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Serial No. 35
Regular Cause list
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
CM(M) 325/2025 CM 5021/2025
Reserved on : 02.07.2026
Pronounced on : 13.07.2026
Uploaded on : 13.07.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
1. Bashir Ahmad Bhat, aged 68 years
…Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)
2. Mohammad Shafi Bhat, aged 60 years
3. Mohammad Yousuf Bhat, aged 50 years
All sons of Late Mohammad Akbar Bhat
R/O Hyderpora, Srinagar
Through:
Mr. G.R Tantray, Advocate
Vs.
1. Adnan Mir
...Respondent(s)
S/O Parvaiz Ahmad Mir
R/O Nigeenbagh Hazratbal, Srinagar
2. Irfan Ahmad Wani
S/O Ghulam Ahmad Wani
R/O A29 Sector 1 Mustafaabad Zainakote
Srinagar
A/P 33/FR ENV/LL/05, PDD-20114/2020CC
Friends Colony, Humhama near Airport
190021
C/O 9811900234/7006822256
Through: Mr. Q.R Shamas, Advocate for R-1
Mr. Sikander Hayat, Advocate for R-2
CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI, JUDGE.
JUDGMENT
1.
By this petition, filed in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
the petitioners are seeking setting aside of order dated 23.06.2025 passed
by the Court of learned Additional District Judge (Bank Cases) Srinagar
(Designated Commercial Court), [hereinafter called the „trial court‟], in
terms whereof, the learned trial court has declined the prayer of the
CM(M) 325/2025
petitioners to pass a compromise decree on the basis of the alleged
compromise between the parties.
Factual Matrix:
2.
The petitioners are stated to have filed a civil suit under the provisions of
the Commercial Courts Act for recovery of the outstanding license fee as
well as mesne profits from the defendants/respondents herein with whom
the petitioners had entered into an agreement of license in the year 2015,
for a period of five years. Prior to the filing of the suit, the petitioners
had initiated a pre-litigation mediation under Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act with defendant No. 1, pursuant to the failure to
liquidate the arrears of license fee. The said pre-litigation mediation did
not yield any positive results, constraining the petitioners to file a civil
suit under the Commercial Courts Act, praying for the below mentioned
reliefs:
a)
b)
c)
A decree for recovery of Rs. 2,60,54,574/- as outstanding
arrears of license fees and mesne profits in respect of the
licensed premises along with the pendent lit interest at bank
rate and interest after the passing of the decree @18% may
be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants.
A decree for attachment of kitchen ware and the furniture
and furnishings belonging to the defendant No. 1 may be
passed before the passing of final judgment against the
defendant No. 1 and the attached articles put to auction for
the purpose of realization of the outstanding arrears of
license fee and mesne profits.
A decree of declaration to the effect that the defendant No. 1
was the licensee of the licensed premises till 31.12.2020 and
thereafter the defendant No. 1 has been a mere trespasser
holding over the property of the plaintiffs illegally to the
detriment of the plaintiffs.
CM(M) 325/2025
d)
e)
3.
A decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants
from causing any forcible entry into the suit building overtly
or covertly and remove the sign board captioned M/S Grills
Bistro & Kitchen fixed to the suit building.
A decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants
from causing any impediment into the free access of
plaintiffs to the suit building and utilize the same for their
own benefit.
During the pendency of the said suit, a compromise was recorded on
04.01.2025, on the basis of statement made by the defendant No. 2 in
presence of his counsel. The terms of the said compromise were not
complied with, though the petitioners prayed for passing of a decree in
their favour in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, which was declined by the
trial court.
4.
The claim of the petitioners/plaintiffs was resisted by the respondents
herein by filing the written statement, however, later on as would the
order dated 04.01.2025 of the trial court reflect the plaintiffs and
defendant No. 2 had arrived at a consensus/amicable settlement that the
license fee of Rs. 2,60,54,574/- would be paid by the defendants and
defendant No. 2 agreed to pay the same in the manner as envisaged in
the said order. Subsequent thereto, the trial court in terms of order dated
08.02.2025 records that the defendants neither turned up, nor have made
the payment as agreed in terms of the agreement dated 04.01.2025. The
order further records that an advocate namely Mr. Dawood Ahmad had
undertaken on behalf of defendant No. 2, to do the needful by the next
date. The said advocate was directed to bring the keys of the premises
with him, if the needful is not done as undertaken by him. For facility of
CM(M) 325/2025
reference, the relevant paragraph of the order dated 08.02.2025 is
reproduced herein below:
“LC for the parties present. The plaintiff present in person
as well. The defendants have neither turned up in the court
nor made the payment to the plaintiff as agreed by them by
virtue of agreement dated 04.01.2025. Advocate Dawood
Ahmad, LC for the defendant No. 2 undertook to do the
needful by next date and in case the defendants are not able
to make the payment he is directed to bring the keys of the
premises in the court on next date. LC for the defendants has
also filed objections, same are taken on record.”
5.
Thereafter, order dated 03.04.2025 passed by the trial court would show
that defendant No. 1 had appeared in person, the learned counsel for
defendant No. 2 had filed a composite application for setting aside exparte proceedings and for restoration of counter claim. The said measure
was taken by the defendant No. 2 on the ground that he could not
manage the promised amount from the prospective buyers.
6.
Subsequently, respondent No. 1 filed another application seeking setting
aside ex-parte proceedings initiated against him in terms of order dated
21.02.2025.
7.
Eventually, the trial court heard the learned counsel for the parties and
upon consideration of the matter passed the impugned order. The
relevant paragraph of the impugned order dated 23.06.2025 is
reproduced herein below:
“In the matter in hand, though with the intervention of the
court the plaintiff and one of the defendant agreed for some
settlement, yet there is no written agreement to that extent
and the defendant No. 1 has not even consented for the
same. As such, the compromise decree as contended by the
LC for plaintiff cannot be passed in the case.
CM(M) 325/2025
Since the applicant/defendant No. 1 has filed the application
showing his desire to participate in the proceedings of the
case and has already filed the written statement and as per
the submission for LC for defendant No. 1 great prejudice
shall be caused to the defendant No. 1 in case ex-parte
proceedings initiated against him are not set-aside.
Therefore, in the interest of justice and for allowing the
defendant No. 1 to participate the proceedings in future, the
ex-parte proceedings initiated against the defendant No. 1
vide order dated 21.02.2025 are set aside subject to the
payment of costs of Rs. 4000/-.”
8.
Aggrieved of the order, the petitioners have approached this Court with
the petition in hand, seeking setting aside of the impugned order being
bad in law and for directing the trial court to draw the decree on the basis
of compromise dated 04.01.2025 recorded by the trial court.
9.
The writ petition is accompanied by an application for interim relief,
wherein the petitioners have prayed that, pending consideration of the
main petition, the operation of the order dated 23.06.2025, passed by the
trial court be stayed.
10. This court in terms of order dated 12.08.2025, while issuing notice to the
respondents, summoned the scanned record from the trial court, which
has been received and is on the file. Upon notice, respondents have
appeared and sought time for filing reply.
11. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has submitted that the compromise
in question is in no way binding upon respondent No. 1, as he has not
signed the same, despite being a contesting party to the dispute.
12. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has submitted that in view of
Section 13 of Commercial Courts Act, the petitioners have a remedy of
appeal and in view of availability of an express remedy provided by the
CM(M) 325/2025
statute, the petition in hand filed in terms of Article 227 of Constitution
of India is not maintainable. He has relied upon judgment/order dated
24.04.2025 passed by the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in case titled
“Pankaj Arora Vs. Mr. Anil Kumar Bansal & Ors.”
13. At the outset, the foremost question that arises for consideration is
whether the petition in hand, filed in terms of the Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, is maintainable or not. It needs no reiteration that
the jurisdiction vested with this Court in terms of Article 227 is not an
ordinary jurisdiction, but an inherent supervisory jurisdiction. The
inherent supervisory jurisdiction vested with this court in terms of
Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised for limited
purposes only, when the order called in question falls within the
exceptions as envisaged in case titled “Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr Vs
Rajendra Shankar Patil” reported as (2010) 8 SCC 326. The relevant
paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced herein below:
62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following
principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution may be formulated:
a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different
from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of
power by High Court under these two Articles is also
different.
b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called
a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ
jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from
the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence
on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been
discussed above.
c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its
power of superintendence under Article 227 of the
Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or
CM(M) 325/2025
Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power,
act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or
tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative
statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would
also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by
the High Court.
d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise
of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid
down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be
guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the
principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly
followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various
other decisions of this Court.
e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed
in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only
to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within
the bounds of their authority'.
f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals
and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in
them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction
which is vested in them.
g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court
can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence
when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of
tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has
been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic
principles of natural justice have been flouted.
h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court
cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or
just because another view than the one taken by the
tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In
other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly
exercised.
i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article
227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been
declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by
the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L.
Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in
(1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a
Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather
cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure
CM(M) 325/2025
Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act,
1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High
Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must
be remembered that such statutory amendment does not
correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of
superintendence under Article 227.
k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on
equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can
be exercised suo motu.
l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power
of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the
main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative
and judicial control by the High Court on the
administration of justice within its territory.
m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and
judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly
functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way
as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of
interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum
to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt
and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in
order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of
the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.
n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention
is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual
cases but should be directed for promotion of public
confidence in the administration of justice in the larger
public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection
of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article
227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high
degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.
o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be
counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary
power of its strength and vitality.
15. The petition in hand, in view of the law laid down and taken note of
herein above, on the face of it, is not maintainable, however, the court
deems it appropriate to deal with the issues raised by the petitioners.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioners has primarily challenged the
impugned order on the ground that, although a compromise had been
CM(M) 325/2025
recorded by the trial court itself between the parties, the respondents
failed to act upon it. Despite this, the trial court declined to pass a
compromise decree based on the said compromise, which is illegal. To
deal with the submission made by the learned counsel, the court deems it
appropriate to reproduce the Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC, which covers the
subject herein:
“3. Compromise of suit—Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly
or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, [in
writing and signed by the parties] or where the defendant
satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of
the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such
agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and
shall pass a decree in accordance therewith [so far as it
relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject
matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the
same as the subject matter of the suit.
[Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by
the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived
at, the Court shall decide the question; but not adjournment
shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question,
unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to
grant such adjournment.]
[Explanation- An agreement or compromise which is void or
voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872),
shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this
rule.]”
17. A plain reading of the provision of law as taken note of herein above
would make it amply clear that, a compromise decree cannot be passed
merely on the willingness of the parties to settle the dispute, but only
upon strict compliance of the conditions prescribed under Rule 3. It
provides that when a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any
lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the
CM(M) 325/2025
court shall record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance
therewith. So, the essential ingredients required to be fulfilled by this
provision of law make a compromise, a lawful agreement of the
compromise, which are mentioned herein below:
a)
b)
c)
d)
It must be lawful agreement or compromise.
It must be in writing.
It must be signed by the parties or their duly authorized
representatives.
The court must be satisfied that the compromise is lawful and
voluntary.
18. It goes without saying that failure to satisfy all these four conditions
would render the agreement/compromise incapable of being made basis
of a compromise decree.
19. I am fortified in my view by the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in case titled “Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. Vs. Jitendra Chaudhary &
Ors.”, reported as 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1255. The relevant paragraph
of the judgment is reproduced herein below:
“5.2. A perusal of various decisions of this Court reveals the
following aspects regarding compromise decree:
(a) Prior to the 1976 Amendment to the CPC, a compromise
could be either oral or written, and the Court could decide
the same on the basis of general evidence by the
parties, Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel.
(b) After the amendment, it has been clarified that a
compromise must be in writing and must be signed by the
parties, Som Dev v. Rati Ram.
(c) The objective of the amendment is to prevent false and
frivolous pleas of compromise having been entered into
between the parties; (Gurpreet Singh supra).
(d) A compromise decree being signed by all parties is a
mandate of the law; (Gurpreet Singh supra).
(e) It has to be voluntarily accepted by parties and once such
acceptance is recorded by the Court, it acquires the sanctity
of the judicial order, Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi.
CM(M) 325/2025
(f) A counsel/duly authorised representative/GPA holders is
permitted to sign a compromise decree on behalf of those
he represents, granted there is express authorisation or
exigency of circumstance (Byram Pestonji Gariwala v.
Union Bank of India; Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder
Singh)
(g) In accepting a compromise decree, while it is true that the
court merely put a seal of approval, but its role cannot be
reduced to being only a recorder. It has to apply its judicial
mind to the terms to ensure that they are lawful;(Banwari
Lal supra)
(h) A consent decree which is the conclusion of a compromise,
does not operate as a resjudicata for it does not
meet Section 11 (CPC) requirements; (Baldevdas Shivlal v.
Filmistan Distributors (India) (P) Ltd.)
(i) The only remedy available against a compromise decree is
a recall application. A fresh suit or an appeal is not
maintainable against this kind of decree; (Navratan Lal
Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma)
20. The Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in case titled “Pankaj Arora Vs. Mr.
Anil Kumar Bansal & Ors.”, while referring to the Division Bench
judgment in case titled “Black Diamond Track Parts (P) Ltd. v. Black
Diamond Motors (P) Ltd” has held that exercise of jurisdiction by the
High Court shall not negate the legislative intent and purpose behind
the Commercial Courts Act and shall not come in the way of expeditious
disposal of commercial suits.
21. Having said that, it needs to be stated that the petitioners on their own
showing have stated that the compromise, which is sought to be enforced
by a compromise decree was not signed by the defendant No. 1, who is a
party to the dispute but by defendant No. 2 only, so, the essential
condition prescribed by Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC that the compromise
CM(M) 325/2025
must be signed by the parties is not satisfied by the compromise in
question.
22. In that view of the matter, the trial court has rightly declined to pass a
compromise decree in favour of the petitioners.
23. Moreover, since the agreement/compromise was not signed by all the
parties to the dispute, it cannot be regarded as a lawful agreement or
compromise, as required under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Since the compromise was only signed by respondent No. 2,
who also choose to file an application, along with respondent No. 1 for
setting aside the ex-parte proceedings initiated by the court in terms of
order dated 21.02.2025, the court has rightly set-aside the ex-parte
proceedings.
24. Last but not the least, the Court must be satisfied that the compromise is
lawful and voluntary, which too is missing in the case in hand. I am
fortified in my view by the ratio laid down in the judgment of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in case titled “Amro Devi & Ors. Vs. Julfi Ram
(Deceased) Th. LRs. & Ors.”, reported as (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1715,
which laid down that when a compromise is to be recorded and a decree
is to be passed, Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code requires that the terms of
compromise should be reduced to writing and signed by the parties.
25. In the instant case, the defendant No. 1 admittedly did not consent and
there was no written compromise involving all the disputing parties,
therefore, the compromise in question does not qualify as a valid and
lawful compromise within the meaning of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the order dated 23.06.2025
CM(M) 325/2025
passed by the court of learned Additional District Judge, (Bank Cases),
Srinagar, is upheld.
26. For all what has been said herein before, the petition in hand is found to
be without any merit, therefore, dismissed along with the connected
application(s), leaving the petitioners free to pursue their suit before the
trial court, which is still pending before the said court. The trial court is
expected to expedite the disposal of the suit.
(MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR:
13.07.2026
“Adil Ismail”
CM(M) 325/2025
Whether the Judgment is Reportable?
No
Whether the Judgment is Speaking?
Yes
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