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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.35477 of 2025
….
Bhabesh Kumar Ghosh
Petitioner
Represented by Adv.–
Mr. Sukanta Kumar Dalai, Advocate
-Versus….
State of Odisha and others
Opposite Parties
Represented by Adv.–
Mr. Saswat Das, Additional Govt. Advocate
CORAM:
HON’ BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
Order No.
ORDER
23.06.2026
01.
1. The petitioner came up before this Court for issuance of a
mandamus upon the Mining Officer to forthwith permit him to
operate the Kadarayan Sand Source for remaining un-operated
lease period and also to declare the prolonging inaction of the
opposite parties in not taking a decision despite the disposal of a
matter before the National Green Tribunal (NGT) to be arbitrary,
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
2.
Admittedly, the petitioner was adjudged as a successful
bidder in relation to a sand quarry and a lease deed was also
executed on 2nd December, 2020 for a period of five years. The
petitioner, after fulfilling and/or complying all the terms and
conditions embodied in the said lease deed as well as the statutory
provisions, ensued the operation, but was subsequently prevented
from 8th February, 2022 when interim order was passed till 16th
July, 2024 when the matter was finally decided. Because of the
interdict created in terms of the order of the National Green
Tribunal, Eastern Zone Bench, Kolkata, the sairat could not be
operated.
2.1.
Admittedly, the said order creates a brindle in operation of
the sand quarries across the State which remained inoperative till
16th July 2024, when the said proceeding pending before the NGT
was finally disposed of. Obviously, between the periods from 2022
till the period of expiration of the lease, the petitioner was
prevented from operating the said sand quarry, yet, in order to
ensure his obligation, the statutory amounts were deposited with
the authority. Obviously, the petitioner was prevented from
utilizing the usufructs of the said lease because of the order of the
NGT and approached the authority to extend or renew the lease for
such period when the order of the NGT was operative. The
authority is sitting over the said representation and has not taken
any conscious decision thereupon.
3.
Mr. Sukanta Kumar Dalai, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner submits that the authority cannot deprive
the petitioner from using and utilizing the resources for the entire
period of lease and in fact, the State has been directed to extend the
period in a slew of litigations filed before this Court.
3.1.
To buttress the aforesaid submission, reliance is placed
upon a Division Bench order of this Court dated 31st May, 2021
passed in Jayaram Das v. State of Odisha and others (W.P.(C)
No.36099 of 2020) where, in an identical situation, a direction was
passed upon the State to extend the tenure of the lease by a period
of one year eight months and ten days, when the said order of the
NGT was operative.
4.
On the other hand, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, learned
Additional Standing Counsel (ASC) appearing on behalf of the
State submits that neither the Rules nor the Act applicable in this
regard contained the provision relating to extension and/or renewal
of the lease which expired by efflux of time. It is further submitted
that after several amendments having brought into the Mines and
Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 as well as the
Odisha Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016, the quarries or the
mines can only be settled through an open auction and not in the
form of an extension or the renewal thereof. Ms. Dash further
submits that the apex Court, in case of Dharmendra Kumar Singh
v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2021) 1 SCC 93 held that
the Court cannot compel the State to extend or renew the lease
period in absence of any such rule and, therefore, the contention of
the petitioner is unsustainable.
5.
On the conspectus of the aforesaid facts so unfurled, it is
undeniable that the period of lease could not be enjoyed by the
petitioner because of an order of the NGT operating during the
currency thereof. Even after the disposal of the proceeding by the
NGT, no conscious decision has been taken by the State as on this
date to grant permission in respect of Kadarayan sand quarry. The
question, therefore, begging an answer is whether the Court should
direct the authorities to extend the period of lease or to renew the
lease, as the petitioner was deprived of enjoying the benefits for the
entire period of the lease.
6.
We have given our anxious consideration to various
provisions of the Act and our endeavor has failed to find out any
specific provision relating to the extension or the renewal of lease
after the same expired. It is a trite law that the Court should not
issue mandamus commanding the authorities to do an act either
forbidden by law or dehors the law. The authorities shall act within
the precincts of the law and transgression of a boundary is always
viewed zealously by the writ Courts, as the interference becomes
inevitable in this regard. Even in case of a statutory lease, it is not
only guided by the terms and conditions embodied therein but also
the statutory provisions governing the field and the Court should be
slow and circumspect in interfering in this regard.
6.1.
The decision rendered in Dharmendra Kumar Singh
(supra) appears to us having taken note of the aforesaid notion of
law in a somewhat identical situation. The said case originated
from the State of Uttar Pradesh, where the operation of several
mining leases was kept at halt by the same order of the NGT. The
apex Court noticed the distinguishing features as several mining
leaseholders approached the Supreme Court. Some of the mining
areas were falling within the purview of the Forest Act and some
beyond the same. The applicability of Section 4 of the Forest Act,
1927 was taken into consideration and the Supreme Court took note
of the fact that they were prevented from operating the lease
because of the order of the NGT. The apex Court in unequivocal
terms held that if the mining policy or the applicable statute does
not permit any extension or the renewal, it would not be proper on
the part of the Court to issue a mandamus in the following:
“37. We do find ourselves in agreement with the
submission of the learned counsel for the State that
the right to extension of lease either flows from a
statutory provision or from the terms of the lease
between the parties concerned. If there has been an
obstructed period by reason of a judicial interdict,
that itself will not give window to extend the lease by
not following the statutory provisions, especially when
the terms of the lease do not provide for any
consequences thereof.”
6.2.
The unreported judgment of this Court relied upon by the
petitioner in case of Jayaram Das (supra) did not notice the
judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Dharmendra Kumar
Singh (supra) at a prior period of time. Apart from the same, if
there is any apparent conflict and/or inconsistency between the
judgment of the High Court and the apex Court, the judgment of
the apex Court is binding on all the Courts by virtue of Article 141
of the Constitution of India. Any judgment which runs counter to
the ratio and/or the principles of law laid down by the Supreme
Court cannot be said to be a good law and, therefore, the safest
course which the High Court should adopt in this regard is to
follow the mandate of the Supreme Court.
6.3.
The Supreme Court, in case of Dharmendra Kumar Singh
(supra) in clear and unequivocal words, held that in absence of any
statutory provision, the Court should not pass a direction upon the
authorities to do an act contrary thereto and, therefore, we do not
find that any direction as sought for in the form of mandamus can
be granted. Equally, we have noticed in recent past that in some of
the cases, the Government has taken a conscious decision based
upon a policy to permit the quarry leaseholders to operate. Whether
that is permissible or not is the wisdom of the administrative
authority to ponder upon and no such direction can be passed by
the Court in judicial fiat.
6.4.
Interestingly, an ancillary point arose in the instant case as
we find from the judgment rendered in Dharmendra Kumar Singh
(supra) that it would be too burdensome on the leaseholder to
continue paying the security deposit and the advance royalties,
despite being prevented by an order passed by the NGT and,
therefore, is entitled to the refund thereof. Ms. Dash, the learned
ASC vociferously submits that even the petitioner is not entitled to
any refund and the observations made by the apex Court in
Dharmendra Kumar Singh (supra) is mere a direction to be
construed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Even
apart, she submits that the Division Bench of this Court in Narayan
Nayak v. State of Odisha (W.P.(C) No. 10384 of 2021), while
disposing of the same on 5th March, 2024, categorically held that
the quarry leaseholder is not entitled to a refund and, therefore,
even the petitioner is not entitled to get the refund of the security
deposit and the advance royalty.
6.5.
Taking the first plea, we do not find the contention of Ms.
Dash to be correct in the perspective of the observations made by
the apex Court in Dharmendra Kumar Singh (supra). The State
was formidably opposing the prayer of the mining leaseholders
seeking for extension and relying on the separate provision of the
Rules and the statute, including the policy adopted by the
Government of Uttar Pradesh, which dislodged the claim of the
mining leaseholder to have the lease extended or renewed. In
pursuit of the same, though there appears to be a word "concession"
used in paragraph 41 thereof but the same has to be read in
juxtaposition with the other contentions raised by the State in the
said matter. It was all along the stand of the State in the said report
that the prayer for extension and/or renewal of a period in which
the order of the NGT was operative cannot be granted in absence of
any statutory Rules or the policy having taken in this regard and in
pursuit of determining the same, the apex Court, in unequivocal
terms held that if such a deprivation is shown, which cannot be
attributed to the conduct of a mining leaseholder, the law permits
the refund of the security deposit and the advanced royalty
deposited by him in the following:
“43. We, thus, find that the appropriate course of
action to be adopted in this case cannot be to extend
the lease for the obstructed period but to direct that
the security deposit, if not already refunded, should be
refunded
and
the
amount
deposited
by
the
appellants/leaseholders as advance royalties to the
respondent State be also paid back to them along with
something more.”
6.6.
A distinction can be drawn between an involuntary act and
a voluntary act. In the event, the lessee or the lessor has committed
a fault or committed a breach of the terms and conditions of the
lease or the statutory provisions, the equity does not come to play.
The position would have been different when neither of the
contracting parties is at fault, but the deprivation is by virtue of an
interdict created by an order of the NGT, such involuntary act
cannot be equated with the voluntary act nor the principles
governing such situation should be blurred.
6.7.
The reliance to an unreported judgment of this Court in
Narayan Nayak (supra) is one of the cases concerning the
voluntary act. In the said case, there was a default or a breach
committed by the mining leaseholder in not submitting the requisite
certificate and in such perspective, the claim for refund was denied.
We have no hesitation nor a dissent to the proposition laid down
therein for the simple reason that if the quarry could not be
operated because of the fault of the lessee in complying with the
terms and conditions of the lease or the statutory provision, he does
not deserve any equitable reliefs in the form of a refund. However,
the position is different when he cannot be blamed for a breach of
any of the terms and conditions or the statutory provision and,
therefore, the judgment rendered in Narayan Nayak (supra) has no
manner of applicability in the instant case.
7.
As indicated hereinabove, we have noticed that in some of
the cases, the Government have taken a decision on the
representation of the mining leaseholder to extend the period and,
therefore, we direct the authorities to consider the said prayer
independently without being swayed by the observations made
hereinabove. In the event, the authorities declined to extend the
period or renew the lease, the security deposit and the advance
royalty paid by the petitioner shall be refunded within two weeks
from the said decision with an interest @ 6% per annum from the
date of the deposit till the payment thereof.
8.
With these observations and directions, the writ petition is
disposed of.
(Harish Tandon)
Chief Justice
(M.S. Raman)
Judge
Aswini
Signature Not
Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR SETHY
Designation: PERSONAL
ASSISTANT (SECY I/C)
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 24-Jun-2026 15:06:00
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