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2026:CGHC:5748
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ORDER RESERVED ON 10.12.2025
ORDER DELIVERED ON 02.02.2026
ORDER UPLOADED ON 02.02.2026
CRMP No. 3615 of 2025
1 - Bablu @ Janardan Yadav S/o Radheshyam Yadav Aged About 45
Years R/o Village- Sehdauli, Post- Farsad, P.S. Badhalganj, DistrictGorakhpur (U.P.) Through- The Power Of Attorney Namely Bahal Singh
Verma S/o Kapil Singh Aged About- 51 Years, R/o Village Oteband,
Post- Bemetara, P.S. And District- Bemetara (C.G.) (As Per Correct
Details/ Aadhar Card)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- The Station House OfficerNandghat, District- Bemetara, Chhattisgarh,
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
:
Shri Sachin Nidhi, Advocate
For Respondent/State
:
Shri Ajit Singh, GA
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma)
C A V Order
This petition has been filed under Section 528 read with Section
503 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), calling in
question the legality and validity of the order dated 01.11.2025 passed
by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bemetara, District
Bemetara has been affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bemetara
in Criminal Revision No. 59/2025, whereby the application filed by the
petitioner for grant of interim custody (supurdnama) of the seized cattle
has been rejected.
2.
The petitioner claims to be the lawful owner of the seized cattle. It
is alleged that on the basis of a written complaint lodged by the
complainant Vivek Kumar Shukla at Police Station Nandghat, it was
alleged that on 20.10.2025 at about 12:50 a.m., a Tata Eicher mini truck
bearing registration No. CG-15-DZ-8001 was found transporting cattle
in a cruel manner. It was alleged that a total of 16 cattle were found tied
with ropes, overcrowded and crammed into the vehicle/mini-truck under
deplorable conditions. The said cattle were seized and Crime No.
192/2025 was registered under Sections 4, 6 and 10 of the Chhattisgarh
Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004 and Section 11 of the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 against the accused
persons. It is further alleged that the cattle were being transported in
contravention of the provisions of the Act of 2004.
3.
During investigation, the cattle were seized and kept in custody.
The petitioner claimed ownership of the seized cattle and filed an
application before the Trial Court for grant of interim custody under
Section 503 of the BNSS. The Trial Court rejected the application vide
order dated 01.11.2025. The revision filed by the petitioner was also
dismissed by the Revisional Court, leading to the present petition before
this Court.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Trial
Court failed to appreciate the factual and legal aspects of the matter. It
was argued that the petitioner had produced documentary evidence
regarding purchase of cattle, including receipts issued by competent
authorities and Panchayat records. It was further submitted that the
seized cattle are milch cows and buffaloes, some of which are pregnant,
and their prolonged detention without adequate care risks severe harm,
including potential death of the animals.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that mere
transportation of cattle does not attract Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004
unless it is proved that the cattle were being transported for the purpose
of slaughter or with the knowledge that they were likely to be
slaughtered. It was argued that there is no allegation or material on
record to show that the cattle were being transported for slaughter.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the chargesheet has been filed, there is no allegation or material on record to
establish that the seized cattle were being transported for the purpose
of slaughter in contravention of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004.
6.
It was argued that Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004 would attract
only when cattle are transported for slaughter or with the knowledge
that they are likely to be slaughtered. In the absence of such allegation,
the statutory bar under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 is not attracted.
He further submits that the Veterinary Examination Report dated
21.10.2025 (Annexure P/4) clearly indicates that the cattle were found
in good and fit condition, with no signs of injury or cruelty. Therefore, the
presumption of slaughter cannot be drawn.
7.
It was further contended that continued detention of cattle in the
custody of third parties is causing irreparable loss and is detrimental to
the welfare of the animals. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the
Supreme Court in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat,
(2002) 10 SCC 283, Basavva Kom Dyamangouda Patil v. State of
Mysore, AIR 1977 SC 1749, and General Insurance Council v. State
of A.P., (2010) 6 SCC 768.
8.
Therefore, the statutory bar under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004
is not attracted. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai (supra) to submit that seized
property should ordinarily be released on supurdnama to the rightful
owner to avoid deterioration and loss.
9.
Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned orders
and submitted that the cattle were seized in connection with serious
offences and that release of the cattle at this stage may prejudice the
prosecution case. It was argued that Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004
puts a statutory embargo on release of seized cattle and therefore both
the courts have rightly rejected the application for interim custody.
10.
Heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival
submissions and also gone through the records with utmost
circumspection.
11.
Section 6(1) of the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation
Act,
prohibits
transportation
of
cattle
only
when
such
transportation is for the purpose of slaughter or with the knowledge that
the cattle are likely to be slaughtered. The provisions contained in
Section 6 of the Act of 2004 reads as under:
“6. Prohibition on transport of Agricultural
cattle for slaughter: (I) No person shall sell,
or transport or offer to transport or cause to
be transported any Agricultural cattle from
any place within the state to any place
within the state or outside the State, for the
purpose of its slaughter in contravention of
the provision of this Act or with the
knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so
slaughtered.
(2) Whenever any person transports or
causes to be transported in contravention
of provisions of sub-section (1) any
agricultural cattle as specified in the
Schedule, such vehicle or any conveyance
used in transporting such animal along with
such agricultural cattle shall be liable to be
seized by such authority or officer as the
State Government may appoint in this
behalf.
(3) The vehicle or conveyance so seized
under sub-section (2) shall not be released
by the order of the court on bond or surety
before the expiry of six months from the
date of such seizure or till the final
judgment of the court, whichever is earlier
and such vehicle shall also be liable for
confiscation at the end of trial.”
12.
It is a settled principle of law that penal statutes must be strictly
construed. In W.H. King v. Republic of India, AIR 1952 SC 156, the
Supreme Court held that penal provisions must receive strict
interpretation. Where the legislature has consciously employed a
specific expression, the provision cannot be interpreted by assigning a
meaning different form that which is conveyed by the plain language of
the statute. It has been observed that :
“As the statute creates an offence and
imposes a penalty of fine and
imprisonment, the words of the section
must be strictly construed in favour of the
subject. The Court is not concerned with
what might possibly have been intended,
but with what has been actually stated in
the language employed by the legislature.”
13.
Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha,
(1982) 1 SCC 561, the Supreme Court observed that criminal statutes
must be construed strictly and no person can be brought within the
scope of penal law unless the statute clearly applies. It has been
reiterated as under:
“15….when it is stated that penal statutes
must be construed strictly, it implies that the
Court must ascertain whether the act
complained of clearly falls within the plain
and unambiguous meaning of the statutory
language. The rule of strict construction
mandates that the language of the statute
must be so interpreted that no case is
brought within its ambit unless it squarely
falls within the reasonable interpretation of
the provision. In case of doubt, the
construction favourable to the subject must
prevail. At the same time, the Court clarified
that the rule of strict interpretation does not
override the fundamental principle of
statutory interpretation, namely, that where
the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, the Court must give effect to
the
expressed
intention
of
the
legislature….”
14.
In Basavva Kom Dyamangouda Patil v. State of Mysore, AIR
1977 SC 1749, the Supreme Court held that the object of granting
interim custody is to ensure that the property does not suffer damage or
decay during pendency of proceedings. In Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai
v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283, the Supreme Court
categorically held that seized property should not be allowed to rot in
custody and should ordinarily be released on appropriate conditions.
Similarly, in General Insurance Council v. State of A.P., (2010) 6 SCC
768, the Supreme Court reiterated that courts should normally release
seized property on supurdnama to the rightful owner subject to
reasonable safeguards.
15.
The pari materia provision contained in clause (4) of Section 6(A)
of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 came up for consideration
before the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Seglibhai Vasava v.
State of Gujarat, 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14545 wherein the Court,
while dealing with an issue identical to the one involved in the present
case, categorically held that clause (4) of Section 6(A) would apply only
in cases where the animals are being transported for the purpose of
slaughter. The Gujarat High Court after interpreting Section 6(A),
observed that the deeming provision under clause (1) would operate
only when it is established that the animals were being transported for
the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act or
with the knowledge that they were likely to be slaughtered. It was further
held that clause (4) of Section 6(A), which imposes restrictions
regarding the release of the vehicle for a period of six months, would be
attracted only when such transportation is proved to be for the purpose
of slaughter.
16.
The Gujarat High Court, after interpreting Section 6(A), observed
that the deeming provision under clause (1) would operate only when it
is established that the animals were being transported for the purpose
of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act or with the
knowledge that they were likely to be slaughtered. It was further held
that clause (4) of Section 6(A), which imposes restrictions regarding the
release of the vehicle for a period of six months, would be attracted only
when such transportation is proved to be for the purpose of slaughter. It
has been reiterated in Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava (supra) as
under :
“10. The plain reading of section 6(A) clause (1)
would indicate that the same is applicable in a
case where it is found that the animals were
being transported from any place within the
State to any other place within the State for the
purpose of slaughter in contravention of the
provisions of the Act or with the knowledge that
they were likely to be slaughtered. There is a
proviso to Section 6(A) clause (1) which
provides that a person shall be deemed to be
transporting such animal for the purpose of
slaughter unless contrary is proved thereto to
the satisfaction of the concerned authority or
officer by such person or he has obtained a
permission
under
sub-section
(2)
for
transporting the animal for bona fide
agricultural or animal husbandry purpose.
11.
Clause (4) to section 6(A) puts a
restriction so far as the release of the vehicle is
concerned for a period of six months.
12. It is therefore manifest that section 6(A)
clause (4) would apply only in a case where the
animals are being transported for the purpose
of slaughter.
13. It is not in dispute so far as the present
case is concerned that no permit was obtained
by the petitioner herein as the registered owner
of the vehicle for the purpose of transport.
However, at the same time, the prosecution
has to, prima facie, show something that the
transport of the cattle was for the purpose of
slaughter. For such purpose, I inquired with Mr.
Dabhi, the learned APP, regarding the materials
collected by the police in the course of
investigation. Mr. Dabhi has fairly submitted
that there is nothing to show that the cattle
were being transported for the purpose of
slaughter. It appears that there is no
investigation in that direction. It it is the case of
the prosecution that the cattle were being
transported for the purpose of slaughter, then
at least, it is expected from the investigating
officer to investigate at which place they were
being taken and were to be handed over to
whom for the purpose of slaughter. There is
nothing in that regard. In the absence of such
material, in my view, the prosecution cannot
straight way take recourse to the deeming
fiction as provided under Section 6(A)(1). In
such circumstances, I am of the view that there
should not be any legal impediment in
releasing the vehicle before the expiry of the
statutory time period ie. six months.”
17.
The Court further clarified that mere transportation of agricultural
cattle from one place to another for purposes other than slaughter does
not constitute an offence under the Act. In such cases, where Section
6(1) of the Act is not attracted, the embargo contained in Section 6(3)
would also not apply, and interim custody of the vehicle can be granted
without waiting for the statutory period of six months.
18.
It was also emphasized that the prosecution must, prima facie,
establish that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of
slaughter. In the absence of any material or investigation indicating the
destination, purpose, or intent of slaughter, the deeming fiction under
Section 6(A)(1) cannot be invoked mechanically. Consequently, in such
circumstances, there would be no legal impediment in releasing the
vehicle before the expiry of the statutory period.
19.
A plain reading of Section 6(A)(1) of the Act makes it abundantly
clear that the provision is attracted only when the animals are
transported from one place to another for the purpose of slaughter or
with the knowledge that they are likely to be slaughtered. Thus, the
legislative intent is explicit that mere transportation of animals, without
any material indicating the purpose of slaughter, would not fall within the
mischief of the provision.
20.
Clause (4) of Section 6(A) imposes a restriction on release only in
cases where the foundational requirement of transportation for
slaughter is satisfied. Therefore, it is manifest that the statutory bar
under clause (4) would apply exclusively in cases where the animals
are being transported for the purpose of slaughter and not otherwise.
21.
In the present case, though it is not in dispute that no permit was
obtained by the petitioner for transportation of the cattle, the prosecution
is nevertheless required to prima facie demonstrate that the cattle were
being transported for the purpose of slaughter. Upon perusal of the case
diary and the material collected during investigation, it is evident that
there allegation or evidence to indicate that the cattle were being taken
to any place for slaughter or were intended to be delivered to any
person for such purpose.
22.
Even the learned State counsel, upon specific query by this
Court, fairly conceded that the investigation does not reveal any
material suggesting that the cattle were being transported for slaughter.
There is no investigation in that direction, nor has the investigating
agency identified the place or the intended recipient of the cattle for
slaughter. In the absence of such material, the prosecution cannot
mechanically invoke the deeming fiction under Section 6(A)(1) of the
Act.
23.
In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that
there exists no legal impediment in granting interim custody of the
seized cattle to the petitioner before the expiry of the statutory period of
six months. Denial of interim custody in the absence of prima facie
evidence of transportation for slaughter would amount to an unjustified
curtailment of the petitioner’s rights and would also be detrimental to the
welfare of the animals.
24.
Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the
aforesaid legal position and the principles flowing from the judgment of
the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Seglibhai Vasava (supra), it is
evident that the impugned orders passed by the Courts below suffer
from a manifest error of law and failure to appreciate the true scope of
Section 6 of the Act. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to interim
custody of the seized cattle on appropriate conditions.
25.
A careful perusal of the record reveals that there is no specific
allegation that the seized cattle were being transported for the purpose
of slaughter. The prosecution case, in essence, is that the cattle were
being transported in a vehicle. The case diary does not disclose any
material indicating the destination of the cattle for slaughter or the
identity of any person to whom the cattle were to be delivered for such
purpose. The documents produced by the petitioner prima facie indicate
that the cattle were purchased through lawful transactions. The receipts
and Panchayat records, though disputed by the prosecution, cannot be
brushed aside at this stage. The record further indicates that some of
the seized cattle are milch cows and pregnant animals. Their prolonged
detention in custody without proper care is likely to cause irreparable
harm, frustrating the very purpose of animal welfare legislation.
26.
In the absence of prima facie material to establish that the cattle
were being transported for slaughter, the statutory embargo under
Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 cannot be invoked mechanically. The
learned Trial Court and the Revisional Court failed to consider the
settled legal position governing grant of interim custody of the seized
cattle and rejected the application in a perfunctory manner.
27.
in
This Court is of the considered view that denial of interim custody
the
present
case
would
constitute
deprivation
of
property
Ravidasbhai Seglibhai Vasava (supra),occasioning grave prejudice
not only to the petitioner and serious detriment to the welfare of the
seized animals.
28.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that the bar
under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 is not attracted in the present case
and the petitioner is entitled to interim custody of the seized cattle.
Accordingly, the impugned orders passed by the learned Trial Court and
the Revisional Court are set aside. The petition is allowed.
29.
The learned Trial Court is directed to release the seized cattle in
favour of the petitioner on interim custody (supurdnama), subject to the
following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall furnish a supurdnama bond
of appropriate value to the satisfaction of the Trial
Court.
(ii) The petitioner shall not sell, transfer or
alienate the cattle during pendency of the trial
without prior permission of the Trial Court.
(iii) The petitioner shall produce the cattle before
the Trial Court or investigating agency as and
when directed.
(iv) The petitioner shall ensure proper care,
maintenance and welfare of the cattle and shall
get the cattle examined by the concerned
Veterinary Officer at regular intervals. The
medical and health status report of the cattle shall
be submitted before the trial court once in every
three months.
(v) Photographs and identification details of the
cattle shall be taken before release.
(vi) In case of violation of any condition, the State
shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of
supurdnama.
30.
The cattle shall be released within seven days from the date of
compliance of the aforesaid conditions.
It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to
the adjudication of the present petition and shall not influence the merits
of the trial.
(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge
SUGUNA
DUBEY
Digitally signed
by SUGUNA
DUBEY
Date:
2026.02.02
16:24:21
+0530
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