Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
-1-
CGHC010378332026
2026:CGHC:42264
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 2540 of 2026
Bajrang Lal S/o Shri Radhe Lal, Aged About 54 Years R/o. Village Dudga Katghora, Tahsil- Katghora, Distt.- Korba (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate Korba,
Distt.- Korba (C.G.)
2 - Puniram S/o. -Bhujbal Aged About 65 Years R/o. Village -Dudga
Katghora, Tahsil- Katghora, Distt.- Korba (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Samir Singh, Advocate
For State
:
Mr. Avinash Singh, Govt. Advocate
S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
Order On Board
28/09/2026
1.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition under Section 528 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short “BNSS”) has been
filed by the petitioner against order dated 07.09.2026 passed in Criminal
Revision No.15/2026 by learned First Additional Sessions Judge,
Katghora, District- Korba whereby revision filed by the petitioner against
order dated 07.07.2026 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Katghora framing charges against him under Sections 420, 467, 468 of
Digitally
signed by
PRAVEEN
KUMAR
SINHA
Date:
2026.10.01
11:06:22
+0530
-2-
IPC, has been dismissed.
2.
Facts necessary for disposal of the present petition, in brief, are
that respondent No.2/complainant instituted a complaint under Section
200 of Cr.P.C., before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katghora,
alleging that land bearing Khasra No.169/3-A, admeasuring 0.20 acre,
situated at Village Junadihi, originally belonged to the complainant and
was acquired by SECL in the year 1985-86. It was further alleged that
the said land had been purchased by the complainant from one
Phagundas and that, upon subsequent subdivision of the original Khasra
No.169 into 15 separate khasras, khasra No.169/3-A was recorded in
the name of the complainant and was thereafter acquired by SECL.
According to the complainant, petitioner was never in possession of the
said land and he secured employment in SECL against the acquisition of
the said land by manipulating the revenue records and submitting forged
and fabricated documents.
3.
On the basis of the allegations made in the complaint, the
complaint case was registered against the petitioner, whereafter notices
were issued and statements were recorded. Upon consideration of the
material available on record, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Katghora, vide order dated 07.07.2026, found prima facie material to
proceed against the petitioner and accordingly framed charges for
offences punishable under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the IPC.
Aggrieved
thereby,
the
petitioner
preferred
Criminal
Revision
No.15/2026 before the learned First Additional Sessions Judge,
Katghora, District Korba, which came to be dismissed vide order dated
07.09.2026, which is under challenge in this petition.
-3-
4.
Assailing legality and validity of the impugned order, learned
counsel for the petitioner would submit that land bearing khasra No.
169/3-A, admeasuring 0.20 acre, acquired by SECL in 1985-86, is
entirely different from the petitioner's land bearing khasra No. 169/16,
the original khasra No. 169 having subsequently been divided into 15
separate khasras; hence, the complaint lodged against the petitioner
was not maintainable. Learned jurisdictional Magistrate framed charges
without any material disclosing the essential ingredients of the alleged
offences, while the learned Revisional Court failed to properly consider
the petitioner's grounds and prima facie case. The complaint was filed in
2015, registered in 2020, and charges were framed only on 07.07.2026,
resulting in prolonged and unwarranted harassment. It is further
submitted that SECL has neither initiated any departmental inquiry nor
alleged that the petitioner obtained employment or continued in service
on the basis of forged documents, and therefore, the prosecution of the
petitioner is wholly unsustainable and liable to be quashed.
5.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondent
would oppose the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and
would further submit that material collected during the course of
inquiry/investigation, coupled with the statements and documents
available on record, prima facie disclose the ingredients of the offences
alleged against the petitioner and were sufficient for framing of charges.
Impugned order does not
suffer from any illegality or perversity
warranting interference by this Court.
6.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the
documents annexed along with this petition.
-4-
7.
Before proceeding to consider the merits of the case, it would be
apposite to refer to the scope and ambit of the inherent jurisdiction of
this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (similar to Section 482 of old
Cr.P.C), which reads as under:
“528. Saving inherent powers of High Court.
Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High Court to
make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.”
8.
The aforesaid provision preserves the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court to pass appropriate orders for securing the ends of justice and
for preventing abuse of the process of any Court. However, such
jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature and is required to be exercised
sparingly, with due caution and circumspection, particularly when
interference is sought against an order framing charge.
9.
It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court has
to consider only the material available on record, to see whether it
discloses grounds for proceeding against the accused. The correctness of
the allegations is not to be appreciated at this stage. The Court is only to
look into the material placed before it, to determine whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding, that is, whether the prosecution has
made out a case for trial. It is not required to enter into the pros and cons
of the matter or to weigh and balance evidence and probabilities, which is
the function of the Court once the trial begins. At the stage of charge, the
Court need only be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against
-5-
the accused.
10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh
Chander & anr, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has laid down the
guidelines for considering the challenge to framing of charge and the
same are extracted below for ready reference:“27.Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and
Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of
jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate
for us to enlist the principles with reference to
which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction.
However, it is not only difficult but is inherently
impossible to state with precision such principles.
At best and upon objective analysis of various
judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out
some of the principles to be considered for proper
exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to
quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or
together, as the case may be :
27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers
of the
Court under Section 482 of the
Code but the more the power, the more due
care and caution is to be exercised in invoking
these powers. The power of quashing criminal
proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in
terms of Section 228 of the Code should be
exercised
very
sparingly
and
with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made from the record of the case and the
-6-
documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations
are
so
patently
absurd
and
inherently
improbable that no prudent person can ever
reach such a conclusion and where the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence are not
satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly
interfere. No meticulous examination of the
evidence is needed for considering whether
the case
the stage of
would end in conviction or not at
framing
of
charge
or
quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is
absolutely
essential
to
prevent
patent
miscarriage of justice and for correcting some
grave error that might be committed by the
subordinate courts even in such cases, the
High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the
threshold, to throttle
the
prosecution
in
exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar
enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or
any specific law in force to the very initiation or
institution and continuance of such criminal
proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide
specific protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the
freedom of a person and the right of the
complainant or prosecution to investigate and
prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the Court cannot be
permitted to be used for an oblique or
ultimate/ulterior purpose.
-7-
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they
appeared from the record and documents
annexed therewith to predominantly give rise
and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of
criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may
be justified in quashing the charge. Even in
such cases, the Court would not embark upon
the critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot
examine the facts, evidence and materials on
record to determine whether there is sufficient
material
on the basis of which the case
would end in a conviction, the Court is
concerned primarily with the allegations taken
as a whole whether they will constitute an
offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process
of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court
called upon to hold a full- fledged enquiry or to
appreciate
evidence
collected
by
the
investigating agencies to find out whether it is a
case of acquittal or conviction.
27.11.Where allegations give rise to a civil
claim and also amount to an offence, merely
because a civil claim is maintainable, does not
mean that a criminal complaint cannot be
maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the
Court cannot take into consideration external
materials given by an accused for reaching the
conclusion that no offence was disclosed or
that there was possibility of his acquittal. The
-8-
Court
has
to
consider
the
record
and
documents annexed with by the prosecution.
27.13.Quashing of a charge is an exception to
the
rule of continuous prosecution. Where
the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court
should be more inclined to permit continuation
of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to
marshal the records with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the documents or
records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under
Section 173 (2) of the Code, suffers from
fundamental legal defects, the Court may be
well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above,
where the Court finds that it would amount to
abuse of process of the Code or that interest of
justice favours, otherwise it may quash the
charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice
for administration of which alone, the courts
exist.”
11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu By
Inspector of Police Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Vs. N. Suresh
Rajan & Ors. and connected matter (2014) 11 SCC 709 has observed
thus:“29. …..... At this stage, probative value of the
materials has to be gone into and the court is not
expected to go deep into the matter and hold that
the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our
-9-
opinion, what needs to be considered is whether
there is a ground for presuming that the offence
has been committed and not whether a ground for
convicting the accused has been made out. To put
it differently, if the court thinks that the accused
might have committed the offence on the basis of
the materials on record on its probative value, it
can frame the charge; though for conviction, the
court has to come to the conclusion that the
accused has committed the offence. The law does
not permit a mini trial at this stage.”
12. Applying the settled legal position to the present case, and on
perusal of the documents annexed to the petition, this Court finds that the
allegations and the material on record prima facie disclose sufficient
grounds to proceed against the petitioner for the alleged offences. The
petitioner's contentions concern the distinction between Khasra No.169/3A and Khasra No.169/16, the subdivision of the original Khasra No.169,
the genuineness of, or manipulation in, the revenue entries, and the
documents relied upon by the petitioner. These raise disputed questions
of fact which require appreciation of evidence. They cannot be
conclusively determined at the stage of framing of charge, or in
proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS challenging such framing.
The learned Magistrate, on considering the material on record, found
sufficient ground to frame charges under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of
the IPC, and the Revisional Court rightly declined to interfere. The
absence of any departmental proceeding by SECL, or the outcome of any
revenue proceedings, does not by itself exonerate the petitioner or negate
the alleged criminal liability. Likewise, delay in the institution or registration
of the complaint and in the framing of charge is not, by itself, sufficient to
quash proceedings where prima facie material exists on record. Its effect
-10-
may be considered by the trial Court after appreciation of evidence. This
Court cannot, at the stage of framing of charge, substitute its own
appreciation of the disputed factual material for that of the trial Court. The
allegations, taken at their face value along with the material relied upon by
the complainant and the prosecution, are sufficient to warrant the
petitioner's trial. The defence raised by the petitioner may be considered
by the trial Court at the appropriate stage, after the parties adduce their
evidence. No ground is therefore made out for exercise of inherent
jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.
13. Consequently, this Court finds no jurisdictional error, perversity or
patent illegality in the impugned
order dated 07.09.2026 passed by
revisional Court affirming order of framing of charge against the petitioner
passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katghora, Korba.
14. Accordingly, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed.
Sd/-/-/(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
Praveen
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review