.03.2017
31.01.2019
47 months
52 months
58 months
31.12.2016
31.03.2017
31.01.2019
47 months
52 months
58 months
31.12.2016
31.03.2017
31.01.2019
Developments Leading to Reduction in Reactor Scope
26.
It is not in dispute that delays had arisen in the execution of the
project. This led to the parties having a high-level discussion on
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
08.10.2015 with LPGCL regarding the revised priority of supply of
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
transformers and reactors. During the meeting, it is the case of the
Petitioner that it confirmed that the Petitioner will be able to deliver
GTs 7, 8 and 9, ICT 8 and one 110R by March 2016. However, the
Respondent desired the Petitioner to keep ICT 8 on hold and instead
supply 6 nos. Of 110R before the end of the year 2015.
27.
Vide a letter dated 13.10.2015, the Respondent communicated
to the Petitioner to put on hold ICT 8 and sought Reactors to be
provided during 2015-2016.
28.
However, vide further communication dated 03.11.2015, the
Respondent conveyed to the Petitioner that it required all the 13 nos.
of 110R to be commissioned by March 2016.
29.
Thereafter, another letter dated 13.11.2015 was issued by the
Respondent reiterating the contents of the letter dated 03.11.2015. The
Respondent, vide this communication, reduced the order quantities of
110R by 7 nos. from 13 to 6, with an added rider that the said quantity
would further be reduced to 3, in case the Petitioner is unable to
deliver 3 nos. of 110R by March 2016 and another 3 by May 2016.
30.
The Respondent, vide communication dated 22.03.2016, put on
hold the supply of 110R 4, 5 and 6. Further, on 29.04.2016, the
Respondent deleted ICT 8 from the scope of work.
31.
The aforesaid hold, on the supply of 110R 4, 5 and 6, was lifted
after approximately five months, vide communication dated
18.08.2016.
32.
The Petitioner, in order to ensure the supply of the said 3 nos. of
110R, being 110R 4, 5 and 6, which were previously on hold,
addressed a communication dated 16.09.2016 to the Respondent,
requesting an extension of time upto 31.07.2017 for the supply of the
said 3 nos. of 110R.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
33.
The said communication was replied to by the Respondent vide
Letter dated 14.10.2016, whereby the Respondent rejected the
Petitioner‘s request for extension of time upto 31.07.2017. The
Respondent, by way of the same communication, stated that they are
in urgent requirement of the said 3 nos. of 110R, and therefore granted
provisional extension for supply of the same upto 31.12.2016
Correspondence Regarding Payments, Performance and Initiation of
Risk-Cost Procurement
34.
Between February, 2017 and 2019, the Petitioner repeatedly
called upon the Respondent to release outstanding dues amounting to
approximately Rs. 35 crores while asserting that substantial supplies
under the contract had already been completed and commissioned.
35.
During this period, meetings were held and correspondence
was exchanged between the parties concerning reconciliation of
outstanding amounts, dispatch of the remaining 110R reactors and
continuation of supplies.
36.
Vide communication dated 07.05.2018, the Respondent
informed the Petitioner that 7 nos. 110R reactors had been procured
from Alstom (now GE T&D) under Risk-Cost Procurement at a value
of Rs. 47.85 crores. The Petitioner thereafter asserted that manufacture
of the remaining 3 nos. of 110 R had been adversely affected owing to
non-payment of outstanding dues.
Disputes and the Arbitral Proceedings
37.
In view of the disputes, with respect to non-payment of the
balance, the Petitioner, in consonance with the dispute resolution
clause, being Clause 7.1 of the Contract, invoked the dispute
resolution clause, which contemplates resolution of disputes by way of
amicable settlement/talks between the parties, before the invocation of
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
the Arbitration. However, no amicable resolution could be arrived at
between the parties.
38.
In view of the same, the Petitioners invoked the Arbitration
Clause, being Clause 7.2 of the Contract, by addressing a Legal Notice
under Section 21 of the Act to the Respondent, and thereby the
aforementioned Arbitral Tribunal was appointed.
39.
Before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, the Petitioner raised
multiple claims arising out of the contractual relationship between the
parties. Broadly, the disputes pertained to (i) recovery of alleged
outstanding dues under the Contracts; (ii) claims arising from
reduction in scope of work, including costs relating to work-inprogress, inventory, and materials procured for manufacture of 110
MVAR reactors; and (iii) issues relating to entitlement and
consequences flowing from the Mega Power Policy benefits,
including obligations linked to procurement of PAC/CEA certificates
and the resultant import of goods at concessional duty.
40.
The Respondent, in turn, filed its Statement of Defence along
with several Counter-Claims seeking, inter alia, recovery of
Liquidated Damages for delay, damages on account of risk–cost
procurement of reactors from third parties, and other ancillary claims
arising out of the alleged breach of contractual obligations by the
Petitioner.
41.
It is also a matter of record that during the pendency of the
arbitral proceedings, the Respondent undertook further procurement of
certain reactors from a third party, i.e., Alstom T&D (now GE T&D),
and sought to incorporate the financial implications thereof as part of
its Counter-Claims, particularly Counter-Claim No. 4.
42.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
The learned Arbitral Tribunal, upon completion of pleadings,
framing of issues, and recording of oral as well as documentary
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
evidence, proceeded to adjudicate the disputes between the parties.
The proceedings involved extensive consideration of contractual
clauses, correspondence exchanged between the parties, expert
evidence, and project timelines.
43.
Upon culmination of the arbitral proceedings, the learned
Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Impugned Award dated 26.07.2025,
whereby various claims and counter-claims were adjudicated. By
virtue of the said Award, Claim No. 1 was partly allowed and Claim
No. 4 was allowed in favour of the Petitioner, whereas Counter-Claim
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 were allowed, and Counter-Claim Nos. 6, 9, 10,
11 and 14 were partly allowed in favour of the Respondent.
44.
The net effect of the Impugned Award was that a sum of Rs.
17,08,58,125/- came to be awarded in favour of the Respondent, along
with costs quantified at Rs. 1,00,00,000/-.
45.
Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner has preferred the present
Petition under Section 34 of the Act, specifically Section 34(2)(b)(ii)
of the Act, impugning the Award to the extent adverse to it.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
46.
Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner,
would assail the Impugned Award, to the limited extent as discussed
in ensuing discussion and would submit that the same is liable to be
set aside under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, being contrary to the
fundamental policy of Indian law and vitiated by findings which are
ex facie perverse, unsupported by evidence, and rendered in disregard
of settled legal principles governing arbitral adjudication.
Challenge qua Claim No. 2
47.
At the outset, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
fairly submit that although the rejection of Claim No. 2 has been
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
challenged in the present Petition, the said Claim was not pressed
before the learned Arbitral Tribunal on account of lack of evidence
and consequently, the challenge to the Impugned Award qua Claim
No. 2 is not pressed before this Court as well.
Challenge qua Counter-Claim No.1
48.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would thereafter assail
the Impugned Award insofar as it allows Counter-Claim No. 120 in
favour of the Respondent, towards Liquidated Damages amounting to
Rs. 23,88,40,000/- along with interest thereupon. Learned senior
counsel would submit that the award of CC-1 is vitiated on multiple
grounds, which are discussed herein after.
Delay not attributable to the Petitioner
49.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that no
delay, much less a culpable delay, was attributable to the Petitioner in
execution of the contractual works since the equipments in question
stood supplied, erected and commissioned within the mutually
extended timelines.
50.
Learned senior counsel would further contend that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal itself recorded a categorical finding that time was
not of the essence of the contract and therefore the very substratum for
levy of Liquidated Damages stood eroded. It would therefore be
submitted that the award of Liquidated damages becomes internally
inconsistent and legally unsustainable.
51.
Learned senior counsel would draw the attention of this Court
to Paragraph No. 12.8 of the Impugned Award, to substantiate the
aforesaid contention and the relevant portion of which reads as under:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
CC-1
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
―12.8. ……As noted above, it is well settled that the principle of
time being of the essence in a contract is not immutable but is
subject to the parties' conduct and mutual agreement in the course
of the execution of the contract. The Tribunal is of the view that
having granted repeated extensions, the Respondent's argument
that the time was of the essence of the contract lacks substance and
is accordingly rejected.‖
(emphasis supplied)
Delay in Issuance of PAC/CEA attributable to the Respondent
52.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that
under the contractual arrangement, the obligation to procure and
furnish PAC/CEA Certificates and allied documents, necessary for
availing customs/excise exemptions, rested squarely upon the
Respondent. In this regard, the attention of this Court would be drawn
to Clause 4 of the Supply LOA, the relevant portion of which reads as
under:
―4.0 Contract Price:
Contract price for the complete scope of supply covered under this
LOA shall be Rs. 176,97,23,526/-, (One hundred Seventy Six crore
Ninety Seven lakh Twenty Three Thousand Five hundred Twenty
Six only) as per the Price schedule attached annexure-A
The prices for supply of goods as mentioned above are considered
for Power Project to be qualified under Mega Power Policy of the
Government of India and therefore entitled for exemptions of
Import duty (i.e., BCD, CVD, AD and Cess thereon) and excise
duty. All necessary documentation such as Project Authority
Certificate (PAC), Mega Power Certificate required for availing
the Mega Power benefits shall be made available by the Project
Owner to supplier within six months from the date of this LoA.‖
53.
Learned senior counsel would contend that the repeated
amendments to the scope of work delayed finalisation of design,
engineering and import planning, resulting in substantial delay in
issuance of the requisite certification. It would be contended that a
period of almost 16 months, out of 28 months of the initial Contract
period, was consumed in obtaining the aforesaid certifications, thereby
seeking
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BHATIA
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to substantiate that the delay was occasioned by the
Respondent.
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
54.
Learned senior counsel would further submit that although the
learned Arbitral Tribunal acknowledged delay on the part of the
Respondent in issuance of PAC/CEA Certificates, it nevertheless
proceeded to hold the Petitioner responsible by introducing an entirely
new line of reasoning, namely, that the Petitioner could have procured
certificates in phases.
55.
It would therefore be urged that the said finding rests upon a
hypothesis evolved suo motu by the learned Arbitral Tribunal, dehors
the pleadings and evidence, which is impermissible in an arbitral
proceeding, warranting interference under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the
Act, being against the basic notions of justice, including Principles of
Natural Justice. In this regard, reliance is placed upon Paragraph Nos.
12.38 and 12.39 of the Impugned Award, which are reproduced herein
under for ready reference:
―12.38. At this juncture, the argument of the Claimant that it was
unable to provide the list of equipment due to frequent amendment
to the LOAs deserves to be considered. Although there is no
dispute that the LOAs were being constantly amended by the
Respondent, but the Tribunal is of the view that in order to mitigate
the delay in imports and consequent delay in supplies, the Claimant
could have made an effort of procuring the PAC for the remaining
materials in part i.e., the Claimant ought to have taken PAC and
CEAs for 10 GT, 7 lCTs and could have got PAC and CEAs for
13, 110 MVAr Reactors at a later date especially when the quantity
of GT and lCTs was finalized and remained unchanged in the
amendments. However, the Claimant chose not to do so.
12.39. Be that as it may, the evidence on record establishes that the
PAC was ultimately issued by Respondent on 10.12.2013, the CEA
Certificate was obtained on 06.01.2014 and the Import License was
issued only on 05.03.2014 and, thus, there was substantial delay in
the issuance of the relevant certificates in the present case.
However, the Claimant has failed to establish that the manufacture
of the contractual items could not at all begin without the imported
parts, for which it wanted to avail of exemption from payment of
Excise and Customs Duty.‖
(emphasis supplied)
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
56.
Learned senior counsel would further contend that the only case
advanced by the Respondent before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, with
respect to delay in providing the relevant certifications, was founded
upon Clause 5 (VI) of the Supply LOA. The relevant portion of the
said clause is reproduced herein under for ready reference:
“Clause 5 (VI) Benefits/Exemptions to Suppliers:
The prices for supply goods as mentioned at Clause no. 4.0 of this
LOA are considered for Power Project to be qualified under "Mega
Power Policy" of the Government of India and accordingly, attract
nil Customs duties (Le. CD, CVD, ACD and SAD) on Import of
raw material components & bought out Items, and nil excise duty,
education cess and higher education cess on directly dispatchable
components/goods. Necessary documentation such as project
authority certificate (PAC), Mega Power Certificate required for
availing the Mega Power benefits will be given to supplier prior to
dispatches.
In case the necessary documents including Project Authority
Certificate/Essentiality Certificate / Mega Power Certificate are not
made available or there is a delay in furnishing of these documents
the material shall be cleared from Customs and Excise as the case
may be, on payment of duties and the total implications arising
therefrom (actual) shall be to the Purchaser's account and in that
event the Supplier is required to furnish the following documents: Disclaimer Certificate duly sealed and signed by Authorized
Signatory (in duplicate) on Supplier's letterhead stating that the
excise duty and/or custom duty as charged on Invoice No,
[Number of Invoice) dated (dd/mm/yyyy) for supplies of
(description of goods) have been paid and neither refund nor any
exemption against such supplied goods from Central Excise or any
other department has been taken/availed‖ …
(emphasis supplied)
57.
Learned senior counsel, in this regard, would submit that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal erroneously placed reliance on the aforesaid
plea of the Respondent and Clause 5(VI) of the Supply LOA to arrive
at the finding that the Petitioner ought to have proceeded with the
import of the materials after paying the customs duty, and sought
reimbursement in terms of the aforesaid Clause.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
58.
Learned senior counsel would submit that the learned Tribunal
had erred in relying upon the said Clause since its invocation could
have been occasioned only upon a clear indication from the
Respondent that the requisite certificates would not be furnished
within time. The relevant paragraph, being Paragraph No. 12.40,
which records the aforesaid finding of the learned Arbitral Tribunal,
reads as follows:
―12.40. In the final analysis, having regard to Clause 5 Sub-Clause
VI of the LOA, which specifically provides that the Claimant on its
accord could pay the Excise and Customs Duties and get the same
reimbursed Respondent and the fact that the Claimant has failed to
demonstrate that it could not commence the manufacturing process
without availing the Customs and Excise exemptions, the Tribunal
is of the view that the Claimant has failed to. establish and prove
any causal link between the delay in obtaining exemptions and the
commencement of manufacturing process and, therefore, the delay
in supply of the contracted equipments is attributable to the
Claimant.‖
59.
In the aforesaid backdrop, learned senior counsel would submit
that the aforestated finding of the learned Arbitral Tribunal, attributing
delay to the Petitioner, despite concluding that the Respondent failed
to furnish requisite certifications in a timely manner, is perverse,
contrary to the contractual framework and unsupported by the
evidentiary record.
No Actual Loss demonstrated by the Respondent
60.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that no
documentary evidence was led by the Respondent to establish any
actual loss suffered on account of the alleged delay, without which the
grant of Liquidated Damages is liable to be set aside, since it goes
against established principles of law, being devoid of any proof or
evidence.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
61.
Learned senior counsel would contend that the Respondent
could not have suffered any losses since commercial operation of the
project itself depended upon commissioning of the 765KV
transmission lines, which, according to the response dated 13.11.2019
of Power Grid Corporation of India Limited, to an RTI application
dated 27.09.2019, indicates that they were commissioned only on
01.10.2016 and 11.04.2017 respectively.
62.
In this regard, learned counsel would further draw the attention
of this Court to the communication dated 13.11.2015, whereby, while
amending the purchase order, the Respondent stated that ―...the 765kV
transmission system which is likely to be ready by March 2016 and all
efforts are being made for the same...‖.
63.
Learned senior counsel would, in this backdrop, submit that in
the absence of operational transmission infrastructure, no evacuation
of power could have taken place, and consequently no revenue loss
could have arisen. It would be submitted that the very premise of
Liquidated Damages, therefore, stood negated.
64.
Learned senior counsel would further assail the reliance placed
by the learned Arbitral Tribunal upon the letters dated 01.04.2014,
31.07.2015 and 12.11.2015 issued by the LPGCL to the Respondent,
allegedly imposing Liquidated Damages upon the Respondent on
account of delay, to conclude that the Respondent suffered loss, at the
instance of the Petitioner‘s delay in fulfilling the contract on time.
65.
Learned senior counsel would contend that the aforesaid finding
is erroneous since the aforesaid communications were themselves
doubtful in origin since both the entities, LPGCL and the Respondent,
were part of the same group of companies and shared the same
registered
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
address and also, since the said Liquidated Damages,
allegedly levied by the LPGCL upon the Respondent, were
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
unsupported by any proof of actual deduction, remittance or financial
debit by the Respondent in favour of the LPGCL.
66.
Learned senior counsel would therefore contend that the award
of Liquidated Damages is mechanical and contrary to settled
principles of law. To substantiate the aforesaid contention, he would
draw the attention of this Court to the cross-examination of RW-1 Mr.
Sunil Kumar, who was the then Chief Financial Officer of the
Respondent. The cross-examination was to prove that the aforesaid
three letters were false and fabricated and were written and signed by
an unknown person, without any designation. The relevant questions
and answers thereto, of cross-examination of RW-1, are reproduced
herein under:
―Q.17. Whose signature does this document bear?
Ans. I do not know.
Q.18. Do you know the official designation of the person who has
signed this document at the time it was issued?
Ans. I do not know.
Q.20. I put it to you that the document Ex. D-2 is a forged and
fabricated document. What do you have to say?
Ans. I do not agree. (Vol.) It was communicated to BIDCO.
Q.20. Did BIDCO ever communicate with BHEL about the urgent
requirement of 110 MVAR Reactors prior to 01.04.2014? If so, can
you show any such communication on record?
Ans. The delivery schedule of 110 MVAR Reactors were defined
in the LOAS and its amendment and it was to be supplied
accordingly. Hence, BIDCO was not required to make any such
communication with BHEL. Q.21. Did BIDCO ever communicate
with BHEL about the urgent requirement of 110 MVAR Reactors
after 01.04.2014? If so, can you show any such communication on
record?
Ans. Yes. BIDCO did communicate with BHEL in respect of
Reactors, as BHEL was failing to supply the same on the due dates.
It is matter of record though I am not able to find it right now.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
Q.22. I put it to you that LPGCL has not withheld Rs. 50 Crores
from payments due to BIDCO for this project. What do you have
to say?
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Ans. I disagree.
***
Q.38. Who signed this letter?
Ans. I am not aware.‖
Delay in approval of Drawings, incorrectly fastened upon the
Petitioner
67.
Learned senior counsel would submit that the allegation
concerning non-submission of drawings, duly vetted by GPT, has
been agitated by the Respondent for the first time in arbitral
proceedings and was never pursued with any degree of seriousness
during execution of the contract. He would submit that had the issue
truly constituted a critical bottleneck, the Respondent would have
raised contemporaneous defaults, issued notices, invoked contractual
remedies, or linked milestones to such alleged omissions. The absence
of any such consistent protest, according to learned Senior Counsel,
clearly demonstrates that the issue had no practical bearing on the
progress of the works.
68.
Learned senior counsel would therefore contend that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has erroneously attached significance to the
alleged delay in submission and approval of drawings, which is
unsupported either by the material on record or by the actual conduct
of the parties during the subsistence of the contract.
69.
Learned senior counsel would submit that once the supply chain
itself stood impacted by the delayed issuance of PAC and allied
documents, any alleged deficiency relating to drawings became, at
best, incidental and could not be elevated to a primary cause of delay.
70.
Learned senior counsel would, therefore, urge that, repeated
amendments to the scope of work, occasioned by the Respondent,
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
required corresponding revisions in drawings, technical particulars,
and engineering documentation.
71.
Learned
senior
counsel
would
submit
that,
in
these
circumstances, to hold the Petitioner singularly responsible for the
alleged delay in drawings, while ignoring the cascading effect of
repeated contractual amendments, is erroneous, contrary to the record
and perverse, being unsupported by pleadings.
Waiver/Abandonment of Right to Levy Liquidated Damages
72.
Learned senior counsel would therefore urge that the conduct of
the
Respondent
clearly
evidences
waiver,
acquiescence,
or
abandonment of any alleged contractual right to levy Liquidated
Damages and the finding of the learned Arbitral Tribunal is contrary
to settled commercial principles, and therefore against the public
policy of India.
Challenge qua Counter-Claim Nos. 3 and 4
73.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would thereafter assail
the Impugned Award insofar as it relates to Counter-Claim No. 321
and Counter Claim No. 422, on the grounds, inter alia, that they were
ex facie barred by limitation, proceeded on assumptions contrary to
the contractual framework and unsupported by evidence, and therefore
warranted interference under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. The
grounds, as raised by the Petitioner while challenging CC-3 and CC-4
are discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.
CC-3 and CC-4 were ex facie barred by the Limitation
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
CC-3
CC-4
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
74.
Learned senior counsel would submit that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has erroneously treated the cause of action for CC-3 and CC4 as arising from a continuing breach.
75.
According to the learned senior counsel, the cause of action for
CC-3 crystallised on 13.11.2015, when the Respondent de-scoped 7
nos. of 110R and thereafter when the Respondent issued Letter of
Award dated 17.11.2015 to Alstom for procurement of the aforesaid 7
nos. of 110R. In this light, learned senior counsel would submit that
any claim for differential cost, if at all maintainable, crystallised, at
best, on 17.11.2015.
76.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that
once the 7 nos. of 110R stood de-scoped and entrusted to another
vendor, the Petitioner‘s obligations in respect thereof ceased and the
subsequent extension of timelines qua remaining portions of the
contract could not postpone limitation for a claim already accrued.
77.
Learned senior counsel would further submit that CC-4 also
suffers from the same infirmity. It would be urged that the 3 nos. of
110R allegedly procured later from Alstom were part of the same
commercial arrangement and described as a ―moral commitment‖
under the Letter of Award dated 17.11.2015 issued to Alstom. It was
only a Purchase Order, with respect to the 3 nos. of 110R, which came
to be issued to GE T&D (―erstwhile Alstom‖) on a later date, being
11.10.2020. Therefore, the cause of action, as for CC-4, also stood
crystallised on 17.11.2015.
78.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would therefore
submit that the limitation is founded on public policy and commercial
certainty. By entertaining and allowing stale claims through an
erroneous theory of continuing cause of action, the learned Arbitral
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BHATIA
15:16:06
Tribunal has disregarded settled principles of law. It would thus be
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
submitted that the findings in respect of CC-3 and CC-4 are liable to
be set aside under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, for being against the
basic notions of justice.
Risk Cost Purchase could not be invoked without Contractual
Termination
79.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
invocation of risk cost procurement was contrary to the contractual
scheme since it unequivocally mandates that termination, preceded by
issuance of one month notice, is an essential precondition before the
Respondent herein could get the balance of work executed through a
third party and recover the cost thereof from the supplier, i.e., the
Petitioner herein.
In support of the aforesaid contention, learned senior counsel would
invite the attention of this Court to Clause 26 of the Supply LOA,
which reads as under:
“26.0 Termination:
Purchaser/Owner shall be entitled to terminate the Contract/LOA,
consequent to the following events/conditions:
1. In the event, the Supplier fails to start the work and/or falls to
follow/ adhere the project schedule at any time during continuance
or pendency of works, provided by the Purchaser and continues to
do so after one (1) month notice to this effect the Purchaser/Owner
shall be entitled to terminate the contract without assigning any
reason to the Supplier.
2. In case the Supplier falls to perform the contract work and/or
complete the contract work at any time during its continuance or
pendency to the entire satisfaction of the Purchaser, the Purchaser
shall be entitled to terminate the contract after giving one (1)
month notice to the Supplier to this effect, the Purchaser shall be
entitled to recover the damages/claims from the supplier.
3. Without prejudice to any other term and conditions contained in
this LOA the Purchaser in event of any of the aforesaid conditions,
shall be entitled to get the balance work completed by another
party and recover the cost thereof from the Supplier. However, in
such a case the terms related to warranty/ guarantee, LD with
respect to the work completed by the supplier shall subsist/survive
this LOA.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
In all the above events/conditions the decision of the Purchaser
shall be final and binding on the Supplier and the supplier shall not
be entitled for any claim against the Purchaser/Owner.‖
(emphasis supplied)
80.
Learned senior counsel would submit that, in the present case,
neither was any notice issued to the Petitioner nor was the Contract
terminated, in accordance with Clause 26 of the Supply LOA. It
would be urged that the unilateral de-scoping of certain quantities by
the Respondent cannot, by any stretch, be equated with termination of
the Contract and, to the contrary, the Respondent continued to seek
performance from the Petitioner, including supply of the remaining 3
nos. of 110R, which itself militates against any suggestion of
termination, if any. In this regard, reliance would be placed upon the
findings in the Minority Award, specifically Paragraph Nos. 31 and 32
of the Impugned Award, which read as under:
―31. Hence, in the context of the provisions of clauses 26.1 and
26.2, the right to terminate the Contract thereunder did not accrue
to BIOCO. In fact, there was no termination of the Contract by
BIOCO. The descoping of 7 reactors by virtue of BIOCO's letter
dated 13.11.2015 cannot be regarded as termination of the
Contract, In fact, the subject of the said letter dated 13.11.2015
itself, describes the letter as “Amendment: Supply 8 Erection of
Transformers and Reactor for Lalitpur STTP Project”
32. When there was no notice as required under Clauses 26.1 and
26.2 there could be no valid termination and, in fact, there was
none. An amendment to the Contract cannot be construed as a
termination. Despite the descoping the Contract was alive in
respect of the remaining reactors etc.‖
81.
Learned senior counsel would, in the aforesaid circumstances,
submit that the finding returned in the Majority Award, being contrary
to the express terms of the Contract and the settled principles
governing contractual interpretation, falls foul of the fundamental
policy of Indian law and is, therefore, liable to be set aside under
Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
No urgency established for the Supply of 110R
82.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
Respondent‘s plea of urgent requirement of reactors, purportedly
justifying procurement of 110R from a third party, stands belied by
the contemporaneous project record, inasmuch as the relevant
infrastructure itself was not commissioned during the alleged period
of urgency since 765 kV Transmission Line-I was commissioned only
on 01.10.2016 and Line-II on 11.04.2017, as acknowledged by the
Power Grid Corporation of India in its response under the RTI Act.
83.
In these circumstances, it would be submitted that the plea of
urgency is untenable and an afterthought to justify unilateral
procurement. The acceptance of such a plea in the Impugned Award
would therefore, in his opinion, be contrary to the record and the
contractual framework, and thus, contrary to the fundamental notions
of justice and morality, warranting interference under Section
34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Alternate Procurement from Alstom Initiated Prematurely
84.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would contend that the
initiation of alternate procurement by the Respondent was not only
contractually impermissible but also pre-mature, being undertaken
before the expiry of the extended timelines.
85.
Learned senior counsel would, in this regard, draw the attention
of this Court to the Limited Tender Enquiry dated 12.10.201523,
issued by the Respondent for alternate procurement even prior to
expiry of the timelines available to the Petitioner for completion of the
Project. It would be submitted that pursuant thereto, Alstom submitted
its final bid to the Respondent on 30.10.2015.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
LTE
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
86.
Learned senior counsel would then draw the attention of this
Court to the communication dated 03.11.2015 to submit that, even
subsequent to issuance of the said LTE and submission of bids thereto,
the Respondent continued calling upon the Petitioner to urgently
supply all 13 nos. of 110R. The relevant extract relied upon reads as
under:
―…..We would hence request you to take all necessary action to
supply all the reactors by February 2016 and request you to
confirm the same. Please provide the schedule of supply of all 13
reactors on return basis so as to reach Lalitpur by February 2016.‖
87.
Learned senior counsel would further submit that, on
13.11.2015, the Respondent communicated to the Petitioner about
descoping of 7 nos. of 110R and immediately thereafter, a LOA dated
17.11.2015 was issued upon Alstom for supply of 7 nos. of 110R, with
a rider that Alstom was under the ―moral commitment‖ to supply 3
nos. of 110R, therefore, in effect, contract of all the remaining 10 nos.
of 110R was granted to Alstom.
88.
Learned senior counsel would contend that such conduct is
demonstrative of a pre-conceived intention to substitute the Petitioner,
rather than to secure performance in accordance with the contractual
framework, even before the extended timelines were to end.
89.
It would, therefore, be contended that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal failed to appreciate this fundamental infirmity and
erroneously proceeded on the premise that the Respondent was
justified in undertaking alternate procurement and recovering
differential cost. Such a finding, in his opinion, was contrary to settled
contractual principles and the fundamental policy of Indian law, and
therefore rendered the Impugned Award, to that extent, liable to be set
aside under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Second Risk Cost proceeding initiated after the invocation of the
Arbitral Clause of the Contract
90.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would contend that
the second set of Risk Cost proceedings initiated by the Respondent is
wholly untenable, having been undertaken after invocation of the
arbitral proceedings, and thus contrary to both the contractual scheme
and settled principles of justice.
91.
Learned senior counsel would submit that the Respondent
issued a Purchase Order to GE T&D (earlier Alstom) only on
11.10.2020 for procurement of the remaining three (3) 110R, i.e., after
invocation of arbitration, and long after the alleged urgency had
ceased to exist.
92.
It is further contended that there is no material on record to
establish actual supply, commissioning, or payment in respect of the
said procurement, thereby undermining the very foundation of the
claim.
93.
In these circumstances, it would be urged by the learned senior
counsel that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has erred in sustaining such
a claim, which is based on post-dispute conduct and unsupported by
evidence, thereby rendering the impugned findings vulnerable to
interference under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Challenge quaCounter-Claim Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12
94.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
counter-claims partly allowed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal under
the heads of incomplete work, leakage rectification, punch point
attendances and alleged gas formation losses, being Counter-Claim
Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12, are wholly unsustainable in law and on facts.
95.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
Learned senior counsel would contend that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has granted amounts under these heads in the absence of
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
foundational evidence establishing either actual expenditure or
contractual liability attributable to the Petitioner.
96.
It would be urged that no primary documentary evidence, such
as invoices, vouchers, work orders, or contemporaneous records
evidencing execution of such works or incurring of expenditure, was
placed on record by the Respondent. It would also be contended that
the quantification of these claims is entirely arbitrary, with no
discernible methodology or evidentiary basis reflected in the
Impugned Award.
97.
In these circumstances, learned counsel submits that the
findings of the learned Arbitral Tribunal in respect of Counter-Claim
Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12 are based on conjecture and surmise, and suffer
from patent illegality. The same, being contrary to the fundamental
principles governing proof of damages and contractual liability,
warrants interference under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
98.
Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent
would, at the outset, submit that the present Petition is nothing but an
attempt to re-agitate the merits of the dispute under the limited
supervisory jurisdiction of Section 34 of the Act. It would be
contended that the Impugned Award is a reasoned and wellconsidered Award, rendered upon a detailed appreciation of extensive
oral and documentary evidence, contractual terms and therefore does
not warrant interference under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Counter-Claim Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12
99.
Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent
would, at
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BHATIA
15:16:06
this juncture, fairly submit that the Respondent does not
oppose the challenge laid by the Petitioner insofar as Counter-Claim
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12 are concerned and confines its opposition only
to Counter-Claim Nos. 1, 3 and 4.
Counter-Claim No. 1
100. Learned senior counsel would submit that the challenge
mounted to Counter-Claim No. 1 is wholly misconceived and
proceeds on a selective reading of the Impugned Award. It would be
contended that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has undertaken a
comprehensive examination of the contractual framework, the conduct
of the parties, and the evidentiary record, and has returned a clear and
reasoned finding that the delay in execution of the project was
attributable
to
the
Petitioner.
The
various
grounds
urged,
substantiating the aforesaid contention, are delineated herein below.
Delay squarely attributable to the Petitioner
101. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would urge that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has examined the chronology of events in
considerable detail and has recorded that the delays were not isolated
or incidental, but systematic and attributable to the Petitioner‘s own
lack of preparedness and coordination with GPT, which directly
contributed to the disruption of the project timelines. It would be
contended that these findings constitute a reasonable and plausible
view, being based on evidence and contractual obligations, which are
immune from interference under Section 34 of the Act.
Effect of “time not being of the essence”
102. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
the Petitioner‘s reliance on the finding that time was not of the essence
is wholly misplaced and selectively presented.
103.
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BHATIA
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Learned senior counsel would urge that the contractual
framework expressly provides for the levy of Liquidated Damages as
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
a pre-estimated compensation for delay, and the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has correctly held that such entitlement survives even where
extensions of time are granted. The grant of extensions, whether
administrative or necessitated, cannot be construed as a waiver.
PAC/CEA: No causal delay attributable to the Respondent
104. Learned senior counsel would contend that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has found that the Petitioner itself failed to furnish the
requisite technical inputs, drawings and documents in a timely
manner, which were necessary for processing PAC/CEA Certificates.
The delay in obtaining the said Certificates was, therefore, not an
independent cause, but a consequence of the Petitioner‘s own default.
105. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would further
submit that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has rightly held that there is
an absence of any causal nexus between delay in certification and
commencement of manufacturing, and that, in terms of Clause 5(VI)
of the Supply LOA, the Petitioner had the contractual liberty to
proceed with imports upon payment of duties, subject to
reimbursement, which the Petitioner consciously chose not to
undertake.
106. In this backdrop, learned senior counsel would submit that the
finding attributing delay to the Petitioner is not only plausible but is
the only conclusion that reasonably emerges from the evidences on
record. Such a finding cannot be disturbed merely because the
Petitioner proposes an alternate narrative.
Liquidated Damages: No requirement of strict proof of loss
107. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
the Contract expressly provides for Liquidated damages as a genuine
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BHATIA
15:16:06
pre-estimate of loss agreed between the parties. Once a delay stands
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
attributable to the Petitioner, the Respondent was contractually
entitled to enforce such a clause without the necessity of strict proof of
actual loss.
108. Learned senior counsel would further contend that, in any
event, the Respondent had placed material on record demonstrating
financial consequences arising from the delay, including exposure to
liquidated damages being imposed upon the Respondent by the project
owner, i.e., LPGCL, which was taken into consideration.
109. Learned senior counsel would thus contend that the Petitioner‘s
argument of absence of actual loss is misconceived and contrary to
settled principles governing liquidated damages. Also, these findings
cannot be reopened in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act.
Delay by the Petitioner of Drawings and Design
110. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
the contractual framework between the parties expressly contemplated
the involvement of GPT as a technical consultant for design,
supervision, and execution support.
111. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
the Petitioner failed to place on record the aforesaid agreement with
GPT and further failed to produce any cogent material to substantiate
the existence or scope of such arrangement. This omission, it would
be contended, goes to the root of the Petitioner‘s case insofar as the
justification for delay in submission of drawings is concerned.
112. Learned senior counsel would further submit that the
Respondent had, on multiple occasions, called upon the Petitioner to
furnish credentials, scope of work, and supporting documentation
pertaining to GPT, and had clearly indicated that approvals relating to
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BHATIA
15:16:06
drawings and schedules would be contingent upon the same. Despite
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
such repeated communications, the Petitioner failed to comply with
the said requirement.
113. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would further
contend that the material on record, before the learned Arbitral
Tribunal, reflects inconsistencies in the identity of the technical entity
itself, with correspondence being addressed to an entity, being GPT
Corporation Ukraine, distinct from that stipulated in the contract,
being GPT Corporation, USA. Such circumstances, it would be
contended, further undermine the Petitioner‘s assertion of a valid and
operative technical consultancy framework.
114. In this backdrop, learned senior counsel would submit that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has, upon a detailed appreciation of
pleadings and evidence, rightly concluded that the Respondent had not
waived the requirement of furnishing the technical agreement or
related documentation and that the delay in submission of drawings
was squarely attributable to the Petitioner.
115. Learned senior counsel would therefore submit that the
aforesaid findings are findings of fact, premised on documentary
evidence and contractual interpretation, and represent a plausible view
taken by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. The same, therefore, does not
warrant interference under Section 34 of the Act.
No Waiver/Abandonment of Right to Levy Liquidated Damages
116. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
the extensions of time granted by the Respondent were in the nature of
commercial indulgence, intended to facilitate completion of the
project and mitigate further delay, and cannot, by any stretch, be
construed as a relinquishment or abandonment of the Respondent‘s
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BHATIA
15:16:06
contractual rights. The Contract, it would be urged, expressly
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
contemplates the levy of Liquidated Damages for delay in Clause 7 of
the LsOA, and nowhere provides that the grant of extension would
operate as a waiver of such entitlement.
117. Learned senior counsel would further submit that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has, upon a correct appreciation of the contractual
terms and the conduct of the parties, held that the Respondent‘s right
to levy Liquidated Damages stood preserved notwithstanding the grant
of extensions. It would be contended that any contrary interpretation
would defeat the very purpose of incorporating a Liquidated Damages
clause in commercial contracts, particularly in infrastructure projects
where timely performance is critical.
118. Learned senior counsel would thus submit that the said finding,
being a plausible and legally sustainable view, more specifically being
based on the terms of the Contract, does not warrant interference
under Section 34 of the Act.
Counter-Claim Nos. 3 and 4
119. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent
would next address submissions in support of CC-3 and CC-4,
submitting
that
the
same
proceeds
on
a
fundamental
mischaracterisation of both the contractual framework and the
findings returned by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
120. It would be contended that the learned Arbitral Tribunal
adjudicated these Counter-claims upon a detailed appreciation of the
contractual stipulations, contemporaneous correspondence and the
conduct of the parties. The conclusions so arrived at are, at the very
least, a plausible view and therefore do not warrant interference under
Section 34 of the Act.
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CC-3 and CC-4 were not barred by the Limitation
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121. Learned senior counsel would controvert the Petitioner‘s plea of
limitation and submit that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has correctly
appreciated the nature of the cause of action in respect of CC-3 and
CC-4. Learned senior counsel would contend that the Petitioner‘s
attempt to fix the cause of action at the stage of de-scoping or issuance
of LOA to a third party, i.e., Alstom, is legally untenable and ignores
the settled principle that claims for risk and cost crystallise only upon
actual incurrence and ascertainment of differential cost.
122. Learned senior counsel would submit that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has therefore rightly held that the cause of action for CC-3
and CC-4 was continuing in nature, and the consequential loss stood
crystallised only upon execution of the alternate procurement.
123. Learned senior counsel would, therefore, contend that the
finding returned by the learned Arbitral Tribunal treating the CC-3
and CC-4 as within the Limitation is a plausible and legally
sustainable view, which does not call for interference under Section
34 of the Act.
Risk and Cost Procurement: Not dependent upon Formal Termination
124. Learned senior counsel would, in this regard, submit that the
Petitioner seeks to read the contractual provisions in an unduly rigid
and literal manner. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has rightly held that
persistent delay by the Petitioner entitled the Respondent to take
corrective measures to mitigate further loss, without termination of the
Contract.
125. Learned senior counsel would submit that termination is not the
sole mechanism available to an employer and the Contract ought to be
construed in a commercially sensible manner to enable performance
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and completion of the project, rather than to await formal termination
at the cost of further delay and escalation.
126. Learned senior counsel would further submit that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has, therefore, correctly rejected the Petitioner‘s
reliance on Clause 26 of Supply LOA by holding that the absence of
formal termination does not denude the Respondent of its right to
recover additional cost incurred due to the Petitioner‘s breach,
particularly where the contract had to remain subsisting to seek
performance of the remaining 3 nos. of 110R.
127. It would therefore be urged that the interpretation adopted by
the learned Majority Tribunal is a purposive and commercially sound
construction of the contract, and cannot be supplanted by a hypertechnical reading in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act.
Urgency and Necessity of Procurement Duly Established
128. Learned senior counsel would contend that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has rightly appreciated that the project was part of a larger
integrated infrastructure scheme, and the timely availability of critical
equipment, such as the reactor, was essential for ensuring overall
project readiness.
129. Learned senior counsel would submit that the Petitioner‘s
attempt to correlate urgency exclusively with the commissioning of
the transmission lines is therefore wholly misconceived. It would be
contended that a delay in procurement of critical equipment, beyond
the agreed contractual timelines, constitutes a breach in itself. Such a
delay cannot be justified by reference to the status of third-party
infrastructure.
130. Learned senior counsel would therefore submit that under the
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contractual framework, governing the parties herein, any such delay is
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liable to be remedied through the stipulated consequences, including
levy of Liquidated Damages and recourse to risk cost procurement,
irrespective of the commissioning of transmission lines, which were
dependent upon an arrangement of the Respondent with a third-party
to which the Petitioner has no privity.
131. Learned counsel for the Respondent would thus submit that the
finding of the learned Arbitral Tribunal that procurement was
necessitated by project requirement and delay attributable to the
Petitioner is a factual, commercially and contractually sound
conclusion, not amenable to interference under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of
the Act.
Risk-Cost Procurement not Pre-mature or Mala fide
132. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
the learned Arbitral Tribunal has examined the sequence of events,
including issuance of LTE, de-scoping and placement of orders to
Alstom, and has rightly concluded that such steps were necessitated
by the Petitioner‘s continued default and inability to perform within
the stipulated and extended timelines.
133. Learned senior counsel would submit that once the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has already reasonably established that there was in
fact a delay attributable to the Petitioner, and that there was no
requirement of termination of the Contract, the invocation of the Risk
Cost Procurement clause was a reasonable mitigation measure, and the
same cannot be characterised as premature or unlawful merely
because the Petitioner disputes the timing thereof.
No merit in the challenge to the second procurement of 3 nos. 110R
134. Learned senior counsel would contend that the rights of parties
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arising out of breach do not stand frozen upon invocation of
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Arbitration, and the Respondent was entitled to take necessary steps to
complete the project and mitigate losses. Invocation of Arbitration
cannot be construed as any stay on the completion of the project.
135. Learned senior counsel would submit that, in essence, the
Petitioner seeks to suggest that the Respondent ought to have stalled
the execution of the Project merely because certain disputes had arisen
inter se the parties. Such a proposition, it would be contended, is
fundamentally flawed, as it would require the Respondent to expose
itself to breach of its independent contractual obligation with LPGCL.
136. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would thus contend
that the Respondent, being bound to ensure timely completion of the
project, was, both contractually and commercially, justified in
proceeding with alternate arrangements to mitigate delay, prevent
further losses and avoid cascading defaults.
Proof of Expenditure and Loss Sufficiently Established
137. Learned senior counsel would submit that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has considered the material on record and has awarded
damages only upon being satisfied that the expenditure incurred was
attributable to the Petitioner‘s failure, and since the Respondent was
under the obligation to complete the Project, the Risk Cost
procurement was correctly invoked by the Respondent.
138. Learned senior counsel would submit that whether procurement
was belated or unsupported by evidence is a pure question of
appreciation of facts, which was correctly undertaken by the Learned
Arbitral Tribunal and cannot be interfered with by this Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
ANALYSIS:
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139. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties at length and, with their able assistance, carefully perused
the paper-book and other material documents placed on record,
including the record of the learned Arbitral Tribunal, as well as the
written submissions filed by the respective parties.
140. At the outset, it is apposite to note that this Court is conscious
of the limited scope of its jurisdiction while examining an objection
petition under Section 34 of the Act. The contours of judicial
intervention in such proceedings have been authoritatively delineated
and settled by a consistent and evolving line of precedents of the
Hon‘ble Supreme Court.
141. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court, after an exhaustive consideration of a catena of earlier
decisions, in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power
Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.24, while dealing with the grounds
of conflict with the public policy of India and perversity, grounds
which have also been urged in the present case, made certain pertinent
observations, which are reproduced hereunder:
“Relevant legal principles governing a challenge to an arbitral
award
30. Before we delve into the issue/sub-issues culled out above, it
would be useful to have a look at the relevant legal principles
governing a challenge to an arbitral award. Recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made through an application
for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-sections (2),
(2-A) and (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Sub-section (2) of
Section 34 has two clauses, (a) and (b). Clause (a) has five subclauses which are not relevant to the issues raised before us.
Insofar as clause (b) is concerned, it has two sub-clauses,
namely, (i) and (ii). Sub-clause (i) of clause (b) is not relevant to
the controversy in hand. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) provides
that if the Court finds that the arbitral award is in conflict with
the public policy of India, it may set aside the award.
Public policy
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(2025) 2 SCC 417
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31. ―Public policy‖ is a concept not statutorily defined, though it
has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and
is also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act,
1872 uses the expression by stating that the consideration or
object of an agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to
public policy. That is, a contract which is opposed to public
policy is void.
*****
35. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994
Supp (1) SCC 644, a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed
that the doctrine of public policy is somewhat open—textured
and flexible. By citing earlier decisions, it was observed that
there are two conflicting positions which are referred to as the
―narrow view‖ and the ―broad view‖. According to the narrow
view, courts cannot create new heads of public policy whereas
the broad view countenances judicial law making in these areas.
In the field of private international law, it was pointed out,
courts refuse to apply a rule of foreign law or recognise a
foreign judgment or a foreign arbitral award if it is found that
the same is contrary to the public policy of the country in which
it is sought to be invoked or enforced. However, it was clarified,
a distinction is to be drawn while applying the rule of public
policy between a matter governed by domestic law and a matter
involving conflict of laws. It was observed that the application
of the doctrine of public policy in the field of conflict of laws is
more limited than that in the domestic law and the courts are
slower to invoke public policy in cases involving a foreign
element than when a purely municipal legal issue is involved. It
was held that contravention of law alone will not attract the bar
of public policy, and something more than contravention of law
is required.
*****
37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against
public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of
India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of
fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve
public interest or public good.
*****
40. In ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9
SCC 263, paras 35, 38 & 39, which also related to the period
prior to the 2015 Amendment of Section 34(2)(b)(ii), a threeJudge Bench of this Court, after considering the decision
inONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, without
exhaustively enumerating the purport of the expression
―fundamental policy of Indian law‖, observed that it would
include all such fundamental principles as providing a basis for
administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country.
The Court thereafter illustratively referred to three fundamental
juristic principles, namely:
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(a) that in every determination that affects the rights of a citizen
or leads to any civil consequences, the court or authority or
quasi-judicial body must adopt a judicial approach, that is, it
must act bona fide and deal with the subject in a fair, reasonable
and objective manner and not actuated by any extraneous
consideration;
(b) that while determining the rights and obligations of parties
the court or Tribunal or authority must act in accordance with
the principles of natural justice and must apply its mind to the
attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one way
or the other; and
(c) that its decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at the same.
41. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, a twoJudge Bench of this Court, held that audi alteram
partem principle is undoubtedly a fundamental juristic principle
in Indian law and is enshrined in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of
the 1996 Act. In addition to the earlier recognised principles
forming fundamental policy of Indian law, it was held that
disregarding:
(a) orders of superior courts in India; and
(b) the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court would
also be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental policy of
Indian law.
Further, elaborating upon the third juristic principle (i.e. qua
perversity), as laid down in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco
International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263, it was observed that
where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant
to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such
decision would necessarily be perverse [Associate Builders
case, (2015) 3 SCC 49, para 31].
To this a caveat was added by observing that when a court
applies the ―public policy test‖ to an arbitration award, it does
not act as a court of appeal and, consequently, errors of fact
cannot be corrected; and a possible view by the arbitrator on
facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the
ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be
relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. It was also
observed that an award based on little evidence or on evidence
which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind
would not be held to be invalid on that score. Thus, once it is
found that the arbitrator's approach is not arbitrary or capricious,
it is to be taken as the last word on facts.
The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48
42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior
to the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment
the expression ―in contravention with the fundamental policy of
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Indian law‖ was not used by the legislature in either Section
34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section
34(2)(b)(ii) and its Explanation read:
*****
44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove
any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the
public policy of India.
45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are
dealing with a case where the application under Section 34 of
the 1996 Act was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the
newly
substituted/added
Explanations
would
apply
[SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15
SCC 131].
46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the
two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b),
in place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly
inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it
does away with the use of words : (a) ―without prejudice to the
generality of sub-clause (ii)‖ in the opening part of the preamended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) ―without
prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section‖ in the
opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section
48(2)(b); secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India
to the three specified categories by using the words ―only if‖.
Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute
shall not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an
application under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b)
of the 1996 Act.
47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in
Section 34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an
arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the
Court may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award. This power of the
Court is, however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states
that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an
erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of
evidence.
48. Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an
arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only
if:
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
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49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of
the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was
in violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall
confine our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral award
is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law,
and/or whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of
morality or justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of
sub-section (2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there
is any patent illegality on the face of the award.
50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be
apposite to consider as to how the expressions:
(a) ―in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law‖;
(b) ―in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice‖; and
(c) ―patent illegality‖ have been construed.
In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression
―in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law‖
was not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.
Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the
context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the
phrase ―contrary to the public policy‖, this Court held that for a
foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention
of law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:
(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or
(b) the interest of India; and/or
(c) justice or morality.
*****
55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid
discussion is that after ―the 2015 Amendments‖ in Section
34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase ―in
conflict with the public policy of India‖ must be accorded a
restricted meaning in terms of Explanation 1. The expression ―in
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law‖ by use
of the word ―fundamental‖ before the phrase ―policy of Indian
law‖ makes the expression narrower in its application than the
phrase ―in contravention with the policy of Indian law‖, which
means mere contravention of law is not enough to make an
award vulnerable. To bring the contravention within the fold of
fundamental policy of Indian law, the award must contravene all
or any of such fundamental principles that provide a basis for
administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country.
56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of
such contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:
(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;
(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding
effect of the judgment of a superior court; and
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(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public
interest, are considered contravention of the fundamental policy
of Indian law.
However, while assessing whether there has been a
contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the
extent of judicial scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out
in Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
*****
Patent illegality
65. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which was
inserted by the 2015 Amendment, provides that an arbitral
award not arising out of international commercial arbitrations,
may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the
award is visited by patent illegality appearing on the face of the
award. The proviso to sub-section (2-A) states that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous
application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
66. In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, while
dealing with the phrase ―public policy of India‖ as used in
Section 34, this Court took the view that the concept of public
policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and
public interest. If the award, on the face of it, patently violates
statutory provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest.
Thus, an award could also be set aside if it is patently illegal. It
was, however, clarified that illegality must go to the root of the
matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature, it cannot be held
that award is against public policy.
67. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, this Court
held that an award would be patently illegal, if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract [See also three-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. SAL Udyog (P) Ltd.,
(2022) 2 SCC 275].
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the substantive
provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in contravention of
Section 28(1)(a) of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of
the contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the
1996 Act.
68. In SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI,
(2019) 15 SCC 131 this Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment which inserted sub-section (2-A) in Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. It was held that ―patent illegality appearing on the
face of the award‖ refers to such illegality as goes to the root of
matter, but which does not amount to mere erroneous
application of law. It was also clarified that what is not
subsumed within ―the fundamental policy of Indian law‖,
namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to ―public
policy‖ or ―public interest‖, cannot be brought in by the
backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground
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of patent illegality [See SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co.
Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131]. Further, it was observed,
reappreciation of evidence is not permissible under this category
of challenge to an arbitral award [See SsangyongEngg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69. Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award was
recognised inONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 263. Therein it was observed that an arbitral
decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no reasonable
person would have arrived at the same. It was observed that if an
award is perverse, it would be against the public policy of India.
70. InAssociate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 certain tests
were laid down to determine whether a decision of an Arbitral
Tribunal could be considered perverse. In this context, it was
observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant
to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such
decision would necessarily be perverse.
However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that when
a court applies these tests it does not act as a court of appeal and,
consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected. Though, a
possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass
muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It was also observed that
an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not
measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held
to be invalid on that score.
71. In SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI,
(2019) 15 SCC 131, which dealt with the legal position post the
2015 Amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was observed
that a decision which is perverse, while no longer being a
ground for challenge under ―public policy of India‖, would
certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of
the award. It was pointed out that an award based on no
evidence, or which ignores vital evidence, would be perverse
and thus patently illegal. It was also observed that a finding
based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the
arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence
inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the
parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as
perverse [See SsangyongEngg.
&
Construction
Co.
Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
72. The tests laid down in Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 to determine perversity were followed
in SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131 and later approved by a three-Judge Bench of this
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Court in Patel Engg. Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power
Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC 167.
73. In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
DMRC Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6
SCC 357, the ground of patent illegality/perversity was
delineated in the following terms: (SCC p. 376, para 39)
―39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available for
setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the arbitrator is
found to be perverse, or so irrational that no reasonable person
would have arrived at it; or the construction of the contract is
such that no fair or reasonable person would take; or, that the
view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view. A finding
based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable
to be set aside under the head of ―patent illegality‖. An award
without reasons would suffer from patent illegality. The
arbitrator commits a patent illegality by deciding a matter not
within its jurisdiction or violating a fundamental principle of
natural justice.‖
Scope of interference with an arbitral award
74. The aforesaid judicial precedents make it clear that while
exercising power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act the Court
does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award. Interference with
an arbitral award is only on limited grounds as set out in Section
34 of the 1996 Act. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts is
to be respected as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the
quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon. It is only
when an arbitral award could be categorised as perverse, that on
an error of fact an arbitral award may be set aside. Further, a
mere erroneous application of the law or wrong appreciation of
evidence by itself is not a ground to set aside an award as is
clear from the provisions of sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of
the 1996 Act.
75. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.,
(2019) 20 SCC 1, paras 27-43, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court held that courts need to be cognizant of the fact that
arbitral awards are not to be interfered with in a casual and
cavalier manner, unless the court concludes that the perversity of
the award goes to the root of the matter and there is no
possibility of an alternative interpretation that may sustain the
arbitral award. It was observed that jurisdiction under Section 34
cannot be equated with the normal appellate jurisdiction. Rather,
the approach ought to be to respect the finality of the arbitral
award as well as party's autonomy to get their dispute
adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law.
*****
Scope of interference with the interpretation/construction of a
contract accorded in an arbitral award
84. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the
terms of the contract. In a case where an Arbitral Tribunal
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passes an award against the terms of the contract, the award
would be patently illegal. However, an Arbitral Tribunal has
jurisdiction to interpret a contract having regard to terms and
conditions of the contract, conduct of the parties including
correspondences exchanged, circumstances of the case and
pleadings of the parties. If the conclusion of the arbitrator is
based on a possible view of the matter, the Court should not
interfere [See: SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd., (2009)
10 SCC 63; Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC, (2003) 8
SCC 593; McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co.
Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181; MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019)
4 SCC 163]. But where, on a full reading of the contract, the
view of the Arbitral Tribunal on the terms of a contract is not a
possible view, the award would be considered perverse and as
such amenable to interference [South East Asia Marine Engg.
& Constructions Ltd. v. Oil India Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 164].
Whether unexpressed term can be read into a contract as an
implied condition
85. Ordinarily, terms of the contract are to be understood in the
way the parties wanted and intended them to be. In agreements
of arbitration, where party autonomy is the grund norm, how the
parties worked out the agreement, is one of the indicators to
decipher the intention, apart from the plain or grammatical
meaning of the expressions used [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2016) 4 SCC 126].
86. However, reading an unexpressed term in an agreement
would be justified on the basis that such a term was always and
obviously intended by the parties thereto. An unexpressed term
can be implied if, and only if, the court finds that the parties
must have intended that term to form part of their contract. It is
not enough for the court to find that such a term would have
been adopted by the parties as reasonable men if it had been
suggested to them. Rather, it must have been a term that went
without saying, a term necessary to give business efficacy to the
contract, a term which, although tacit, forms part of the contract
[Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd. v. Gujarat ERC, (2019) 19 SCC
9].
87. But before an implied condition, not expressly found in the
contract, is read into a contract, by invoking the business
efficacy doctrine, it must satisfy the following five conditions:
(a) it must be reasonable and equitable;
(b) it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract,
that is, a term will not be implied if the contract is effective
without it;
(c) it must be obvious that ―it goes without saying‖;
(d) it must be capable of clear expression;
(e) it must not contradict any terms of the contract [Nabha
Power Ltd. v. Punjab SPCL, (2018) 11 SCC 508, followed
in Adani Power case, (2019) 19 SCC 9].‖
(emphasis supplied)
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Challenge to Claim No.2
142. This Court notes, at the outset, the fair and categorical
submission advanced by learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the Petitioner that, insofar as Claim No. 2 is concerned, the same was
not pressed before the learned Arbitral Tribunal on account of lack of
supporting evidence.
143. Learned senior counsel has further submitted that, in view of
the aforesaid position, the Petitioner does not seek to press the
challenge to the Impugned Award qua Claim No. 2 even in the present
proceedings under Section 34 of the Act.
144. In view of the aforesaid, it is evident that no lis survives for
consideration before this Court insofar as Claim No. 2 is concerned.
This Court is therefore not called upon to examine either the
correctness of the findings returned by the learned Arbitral Tribunal or
the merits of the claim itself.
145. Accordingly, the Impugned Award, to the extent it pertains to
Claim No. 2, is left undisturbed and stands upheld.
Challenge to Counter-Claim No.1
Effect of “Time not being of the essence”
146. The Petitioner has assailed the Impugned Award, insofar as it
relates to CC-1, principally on the ground that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal itself recorded a finding that time was not of the essence of
the Contract and, therefore, the very substratum for the levy of
Liquidated Damages stood eroded. This contention, though prima
facie attractive, does not withstand closer scrutiny in the factual or
legal context of the present case.
147. A perusal of the Impugned Award, particularly Paragraph No.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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12.8 thereof, indicates that the learned Arbitral Tribunal, upon
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
consideration of the conduct of the parties and the repeated extensions
granted during the subsistence of the Contract, concluded that time
could not be regarded as being of the essence in the strict contractual
sense. However, significantly, the learned Arbitral Tribunal did not
treat this finding as determinative of the Respondent‘s entitlement to
liquidated damages for delay. The relevant finding of the learned
Arbitral Tribunal, being Paragraph No. 12.8 of the Impugned Award,
is reproduced herein under:
―12.8 Having regard to the fact that the Respondent has repeatedly
granted extensions to the Claimant, to ensure completion of the
Project, these extensions fundamentally undermine the
Respondent's assertion that time was of the essence of the Contract.
By providing multiple extensions, the Respondent effectively
acknowledged and accepted the delays, thereby, departing from the
strict enforcement of timelines, and indicating that the Parties'
actions collectively redefined the contractual terms concerning the
Project timelines. As noted above, it is well settled that the
principle of time being of the essence in a contract is not
immutable but is subject to the parties' conduct and mutual
agreement in the course of the execution of the contract. The
Tribunal is of the view that having granted repeated extensions, the
Respondent's argument that the time was of the essence of the
contract lacks substance and is accordingly rejected.‖
148. What emerges from the aforesaid is that the learned Arbitral
tribunal merely diluted the rigidity of the original timelines on account
of the conduct of the parties; it did not efface the obligation of timely
performance nor absolve the consequences of delay. The learned
Arbitral Tribunal thereafter proceeded to independently examine the
question of delay, its extent, and its attribution. Upon a detailed
appreciation of the evidentiary record, it returned a categorical finding
that the delay was attributable to the Petitioner. Consequent thereto, it
upheld the Respondent‘s entitlement to Liquidated Damages in terms
of Clause 7 of the LsOA. For the sake of clarity, Clause 7 of the LsOA
reads as under:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
―7.0 Liquidated Damages:
Works/ facilities will be deemed to have been completed and
would be taken over only when all components, and parts required
for completion of the complete GT, ICT and Reactor Package as a
whole, Essential Spare Parts, Tools & Tackles, respective O&M
Manuals, complete "As-built" drawings and Test Certificates are
also delivered to the satisfaction of the purchaser. If any of the
above are not delivered in full and in time, the works/ facilities will
be considered as delayed and LD shall become applicable.
7.1 LD for Delay:
In case of delayed completion of works/ facilities as per schedule
mentioned at clause no. 6.1 above, the Contractor shall pay LD for
delay @ 0.5% of Lot wise contract price per week or part thereof
of the delay subject to maximum of 10% of Lot wise contract
price.‖
149. It is a settled principle of contractual law that the expression
“time not being of the essence” does not render delay inconsequential,
nor does it preclude a party from claiming damages arising from such
delay. The effect of such a finding is merely to relax the right of strict
enforcement of timelines as a condition precedent to termination; it
does not obliterate the right to seek compensation for delayed
performance.
150. This principle assumes even greater significance in commercial
infrastructure contracts, where delay in performance has cascading
operational and financial consequences. In Construction & Design
Services v. Delhi Development Authority 25 , the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court has authoritatively held that the grant of extension of time, by
itself, does not amount to waiver of the right to recover damages,
particularly where the contract expressly provides for levy of
Liquidated Damages. Such a contractual stipulation continues to
operate unless there is a clear and unequivocal waiver. The relevant
paragraph of the said judgement, being Paragraph No. 14, is
reproduced herein under for ready reference:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
(2015) 14 SCC 263
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
―14. There is no dispute that the appellant failed to execute the
work of construction of sewerage pumping station within the
stipulated or extended time. The said pumping station certainly was
of public utility to maintain and preserve clean environment,
absence absence of which could result in environmental
degradation by stagnation of water in low lying areas. Delay also
resulted in loss of interest on blocked capital as rightly observed in
para 7 of the impugned judgment of the High Court. In these
circumstances, loss could be assumed, even without proof and
burden was on the appellant who committed breach to show
that no loss was caused by delay or that the amount stipulated
as damages for breach of contract was in the nature of penalty.
Even if technically the time was not of essence, it could not be
presumed that delay was of no consequence. Thus, even if there
is no specific evidence of loss suffered by the respondent-plaintiff,
the observations in the order of the Division Bench that the project
being a public utility project, the delay itself can be taken to have
resulted in loss in the form of environmental degradation and loss
of interest on the capital are not without any basis.‖
(emphasis supplied)
151. The aforesaid observations apply with equal force to the facts of
the present case, where the Contract pertained to a large-scale
infrastructure project involving coordinated supply, erection and
commissioning obligations, the timely execution whereof was critical
to the overall project schedule.
152. Further, in the present case, the Contract expressly provides for
Liquidated Damages under Clause 7 of the LsOA, which is in the
nature of a genuine pre-estimate of loss. The learned Arbitral Tribunal
has interpreted and applied the said clause in conjunction with its
finding on attribution of delay. This approach is not only consistent
with the contractual framework but is also in consonance with settled
legal principles governing commercial contracts, particularly in
infrastructure projects where timely performance is of critical
importance.
153. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the aforesaid
interpretation
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
15:16:06
is either contrary to the terms of the Contract, or in
conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law, or so irrational as
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
to shock the conscience of this Court. The view taken by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal is, at the very least, a plausible and legally tenable
view based on the material before it.
154. In such circumstances, no ground for interference under Section
34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act is made out. The challenge to the Impugned
Award on this count is, accordingly, rejected.
PAC/CEA Certificates: Absence of Causal Nexus
155. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner is
that the delay in execution of the contractual works was occasioned by
the Respondent‘s failure to procure and furnish the PAC and CEA
Certificates within the stipulated time, which were necessary for
availing customs and excise duty exemptions. This contention has
been specifically considered and dealt with by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal in Paragraph Nos. 12.32 to 12.40 of the Impugned Award.
The operative findings, as contained in Paragraph Nos. 12.38 to 12.40
are reproduced herein below for ready reference:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
―12.38. At this juncture, the argument of the Claimant that it was
unable to provide the list of equipment due to frequent amendment
to the LOAs deserves to be considered. Although there is no
dispute that the LOAs were being constantly amended by the
Respondent, but the Tribunal is of the view that in order to mitigate
the delay in imports and consequent delay in supplies, the Claimant
could have made an effort of procuring the PAC for the remaining
materials in part i.e., the Claimant ought to have taken PAC and
CEAs for 10 GT, 7 lCTs and could have got PAC and CEAs for
13, 110 MVAr Reactors at a later date especially when the quantity
of GT and lCTs was finalized and remained unchanged in the
amendments. However, the Claimant chose not to do so.
12.39. Be that as it may, the evidence on record establishes that the
PAC was ultimately issued by Respondent on 10.12.2013, the CEA
Certificate was obtained on 06.01.2014 and the Import License was
issued only on 05.03.2014 and, thus, there was substantial delay in
the issuance of the relevant certificates in the present case.
However, the Claimant has failed to establish that the manufacture
of the contractual items could not at all begin without the imported
parts, for which it wanted to avail of exemption from payment of
Excise and Customs Duty.
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
12.40. In the final analysis, having regard to Clause 5 Sub-Clause
VI of the LOA, which specifically provides that the Claimant on its
accord could pay the Excise and Customs Duties and get the same
reimbursed Respondent and the fact that the Claimant has failed to
demonstrate that it could not commence the manufacturing process
without availing the Customs and Excise exemptions, the Tribunal
is of the view that the Claimant has failed to. establish and prove
any causal link between the delay in obtaining exemptions and the
commencement of manufacturing process and, therefore, the delay
in supply of the contracted equipments is attributable to the
Claimant.‖
(emphasis supplied)
156. A careful reading of the said findings demonstrates that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has not brushed aside the Petitioner‘s case,
rather it has undertaken a nuanced evaluation of both the factual
matrix and the contractual framework governing the parties. The
learned Arbitral Tribunal has acknowledged that there was, in fact, a
delay in the issuance of PAC and CEA Certificates. However, it has
proceeded to examine whether such delay bore a proximate and
causative nexus with the Petitioner‘s inability to perform its
contractual obligations.
157. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has, upon appreciation of the
material on record, returned a clear and categorical finding that the
Petitioner failed to establish any causal nexus between the delay in
issuance of PAC/CEA Certificates and the delay in commencement of
manufacturing or supply of contractual equipment. This distinction
between the existence of delay and its legal consequence is both
significant and well-founded, for it is trite that delay on the part of one
contracting party does not, by itself, exonerate the other, unless it is
demonstrated that such delay directly impeded performance.
158. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has placed reliance on Clause 5(VI) of the Supply LOA,
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BHATIA
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which expressly contemplates a contractual mechanism enabling the
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Petitioner to proceed with procurement upon payment of applicable
duties, with a corresponding right of reimbursement. The learned
Arbitral Tribunal has, thus, construed the contractual scheme to mean
that procurement of PAC/CEA Certificates was not an absolute
condition precedent to commencement of performance, but rather a
facilitative mechanism intended to confer fiscal benefit.
159. The Petitioner‘s submission that it was commercially imprudent
to proceed without exemptions has also been considered by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal and rejected, inasmuch as no material was
placed to show that such a course of action was contractually
prohibited or commercially unviable to the extent of halting
performance altogether. The learned Arbitral Tribunal‘s approach,
therefore, reflects a balanced appreciation of both contractual rights
and commercial realities.
160. It is also evident that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has confined
its analysis to the terms of the Contract and the evidentiary record,
without importing any extraneous considerations. The finding that no
causal nexus exists between delay in issuance of PAC/CEA
Certificates and delay in performance is, thus, a reasoned finding
grounded in evidence and contractual interpretation.
161. The challenge mounted by the Petitioner, in substance, seeks a
re-appreciation of the evidentiary material and a substitution of its
preferred interpretation of Clause 5(VI) of the Supply LOA in place of
that adopted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. Such an exercise is
clearly impermissible within the limited scope of interference under
Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, which does not permit this Court to act
as a court of appeal over arbitral findings.
162.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds no infirmity in the
approach or conclusion of the learned Arbitral Tribunal on this aspect.
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
The finding that delay in issuance of PAC/CEA Certificates did not
constitute the proximate cause of delay in performance is a plausible
and legally sustainable view, not warranting interference under
Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Delay Expert, Delay Analysis and Appreciation of Evidence
163. The Petitioner has assailed the Impugned Award on the ground
that the learned Arbitral Tribunal disregarded that the Respondent
failed to prove the expert report on delay relied upon by them and
instead the learned Arbitral Tribunal evolved its own theory of delay
attribution. This submission, upon a careful and holistic reading of the
Award, does not merit acceptance.
164. It is a settled principle that an Arbitral Tribunal is the final
arbiter of facts and evidence. The Tribunal is not bound by expert
opinion and is fully competent to evaluate, accept, reject, or depart
from such opinion, provided its conclusions are supported by reasons
discernible from the record. Expert evidence, by its very nature, is
advisory and cannot supplant the Tribunal‘s independent assessment
of the evidentiary material.
165. A perusal of the Impugned Award, particularly Paragraph Nos.
12.21 to 12.57, including the analytical discussion contained in
Paragraph Nos. 12.21, 12.27, 12.28, 12.35, 12.37, 12.54 and 12.57
demonstrate that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has undertaken a
comprehensive and independent evaluation of the entire evidentiary
record. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has analysed the sequence of
events, contractual stipulations, contemporaneous correspondence,
and the conduct of the parties, before arriving at its conclusions on
delay attribution. The relevant paragraphs of the Impugned Award are
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
reproduced herein under for ready reference:
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
―12.21 The Tribunal shall now proceed to determine the individual
breaches allegedly committed by the Parties and their implication
on the Claims/ Counter Claims preferred by the Parties. The
Claimant has divided the alleged breaches committed by the
Respondent into three categories while the Respondent has divided
the alleged breaches committed by the Claimant into six categories.
Since the submissions of the Parties on delays are interconnected,
the Tribunal proceeds to discuss the same in the following broad
categories:
****
12.27 In light of the above, certain undisputed facts that deserve to
be taken into consideration are that: (i) the Claimant has not placed
on record the technical agreement that it claims to have entered
into with GPT; (ii) Clause 3 of the LOA unequivocally stipulates
that the Claimant has entered into an agreement with GPT; (iii) that
in spite of repeated assurances to the Respondent, the Claimant has
failed to produce the technical agreement purportedly entered into
with GPT; and (iv) the drawings ultimately submitted by the
Claimant were without GPT logo and signature with the caveat that
the Claimant would submit the drawings/ documents prepared by
GPT at a later date.
****
12.35 A bare reading of the above provisions indicates that: (i)
LPGCL i.e., the owner of the Project was under an obligation to
provide the PAC and CEA Certificate to the Claimant within 6
months from the date of the LoA; (ii) in case there was delay in
furnishing of the required documents by LPGCL, the Claimant
could clear the required materials from the Customs and Excise
authorities on its own cost; and (iii) in case the Claimant had
incurred any costs in clearing the required materials, the same was
to be reimbursed by LPGCL on producing the required documents
as enumerated in the provision. Nevertheless, vide letter dated
17.09.2012, the Respondent had assured the Claimant that it will
procure from LPGCL all the necessary documents to be submitted
by the Claimant before the Customs and Excise authorities.
****
12.37 The Ld. Counsel further submitted that after the PAC and
CEA Certificate were issued on 06.01.2014, a meeting was held on
18.02.2014 wherein it was agreed that the entire equipment shall be
delivered by 31.01.2015, therefore, even if there was delay in grant
of PAC, it had no link with the delay in deliveries. In any case
there was no reason for the Claimant to remain passive. It had two
options; i.e., to obtain PAC for materials in parts or to import the
material on payment of Duty and charge the same to the
Respondent as stipulated
in Clause 5(Vl) of the LoA, which indemnifies the Claimant from
additional liability owing to payment of extra Excise and Customs
Duties, for want of the requisite Certificates.
****
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
12.54 At this juncture, it would be essential to analyse the conduct
of the Claimant in withholding the delivery of the Reactors on the
grounds of pending payments by the Respondent. Clause 12 of the
LOAs, which deals with terms of payment, stipulates that: (i) 10%
of the contract price is paid as an initial advance; (ii) 75% of the
Order Price Is payable on dispatch of the ICTs, GTs and the
Reactors; (iii) on receipt of the equipment on site and subject to
physical verification, 15% of the contract price becomes payable;
(iv) on issuance of PAC and submission of final approved
documents and O&M Manuals 5% becomes due and payable; (v)
5% becomes payable on the completion of all associated work and
issuance of FAC a further 5% is due and payable. Hence, it is
evident from the above that the LOAs encapsulated provisions for
terms of payment that needed to be adhered to in order to release
payments. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Claimant was not
entitled to claim 100% payment without fulfilling the requirements
as provided for in Clause 12 of the LOAs.
****
12.57 In view of the analysis above, the Tribunal holds that the
Claimant is responsible for the delay in Supply, Erection, Testing
and Commissioning of the subject equipment.‖
166. The aforesaid extracts unmistakably reveal that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal‘s conclusions are not founded upon conjecture or a
mechanical rejection of expert evidence, but upon a structured and
reasoned appreciation of the material on record. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal has, inter alia, taken into account the Petitioner‘s failure to
place on record the technical agreement with GPT, its non-compliance
with contractual requirements relating to drawings, the contractual
framework governing PAC/CEA procurement, and the Petitioner‘s
conduct in relation to performance and payment obligations.
167. The Petitioner‘s grievance, in essence, invites this Court to
undertake a re-appreciation of the evidence and to substitute its own
view on delay attribution in place of that arrived at by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. Such an exercise is wholly impermissible within the
limited scope of interference under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act,
which does not permit this Court to sit in appeal over arbitral findings
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
of fact.
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
168. This Court finds that the delay analysis undertaken by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal is reasoned, supported by the material on
record, and reflective of a plausible view and therefore does not render
the Award vulnerable to challenge under Section 34 of the Act.
169. In view of the foregoing, no ground is made out to interfere
with the findings of the learned Arbitral Tribunal on delay analysis.
The challenge on this aspect is, accordingly, rejected.
Delay Attributable to the Petitioner: A Finding of Fact
170. A perusal of the Impugned Award, particularly the discussion
contained in Paragraph Nos. 12.30 to 12.57, the relevant portions
whereof stand noticed hereinabove, demonstrates that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has undertaken a detailed, structured and sequential
examination of the chronology of events, the contractual obligations
of the parties, and their conduct during execution of the project. The
learned
Arbitral
Tribunal
has
analysed
contemporaneous
correspondence, contractual stipulations and performance milestones
to ascertain the true cause of delay. Upon such comprehensive
evaluation, a clear and reasoned finding has been returned that the
delay in execution of the project is attributable to the Petitioner.
171. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has, inter alia, taken note of
delays in submission and approval of drawings, lack of timely
finalisation of designs, and deficiencies in coordination with the GPT,
which have a cascading effect on downstream activities such as
procurement, manufacturing and supply. These findings are not based
on conjecture, but emanate from the material placed on record. The
learned Arbitral Tribunal has also examined the question of causation
and has recorded reasons as to why the delay cannot be attributed to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
factors beyond the Petitioner‘s control.
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
172. In the considered view of this Court, the aforesaid
determination constitutes a pure finding of fact rendered upon due
appreciation of evidence. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that
such a finding is vitiated by perversity, in the sense of being based on
no evidence, or that any material evidence has been ignored, or that
the conclusion is so irrational that no reasonable person could have
arrived at it. The challenge, in substance, is an invitation to this Court
to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute the Petitioner‘s preferred
narrative in place of that accepted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal, an
exercise which lies beyond the permissible scope of interference under
Section 34 of the Act.
Liquidated Damages: No Requirement of Strict Proof of Loss
173. The Petitioner has assailed the Impugned Award on the ground
that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has awarded Liquidated Damages in
the absence of proof of actual loss. This contention does not merit
acceptance, either qua the understanding of the contractual
stipulations or in light of the findings returned in the Impugned
Award.
174. A perusal of the Impugned Award reveals that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has not proceeded on any abstract or presumptive
basis, but has specifically examined the enforceability of the
Liquidated Damages clause within the framework of the Contract and
in the backdrop of the established delay attributable to the Petitioner.
The learned Arbitral Tribunal has treated the levy of Liquidated
Damages not as a matter of discretion, but as a contractual
consequence flowing from breach, in terms of Clause 7 of the LsOA.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
175. The material discussion and findings in this regard are
mentioned in Paragraph Nos. 14.1, 14.8 to 14.11 of the Impugned
Award, which read as follows:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
―14.1 Time now to focus on the Respondent's Claim for Liquidated
Damages (LD). For this purpose, it would be apposite to take note
of the relevant provision providing for LD. Clause 7 of the LOAs
reads as follows:
―7.0 Liquidated Damages:
Works/ facilities will be deemed to have been completed
and would be taken over only when all components, and
parts required for completion of the complete GT, ICT and
Reactor Package as a whole, Essential Spare Parts, Tools
& Tackles, respective O&M Manuals, complete "As-built"
drawings and Test Certificates are also delivered to the
satisfaction of the purchaser. If any of the above are not
delivered in full and in time, the works/ facilities will be
considered as delayed and LD shall become applicable.
7.1 LD for Delay:
In case of delayed completion of works/ facilities as per
schedule mentioned at clause no. 6.1 above, the Contractor
shall pay LD for delay @ 0.5% of Lot wise contract price
per week or part thereof of the delay subject to maximum
of 10% of Lot wise contract price‖
***
14.8 The next issue, which, warrants careful consideration is the
question whether the Respondent has been able to prove that it has
suffered loss owing to the delay in completion of the Project. In
this regard, the Respondent has pressed into service three letters
dated 01.04.2014, 31.07.2015 and 12.11.2015to aver that LPGCL
has imposed LD on it owing to the delays attributable to the
Claimant. In the letter dated 01.04.2014, addressed by LPGCL to
the Respondent, LPGCL, while stating that the delivery of
equipment has been delayed beyond acceptable limits, LPGCL had
informed the Respondent that it was withholding a sum of ₹50.00
Crores out of the Package awarded to it, to be adjusted towards
Liquidated Damages, which is being calculated at actual upon
execution of the Contract. Similarly, in the letter dated 31.07.2015,
LPGCL had intimated the Respondent that they had withheld
release of 10% of the Package, aggregating to ₹23.85 Crores, to be
adjusted against the Liquidated Damages at the time of closure of
the Contract.
14.9 Thus, in the above context, the Tribunal is of the view that the
Respondent has been able to establish that owing to the delays by
the Claimant in meeting the supply requirements, as per the
timelines committed by it, as referred to in the aforenoted
communications, the Respondent is justified in imposing the
Liquidated Damages as per the Contractual stipulations. The
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Tribunal has no reason to doubt the genuineness of the letters dated
01.04.2014, 31.07.2015 and 12.11.2015 placed on record by the
Respondent, more so, when in its Affidavit of admission/ denial of
the documents filed by the Respondent, the Claimant has
simply"denied" the said documents, without indicating the reasons
for such denial.
14.10 In this regard, it would also be apposite to refer to the
Claimant's letter dated 17.10.2016, which shows that the
commitment of the Claimant to supply additional 3 Reactors was
based on high level discussions between the representatives of
LPGCL,' the Claimant and the Respondent. However, the schedule
for supply, as indicated in the said letter, was still not adhered to,
with the result that LPGCL while conveying its anguish in the
delay in the execution of the Project, had notified the Respondent
that it was withholding the aforenoted amount towards the
Liquidated Damages, which, the Respondent will be liable to pay
to them due to such delays.
14.11 Resultantly, in view of the afore-mentioned discussion, the
Tribunal holds that the Respondent is entitled to levy Liquidated
Damages on the Claimant, amounting to ₹23,84,40,000/- for the
delayed supply and erection of the equipment, as stipulated in the
Contract. Counter Claim No.1 is allowed accordingly.‖
176. It is thus evident that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has
proceeded on a two-fold basis. First, that delay in performance stood
established and was attributable to the Petitioner and second, that the
Contract itself envisaged a pre-agreed mechanism for computation of
damages in the event of such delay. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has,
therefore, enforced the Liquidated Damages clause as a manifestation
of the parties‘ agreed allocation of risk, rather than requiring strict
proof of actual loss.
177. The contention of the Petitioner, if accepted, would render the
Liquidated Damages clause nugatory and defeat the commercial intent
underlying such stipulations, particularly in infrastructure contracts
where delay has cascading consequences and actual loss may be
inherently difficult to quantify with precision.
178. It is well settled that where parties have agreed to a genuine preSignature Not Verified
estimate of damages, the same is enforceable without proof of actual
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O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
loss, unless it is demonstrated that the stipulation is by way of penalty.
In ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd.26, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court has held
that a Liquidated Damages clause, if reasonable and not in terrorem,
can be enforced even in the absence of strict proof of loss. The
relevant paragraphs thereof are reproduced herein under:
“64. It is apparent from the aforesaid reasoning recorded by the
Arbitral Tribunal that it failed to consider Sections 73 and 74 of the
Contract Act and the ratio laid down in Fateh Chand v. Balkishan
Dass, (1964) 1 SCR 515, SCR at p. 526 wherein it is specifically
held that jurisdiction of the court to award compensation in case of
breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum
stipulated; and compensation has to be reasonable. Under Section
73, when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such
breach is entitled to receive compensation for any loss caused to
him which the parties knew when they made the contract to be
likely to result from the breach of it. This section is to be read with
Section 74, which deals with penalty stipulated in the contract,
inter alia (relevant for the present case) provides that when a
contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the
amount to be paid in case of such breach, the party complaining of
breach is entitled, whether or not actual loss is proved to have been
caused, thereby to receive from the party who has broken the
contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so
named. Section 74 emphasises that in case of breach of contract,
the party complaining of the breach is entitled to receive
reasonable compensation whether or not actual loss is proved to
have been caused by such breach. Therefore, the emphasis is on
reasonable compensation. If the compensation named in the
contract is by way of penalty, consideration would be different and
the party is only entitled to reasonable compensation for the loss
suffered. But if the compensation named in the contract for such
breach is genuine pre-estimate of loss which the parties knew when
they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it,
there is no question of proving such loss or such party is not
required to lead evidence to
prove actual loss suffered by him.…
68. From the aforesaid discussions, it can be held that:
(1) Terms of the contract are required to be taken into
consideration before arriving at the conclusion whether the party
claiming damages is entitled to the same.
(2) If the terms are clear and unambiguous stipulating the
liquidated damages in case of the breach of the contract unless it is
held that such estimate of damages/compensation is unreasonable
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(2003) 5 SCC 705
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
or is by way of penalty, party who has committed the breach is
required to
pay such compensation and that is what is provided in Section 73
of the Contract Act.
(3) Section 74 is to be read along with Section 73 and, therefore, in
every case of breach of contract, the person aggrieved by the
breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by
him before he can claim a decree. The court is competent to award
reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual
damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the
breach of a contract.
(4) In some contracts, it would be impossible for the court to assess
the compensation arising from breach and if the compensation
contemplated is not by way of penalty or unreasonable, the court
can award the same if it is genuine pre-estimate by the parties as
the measure of reasonable compensation.‖
(emphasis supplied)
179. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court in Construction & Design Services (supra), wherein it
was held that when breach and resultant loss are established in a
commercial contract, the burden shifts upon the party committing the
breach to demonstrate that the stipulated damages are penal in nature
or that no loss was likely to occur. In this regard, Paragraph No. 15 of
the said Judgement assumes importance, which reads as under:
―15. Once it is held that even in the absence of specific evidence,
the respondent could be held to have suffered loss on account of
breach of contract, and it is entitled to compensation to the extent
of loss suffered, it is for the appellant to show that stipulated
damages are by way of penalty. In a given case, when the highest
limit is stipulated instead of a fixed sum, in the absence of
evidence of loss, part of it can be held to be reasonable
compensation and the remaining by way of penalty. The party
complaining of breach can certainly be allowed reasonable
compensation out of the said amount if not the entire amount. If the
entire amount stipulated is genuine pre-estimate of loss, the actual
loss need not be proved. Burden to prove that no loss was likely to
be suffered is on the party committing breach, as already
observed.‖
(emphasis supplied)
180. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the
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approach adopted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal is consistent with
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
the contractual framework and settled principles of law. The challenge
mounted by the Petitioner, in substance, seeks a re-evaluation of the
sufficiency of evidence relating to loss, which lies beyond the limited
scope of interference under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
181. The finding of the learned Arbitral Tribunal upholding the levy
of Liquidated Damages is, thus, a plausible and legally sustainable
view, not warranting interference.
Delay in Design and Drawing: A Material Factor
182. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has undertaken an independent,
structured and detailed examination of the issue pertaining to delay in
submission, finalisation and approval of drawings, including the
process of third-party vetting, and has identified the same as a material
and contributing factor in the overall delay in execution of the
contractual works.
183. It is apposite to note that, under the contractual framework, the
Petitioner‘s
scope
of
work
expressly
encompassed
design,
engineering, and mandatory vetting by a designated third-party
technical consultant, prior to manufacture and supply of the
equipment. The requirement of submission of complete and compliant
drawings for approval was, therefore, not merely procedural in nature,
but constituted a foundational precondition for the commencement of
downstream activities. This position stands unequivocally reflected in
Clause 3 of the LsOA, which reads as follows:
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―BHEL has confirmed to the purchaser that it has entered Into
technical consultancy agreement with Global PT Corporation, USA
hereinafter referred as ―GPT or Supplier's Technical Consultant‖
and shall procure from GPT the complete detailed design for the
manufacturing of 275 MVA GT, 105MVA ICT and 80 MVAR
Reactor and ensure vetting of design for 110 MVAR reactor from
GPT. Also, GPT shall also provide support to BHEL by deputing
their experts for manufacturing supervision upto testing. During
erection and commissioning BHEL would obtain technical support
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
and expert advice as may be required from M/ s. Global PT for
smooth commissioning.‖
184. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has, in this regard, undertaken a
detailed scrutiny of contemporaneous correspondence and has
recorded a categorical finding that the Petitioner failed to adhere to the
stipulated timelines in furnishing complete, coordinated and contractcompliant drawings. The delay in securing approvals, including
through the third-party vetting mechanism, has thus been traced by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal to deficiencies in the Petitioner‘s own
performance, and not to any extraneous or supervening cause. The
discussion in this regard finds elaborate treatment in Paragraph Nos.
12.22 to 12.31 of the Impugned Award.
185. The contention of the Petitioner that repeated amendments to
the LsOA necessitated revisions in drawings and thereby contributed
to delay has also been specifically considered by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal. However, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has, upon
appreciation of the material on record, concluded that such
amendments did not absolve the Petitioner of its obligation to ensure
the timely and coordinated submission of drawings, nor did they
justify the prolonged delay in complying with the contractual
requirements.
186. A significant aspect which weighed with the learned Arbitral
Tribunal, and which merits particular emphasis, is the Petitioner‘s
failure to place on record the technical consultancy agreement with
GPT, despite the same forming an integral component of the
contractual framework. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has further
taken note of the inconsistent stand adopted by the Petitioner,
including its inability to substantiate the existence and scope of the
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GPT arrangement, as well as the fact that correspondence was
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addressed to an entity distinct from that contemplated under the
Contract. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has, on the basis of
contemporaneous material, rejected the plea of waiver and has held
that the obligation relating to GPT remained operative throughout.
The findings extracted herein below clearly demonstrate that the delay
in submission of drawings was attributable to the Petitioner‘s own
non-compliance with these contractual requirements. The relevant
portion of the Impugned Award in this regard is as follows:
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―12.24 At this point, it is equally important to note that the
Claimant has not put on record the technical consultancy
agreement with GPT. Surprisingly, even in its Pleadings, the
Claimant has not provided any cogent material to prove its
technical agreement with GPT that it allegedly had entered into at
the time of entering into the LOAs. It is pertinent to understand the
role of GPT in the context of the issue revolving around the
drawings. GPT was to provide support to the Claimant by deputing
experts for manufacturing supervision upto testing and also
providing technical support and expert advice during the erection
and commissioning as well.
12.25 The Claimant has also averred that the Respondent is
estopped from raising any objection at this juncture regarding
breach of the Contract since it never objected to the said drawings
as and when they were submitted for approval and neither did the
Respondent put the manufacturing process at halt for want of
vetting of drawings by GPT. An incisive analysis of the Pleadings
and Evidence on record indicates that during the first meeting on
07.09.2012, the Claimant agreed to furnish credentials, scope of
work of GPT for design consultancy by 08.11.2012. Subsequently,
on 05.11.2012, during a meeting between the Parties, the Claimant
confirmed that the order for the design of 275 MV A GT and 105
MV A lCT to GPT shall be placed on 07.11.2012. Similarly,
during the meeting held between the Parties on 16.11.2012, the
Respondent informed the Claimant that in the absence of the
credentials about GPT it shall not approve/comment on MDL and
Ll schedule and that the Claimant must furnish all design
documents of GTP. Consequently, on 23.11.2012, the Respondent
sent an email to the Claimant requesting it to furnish the
credentials, scope of work of GPT for design consultancy and
provide an unpriced copy of order placed on GTP, USA by
19.11.2012. The above communications between the Parties
ultimately culminated in the letter dated 27.11.2012 addressed by
the Claimant to the Respondent wherein the Claimant informed the
Respondent as follows:
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
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―As per our arrangement with M/s GPT, we upload the
requirements of design for Transformer with relevant
parameters to their ftp server.There is no formal P.O. to be
placed as it is as per our agreement with GPT ... Also,
regarding point No.1 of MoM dated 16.11.2012 ... we
hereby agree. the option No.2 i.e., "BHEL will submit
documents/ drawings without GPT logo and signature and
BHEL will also submit the original drawings/ documents
prepared by GPT for BIDCO information. BIDCO will
keep the drawings/ documents prepared by GPT as a
reference/information.‖
12.26 Notably, vide the above email, the Claimant also forwarded
its correspondence with one "GPT Corporation Ukraine" although
the LOA categorically had stipulated "GPT Corporation USA".
However, the fact remains that until 17.07.2014, the drawings were
not submitted by the Claimant.
****
12.30 On a conjoint reading of the Pleadings and Evidence on
record, it becomes manifest that the Parties having specifically
postulated about the technical consultancy agreement in Clause 3
of the LOAs, the onus was on the Claimant to establish that the
Respondent had waived off the above-postulated requirement It is
undisputed that the Claimant vide its letter dated 27.11.2012 opted
for the second option whereby it was expected to submit the
documents/ drawings without GPT logo and would subsequently
submit the original drawings/ documents prepared by GPT. Such
being the case, the Tribunal does not find any evidence brought on
record, which may even remotely suggest that the Respondent had
waived off this requirement completely. Moreso, when the
Respondent had repeatedly sent requests to the Claimant to furnish
the drawings, which the Claimant had failed to furnish. Moreover,
the Claimant's decision not to bring the technical agreement on
record is a significant failure. The caveat that the GPT drawings
would be submitted at a later date does not absolve the Claimant of
its obligation in any manner.
12.31 It is well settled that when the intention of the parties is
expressed in an unambiguous manner and is clear from the
language they have employed in the Agreement, there is no scope
for drawing upon hypothetical considerations or supposed intention
of the parties, In the instant case, a plain reading of the LOAs
illustrates that the Parties did accord significance to the Technical
Agreement stated to have been entered into by the Claimant with
GPT and the concerned undertaking provided by the Claimant
therein and therefore, the Tribunal cannot construe the intention of
the Parties in a different manner. Resultantly, Accordingly, the
Tribunal is of the firm view that the Respondent has not waived off
the requirement of furnishing of the Technical Agreement and the
related details concerning GPT and thus, the delays caused in the
submission of drawings are attributable to the Claimant.‖
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
187.
In the considered view of this Court, the aforesaid findings of
the learned Arbitral Tribunal constitute a pure determination of fact,
arrived at upon a comprehensive appreciation of contractual
stipulations, sequencing of obligations, and contemporaneous
evidence. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the said
findings are based on no evidence, or that relevant material has been
ignored, or that the conclusions drawn are so irrational or implausible
as to warrant interference within the narrow confines of Section
34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
188. On the contrary, the reasoning of the learned Arbitral Tribunal
reflects a coherent and logical nexus between the contractual
obligations relating to design and drawing, the conduct of the parties,
and the resultant delay in execution. The identification of delay in
design and drawing as a material contributing factor is, therefore, a
plausible and well-reasoned view emanating from the record.
189. It is trite that where an arbitral finding is based on a possible
and reasonable interpretation of the material on record, this Court, in
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot substitute
its own view merely because another view may also be possible. The
challenge mounted by the Petitioner on this aspect, in essence, seeks a
re-appreciation of evidence, which is impermissible. The challenge to
the Impugned Award on this ground does not merit acceptance.
No Waiver of Right to Levy Liquidated Damages
190. The Petitioner has contended that, by granting repeated
extensions of time, the Respondent had waived its right to levy
Liquidated Damages. This contention stands expressly considered and
rejected by the learned Arbitral Tribunal upon a careful analysis of the
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contractual framework as well as the conduct of the parties.
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
191. It must be noted that a waiver, in law, is not to be readily
inferred. It must be clear, conscious, and unequivocal, and must
evince an intentional relinquishment of a known right. The mere grant
of extensions of time, particularly in commercial contracts, cannot, by
itself, be construed as an abandonment of contractual remedies, unless
supported by an express or necessarily implied waiver.
192. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has dealt with this issue in detail
in Paragraph Nos. 12.9 to 12.15 of the Impugned Award. A perusal of
the said discussion reveals that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has not
only examined the legal position but has also scrutinised the relevant
contractual provisions, including Clause 25.1 of the GCC, which
mandates that any waiver must be in writing. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal has recorded a categorical finding that no such written
waiver exists on record and, therefore, the plea of waiver is
unsustainable. The relevant paragraphs of the same read as under:
―12.9 At this stage, it would also be appropriate to address the
question of the practical ramifications of the aforementioned
conclusion that time was not of the essence of the Contract, pressed
into service on behalf of the Claimant. In other words, the question
for consideration is whether, having granted repeated extensions
for the completion of the Project, the Respondent has waived its
right to levy liquidated damages, as urged on behalf of the
Claimant. In support of its proposition that once it is proved that
the time is not the essence of the contract, then the necessary
corollary is that the Respondent has waived its right to impose LD,
reliance is placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Welspun Speciality Solutions Ltd. v. Oil and Natural
Gas Corp. (supra).
12.10 Per contra, the submission of the Respondent is that the
Eo'Ts were granted only for the purpose of getting the Project
completed and the Respondent has not waived its right to levy the
LD for the delay in the execution of the Contract in its entirety. In
support, the Respondent relies on Clause 25.1 of the GeC to assert
that any waiver in the contractual stipulations has to be necessarily
in writing and, therefore, the Respondent having not provided any
kind of waiver in writing, has not waived its right to levy LD.
****
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O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
12.14 A bare reading of the above provision in the GCC indicates
that the Parties have specifically stipulated that it is only through a
written communication that one party can waive its rights under the
Contract. In the present case, there has been no written
communication by the Respondent in this behalf nor is there any
document brought on record by the Claimant, which may even
remotely suggest that the Respondent had waived its right to levy
LD.
12.15 The analysis of the Respondent's EoT letters and Clause 25.1
of the GCC, when scrutinised through the lens of established legal
principles, leads to the conclusion that the Respondent had
preserved its right to impose LD throughout extending the Project
timelines. At the cost of repetition, it may be noted that each
extension letter issued by the Respondent explicitly reserved its
rights flowing from the Contract, which obviously, includes the
right to levy LD, thereby negating the plea of implied waiver.
Hence, the repeated and explicit reservation of Claim for LD in
these communications undermines any argument suggesting a
waiver.‖
193. Significantly, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has also taken note
of the Extension of Time communications issued by the Respondent
and has found that such extensions consistently contained an express
reservation of rights. These reservations, as noted by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal, expressly preserved the Respondent‘s entitlement to
enforce contractual remedies, including the levy of Liquidated
Damages. The existence of such express reservations, in fact, negates
any inference of implied waiver.
194. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has thus correctly drawn a
distinction between the grant of extension as a matter of commercial
necessity to ensure completion of the project and the relinquishment
of a contractual right. In the absence of any express waiver or conduct
so unequivocal as to establish abandonment, no such inference can be
drawn.
195. The Petitioner has not been able to place any material on record
to demonstrate that the Respondent, at any point, intended to forgo its
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right to levy Liquidated Damages. There is neither any written
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
communication nor any course of conduct that meets the threshold
required in law to establish waiver. On the contrary, the contractual
scheme, read with the contemporaneous record, indicates a consistent
preservation of such rights.
196. The acceptance of the Petitioner‘s submission would, in effect,
lead to an untenable position in commercial law, where every
extension granted to facilitate performance would operate as a waiver
of contractual remedies. Such a proposition would undermine the very
purpose of incorporating Liquidated Damages clauses in infrastructure
contracts and would be contrary to settled commercial principles.
197. In the considered view of this Court, the finding returned by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal that there was no waiver of the Respondent‘s
right to levy Liquidated Damages is based on a correct appreciation of
the contractual provisions, supported by evidence, and aligned with
settled legal principles. The said finding constitutes a plausible and
reasoned determination and does not warrant interference under
Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Conclusion vis-à-vis Counter Claim No. 1
198. Upon a cumulative consideration of the findings returned by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal, this Court is satisfied that the determination
in respect of Counter-Claim No. 1 is founded upon a comprehensive
and
structured
appreciation
of
the
contractual
framework,
contemporaneous material, and the conduct of the parties during
execution of the project. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has
meticulously analysed the issue of delay attribution, examined the
competing contentions, and rendered reasoned findings on all material
aspects, including delay in drawings and design, absence of causal
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O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
nexus qua PAC/CEA Certificates, applicability of Liquidated
Damages, and the plea of waiver.
199. The challenge mounted by the Petitioner, when examined in
substance, is nothing but an attempt to re-agitate questions of fact and
to invite this Court to substitute its own view in place of that taken by
the learned Arbitral Tribunal. Such an exercise is plainly
impermissible within the limited jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
Act. It is well settled that where the view taken by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal is a plausible one, based on evidence and a reasonable
interpretation of contractual terms, the same is immune from
interference.
200. This Court does not find that the Impugned Award, insofar as it
relates to Counter-Claim No. 1, suffers from perversity or that it is in
conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law or the basic notions
of justice. The reasoning of the learned Arbitral Tribunal is neither
arbitrary nor capricious, rather it is anchored in the material on record
and supported by cogent and intelligible reasons.
201. In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no ground to interfere
with the Impugned Award insofar as it pertains to Counter-Claim
No.1. The challenge laid by the Petitioner on this aspect is,
accordingly, rejected. The same is upheld.
Challenge to Counter Claim Nos. 3 and 4
Counter Claim Nos. 3 & 4 not barred by Limitation: A Factual
Finding
202. The principal contention urged by the Petitioner is that the
cause of action for the risk cost claims stood crystallised on
13.11.2015, i.e., the date of alleged de-scoping, or at the latest on
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17.11.2015, when the LOA came to be issued in favour of Alstom for
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
substituted performance. Proceeding on this premise, it is contended
that CC- 3 and CC-4 are barred by limitation under Article 55 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
203. This Court is unable to accede to the aforesaid submission. A
perusal of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has examined the issue of limitation in the specific context of
risk-cost claims with considerable depth and, upon an exhaustive
appreciation of the contractual framework, the sequence of events, and
the nature of the alleged breach. The discussion contained in the
Impugned Award reflects that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has not
mechanically accepted the Respondent‘s position, but has analysed the
point at which the alleged loss became ascertainable, the effect of
successive extensions of time, and the continued subsistence of
obligations under the Contract. The relevant discussion on the issue of
limitation is contained in Paragraph Nos. 12.16 to 12.20 of the
Impugned Award; relevant extracts whereof are reproduced herein
below:
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―12.16 One of the Preliminary Objections' raised by the Claimant
is that most of the Counter Claims preferred by the Respondent, in
particular, Counter Claims No.1 and 3 are barred by limitation and,
therefore, deserve to be rejected on this short ground alone. The
Claimant asserts that the Respondent has nowhere in the Pleadings
stated as to when the cause of action for the said Claims arose.
12.17 The basic contention of the Claimant is that as per the
Respondent's own admission, the cause of action to impose
Liquidated Damages accrued on 05.04.2015 but the Counter
Claims were filed only on 09.01.2021, rendering them time barred
and that even if the limitation is to be reckoned not on the date of
filing of the Counter Claims but on 25.07.2019, when the
Respondent admittedly raised its Claim with regard to Liquidated
Damages for the first time, the same is barred by limitation. In so
far as Counter Claim No.3 is concerned, according to the Claimant,
the cause of action accrued on 13.11.2015 when 07 number of 110
MVAR Reactors were descoped and on 17.11.2015 when Letter of
Award in respect of the Reactors was issued in favour of Alstom
but the alleged cost of Alstom deal was intimated by the
Respondent only vide letter dated 07.05.2018, whereby instead of
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
making any Claim qua the additional cost of procuring the
Reactors,
the Claimant was simply informed that the PO value shall be
reduced
to the said effect. Therefore, it is the date of institution of the
Counter
Claim which is to be considered for calculation of limitation, and if
deemed so, the Counter Claim is time barred, argues the Claimant.
****
12.20 The Tribunal is of the view that the bar of limitation would
not apply to the Counter Claims for the following reasons:
(i). As per Clause 7.0 of LoA, the works / facilities would have
been deemed completed and taken over only when all components
and parts required for completion of the package as a whole, along
with spare parts and complete as-built drawings and test
certificates were delivered to the satisfaction of the purchaser.
Admittedly, there was dispute between the Parties about the supply
of complete package and the dispute was alive till the Counter
Claims were filed. Admittedly, spare parts for the equipment were
supplied and the drawings have still not been supplied by the
Claimant.
(ii) As per Clause 11.1.1 of the GCC, Liquidated Damages are to
be paid for delay in achieving provisional performance acceptance
for each and every week or part thereof which elapses after the
guaranteed completion date for the unit.
(iii) As per Clause 9.4, extension of time for completion could be
granted and as per Clause 14 of the GCC, the guaranteed
completion date could be changed. It is not in dispute that on not
less than four occasions EoT was granted, the last one being on
24.05.2018 when the guaranteed completion date was amended to
31.03.2019. So, cause of action to levy Liquidated Damages and
also to claim the differential cost of the Reactors purchased from
Alstom which arose for the first time on expiry of the original
guaranteed completion date continued till the extension thereof, i.e.
31.03.2019. It is altogether a different issue that even on
31.03.2019 the Contract was not closed. Therefore, the cause of
action to file Counter Claims was subsisting on 31.03.2019.
Consequently, even if we compute limitation as on the date of the
filing of the Counter Claims, the same are within limitation.‖
204. A careful reading of the aforesaid findings reveals that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has approached the issue of limitation in the
backdrop of the subsisting contractual relationship between the parties
and not as an isolated event confined to November 2015. The Tribunal
has specifically taken note of Clause 7.0 of the LoA, in terms whereof
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the contractual works/facilities could be deemed complete only upon
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
delivery of all components, spare parts, as-built drawings and test
certificates to the satisfaction of the purchaser. The learned Tribunal
has further recorded that “the dispute was alive till the Counter
Claims were filed” and that “even on 31.03.2019 the Contract was not
closed.”. These findings assume significance inasmuch as they
indicate that the obligations under the Contract continued to subsist
and the disputes between the parties remained unresolved well beyond
the alleged date of de-scoping.
205. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has also taken into account the
undisputed fact that extensions of time were granted on multiple
occasions and that the final extension was granted on 24.05.2018,
whereby the guaranteed completion date stood extended till
31.03.2019. It is in this context that the learned Arbitral Tribunal
concluded that “the cause of action to levy Liquidated Damages and
also to claim the differential cost of the Reactors purchased from
Alstom… continued till the extension thereof, i.e. 31.03.2019.” The
learned Arbitral Tribunal has thus proceeded on the basis that the
cause of action in respect of the risk-cost claims was not exhausted
upon the issuance of the substitute LOA, but continued during the
subsistence of the contractual relationship and the extended
completion period.
206. The Petitioner‘s attempt to anchor limitation to the date of descoping or issuance of LOA to a third party is, in effect, an artificial
truncation of the cause of action. Such an approach disregards the
fundamental distinction between breach and resultant loss. In
commercial contracts of this nature, the mere act of substitution does
not ipso facto result in loss; the loss emerges only when the substitute
procurement
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is affected and the financial differential becomes
ascertainable.
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
207. This Court is also unable to accept the submission that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has disregarded Article 55 of the Limitation
Act. On the contrary, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has interpreted the
accrual of cause of action in the factual context of continuing
contractual obligations and continuing consequences of breach. Such
an interpretation, founded upon the contractual terms and factual
matrix of the case, clearly falls within the domain of arbitral
adjudication.
208. It is well settled that the question as to when a cause of action
accrues, particularly in commercial disputes involving continuing
obligations and consequential losses, is often a mixed question of fact
and law, substantially dependent upon the contractual framework and
evidentiary record. The learned Arbitral Tribunal, being the final
adjudicator of facts, has returned a reasoned finding on this aspect
upon appreciation of the material placed before it.
209. No material has been placed before this Court to demonstrate
that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has ignored relevant evidence, relied
upon extraneous considerations, or adopted a view which no
reasonable person could have taken. The challenge mounted by the
Petitioner, in essence, seeks substitution of one possible interpretation
with another, which is impermissible within the limited scope of
interference under Section 34 of the Act.
210. In the context of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that
the conclusion of the learned Arbitral Tribunal that CC-3 and CC-4
are within limitation constitutes a plausible and legally sustainable
view emanating from the contractual terms and the factual record. The
said finding does not suffer from perversity or contravention of the
fundamental policy of Indian law so as to warrant interference under
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Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Risk-Cost Procurement: Whether dependent upon Formal
Termination
211. The next limb of challenge advanced by the Petitioner is
founded upon Clause 26 of the Supply LOA, it being contended that
recourse to risk-cost procurement was impermissible in the absence of
a formal termination of the Contract preceded by the issuance of the
stipulated notice. According to the Petitioner, termination constitutes a
condition precedent for the invocation of any right to procure the
balance work through an alternate agency and recover the differential
cost therefrom.
212. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid submission. A
careful reading of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has undertaken an extensive and nuanced analysis of
Clause 26 of the Supply LoA and the contractual scheme governing
termination, substitute performance and risk-cost recovery. The
learned Arbitral Tribunal has not adopted either a rigidly literal or
hyper-technical interpretation of the clause. Instead, it has construed
the contractual framework in a purposive and commercially sensible
manner, keeping in view the nature of the project, the obligations
undertaken by the parties, the serious delays attributable to the
Petitioner, and the practical necessity of ensuring the timely
completion of the works.
213. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has, as a matter of fact, found that
the Petitioner had persistently failed to adhere to the agreed timelines
despite
repeated
extensions
and
communications
from
the
Respondent. The findings returned in Paragraph Nos. 19.7 to 19.10 of
the Impugned Award clearly establish that the Respondent was
constrained to take corrective measures only after the Petitioner
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repeatedly expressed its inability to supply the requisite Reactors
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
within the project schedule. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has
specifically recorded that the de-scoping of seven Reactors was “not
because these were no more required, but because of the Claimant’s
persistent failure to adhere to the schedule despite repeated
reminders.”
214. The discussion and findings rendered by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal on the issue as to whether the invocation of Clause 26(3) of
the
Supply LOA was dependent upon formal termination of the
Contract are contained in Paragraph Nos. 19.11 to 19.16 of the
Impugned Award. The relevant extracts thereof are reproduced herein
below:
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―19.11 Time now to consider the contention of the Claimant that
risk and cost option could not be availed by the Respondent without
terminating the Contract.
****
19.14 For proper appreciation of the contentions, Clause 26 of the
LoA has to be analyzed. It reads sunder:
―26.0 – Termination
Purchaser/ Owner shall be entitled to terminate the
Contract/LOA, consequent to the following events/
conditions:
1. In the event, the Supplier fails to start the work and/ or
fails to follow/ adhere the project schedule at any time
during continuance or pendency of works, provided by the
Purchaser and continues to do so after one (1) month
notice to this effect the Purchaser/Owner shall be entitled
to terminate the contract without assigning any reason to
the Supplier.
2. In case the Supplier fails to perform the contract work
and/ or complete the contract work at any time during its
continuance or pendency to the entire satisfaction of the
Purchaser, the Purchaser shall be entitled to terminate the
contract after giving one (1) month notice to the Supplier
to this effect, the
Purchaser shall be entitled to recover the damages/claims
from the supplier.
3. Without prejudice to any other term and conditions
contained in this LOA the Purchaser in event of any of the
aforesaid conditions, shall be entitled to get the balance
work completed by another party and recover the cost
thereof from the Supplier. However, in such a case the
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terms related to warranty/ guarantee, LD with respect to
the work completed by the supplier shall subsist/ survive
this LOA‖
19.15 It is evident that Sub-clause (1) of Clause 26 speaks about the
Contractor not adhering to the schedule, while Sub-clause (2) is
attracted when the Contractor fails to perform to the entire
satisfaction of the Owner. Sub-clause (3) starts with the phrase
―without prejudice to any other terms and conditions contained in
this LoA‖. The Tribunal is of the opinion that this phrase does not
qualify as non-obstante clause as is being attempted to be projected
by the Respondent. This phrase ought not be confused with
―notwithstanding‖ anything contained elsewhere in the contract".
Both the phrases serve distinct functions. The phrase
―notwithstanding‖ indicates that the provision it introduces will
override any other terms in the Contract. It establishes supremacy
of the specific Clause over others. It means in
spite of' or ‗despite‘ other provisions. In plain English, ‗without
prejudice to‘ essentially means 'without affecting'. Therefore, the
phrase ―without prejudice to any other terms and conditions
contained in LoA‖ signifies 'that the Clause it introduces is
complementary and does not affect the validity or operation of
other provisions in the Contract. It ensures that the Clause co-exists
with other terms without altering or diminishing them. Therefore,
Sub-clause (3) ought not be considered overriding other provisions
of the Contract. Even otherwise, the words ―purchaser in the event
of the aforesaid conditions‖ are in continuity with the words"
without prejudice to any other terms and conditions contained in
LOA‖. Consequently, if we read the entire phrase, it would be clear
that the enumerated conditions must occur before the owner can
invoke the risk and purchase clause.
As previously discussed, these conditions can be summarised as
follows:
i)
The supplier's failure to adhere to the project schedule,
followed by continued default despite a one month notice.
ii)
The supplier's failure to perform or complete the contract
work to the purchaser's satisfaction, despite one month notice.
19.16 It is noteworthy that while Sub-clause (1) and Sub-clause (2)
of Clause 26 provide for termination of the contract if the
conditions laid down therein are met. However, Sub-clause (3) does
not require contract termination as a pre-requisite for its invocation.
Instead, it states that “without prejudice to any other term and
conditions contained in this LOA, the purchaser in the event of any
of the aforesaid conditions, shall be entitled to get the balance
work completed by another party and recover the cost thereof from
the supplier.” This phraseology emphasises that the occurrence of
the specified conditions rather than contract termination is the
critical trigger for invoking Sub-clause (3). Once these conditions
occur, the purchaser has the discretion to terminate the Contract
under Sub clause (1) and Sub-clause (2). However, Sub-clause (3)
provides an additional remedy that allows the purchaser to have the
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
remaining work completed by another party and recover the cost
from the supplier without necessarily terminating the Contract. If
Sub-clause (3) were intended to apply only in the event of
termination of the Contract, it would have been redundant as clause
15 of GCC already contains a separate clause, addressing the
consequences of termination of contract for any reason, including
the purchaser's right to procure the material or complete the work
through alternative source and recover costs from supplier. It need
not be reiterated that the phrase "without Prejudice‖ underscores
the Parties' intention that Sub-clause (3) operates independently of
termination. It is designed to take effect upon the occurrence of the
specified conditions as noted above.
Therefore, the assertion of the Claimant that termination of the
Contract was a condition pre-requisite for invoking Sub-clause (3)
of Clause 26 has no merit.‖
215. Viewed in this backdrop, the Respondent‘s decision not to
terminate the entire Contract, but instead to de-scope a portion of the
work and procure the balance through an alternate source, was clearly
guided by commercial prudence and mitigation of loss. In fact, the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has expressly recorded in Paragraph 19.13 of
the Impugned Award that despite several breaches on the part of the
Petitioner, the Respondent consciously chose not to terminate the
Contract “as a measure of business prudence”, since termination of
the entire Contract would have jeopardised completion of the main
project package and exposed the Respondent to further liabilities and
penalties.
216. The construction suggested by the Petitioner would therefore
lead to manifestly impracticable consequences. It would compel an
employer either to indefinitely await performance by a defaulting
contractor, despite looming project deadlines and cascading liabilities,
or to resort to wholesale termination of the Contract even where
substantial portions of the work remained capable of performance.
Such an interpretation would not only defeat business efficacy but
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O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
would also run contrary to settled principles of commercial
construction of contracts.
217. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has harmonised Clause 26 with
the broader contractual scheme, the doctrine of mitigation of damages,
and the practical realities surrounding execution of the project. The
finding that absence of formal termination does not extinguish the
Respondent‘s contractual right to recover additional expenditure
incurred on account of the Petitioner‘s default is thus a reasoned,
balanced and commercially sound conclusion arising squarely from
the contractual terms themselves.
218. It also bears emphasis that the interpretation of contractual
clauses falls preeminently within the domain of the learned Arbitral
Tribunal. Once the interpretation adopted by the Tribunal is a possible
and plausible one arising from the terms of the Contract, this Court,
while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot
substitute its own interpretation merely because another view may
also be possible.
219. In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that
the conclusion arrived at by the learned Arbitral Tribunal, namely that
invocation of risk-cost procurement under Clause 26(3) was not
contingent upon formal termination of the Contract, constitutes a
plausible, reasoned and commercially sensible interpretation of the
contractual framework. The said finding neither suffers from
perversity nor discloses any patent illegality warranting interference
under Section 34 of the Act.
Urgency and Necessity of Procurement from Third Party
220. The Petitioner has sought to contend that there existed no
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urgency warranting procurement of Reactors from third parties,
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particularly by placing reliance upon the commissioning timeline of
the transmission lines and by contending that the Respondent could
have awaited supply from the Petitioner itself. According to the
Petitioner, since certain transmission infrastructure was yet to be
commissioned, there was no immediate necessity to procure the
Reactors from alternate sources at a higher cost.
221. This Court finds no merit in the aforesaid submission. A perusal
of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has extensively dealt with the issue of urgency, necessity and
mitigation while adjudicating CC-3 and CC-4. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal
has
examined
the
contemporaneous
correspondence
exchanged between the parties, the project timelines, the repeated
delays attributable to the Petitioner, and the cascading commercial
consequences likely to ensue in the event of further delay.
222. In Paragraph Nos. 19.19 and 19.20 of the Impugned Award, the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has specifically considered the necessity of
alternate procurement and the circumstances in which the Respondent
was compelled to procure Reactors from Alstom. The relevant extracts
thereof are reproduced herein below:
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―19.19. In this context, the letter dated 13.10.2015 is significant
whereby the Respondent explicitly requested the Claimant to
ensure the supply of 9 Reactors by March 2016. This
communication serves as notice to the Claimant to adhere to the
scheduled delivery date, which, even with
an extension, was set to expire in March 2016. In response, the
Claimant in its letter dated 17.10.2015 stated that it could supply
only 3 Reactors by March 2016. It went on to make a conditional
offer to supply an additional three Reactors by April 2016 and
another three by June 2016, provided that GT9 was postponed to
June 2016. These exchanges satisfy the requirement of Sub-clause
(3) of Clause 26, as the Claimant, despite being called upon to
meet the scheduled delivery date, clearly indicated its inability to
do so. Under these circumstances, the Respondent had no choice
but to reduce the quantity to match what the Claimant was capable
of supplying. Given that the Project was to be completed in a
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
timely manner and there was little to no likelihood of the Claimant
delivering more than what was confirmed in the letter dated
17.10.2015, the Respondent was not expected to wait any longer.
Therefore, the decision to trim the quantity was not intended as a
penalty, but was a necessary step compelled by the situation
created by the Claimant. In these circumstances, not much
significance ought to be attached to the fact that the Respondent
had issued a limited tender enquiry even before formally reducing
the quantity to be supplied by the Claimant. It is important to note,
as indicated in the letter dated 13.11. 2015, that prior to the letter
dated 13.10.2015, a meeting had already taken place in which the
Claimant had expressed its inability to deliver theReactors in time.
Against this backdrop, the limited tender enquiry was a necessary
mitigation measure. Crucially the letter of award to Alstom India
was issued only after the Respondent had formally reduced the
quantity allocated to the Claimant.
19.20. The Tribunal is convinced that there is an intrinsic link
between the power to descope 7 Reactors and the Respondent's
legal right to mitigate its losses. The circumstances, that led to the
Respondent mitigating losses have been elaborated upon in the
foregoing paragraphs. In essence, the Respondent was forced to
procure the Reactors from a third party since LPGCL had imposed
Liquidated Damages on the Respondent and had threatened to
impose further Liquidated Damages on the Respondent on account
of the delay in delivery of the Reactors in the event of failure of the
Claimant to deliver the Reactors on time.‖
223. The aforesaid findings unmistakably demonstrate that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has returned a categorical finding that the
Respondent was constrained to procure the Reactors from alternate
sources owing to the Petitioner‘s admitted inability to adhere to the
project schedule. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has specifically noted
that despite repeated communications and reminders, the Petitioner
unequivocally indicated its inability to supply more than three
Reactors within the stipulated timeline. The learned Arbitral Tribunal
has thus found that the Respondent “was not expected to wait any
longer” and that the issuance of a limited tender enquiry constituted
“a necessary mitigation measure.”
224. The contention of the Petitioner that urgency ought to have been
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assessed solely with reference to the commissioning of transmission
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lines has also been specifically dealt with and rejected by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. In Paragraph Nos. 19.6 and 19.9 of the Impugned
Award, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has categorically held that the
delay in supply of Reactors had a direct bearing upon the overall
project schedule and that the de-scoping was necessitated by the
Petitioner‘s inability to timely deliver critical equipment. The relevant
extracts are reproduced herein below:
―19.6 The Tribunal is of the view that every act of descoping does
not fall in the purview of change order. A change order is usually
issued to modify the scope of work as per project requirements.
However, if the deletion/removal of work from the scope of
Contract is ordered due to a breach - such as failure to adhere to the
project schedule, it is more akin to a consequence of default rather
than a standard change order. Such an order can be treated as
change order only if the Contract explicitly states that it is to be
treated so. Otherwise, a descoping
triggered by a breach would not qualify as a change order. It would
rather be an exercise of contractual right due to non-performance.
****
19.9 Needless to say, that precisely in the light of these facts, the
Respondent removed 7 Reactors from the scope of supply with the
warning that this number would be further reduced to 3 in case the
Claimant failed to confirm supply of 3 Reactors by March and
another 3 by May 2016. Therefore, the reduction in the scope was
not due to diminished requirement but because of the fact that the
Reactors were urgently needed, yet the Claimant was not in a
position to deliver the same in a timely manner. It is crucial that the
Claimant failed to respond to the letter dated 13.11.2015, implying
tacit agreement with the Respondent's assertions. By not objecting,
the Claimant effectively consented to the reduction in the quantity.
There was no contemporaneous assertion by the Claimant that it
was ready and willing to supply all the 13 Reactors. It is only vide
letter dated 21.05.2018 (Annexure D 23) that the Claimant for the
first time wrote that it was ready to supply all the Reactors, but the
decision to reduce the quantity was taken by the Respondent
unilaterally. Such a belated assertion carries no sanctity.‖
225. The aforesaid findings clearly indicate that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal appreciated the project as an integrated and interdependent
commercial undertaking, wherein the timely availability of each
critical component was essential for coordinated commissioning and
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O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
project completion. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has specifically
found that the Reactors “were urgently needed” and that the reduction
in scope was “not due to diminished requirement” but solely because
the Petitioner was unable to deliver them within the required
timelines.
226. Further, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has rightly analysed the
issue in the context of the Respondent‘s obligation to mitigate losses
under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In Paragraph Nos.
19.21 and 19.22, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has observed as under:
―19.21 In fact, Section 73 of the Contract Act casts a duty on the
party seeking damages to mitigate its loss. The duty to mitigate
losses is encapsulated in the Explanation to Section 73, which
states that "in estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach
of contract, the means which existed of remedying the
inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract must
be taken into account. Thus, the Respondent was required to take
steps to mitigate the losses it suffered owing to the delays caused
by the Claimant, thereby entitling it to procure the Reactors from a
third party. The LOA dated 17.11.2015 placed by the Respondent
upon Alstom is indeed a measure of mitigation adopted by the
Respondent whereby the Respondent decided to procure 7 Reactors
from a third party for an amount of ₹48,02,00,197/ -, by paying an
additional amount of ₹4.89 Crores. All the seven reactors were
supplied by Alstom between 16.02.2016 and 18.04.2016.
19.22 The Tribunal finds that the evidence on record shows a direct
causal link between the Claimant's breach and the necessity of
procuring Reactors from Alstom, which was essential to prevent
further losses. The additional cost incurred by the Respondent in
procuring the 7 Reactors is thus attributable to the Claimant. The
Tribunal finds the Claim to be fair and reasonable, as it accounts
for only the mitigation costs necessitated by the Claimant's nonperformance.‖
****
19.24. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Tribunal holds that
the Respondent was within its rights under the Contract to purchase
7 Reactors from Alstom India, which the Claimant was required to
supply as per the Contract, but was not able to meet the
Respondent's requirements. Therefore, the Respondent is entitled
to recover from the Claimant the price differential of ₹ 14.89
Crores, which amount has otherwise not been disputed by the
Claimant. The Counter Claim is allowed, accordingly.‖
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O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
227. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has thus expressly linked the
alternate procurement with the Respondent‘s statutory and contractual
duty to mitigate losses arising from the Petitioner‘s breach. The
learned Arbitral Tribunal has found a ―direct causal link‖ between the
Petitioner‘s default and the necessity of procurement from Alstom. It
has further recorded that the additional expenditure incurred
constituted only mitigation costs necessitated by the Petitioner‘s nonperformance.
228. This Court finds no infirmity in the aforesaid reasoning. The
contractual obligations undertaken by the Petitioner cannot be diluted
by relying upon factors dehors the Contract or by selectively referring
to external milestones such as the commissioning of transmission
infrastructure. The Petitioner‘s obligation was to supply the Reactors
within the agreed timelines. The status of transmission lines, which
admittedly did not fall within the Petitioner‘s scope of work, cannot be
invoked to justify persistent delays or to compel the Respondent to
indefinitely postpone procurement of critical equipment.
229. This Court finds that the findings returned by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal on the urgency and necessity of procurement from
alternate sources are based upon contemporaneous material,
contractual obligations and commercial realities emerging from the
record. The said findings constitute a plausible and reasoned view and
do not suffer from perversity, patent illegality or violation of the
fundamental policy of Indian law warranting interference under
Section 34 of the Act.
Risk-Cost Procurement: Whether pre-mature and mala fide
230. The Petitioner has further contended that the Respondent
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initiated alternate procurement prematurely, even during the
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
subsistence of extended timelines, and that such conduct itself
evidences mala fides and a pre-determined intent to exclude the
Petitioner from continuing the Contract. According to the Petitioner,
the issuance of the LTE on 12.10.2015, prior to formal de-scoping on
13.11.2015, demonstrates that the Respondent had already decided to
procure the Reactors from a third party, irrespective of the Petitioner‘s
performance.
231. A careful perusal of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has meticulously examined the entire
sequence of events leading to the alternate procurement and has
returned
detailed
findings
based
upon
contemporaneous
correspondence exchanged between the parties, the Petitioner‘s
admitted inability to adhere to the contractual schedule, and the
commercial exigencies facing the Respondent.
232. In this regard, the findings contained in Paragraph Nos. 19.18
and 19.19 of the Impugned Award assume considerable significance.
The relevant portions thereof are reproduced herein below:
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―19.18 … Therefore, Sub-clause (1) of Clause 26 was attracted,
which, as discussed above, did not require any formal notice. Still,
a communication or directive asking the Claimant to supply the
Reactors within the timeframe, which was already beyond the
schedule.
19.19 In this context, the letter dated 13.10.2015 is significant
whereby the Respondent explicitly requested the Claimant to
ensure the supply of 9 Reactors by March 2016. This
communication serves as notice to the Claimant to adhere to the
scheduled delivery date, which, even with an extension, was set to
expire in March 2016. In response, the Claimant in its letter dated
17.10.2015 stated that it could supply only 3 Reactors by March
2016. It went on to make a conditional offer to supply an additional
three Reactors by April 2016 and another three by June 2016,
provided that GT9 was postponed to June 2016. These exchanges
satisfy the requirement of Sub-clause (3) of Clause 26, as the
Claimant, despite being called upon to meet the scheduled delivery
date, clearly indicated its inability to do so. Under these
circumstances, the Respondent had no choice but to reduce the
quantity to match what the Claimant was capable of supplying.
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Given that the Project was to be completed in a timely manner and
there was little to no likelihood of the Claimant delivering more
than what was confirmed in the letter dated 17.10.2015, the
Respondent was not expected to wait any longer. Therefore, the
decision to trim the quantity was not intended as a penalty, but was
a necessary step compelled by the situation created by the
Claimant. In these circumstances, not much significance ought to
be attached to the fact that the Respondent had issued a limited
tender enquiry even before formally reducing the quantity to be
supplied by the Claimant. It is important to note, as indicated in the
letter dated 13.11.2015, that prior to the letter dated 13.10.2015, a
meeting had already taken place in which the Claimant had
expressed its inability to deliver the Reactors in time. Against this
backdrop, the limited tender enquiry was a necessary mitigation
measure. Crucially the letter of award to Alstom India was issued
only after the Respondent had formally reduced the quantity
allocated to the Claimant‖
233. The aforesaid findings clearly demonstrate that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has not viewed the issuance of the LTE in isolation.
Rather, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has examined the same in the
backdrop of repeated delays, prior meetings between the parties, and
the Petitioner‘s own admission regarding its inability to timely supply
the Reactors. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has specifically recorded
that even prior to issuance of the LTE, the Petitioner had already
conveyed its inability to meet the required schedule.
234. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has also returned a categorical
finding that the Respondent could not have been expected to
indefinitely await performance by the Petitioner when the project
itself was time-sensitive and exposed the Respondent to serious
commercial consequences. In Paragraph No. 19.20, the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has specifically recorded that LPGCL had already
imposed Liquidated Damages and had threatened further imposition of
Liquidated Damages in the event of continued delay. The relevant
portion of the aforesaid paragraph reads as under:
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―19.20 … In essence, the Respondent was forced to procure the
Reactors from a third party since LPGCL had imposed Liquidated
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Damages on the Respondent and had threatened to impose further
Liquidated Damages on the Respondent on account of the delay in
delivery of the Reactors in the event of failure of the Claimant to
deliver the Reactors on time.‖
235. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has thus appreciated the
Respondent‘s conduct as a commercially necessary response to the
Petitioner‘s persistent default and not as an arbitrary or premeditated
attempt to exclude the Petitioner from the Contract. The finding that
the alternate procurement constituted a mitigation measure is further
reinforced by Paragraph Nos. 19.21 and 19.22 of the Impugned
Award, wherein the learned Arbitral Tribunal expressly invoked the
principle embodied in Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
and held that the Respondent was duty-bound to take reasonable steps
to mitigate the losses occasioned by the Petitioner‘s breach.
236. The allegation of mala fides, in the present case, is entirely
unsupported by the record. The learned Arbitral Tribunal, upon
appreciation
of
contemporaneous
material
and
contractual
correspondence, has found no evidence whatsoever of arbitrary
conduct, bad faith, or ulterior motive on the part of the Respondent.
On the contrary, the findings consistently indicate that the
Respondent‘s actions were dictated by project exigencies, contractual
obligations and the pressing necessity of ensuring timely completion
of the project. No ground for interference under Section 34 of the Act
is therefore made out.
Challenge to Second Risk-Cost Procurement vis-à-vis CC-4 after
initiation of Arbitration
237. The Petitioner has assailed Counter-Claim No. 4, inter alia, on
the ground that procurement of the remaining three (03) 110R was
undertaken after invocation of arbitration and, therefore, any
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consequential risk-cost claim is legally impermissible. According to
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
the Petitioner, once disputes had crystallised and arbitral proceedings
had commenced, the Respondent could not have proceeded with
substitute procurement and thereafter saddled the Petitioner with the
differential cost thereof.
238. This contention, though emphatically urged, does not merit
acceptance. A perusal of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has specifically examined this aspect while
adjudicating CC-4 and has returned a categorical finding that the
subsequent procurement was necessitated solely on account of the
Petitioner‘s continued refusal to supply the remaining 3 nos. Of 110R
in accordance with the contractual terms.
239. In this regard, the discussion contained in Paragraph Nos. 19.34
to 19.36 of the Impugned Award assumes significance. The relevant
extracts thereof are reproduced herein below:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
―19.34 This brings us to the argument of the Claimant that in fact
the Respondent never insisted on supply of Reactors till 2019
because till then there was no 'need and that the action of
purchasing Reactors from third party a higher cost of ₹6.71 Crores
per Reactor when the Claimant was willing to supply the same at
the contractual price of 3.93 crores per Reactor smacks of
malafides.
19.35 The Tribunal does not find substance in the argument. Till
the invocation of Arbitration, it is the Claimant who remained
adamant in its stand not to supply unless payment in advance was
made. Therefore, it does not lie in its mouth to claim that till 2019
the Reactors were not required. No doubt that the contractual price
was less than what was paid to the third party, it cannot be said that
the action of the Respondent suffered from malafides. The
Claimant was not willing to supply as per the terms of the
Contract. Therefore, it was not a case that the Claimant was willing
to supply but the Respondent mischievously purchased the
Reactors from a third party. The situation created by distinct and
unequivocal refusal by the Contractor to supply unless its
conditions were agreed to was serious enough for the Respondent
to decide to make purchase from third party.
19.36 It is not disputed that the landed cost of the Reactors
supplied by the Claimant was ₹4.91 Crores per Reactor against
which the landed cost of supply made by GET&D was Crores per
Reactor. However, the action of the Respondent is to be judged not
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
by the price difference but in the light of the circumstances created
by the Claimant. So, it is not the Respondent but the Claimant who
has to bear the cost. In that view of the matter, the difference
would work out to be ₹6.91 Crores per Reactor. Multiplied by 3,
the amount which the Respondent is entitled to recover from the
Claimant is Crores. The Counter Claim is allowed accordingly.‖
240. The aforesaid findings clearly establish that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal has not treated the mere invocation of arbitration as an
embargo on contractual performance or commercial decision-making.
On the contrary, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has appreciated that
despite the pendency of disputes, the Respondent continued to remain
contractually obligated to ensure completion of the project and could
not indefinitely postpone procurement of critical equipment merely
because arbitral proceedings had commenced.
241. It is well settled that commencement of arbitral proceedings
does not suspend the underlying contract unless the contract itself
stands terminated or a competent forum restrains further performance.
Arbitration is fundamentally a mechanism for adjudication of disputes
and does not, by itself, operate as a stay on performance of contractual
obligations or commercially necessary measures undertaken in
mitigation of losses.
242. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has specifically recorded that it
was the Petitioner itself which had adopted an unequivocal stand that
supply would not be affected unless advance payment and clearance
of alleged outstanding dues were first made. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal has, therefore, rightly concluded that the Respondent‘s
decision to procure the remaining Reactors from a third party was not
voluntary or mala fide, but was necessitated by the situation created
by the Petitioner‘s own refusal to perform in accordance with the
Contract.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
243. The submission of the Petitioner, if accepted, would lead to
manifestly untenable and commercially unworkable consequences. It
would imply that immediately upon invocation of arbitration, the
Respondent was required to halt execution of the project, indefinitely
defer procurement of essential equipment, and expose itself to
continuing delays, liabilities and third-party claims, notwithstanding
the Petitioner‘s refusal to perform. Such an interpretation would
fundamentally undermine the commercial purpose of the Contract.
244. The findings recorded in Paragraph Nos. 19.34 to 19.36 of the
Impugned Award thus constitute a reasoned and plausible view
founded
upon
contractual
interpretation,
contemporaneous
correspondence and commercial realities. The challenge raised by the
Petitioner, in essence, seeks a re-appreciation of factual findings and
contractual construction undertaken by the learned Arbitral Tribunal,
which is impermissible within the limited scope of interference under
Section 34 of the Act.
Sufficiency of Evidence and Quantification of Loss
245. The Petitioner has further contended that the Respondent failed
to establish actual expenditure or loss in support of Counter-Claim
Nos. 3 and 4, and that the Impugned Award, to that extent, is
unsustainable. According to the Petitioner, there was no strict proof of
payment, actual financial outflow, or legally admissible evidence
establishing the exact differential loss allegedly incurred by the
Respondent. This Court finds no merit in the said submission.
246. A perusal of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal has not proceeded on mere assertions or
unsubstantiated pleadings, but has undertaken a detailed examination
of the contemporaneous material placed on record in support of the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
alternate procurement undertaken by the Respondent and the
consequential differential cost incurred thereby. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal has examined the contractual background, the necessity for
substitute procurement, the procurement process itself, and the nexus
between the expenditure incurred and the Petitioner‘s breach, before
allowing the claims.
247. In this regard, the discussion contained in Paragraph Nos. 19.21
to 19.24 of the Impugned Award assume significance. The learned
Arbitral Tribunal has specifically recorded that the procurement from
Alstom was undertaken as a mitigation measure necessitated by the
Petitioner‘s inability to meet the project requirements and that the
additional expenditure incurred was directly attributable to such
default.
248. Equally significant is Paragraph No. 19.23 of the Impugned
Award, wherein the learned Arbitral Tribunal has specifically noticed
that the Petitioner did not meaningfully challenge the amounts
incurred by the Respondent during cross-examination and had,
instead, confined its challenge primarily to the issue of de-scoping.
249. The Petitioner has further contended that the Respondent failed
to establish actual expenditure or loss in support of Counter-Claim
Nos. 3 and 4, and that the Impugned Award, to that extent, is
unsustainable. This Court finds no merit in the said submission. The
relevant paragraphs in support of the foregoing discussion, being
Paragraph Nos. 19.21 and 19.22 have been reproduced herein before,
while Paragraph No. 19.23 is reproduced herein under for ready
reference:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
―19.23 Pertinently, the Claimant did not cross-examine the
Respondent's Witness with respect to the amounts paid by the
Respondent to Alstom, but has primarily focused on the aspect of
descoping of the Reactor. The relevant extract from the cross-
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
examination of RW-1, which sheds light on this issue, is as
follows:
―Q.34: Despite issuing LTE for 10 Reactors, why did you
confine the LOA granted to ALSTOM to 7 Reactors?
Ans: 10 Nos. Reactors were mentioned in the limited
tender enquiry while the LOA was placed for 7 Reactors
as mutually agreed between BIDCO and ALSTOM, for
meeting the project site requirement of synchronization by
March 31,2016.
****
Q. 52 When were the 7 Reactors allegedly supplied by
ALSTOM erected and commissioned?
Ans: By March, 2016.‖
250. The aforesaid findings clearly establish that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal was satisfied, upon appreciation of documentary and oral
evidence, that the Respondent had in fact undertaken substitute
procurement and incurred additional expenditure on account thereof.
Significantly, the Petitioner did not seriously dispute either the
procurement itself or the actual amounts paid thereunder during the
evidentiary stage. In such circumstances, it does not lie in the mouth
of the Petitioner to contend, at the stage of challenge under Section 34,
that the claims lacked evidentiary foundation altogether.
251. The Petitioner‘s challenge, in essence, invites this Court to
undertake a fresh scrutiny of the evidentiary record and to reassess
whether the proof adduced before the learned Arbitral Tribunal was
sufficient or adequate. Such an exercise is wholly impermissible
within the limited confines of Section 34 of the Act, particularly in the
absence of any allegation that the findings are based on no evidence or
that vital material has been ignored.
252. It is also pertinent to note that claims arising out of risk-cost
procurement in commercial contracts cannot be tested with the rigidity
of strict proof applicable to a conventional civil trial. In complex
infrastructure
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BHATIA
15:16:06
and EPC contracts, damages arising from substitute
procurement are necessarily assessed on the basis of contractual
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
documents, procurement
records,
correspondence,
comparative
costing and surrounding commercial circumstances. The law requires
reasonable and credible substantiation of loss, not mathematical
exactitude or proof beyond all conceivable doubt.
253. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has, in fact, confined the award
only to the actual differential expenditure incurred by the Respondent
and has not granted any speculative or remote damages. The
quantification undertaken by the learned Arbitral Tribunal is therefore
rooted in the material available on record and bears a direct nexus
with the breach established against the Petitioner.
254. In the present case, the findings returned by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal demonstrate due application of mind, appreciation of
evidence and a reasoned nexus between the breach, mitigation
measures,
and
the
expenditure
incurred.
No
perversity
or
contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law has been made
out.
255. Accordingly, the challenge on the ground of absence of strict
proof of expenditure or loss is rejected and does not warrant
interference with the Impugned Award.
Conclusion vis-à-vis CC-3 and CC-4
256. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that each
of the challenges mounted by the Petitioner to Counter-Claim Nos. 3
and 4 fail to meet the threshold envisaged under Section 34(2)(b)(ii)
of the Act.
257.
The learned Arbitral Tribunal has, upon a comprehensive
appreciation
of
the
contractual
framework,
contemporaneous
correspondence, oral testimony and documentary material, returned
detailed and reasoned findings on all aspects arising for consideration,
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
including limitation, permissibility of risk-cost procurement, urgency
and necessity of alternate procurement, timing thereof, mitigation of
losses, and quantification of damages.
258. The contention of the Petitioner that the claims were barred by
limitation has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal upon holding that
the cause of action subsisted during the extended contractual period
and crystallised within the limitation period. Likewise, the Tribunal‘s
interpretation that recourse to risk–cost procurement was not
dependent upon formal termination, but could be invoked as a
measure to mitigate loss in the face of persistent default, is a
commercially sound and legally tenable construction of the contract.
259. The cumulative effect of the submissions advanced by the
Petitioner is nothing but an invitation to this Court to re-appreciate
evidence, re-interpret contractual clauses, and substitute the findings
returned by the learned Arbitral Tribunal with another possible view.
Such an exercise lies wholly beyond the permissible scope of
interference under Section 34 of the Act.
260. In view of the foregoing detailed discussion on all the grounds
contended by the Petitioner, this Court finds no element of perversity,
irrationality, or contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law
in the findings returned by the learned Arbitral Tribunal insofar as
Counter-Claim Nos. 3 and 4 are concerned.
261. Accordingly, the Impugned Award, to the extent it allows
Counter-Claim Nos. 3 and 4, warrants no interference and is upheld.
Counter-Claims Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12
262. This Court further takes note of the fair and candid submission
advanced by learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent that it does not seek to contest the challenge laid by the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
Petitioner insofar as it pertains to Counter-Claim Nos. 6, 10, 11 and
12.
263.
It has been specifically submitted that the Respondent confines
its opposition in the present proceedings to Counter-Claim Nos. 1, 3
and 4, and does not seek to sustain the findings returned by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal qua Counter-Claim Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12.
264. In view of the aforesaid concession, no further adjudication is
required insofar as the merits of Counter-Claim Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12
are concerned. It is well settled that where a party, in proceedings
under Section 34 of the Act, elects not to support a severable portion
of the arbitral award, the Court is not required to independently
undertake an examination of the correctness thereof, provided such
portion is capable of being segregated from the remainder of the
Award.
265. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to advert to the principle
of severability of arbitral awards and the permissibility of partial
setting aside under Section 34 of the Act. In this regard, reference may
be made to the decision of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Gayatri
Balasamy vs. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited27, wherein the
doctrine of severability and the power of partial setting aside were
elaborately considered. The relevant observations contained in
Paragraph Nos. 33 to 35 thereof are reproduced herein below:
―33. We hold that the power conferred under the proviso to Section
34(2)(a)(iv) is clarificatory in nature. The authority to sever the
―invalid‖ portion of an arbitral award from the ―valid‖ portion,
while remaining within the narrow confines of Section 34, is
inherent in the court‘s jurisdiction when setting aside an award.
34. To this extent, the doctrine of omne majus continet in se
minus—the greater power includes the lesser—applies squarely.
The authority to set aside an arbitral award necessarily
encompasses the power to set it aside in part, rather than in its
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
2025 SCC ONLINE SC 986
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
entirety. This interpretation is practical and pragmatic. It would be
incongruous to hold that power to set aside would only mean
power to set aside the award in its entirety and not in part. A
contrary interpretation would not only be inconsistent with the
statutory framework but may also result in valid determinations
being unnecessarily nullified.
35. However, we must add a caveat that not all awards can be
severed or segregated into separate silos. Partial setting aside may
not be feasible when the ―valid‖ and ―invalid‖ portions are legally
and practically inseparable. In simpler words, the ―valid‖ and
―invalid‖ portions must not be inter-dependent or intrinsically
intertwined. If they are, the award cannot be set aside in part.‖
266. In the considered view of this Court, the findings returned by
the learned Arbitral Tribunal qua Counter-Claim Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12
are clearly severable and independent of the findings rendered in
respect of Counter-Claim Nos. 1, 3 and 4, which have been separately
examined hereinabove. The adjudication pertaining to the aforesaid
Counter-Claims neither forms the foundational basis of, nor is
intrinsically intertwined with, the surviving portions of the Impugned
Award.
267. In such circumstances, and particularly in light of the
unequivocal stand adopted by the Respondent, this Court finds no
impediment in partially setting aside the Impugned Award to the
limited extent of Counter-Claim Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12, while
sustaining the remainder thereof.
268. Accordingly, the Impugned Award, insofar as it relates to
Counter-Claim Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12, is set aside.
DECISION:
269. In view of the foregoing detailed discussion and the findings
returned hereinabove, the present Petition under Section 34 of the Act
is partly allowed.
270. The findings returned by the learned Arbitral Tribunal in
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
respect of Counter-Claim Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are found to be reasoned,
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
plausible and based upon a proper appreciation of the contractual
framework,
contemporaneous
correspondence
and
evidentiary
material on record. No ground warranting interference under Section
34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act is made out in respect of the said CounterClaims. Accordingly, the challenge laid by the Petitioner to the
Impugned Award, insofar as it pertains to Counter-Claim Nos. 1, 3
and 4, is rejected and, therefore, the Impugned Award, to the extent it
allows Counter-Claim Nos. 1, 3 and 4, is upheld.
271. However, in view of the categorical and unequivocal stand
adopted by the Respondent during the course of hearing, and for the
reasons recorded hereinabove, the Impugned Award, insofar as it
pertains to Counter-Claim Nos. 6, 10, 11 and 12, is set aside.
272. The remaining findings and directions contained in the
Impugned Award, not specifically interfered with hereinabove, shall
remain undisturbed and continue to bind the parties.
273. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforementioned terms.
274. There shall be no order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
MAY 29, 2026/DJ
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:16:06
O.M.P. (COMM) 535/2025
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