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Page No.# 1/46
GAHC010015662026
2026:GAU-AS:2734
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/7351/2025
AYSHA KHATUN
W/O.- SURUT ZAMAL
VILL.- TARANGAPUR
P.O. TULSHIBARI
P.S. LAKHIPUR
DIST- GOALPARA
ASSAM
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE ADDITIONALCHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF
ASSAM
PANCHAYAT RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-06.
2:THE ASSAM STATE ELECTION COMMISSION
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
DOWN TOWN
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-06.
3:THE COMMISSIONER
PANCHAYAT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
PANJABARI
JURIPAR
GUWAHATI- 37.
4:THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
Page No.# 2/46
GOALPARA
ASSAM
PIN- 783101.
5:THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
GOALPARA ZILLA PARISHAD
GOALPARA
ASSAM
PIN -783101.
6:THE BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OFFICER
JOLESWAR DEVELOPMENT BLOCK
JOLESWAR
DIST- GOALPARA
ASSAM
PIN- 783132.
-----------Advocate for : MR H R A CHOUDHURY
Advocate for : GA
ASSAM appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
For the Petitioner(s)
: Mr. N.H. Laskar, Advocate
For the Respondents(s)
: Mr. J. Handique, Govt. Advocate
Mr. S. Dutta, Standing Counsel
Mr. R. Dubey, Standing Counsel
Date on which judgment was reserved : NA
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 23.02.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
Operative part of the judgment?
: NA
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
: Yes
Page No.# 3/46
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Heard Mr. N.H. Laskar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the Petitioner. Mr. J. Handique, the learned Government Advocate
appears on behalf of the District Administration and Mr. S. Dutta, the
learned Standing Counsel appears on behalf of the P&RD Department.
Mr. R. Dubey, the learned Standing Counsel appears on behalf of the
Respondent No. 2.
PREFACE
2.
The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated
09.12.2025 passed by the District Commissioner, Goalpara, whereby in
exercise of the powers conferred under Section 111(2)(f) [wrongly
written in the impugned order as Section 111(1)(f)] of the Assam
Panchayat Act, 1994 (for short, “the Act of 1994”), as well as Rule
62(4)(b) & (c) of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995 (for
short, “the Rules of 1995”), the Petitioner was removed from the 5
No.
Sardarvita
Tarangapur
GP
Ward
Constituency
under
the
Tarangapur Gaon Panchayat of Jaleswar Anchalik Panchayat.
THE CONSPECTUS OF FACTS
3.
The Petitioner herein claims that she was born on 03.01.1996 to
one Afzal Hoque of Village Kulamuya Choto Nichinpur, P.S. Fakirganj,
in the district of Dhubri. The Petitioner appeared in the HSLC
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Examination in 2012 from Kulamuya Nichinpur High School under the
Assam Board of Secondary Education. The Petitioner was issued an
HSLC admit card wherein her date of birth was recorded as
03.01.1996. In the registration card, her date of birth was also
recorded as 03.01.1996, and in the HSLC certificate issued by the
concerned High School, her date of birth was also recorded as
03.01.1996. Be that as it may, it is very pertinent to take note of the
fact that in the High School Leaving Certificate issued by the Board of
Secondary Education, Assam, the Petitioner’s date of birth was
recorded as 01.03.1996.
4.
It is the further case of the Petitioner that on 05.01.2015, she
married one Surat Zamal, son of Habibar Rahman of Tarangapur P.S.,
Lakhipur, in the district of Goalpara, as per Islamic rites and rituals.
The Kabinnama has been enclosed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition,
wherein the Petitioner’s date of birth was recorded as 03.01.1996 and
the date of marriage as 05.01.2015.
5. The Petitioner further stated that out of the said wedlock, a
daughter and a son were born. The elder child, namely Ms. Sultana
Parvin, was born on 06.11.2015, and the younger child namely Master
Akhiruz Zamal was born on 13.11.2017. The birth Certificates were
enclosed as Annexures-6 and 7 to the writ petition.
6.
It is the case of the Petitioner that in the last Panchayat elections
Page No.# 5/46
held in the State of Assam in the year 2025, the Petitioner contested
the election for Gaon Panchayat Member from 5 No. Sardarvita
Tarangapur Gaon Panchayat Ward Constituency under 8 No.
Tarangapur Gaon Panchayat in the district of Goalpara. The election
was held on 07.05.2025 and the results were declared on 11.05.2025.
The Petitioner, having secured the highest number of votes, won the
election and accordingly was issued the return of election as per Rule
44(7) of the Rules of 1995. The Petitioner subsequently was elected
as the President of the said 8 No. Tarangapur Gaon Panchayat.
7.
It is the case of the Petitioner that to her surprise, the District
Commissioner, Goalpara, i.e. the Respondent No. 4 on the basis of a
complaint stated to have been filed by one Sri Hakimuddin, removed
the Petitioner from membership of the Gaon Panchayat under Section
111(1)(f) of the Act of 1994 read with Rule 62(4)(b) & (c) of the
Rules of 1995 vide an order dated 09.12.2025, that too, without
issuing any show-cause notice and without giving her any opportunity
of hearing. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner approached this Court by
filing the present writ petition.
8.
The record reveals that pursuant to the filing of the instant writ
petition on 17.12.2025, this Court issued notice
on 18.12.2025
making it returnable by 4 (four) weeks, and in the interim directed
that the order dated 09.12.2025 passed by the District Commissioner,
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Goalpara shall remain suspended. It is relevant to take note of that
the Respondents have not filed any affidavit-in-opposition.
9.
Be that as it may, one Hakimuddin, claiming to be the
complainant, at whose instance the District Commissioner, Goalpara,
had passed the impugned order dated 09.12.2025 sought leave to be
arrayed as a Respondent to the instant writ petition by filing an
Interlocutory Application, which was registered and numbered as I.A.
(Civil) No. 386/2026. Along with the said application, the said
Hakimuddin also filed another Interlocutory Application being I.A.
(Civil) No. 385/2026 seeking vacation, modification and for alteration
of the interim order dated 18.12.2025.
10.
Today, when the matter was taken up for consideration of the
said Interlocutory Applications, this Court vide a separate order,
rejected the application filed by the said Hakimuddin on the ground
that the applicant is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the
present proceedings. Reasons have been separately assigned in the
said order passed in I.A.(Civil) No. 386/2026.
11.
It is a settled principle of law that when a statutory functionary
makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged
by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by the
fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit or otherwise. This
proposition of law stands well settled in view of the judgment of the
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Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder
Singh Gill & Another Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi &
Others reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405. Under such circumstances,
irrespective of any affidavit being filed by the Respondents, the
legality or validity of the impugned order dated 09.12.2025 can be
looked into.
12.
It was also pointed out before this Court by Mr. S. Dutta, the
learned Standing Counsel, P&RD Department that the materials on
the basis of which the impugned order dated 09.12.2025 was passed
are available in the application filed by the said Hakimuddin in I.A.
(Civil) No. 385/2026.
13. Mr. J. Handique, the learned Government Advocate appearing on
behalf of the District Administration submitted that this Court can
decide the legality and validity of the impugned order dated
09.12.2025 on the basis of the documents enclosed to the application
registered as I.A.(Civil) No. 385/2026.
CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
LEARNED
COUNSELS
FOR
THE
PARTIES.
14.
Mr. N.H. Laskar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner submitted that the Respondent No. 4 did not have the
authority
or
jurisdiction
to
pass
the
impugned
order
dated
Page No.# 8/46
09.12.2025, that too, on an application filed by a stranger.
15. The learned counsel submitted that the Respondent No. 4 could
not have exercised jurisdiction in respect to a disqualification which
was in existence on the date of election and as such the impugned
order is without jurisdiction and authority of law. The learned counsel
further submitted that the impugned order dated 09.12.2025 suffers
from complete non-application of mind inasmuch as a perusal of the
impugned order would show that the ground on which the Petitioner
was held to be disqualified is that the Petitioner had violated the
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006 whereas, a reading of
the impugned order shows that the Petitioner was disqualified in
terms with Section 111(1)(f) of the Act of 1994 which is
disqualification relating to conviction. The learned counsel therefore
submitted that the impugned order is not backed by the reasons
assigned.
16.
The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the
impugned order dated 09.12.2025 is based upon conjectures and
surmises. The learned counsel submitted that the impugned order is
not based upon the documents concerning the date of birth of the
Petitioner or her husband, but is based upon some purported
documents in relation to the age of the children of the Petitioner and
then assuming the age of the Petitioner when she got married. The
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learned counsel submitted that such documents cannot override the
documents which have been statutorily issued. The learned counsel
submitted that had a proper opportunity of hearing been provided to
the Petitioner, the Petitioner would have been in a position to place
the necessary materials.
17.
The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that Sections
111(1) and 111(2) of the Act of 1994 contains various disqualifications
for a person to be elected or co-opted and remain as President, VicePresident, or Member of the Zilla Parishad, Anchalik Panchayat, and
Gaon Panchayat. The disqualification so mentioned by the legislature
has to be strictly construed. The learned counsel further submitted
that based upon certain purported documents obtained from certain
sources by certain enquiry officer, the impugned order was passed
presuming that the Petitioner herein had to be married prior to 2013
as the date of birth of the Petitioner's first child was in the year 2013
on the basis of the purported documents. The learned counsel
submitted that the date of birth of the Petitioner's children as per the
Government records i.e. the birth certificate issued by the Department
of Health and Family Welfare Department are 06.11.2015 and
13.11.2017 and the Petitioner was married on 05.01.2015. The
learned counsel further submitted that these birth certificates have a
QR code, and the authenticity of the said certificate could have been
ascertained by using the QR code. The learned counsel referring to
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the birth certificate of the Petitioner's first child enclosed at page No.
37 of the I.A.(Civil) No. 385/2026 submitted that the said certificate
also has a QR code and the authenticity of the said birth certificates
could have been ascertained from that.
18.
The learned counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that,
while deciding the question of disqualification, the determination must
be made on the basis of documents relating to the age of the
Petitioner or her husband, and not on mere presumptions or
assumptions, as has been done in the present case. He, therefore,
submitted that the present case is a fit one for setting aside the
impugned order.
19. Per contra, Mr. S. Dutta, the learned Standing Counsel appearing
on behalf of the P&RD Department submitted that upon a perusal of
the documents enclosed to I.A.(Civil) No. 385/2026, it would show
that one Hakimuddin had submitted an application on 01.07.2025 to
the District Development Commissioner, Goalpara for cancellation of
the membership of the Petitioner on the ground that in the affidavit
filed along with the nomination papers, the Petitioner’s date of
marriage was shown as 05.01.2015. However, the date of birth of her
daughter was on 06.01.2013. The learned Standing Counsel further
submitted that the question, as to whether, the Petitioner was
afforded an opportunity is clear from the fact that the Petitioner
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received notice issued by the District Development Commissioner,
Goalpara dated 02.07.2025 whereby the Petitioner was asked to be
present on 05.07.2025 in his office chamber. The learned Standing
Counsel therefore submitted that the question of the Petitioner not
being given an opportunity to be heard does not arise. The learned
Standing Counsel, however, duly admitted that in the order dated
05.07.2025 there was a direction seeking verification of the
certificates, thereby fixing the matter on 20.07.2025. The learned
Standing Counsel further submitted that the enquiry report was
submitted on 21.07.2025, but thereupon it is not known whether any
enquiry report was afforded to the Petitioner or not. The learned
Standing Counsel further submitted that it is the mandate of Rule
62(4)(a) of the Rules of 1995 that the candidate had to furnish an
affidavit regarding his/her age along with his/her spouse at the time
of the marriage, failing which the candidate would be disqualified. The
learned
Standing
Counsel
submitted
that
the
grounds
of
disqualification as mentioned in Section 111 of the Act of 1994 are the
only grounds on which a candidate can be disqualified, and not for
any other ground as it is the mandate of the Act of 1994.
20. Mr. J. Handique, the learned Government Advocate appearing on
behalf of the District Administration submitted that the Respondent
No. 4 had passed the impugned order after making necessary
Page No.# 12/46
enquiries and taking into consideration the enquiry report dated
21.07.2025. The learned Government Advocate, however, submitted
that no instructions are with him, as to whether, the enquiry report
dated 21.07.2025 was provided to the Petitioner prior to the passing
of the impugned order.
21.
During the course of the hearing, this Court enquired with the
learned Standing Counsel for the P&RD department as well as with
the learned counsel representing the Respondent No. 4 as regards the
competence of the Respondent No. 4 to pass the impugned order. The
learned counsels submitted that the Respondent No. 4 had the
jurisdiction in the circumstances, information comes to light that a
candidate who was disqualified under Section 111 of the Act of 1994
was continuing to function as a member of the Panchayat.
22. The following points for determination arises:POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
(i)
Whether the District Commissioner has the authority and
jurisdiction to pass the impugned order dated 09.12.2025?
(ii)
In the circumstances, the District Commissioner had the
authority and jurisdiction, whether the impugned order dated
09.12.2025 suffers from patent illegality and perversity requiring
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interference from this Court?
(iii) What relief or reliefs the parties herein are entitled to?
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
FIRST POINT FOR DETERMINATION
23.
The narration of the facts herein above shows that the
Respondent No. 4 had assumed jurisdiction under Section 111 of the
Act of 1994 read with Rule 62 of the Rules of 1995 on the basis of a
complaint filed by one Hakimuddin. This aspect is apparent from the
complaint filed on 01.07.2025 by one Hakimuddin, which is AnnexureD to I.A. (Civil) No. 385/2026 as well as the very notice which was
issued by the District Development Commissioner, Goalpara on
02.07.2025 enclosed as Annexure-E to I.A.(Civil) No. 385/2026.
24.
For the purpose of deciding the authority and jurisdiction of the
Respondent No. 4 to pass the impugned order, it is relevant to take
note of the Constitution of India read with the Act of 1994 and the
Rules of 1995.
25.
Chapter-IX of the Constitution of India is with the heading
“Panchayats”. Articles 243, 243-A to Article 243-O of the Constitution
of India are the Articles in the said Chapter. This Chapter was inserted
vide the Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992 and came
Page No.# 14/46
into force w.e.f. 24.04.1993. The Act of 1994 was enacted on the
basis of Chapter-IX of the Constitution. Article 243-F of the
Constitution stipulates “Disqualification for Membership”. The said
Article is the basis on which Section 111 of the Act of 1994 was
enacted. Under such circumstances, the said Article 243-F of the
Constitution is reproduced herein below:
“243F. Disqualifications for membership.— (1) A person shall be disqualified for
being chosen as, and for being, a member of a Panchayat—
(a)
if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for
the purposes of elections to the Legislature of the State concerned:
Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that
he is less than twenty-five years of age, if he has attained the age of
twenty-one years;
(b)
if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the
State.
(2)
If any question arises as to whether a member of a Panchayat has become
subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1), the question shall be
referred for the decision of such authority and in such manner as the Legislature of a
State may, by law, provide.”
26. A perusal of the above quoted Article would show that a person
shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of
a Panchayat. The words “for being chosen as” and “and for being” are
of importance. The phrase “for being chosen as” denotes the initial
eligibility to contest an election or being selected for a position. The
Page No.# 15/46
phrase “and for being” refers to the ongoing right to remain in the
position after being elected.
Sub-Clause(a) of Article 243F(1) of the Constitution stipulates
when the person is disqualified i.e. if the person is disqualified by or
under any law for the time being in force for the purpose of elections
to the Legislature of the State i.e. either in terms with Article 191 of
the Constitution of India or in terms with Chapter-III of the
Representation of People’s Act, 1951 (for short, “the Act of 1951”),
the person neither can be chosen nor can continue as a member of
the Panchayat.
Sub-Clause (b) of Article 243-F(1) of the Constitution of India
further stipulates that a person cannot be chosen and continue if the
person is disqualified under any law made by the Legislature of the
State and in the instant case would be the Act of 1994 and more
particularly, Section 111 of the Act of 1994.
27.
Article 243-F(2) of the Constitution of India is of seminal
importance for the purpose of the present dispute. It stipulates that if
any question arises as to whether a member of the Panchayat has
become subject to any disqualification mentioned in Clause (1) of
Article 243-F of the Constitution, the question shall be referred for the
decision of such Authority and in such manner as the Legislature of
the State may by law, provide. The said Article pre-supposes that the
Page No.# 16/46
person had already been chosen as a Member of the Panchayat.
The phrase “if a question arises” at Article 243-F(2) is also found in
Article 103 and Article 192 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in
the case of Consumer Education and Research Society Vs. Union of
India & Others reported in (2009) 9 SCC 648 had the occasion to deal
with the said phrase and when such reference is required to be made.
The Supreme Court observed that a disqualification which occurs after
a member of the Parliament had been chosen is required to be
voluntarily declared by the Member and upon such declaration, the
Seat of the Member of the Parliament results in vacation. However, in
a circumstance when such member does not voluntarily make the
declaration, a question if raised, would arise whether the Member is
disqualified or not. Such question would be referred to the President
of India for a decision. Paragraph No. 54 of the said judgment being
relevant is reproduced herein below:
“54. The constitutional scheme, therefore, is that a person shall be disqualified from
continuing as a Member of Parliament if he/she holds any disqualifying office of profit.
Such a disqualification can result in the vacation of his/her seat when the Member
admits or declares that he/she is holding the disqualifying office of profit. However, if
he/she does not make a voluntary declaration about the same, the question of
whether he/she is disqualified or not, if raised, shall have to be referred for a decision
by the President of India and the same will be made after obtaining the opinion of the
Election Commission of India. The question of whether a particular Member has
incurred a disqualification can be referred for the decision of the President by any
Page No.# 17/46
citizen by means of making an application to the President. It is only after the
President decides that the Member has incurred an alleged disqualification that the
particular Member’s seat would become vacant.”
28.
The Supreme Court further analyzed the various Clauses of
Article 101 of the Constitution and observed that in some situations
there would be an automatic vacation of the seat and in some
situation when a decision is required from the President of India for a
seat to be declared vacant. Paragraph No. 64 of the said judgment is
relevant as it observes that when disputed questions arise as to
whether the member had suffered disqualification, the decision of the
President of India is required. Paragraph No. 64 reads as under:
“64. Let us visualise some of these possibilities. Assume a scenario where a political
party states that one of its Members gave up his/her membership, and on the other
hand the Member concerned denies the same fact. The six-month period prescribed
for conducting a bye-election cannot obviously be computed from the alleged date of
surrender of membership. The said period should be properly computed from the date
on which a decision on the subject of disqualification is given by the Chairman or
Speaker of the House. Similarly, when somebody alleges that a sitting MP had
accepted an office of profit, there would be no automatic vacancy of the seat, as the
question whether the Member accepted any office of profit or not, may be a disputed
issue. Therefore, under the constitutional scheme, the vacancy would occur only when
the dispute is resolved by a decision of the President which could then result in a
declaration of disqualification. Hence, it is tenable to hold that when Article 101(3)(a)
states that when a Member of House of Parliament becomes subject to any of the
disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) or clause (2) of Article 102, it means when
the President or the Speaker/Chairman as the case may be, by his decision declares
that Member had incurred the disqualification and not earlier.”
Page No.# 18/46
29.
This Court is aware of the fact that in Chapter-IX of the
Constitution of India, there is no pari materia provision like Article 101
and
Article
of
the
Constitution
of
India.
Under
such
circumstances, the question of automatic vacation is not provided in
Part-IX of the Constitution insofar as Membership to Panchayats is
concerned. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court now analyze
Section 111 of the Act of 1994 and Rule 62 of the Rules of 1995.
30.
A perusal of Section 111 of the Act of 1994 shows that the said
provision stipulates the various grounds when a person cannot be
elected or co-opted and remain as President, Vice-President or
Member of the Zilla Parishad, Anchalik Panchayat and Gaon
Panchayat.
It is notable to take note of the fact that the Legislature of the
State while enacting Section 111 of the Act of 1994 did not use the
phrases “for being chosen as” and “and for being” as is mentioned at
of Article 243-F of the Constitution. Rather, the Section 111 of the Act
of 1994 uses the words “elected or co-opted” and “and remain”. The
use of the words “and remain” pre-supposes that the member of the
Panchayat had already been elected.
31.
Sub-Section (1) of Section 111 of the Act of 1994 contains
various grounds of disqualification which were in existence since the
Act of 1994 came into force, except Sub-Clause (j) of Section 111(1)
Page No.# 19/46
of the Act of 1994, which was substituted vide the Assam Act No. X of
1997 w.e.f. 30.04.1997. Sub-Clauses (a) to (g) and (i) of Section
111(1) of the Act of 1994 stipulates the various disqualifications.
32.
A perusal of Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 111(1) of the Act of
1994 stipulates various types of disqualifications. Clauses (a), (b) and
(f) stipulates about a disqualification which was incurred on the date
of the submission of the nomination. On the other hand, the
disqualifications
mentioned
in
Clauses
(c),
(d)
and
(e)
are
disqualifications which may be on the date of submission of the
nomination or even subsequent to the elections. The disqualification is
Clause (i) is subsequent to the elections. In other words, if a
candidate has incurred disqualification mentioned in Clauses (a), (b),
(c), (d), (e) and (f) of Section 111(1) of the Act of 1994, the person
cannot be elected. On the other hand, if a person entails
disqualification in terms with Clauses (c), (d), (e) and (i), the person
cannot remain as a member of the Panchayat.
33. Clause (h) of Section 111(1) of the Act of 1994 is very pertinent
for the purpose of the instant dispute, and as such, the same is
reproduced herein under:
“(h)
if any question arises as to whether a member of a Panchayat body at any level
has become subject to any of the disqualifications under this section, the question
shall be referred for decision of such authority and in such manner as the Government
may by law provide;”
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34.
A reading of the above quoted Clause (h) of Section 111(1) of
the Act of 1994 would show that it is similarly worded with Article
243-F of the Constitution of India. It stipulates that if any question
arises as to whether a member of a Panchayat body at any level has
become subject to any of the disqualifications under Section 111 of
the Act 1994, the question shall be referred for a decision of such
authority and in such manner as the Government may by law provide.
The difference, however, in the language between Article 243-F of the
Constitution with Section 111(1) of the Act of 1994 is that whilst
Article 243-F of the Constitution stipulates “and in such manner as the
Legislature of the State may, by law, provide”, but in Section 111(1)
(h) of the Act of 1994 it stipulates “and in such manner as the
Government may by law provide”.
35.
The words in Clause (h) of Section 111(1) of the Act of 1994
“the question shall be referred for decision of such authority and in
such manner as the Government may by law provide” is of great
importance, taking into account that a question of disqualification
under Section 111 of the Act of 1994 is to be referred to the authority
who would decide, that too in the manner the Government may by
law provide. In other words, the authority who is competent to
decide, cannot assume jurisdiction on its own unless there is a
reference made to the authority the question of disqualification of a
member of a Panchayat body. At this stage, it is apposite to observe
Page No.# 21/46
that in contradistinction to Article 103 and Article 192 of the
Constitution of India, the reference to the question of disqualification
is directly to be made to the President of India and the Governor
respectively.
36. Clause (i) of Section 111(1) of the Act of 1994 as already stated
above is a case of disqualification subsequent to a person elected as a
Member of Panchayat and it leads to an Automatic vacation of the
seat.
37.
Sub-Section (2) of Section 111 of the Act of 1994 further adds
additional grounds of disqualification beyond what is mentioned in
Section 111(1) of the Act of 1994.
38.
It is also very pertinent to mention that Sub-section (2) of
Section 111 of the Act of 1994 was inserted vide the amendment
made to the Act of 1994 w.e.f. 19.03.2018. It is also relevant to
mention that the present Clauses (b) & (c) of Section 111(2) of the
Act of 1994 were substituted by the Assam Panchayat (Amendment)
Act, 2023 which came into operation w.e.f. 19.10.2023. Clause (f) of
Section 111(2) of the Act of 1994 was inserted vide the Assam
Panchayat (Amendment) Act, 2023 w.e.f. 19.10.2023.
39.
Clause (a) of Section 111(2) of the Act of 1994 stipulates that
when a person who has more than 2 (two) living children from a
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single or multiple partners, he/she shall not be elected or co-opted
and remain as President, Vice-President, or Member of the Zilla
Parishad, Anchalik Panchayat, and Gaon Panchayat. The proviso to the
said Clause, however, stipulates that the said provision shall not be
applicable in respect to those persons who have more than 2 (two)
children prior to the date of commencement of the Act. It is of
importance to note that the disqualification mentioned in Clause (a) of
Section 111(2) of the Act of 1994 denotes a disqualification which a
candidate incurred at the time of submission of the nomination paper
or even subsequent to the election. For example, a candidate who has
more than two children of which one or some are born after
19.03.2018 would be disqualified to contest elections. At the same
time if a candidate has two children at the time of the election and
thereupon another child is born, the candidate would be disqualified
and cannot remain as a Member of the Panchayat. This distinction is
very material to understand the present analysis.
40. Clauses (b) & (c) of Section 111(2) of the Act of 1994 relates to
educational qualifications. A perusal of the said provisions show that a
candidate has to have certain educational qualifications for being able
to contest as a Member of the Panchayat. In other words, without the
basic educational qualifications stipulated, a candidate cannot contest
the Panchayat elections or be elected as a Member of the Panchayat.
There cannot be a case of disqualification subsequent to the election
Page No.# 23/46
in respect to a member of Panchayat under Clauses (b) & (c) of
Section 111(2) of the Act of 1994.
41. Clause (e) of Section 111(2) of the Act of 1994 stipulates that no
person shall be elected or co-opted and remain as President, VicePresident, or Member of the Zilla Parishad, Anchalik Panchayat, and
Gaon Panchayat who does not have a functional sanitary toilet in
his/her residence. The said disqualification stipulates that prior at the
time of submission of the nomination paper, the person contesting the
elections has to have a functional sanitary toilet in his/her residence
else the person would incur disqualification to contest the elections. It
also means that subsequent to the elections if the member of the
Panchayat does not continue to have a functional sanitary toilet after
having been elected, the Member of Panchayat would be disqualified
to remain as a Member of the Panchayat.
42.
Clause (f) of Section 111(2) of the Act of 1994 is of relevance,
and the same is reproduced herein under:
“(f)
who either by himself or herself or his or her spouse has violated the legal age
of marriage under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006.”
43.
A perusal of the above quoted Clause would show that no
person shall be elected or co-opted and remain as President, VicePresident or Member of the Zilla Parishad, Anchalik Panchayat, and
Gaon Panchayat who either by himself or herself or his or her spouse
Page No.# 24/46
violated the legal age of marriage under the Prohibition of Child
Marriage Act, 2006.
44. The disqualification coming within the purview of Section 111(2)
(f) of the Act of 1994 could be either a disqualification at the time of
submission of the nomination paper or a disqualification that occurred
subsequent to the elections. For example, a candidate, who either by
himself or herself or his or her spouse, violated the legal age of
marriage under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 would be
disqualified to contest the elections. At the same time a Member of a
Panchayat, if he or she marries subsequent to the elections and his or
her spouse is below the legal age of marriage under the Prohibition of
Child Marriage Act, 2006 cannot remain or continue as a Member of
the Panchayat. There is a fundamental distinction between a
disqualification at the time of submission of the nomination paper as
well as a disqualification subsequent to the election insofar as Section
111(2)(f) of the Act of 1994 is concerned.
45.
Sub-Section (3) of Section 111 of the Act of 1994 relates to
disqualifications in the case of Zilla Parishad, which however this
Court in the present proceedings is not concerned with. Be that as it
may, it is very pertinent to note that Sub-Clause (ii) of Section 111(3)
of the Act of 1994 stipulates that the District Commissioner shall have
the absolute power in deciding cases pertaining to disqualification of
Page No.# 25/46
members on the ground of defection. The Section 111(3) of the Act of
1994 was also inserted vide the Assam Panchayat (Amendment) Act,
2023 w.e.f. 19.10.2023.
46. In the foregoing paragraphs, this Court dealt with Section 111(1)
(h) of the Act of 1994 which stipulates that if any question arises as to
whether a Member of the Panchayat is subject to any disqualification,
the same shall be referred for decision of such Authority and in such
manner as the Government may by law provide.
47. Rule 62 of the Rules of 1995 provides the prescription insofar as
Section 111(2) of the Act of 1994. Rule 62 comes with the heading
“Conditions and Procedure of disqualification under sub-section (2) of
Section 111 of the Act of 1994”.
48. Rule 62(1) of the Rules of 1995 relates to the conditions and the
procedure of disqualification, insofar as Section 111(2)(a) of the Act
of 1994 is concerned. It is apposite to mention that the proviso to
Section 111(2)(a) of the Act of 1994 receives clarity by virtue of Rule
62(1)(b) of the Rules of 1995 which mentions that the disqualification
contained in Section 111(2)(a) of the Act of 1994 shall only be
applicable if after 19.03.2018, the President, Vice-President, or
Member of the Zilla Parishad, Anchalik Panchayat, and Gaon
Panchayat gives birth to an additional child.
Page No.# 26/46
49.
Rule 62(2) of the Rules of 1995 is in reference to the
disqualification under Section 111(2)(b) & (c) of the Act of 1994. Rule
62(3) of the Rules of 1995 stipulates the Conditions and Procedure of
disqualification in respect to Section 111(2)(e) of the Act of 1994.
50.
Rule 62(4) of the Rules of 1995 is of relevance for the purpose
of the instant case, as it refers to the Conditions and Procedure of
disqualification under Section 111(2)(f) of the Act of 1994. It is
relevant to take note of that Rule 62(4) of the Rules of 1995 was
inserted vide the Notification No. ECF-596015/2 dated 24.12.2024.
Clauses (a), (b) & (c) of Rule 62(4) of the Rules of 1995 being
relevant for the purpose of the instant proceedings, are reproduced
herein under:
“(a)
subject to the provisions of the Act, at the time of filing of nominations, the
candidates shall furnish affidavit regarding their age at the time of their marriage,
failing which, concerned candidates shall be disqualified.
(b)
The State Government or concerned District Authority shall remove any
President, Vice President or Member of Zilla Parishad, Anchalik Parishad and Gaon
Panchayat, if it is found that he or she or his or her spouse was underage at the time
of marriage.
(c)
The Gaon Panchayat Secretary on receipt of information of such underage or
minor marriage in respect of President, Vice President or member of Gaon Panchayat
shall inform the matter to the concerned Block Development Officer, who in turn shall
inform the concerned District Commissioner through the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla
Parishad. The concerned District Commissioner shall examine the matter and on
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establishment of facts, shall remove the President, Vice President or member of Gaon
Panchayat concerned accordingly with a intimation to the State Government as well as
State Election Commission.”
51.
From a perusal of the above-quoted Rule, it shows that subject
to the provisions of the Act of 1994, at the time of filing nominations,
the candidates are required to furnish affidavit regarding their age at
the time of their marriage, failing which, the concerned candidates
shall be disqualified. The said Sub-Rule 62(4)(a) of the Rules of 1995
makes it clear that at the time of filing nominations, the candidates
are required to furnish affidavit regarding their age at the time of
marriage and non-furnishing of such affidavit would lead to
disqualification. The said Sub-Rule, however, does not say anything
about the disclosure the age of the candidate’s spouse.
Clause (b) of Rule 62(4) of the Rules of 1995 is in reference to
Article 243-F(2) of the Constitution and Section 111(1)(h) of the Act
of 1994 inasmuch as the Authority to remove the President, VicePresident, or Member of the Zilla Parishad, Anchalik Panchayat, or
Gaon Panchayat is conferred upon the State Government or the
concerned District Authority. Rule 62(4)(c) of the Rules of 1995 is also
in reference to Section 111(1)(h) of the Act of 1994 thereby
prescribing the manner in which the Reference would be made to the
Authority who would decide the question of disqualification. A perusal
of the said Sub-Rule reveals that the Gaon Panchayat Secretary, on
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receipt of information of such underage or minor marriage, in respect
of the President, Vice-President, or Member of the Gaon Panchayat
shall inform the matter to the concerned Block Development Officer,
who in turn shall inform the concerned District Commissioner through
the Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Parishad. The prescription
contained in Rule 62(4)(c) of the Rules of 1995 does not prescribe
that the District Commissioner on its own can exercise the jurisdiction
of the Authority. Rather it stipulates that upon the reference made in
the manner stipulated in Rule 62(4)(c) of the Rules of 1995, the
District Commissioner can exercise the jurisdiction.
52.
A reading of Rule 62(1) (f), (g) & (h), Rule 62(3) (c), (d) & (e)
as well as 62(4)(c), (d), and (e) of the Rules of 1995 stipulates the
manner in which the question of disqualification of a member of a
Panchayat body can be referred for decision to the Authority. In other
words, the Parliament, the State Legislature as well as the State
Government were of the view that the disqualification proceedings
have to be referred to the Authority for decision, and not that the
Authority competent to decide could assume such jurisdiction on its
own. The question therefore arises as to whether the Respondent No.
4 could have at all initiated an enquiry and passed the impugned
order without a Reference made in terms with Rule 62(4)(c) of the
Rules of 1995. The answer has to be in the negative for the simple
reason that when the prescription mentions a particular mode, the
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same ought to be followed.
53.
Be that as it may, the question still looms as to whether the
District Commissioner had the competence and jurisdiction to pass the
impugned order de hors the fact that the District Commissioner could
not have assumed jurisdiction without a reference being made.
54.
For deciding the said question, it is necessary to take into
consideration some of the provisions of the Constitution of India, Act
of 1994, Act of 1951, Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and the Rules
of 1995. Before proceedings on the said analysis, this Court finds it
relevant to quote Rule 45Z of the Rules of 1995.
“45Z. Applicability of Central Rules, statutory orders, etc:- (1) Without
prejudice to the foregoing provisions, wherever no specific provisions with respect to
the use of electronic voting machines at elections is made, the corresponding
provisions related to voting in these rules shall mutatis mutandis apply in such cases.
(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions, wherever no specific provisions are
made in these rules, the provisions of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 and the
Representation of People Act, 1951 (Act No. 43 of 1951) shall apply from time to time
and the instructions, statutory orders and clarifications issued by the Election
Commission of India shall mutatis mutandis apply for the cases under these rules.”
In the backdrop of the above, let this Court analyze the provisions
of the Constitution, the Act of 1994, Act of 1995, Conduct of Election
Rules, 1961 as well as the Rules of 1995.
55.
Section
of
the
Act
of
stipulates
that
the
Page No.# 30/46
superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the
Electoral roll for and the conduct of all elections to the Panchayat shall
be vested in a State Election Commission consisting of a State Election
Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor. Sub-Section (4) of
Section 114 of the Act of 1994 stipulates that the various officers, i.e
the Returning Officers, Assistant Returning Officers, Presiding Officers,
Polling Officers, and any other officer appointed under the Act of 1994
and any Police Officers designated for the time being by the State
Government for the conduct of the Panchayat Election shall be
deemed to be on deputation to the State Election Commission for the
period commencing on and from the date of the Notification calling
for the Panchayat Election and ending with the date of declaration of
the results of the election and such officers shall, during this period be
subject to the control, superintendence, and discipline of the State
Election Commission. Sub-Section 5 of Section 114 of the Act of 1994
stipulates that subject to the provisions of the Constitution of India,
the State Legislature may by law, make provision with respect to all
matters relating to, or in connection with the Election to the
Panchayats.
At this stage, it is apposite to observe that Section 114 of the Act
of 1994 has its roots embedded in Article 243-K of the Constitution.
Clause (4) of Article 243-K of the Constitution empowers the State
Legislature to make provisions with respect to all matters relating to
Page No.# 31/46
or are in connection with, elections to the Panchayats.
It is under such circumstances, various provisions have been made
in the Act of 1994 which relates to or in connection with elections to
Panchayat.
56.
Chapter-XI
of
the
Act
of
is
with
the
heading
“Miscellaneous”. Section 127 of the Act of 1994 stipulates that the
Government shall constitute such Panchayat Election Tribunals as may
be necessary, on the recommendation of the High Court to dispose of
all direct election petitions challenging election under the Act of 1994.
Section 127A to Section 127P of the Act of 1994 relates to various
offences and penalties. Section 127Q confers jurisdiction upon the
competent Court to try any offence under the Act of 1994. Section
127R of the Act of 1994 stipulates that such offences under the Act of
1994 may be tried summarily in the manner provided for summary
trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
57.
Section 129 of the Act of 1994 is of relevance and as such, the
same is reproduced herein under:
“129. Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters:-
Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act(a)
the validity of any law relating to the delimination of constituencies on the
allotment of seats to such constituencies, made under Article 243 of the
Constitution of India shall not be called in question in any Court;
Page No.# 32/46
(b)
no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election
petition presented within sixty days from the date of declaration of election
results to the Tribunal constituted under Section 127.”
58.
For the purpose of the present dispute, this Court is not
concerned with Section 129(a) of the Act of 1994. Clause (b) of
Section 129 of the Act of 1994 specifically mandates that no election
to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by way of an
election petition presented within 60 (sixty) days from the date of
declaration of the election results to the Tribunal constituted under
Section 127 of the Act of 1994. In other words, an election to any
Panchayat can be called in question only by way of an election
petition, that too, presented within 60 (sixty) days from the date of
declaration of the results to the Election Tribunal. It is also very
pertinent to take note of the fact that Section 129 of the Act of 1994
provides opportunities to the person aggrieved to challenge the
election result, but in doing so, an election petition has to be
presented within 60 (sixty) days before the Tribunal.
59.
The edifice of Section 129 of the Act of 1994 is in Article 243-O
of the Constitution of India which bars interference by Courts in
electoral matters. The said Article, being relevant, is reproduced
herein under:
“243O. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters.—Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution,—
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(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the
allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under
article 243K, shall not be called in question in any court;
(b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an
election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided
for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State.”
60. Article 243-O of the Constitution of India as a whole starts with a
non-obstinate
Clause
i.e.
“Notwithstanding
anything
in
this
Constitution”, and in terms with Clause (b) of Article 243-O no election
to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election
petition presented to such Authority and in such manner as is
provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of the
State. The law made by the Legislature of the State in the instant
case would be the Act of 1994. At this stage, it is also apposite to
observe that Section 141 of the Act of 1994 empowers the State
Government to make Rules. It is in exercise of the powers under SubSection(1) of Section 141 of the Act of 1994, that the Rules of 1995
were made. The Rules of 1995 deal inter alia with delimitation of the
Panchayat constituencies as well as elections to the Panchayats
including elections to the President, Vice President at any of the levels
of the Panchayats.
61.
Rule 45Z of the Rules of 1995 has been already quoted herein
above. By the said Rule, the provisions of the Act of 1951, the
Page No.# 34/46
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, the instructions, statutory orders and
clarifications issued by the Election Commission of India are adopted
where there is no specific provision provided in the Rules.
62. This Court, at this stage would take note of Article 329(b) of the
Constitution of India, which is also pari materia to Article 243-O of the
Constitution of India and to some extent to the provisions of Section
129 of the Act of 1994. The observations of the Supreme Court in the
case
of
N.P.
Ponnuswami
Vs.
Returning
Officer,
Namakkal
Constituency & Others reported in (1952) 1 SCC 94 wherein the Bench
comprising of 6 (six) Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court deliberated
upon as regards the scope of Article 329(b) of the Constitution of
India is of relevance.
63.
His Lordship Justice Fazl Ali, J., (as His Lordship then was)
authoring the judgment observed that even the invocation of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, in respect to a challenge to an election, would
be contrary to the Scheme of Part XV of the Constitution of India and
the Act of 1951. His Lordship opined that Article 329(b) of the
Constitution of India was apparently enacted to prescribe the manner
in which and the stage at which, the grounds which may be raised
under law to call an election in question could be urged. It was
observed that by necessary implication from the language of Article
Page No.# 35/46
329(b) of the Constitution of India read with the grounds mentioned
in the Act of 1951, such grounds cannot be urged in any other
manner, at any other stage, or before any other Court. It was further
observed that if the grounds on which an election can be called in
question could be raised at an early stage and errors, if any, are
rectified, there would be no meaning in enacting a provision like
Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India and in setting up a Special
Tribunal. Any other meaning ascribed to the words used in Article
329(b) of the Constitution of India would lead to anomalies which the
Constitution could not have contemplated, one of them being that
conflicting views might be expressed by the High Court at pre-polling
stage and by the Election Tribunal, which is an independent body, at
the stage when the matter is brought before it.
64. This Court also finds it pertinent to take note of the observations
of His Lordship V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., (as His Lordship then was), in the
judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case
of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), wherein His Lordship observed that an
election dispute is not like an ordinary lis between private parties. The
entire electorate is vicariously and not inertly, before the Court. His
Lordships observed that election disputes is a species of cases which
can be called as collective litigation, where judicial activism assures
justice to the constituency, safeguards the purity of the system and
decides the rights of the candidates.
Page No.# 36/46
65.
In both the judgments i.e. in the cases of N.P. Ponnuswami
(supra) and in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), the Supreme Court
categorically opined that the result of an election can be challenged
only by way of an election petition thereby presenting it to such
authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any
law made by the appropriate Legislature. Insofar as Article 329(b) of
the Constitution of India is concerned, the appropriate legislation so
made is the Act of 1951.
66. It is the opinion of this Court that insofar as Article 243-O of the
Constitution of India is concerned, the same principles would apply. In
other words, election to a Panchayat can only be called in question by
way of an election petition and taking into account Section 129 of the
Act of 1994, such election can be called in question by presenting an
Election Petition to the Election Tribunal constituted under Section 127
of the Act of 1994. The above opinion of this Court finds support from
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (DMK) Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2020) 6 SCC
548 as well as State of Goa & Another Vs. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh &
Another reported in (2021) 8 SCC 401.
67.
Now in the above backdrop, the question arises as to what
disputes come within the meaning of calling in question an election.
This aspect is important inasmuch as such dispute can only be
Page No.# 37/46
decided by the Election Tribunal and not by any other Court or
Authority.
For understanding the said aspect, this Court finds it relevant to
note the interplay between Article 243-F of the Constitution and
Section 111 of the Act of 1994 with Article 243-O of the Constitution,
Section 129 of the Act of 1994, the Rules of 1995 and the Act of
1951.
68. In the previous segments of the instant judgment, this Court had
dealt with Article 243-F of the Constitution wherein it is stipulated that
a candidate would be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being a
member of the Panchayat if the candidate suffers disqualification in
terms with Article 191 of the Constitution as well as Section 111 of
the Act of 1994 wherein the disqualifications mentioned may be solely,
(i) occurring at the time of election or,
(ii) at the time of the election or subsequent to the elections; or
(iii) subsequent to the elections.
69. Similarly, a reading of Article 191 of the Constitution would show
that the disqualifications mentioned in Sub-Clauses (a) to (d) of
Article 191(1) of the Constitution can be at the time of election i.e.
submission of the nomination paper or subsequent to the election. It
Page No.# 38/46
is also apposite to mention that Article 191(1)(e) of the Constitution
stipulates that a candidate may be disqualified by or under any law
made by the Parliament. In that respect, reference to Chapter III of
the Act of 1951 may be made which refers to various forms of
disqualifications which can occur at the time of election i.e.
submission of the nomination paper or subsequent to the elections.
70.
At this stage, it is also apposite to take note of Rule 22 of the
Rules of 1995 which stipulates “Filing and Scrutiny of Nomination
Paper Form IIA and IIB”. A perusal of the said Rule and more
particularly Rule 22(1) of the Rules of 1995 stipulates that any person
whose name appears in the list of voters of any of the constituencies
of a Gaon Panchayat or Zilla Parishad as published under Rule 11 of
the Rules of 1995 and who is not disqualified under Section 111 of the
Act of 1994 may be nominated as a candidate from the concerning
Zilla Parishad or Gaon Panchayat Constituency as the case may be.
The said Sub-Rule also stipulates that the nomination paper be
delivered either by the candidate or by his/her proposer to the Officer
authorized by the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer
as the case may be.
Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 22 of the Rules of 1995 is very relevant for
the purpose of the present analysis and as such the same is
reproduced herein under:
Page No.# 39/46
“(2) The Officer as may be authorised under sub-rule (1), shall not be below the
Gazetted rank and shall be appointed with prior approval of the State Election
Commission. Such Officer shall(a)
examine the nomination papers on the date, time and place notified
for the purpose under the Rule;
(b)
give the candidate or his proposer reasonable opportunity to examine
the nomination paper and shall decide on the spot, the objections, if
there be any, by summary enquiry. He may either on his own initiative or
an objections raised, reject any nomination on any of the following
grounds(i) that the candidate is not qualified under the provisions of the act;
(ii) that he is disqualified from being chosen to fill the office or that he is
disqualified since requisite amount of security deposit has not been paid;
(iii) that there has been failure to comply with any of the provisions of
these Rules; and
(iv)
that the signature or thumb-impression of the candidate or the
proposer is not genuine.
Provided that nothing in sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) above shall be deemed to
authorise the rejection of the nomination paper of any candidate on the ground of
irregularity in respect of a nomination paper, if the candidate has been duly nominated
by means of other nomination paper in respect of which no irregularity has been
committed.”
71. A perusal of the above quoted Sub-Rule shows that the officer as
authorized under Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 22 of the Rules of 1995 shall
examine the nomination paper. The Officer further also shall by
Page No.# 40/46
affording reasonable opportunity to the candidate or his/her proposer
decide the objections to the nomination paper and if necessary by
carrying out a summary enquiry. The Officer shall also examine as to
whether the candidate is qualified or the candidate is disqualified from
being chosen to fill the office. The officer is authorized to reject the
nomination if the candidate amongst others is found to be
disqualified. This Sub-Rule(2) of Rule 22 of the Rules of 1995 is akin
to Section 36 of the Act of 1951.
From the above, it would show that the Officer Authorized is
competent to either accept the nomination or reject the nomination
for varied reasons including on an examination as to whether the
candidate is disqualified or not. The bar contained in Article 243-O of
the Constitution which is similar to Article 329(b) of the Constitution
as well as Section 129 of the Act of 1994, do not permit the candidate
or any person aggrieved to assail the acceptance of the nomination
paper or rejection of the nomination paper unless the elections are
over. The said provide further mandate challenging the said aspect by
way of an election petition to be submitted before the Election
Tribunal within 60 (sixty) days from the date of declaration of the
result. At this stage, it is of importance to again refer to the judgment
of the Supreme Court in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) wherein
the 6 (six) Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court per curiam held that
the word “election” has been used in Part-XV of the Constitution of
Page No.# 41/46
India in a wide sense to connote the entire procedure to be gone
through to return a candidate to Legislature. It was also observed that
improper rejection of the nomination paper is a part of the election
process and challenge to the same is only permissible by way of an
election petition and not by way of a writ petition. It is also important
to note that improper acceptance of a nomination of a return
candidate or improper rejection of a nomination are grounds available
under Section 100 of the Act of 1951 from declaring an election void.
72.
In the backdrop of the above observations of the Supreme
Court, it is relevant to note that the Act of 1994 as well as the Rules
of 1995 do not mention what are the grounds to be urged for
declaring an election void. However, in view of Rule 45Z of the Rules
of 1995 , the Act of 1951 has been adopted to fill in those gaps where
specific provisions have not been made in the Rules of 1995. Under
such circumstances, Section 100 of the Act of 1951 would apply as
regards an election petition to be filed calling in question an election
and the grounds mentioned in Section 100 of the Act of 1951 can only
be urged in an election petition for declaration of an election to be
void. In this regard special reference can be made to Section 100(1)
(d)(i) of the Act of 1951 which stipulates where the results of an
election insofar as it concerns the returned candidate have been
materially affected by improper acceptance of nomination would be a
ground for declaring an election void.
Page No.# 42/46
73.
Now therefore the pivotal question is, if a candidate who
incurred a disqualification at the time of submitting the nomination
that is at the time of elections by virtue of Article 191 of the
Constitution of India or Chapter-III of the Act of 1951 or Section 111
of the Act of 1994 but the nomination paper was accepted by the
Officer Authorized to do so, can this aspect be looked into by the
Authority to whom a reference is made to decide the question of
disqualification?
74.
The answer has to be in the negative inasmuch as a candidate
who had incurred disqualification at the time of the election i.e.
submission of the nomination paper, but the nomination paper was
accepted would be a case of an improper acceptance of a nomination.
This improper acceptance of the nomination being a part of the
election process, the same has to be challenged by way of an election
petition by presenting the same before the Election Tribunal within the
period of 60 (sixty) days from the date of declaration of the results.
Failure to challenge the improper acceptance of a nomination by way
of an election petition would result in the returned candidate
continuing to remain as a Member of the Panchayat. This Court at this
stage finds it relevant to again refer to the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Consumer Education and Research Society
(supra) wherein the Supreme Court at paragraph No. 50 makes the
aforesaid principles absolutely clear. Paragraph No. 50 of the said
Page No.# 43/46
judgment is reproduced herein below:
“50. Thus, it is clear that where a person was under a disqualification at the time of
his election, the provisions of Articles 101(3)(a) and 103 will not apply. He/She will
continue as a Member unless the High Court in an election petition filed on that
ground, declares that on the date of election, he/she was disqualified and
consequently, declares his/her election to be void. It follows, therefore, that if an
elected candidate was under a disqualification when he was elected, but no one
challenges his/her election, he/she would continue as a Member irrespective of the
fact that he/she was under a disqualification when elected.”
75.
In the instant case, even assuming that the Petitioner had
incurred disqualification on account of having married below the legal
age as provided under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, the
said disqualification was not taken into account while scrutinizing the
nomination paper of the Petitioner by the Officer Authorized and
consequently, the Petitioner contested the election and was elected as
the Member of the concerned Gaon Panchayat. Under such
circumstances, the case against the Petitioner at best would be a case
of improper acceptance of her nomination paper. The improper
acceptance of the nomination is a ground for declaring the election
void and the same has to be challenged by way of an election petition
presented to the Election Tribunal within 60 (sixty) days from the date
of the result of the elections. The Authority under Article 243-F(2) of
the Constitution of India as well as Section 111(1)(h) of the Act of
1994 cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal to decide a
Page No.# 44/46
question of disqualification which the candidate incurred at the time of
election i.e. at the time of submission of the nomination paper. The
jurisdiction of the Authority under Article 243-F(2) of the Constitution
as well as Section 111(1)(h) of the Act of 1994 would be only in
respect to disqualification which occurred subsequent to the elections.
76.
In the instant case, the marriage of the Petitioner as per the
Petitioner was 05.01.2015. The Respondent No. 4 opined that the
marriage of the Petitioner must have been prior to 06.01.2013 as the
Petitioner’s first child was born on 06.01.2013. Even assuming that
the said findings are correct as observed by the Respondent No. 4,
the Petitioner would be deemed to have incurred disqualification on
the date of the elections but in spite of the same, the nomination of
the Petitioner was accepted by the Officer Authorized and the
Petitioner was permitted to contest the elections. The Petitioner
contested the elections and returned as elected. The improper
acceptance of the Petitioner’s nomination being a ground available to
declare an election void, the same could only have been challenged
by filing an election petition within 60 (sixty) days from the date of
the declaration of the result. The Respondent No. 4 had no authority
or jurisdiction to decide a disqualification which was there at the time
of election i.e. submission of the nomination paper and as such the
impugned
jurisdiction.
order
dated
09.12.2025
is
without
authority
and
Page No.# 45/46
The above answers the first point for determination.
SECOND POINT FOR DETERMINATION
77.
The second point for determination pertains to, as to whether,
the impugned order dated 09.12.2025 suffers from patent illegality
and perversity requiring interference from this Court.
78.
In view of the first point for determination answered, it is not
necessary for this Court to decide the second point for determination
as the District Commissioner, Goalpara did not have the jurisdiction
and authority to decide the question of disqualification of the
Petitioner inasmuch as the disqualification, if any as alleged was at
the time of the election of the Petitioner and not subsequent to the
election of the Petitioner.
79.
Under such circumstances, this Court need not decide on the
question as to whether the impugned order suffers from perversity or
patent illegality inasmuch as the said impugned order is passed by an
authority having no jurisdiction or authority.
THIRD POINT FOR DETERMINATION.
80.
The impugned order dated 09.12.2025 cannot be sustained in
law as it is an order passed by an Authority without jurisdiction and
accordingly is required to be set aside and quashed. Further to that,
all consequential actions on the basis of the impugned order dated
Page No.# 46/46
09.12.2025 cannot also be sustained in law and are liable to be set
aside and quashed.
CONCLUSION
81.
The instant writ petition, therefore, stands disposed of with the
following observations and directions:
(i)
The impugned order dated 09.12.2025 is set aside and
quashed.
(ii)
All consequential action(s) based upon the impugned order
dated 09.12.2025 is also set aside and quashed.
(iii) There shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGE
Date: 2026.03.06 07:29:33 +05'30'
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