Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 948 of 2024
Order reserved on 17/04/2026
Order delivered on 15/06/2026
Awadh Kishore S/o Late Devki Mistry Aged About 54 Years R/o Q No. B200 , Basant Vihar Colony Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Petitioner
versus
Harjeet Singh S/o Lt. Guru Bachan Singh Aged About 66 Years R/o L-10
Vinoba Nagar Bilaspur (C.G.)
---Respondent
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
: Mr. Soumya Rai, Advocate
For Respondent
: Mr. Vijay K. Deshmukh, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
C.A.V. Order
1.
Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
challenging the judgment and decree dated 04.05.2022, passed by
learned 7th Civil Judge Class-II, Bilaspur, in civil suit No. B/02/2022,
whereby a decree for recovery of Rs. 1,44,000/- along with 0.50%
Digitally
signed by
VED
PRAKASH
VED
DEWANGAN
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN Date:
2026.06.15
20:07:21
+0530
monthly interest till its realization has been passed against the
defendant on the basis of compromise between the parties.
2.
Brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was defendant before
the learned trial Court. The respondent/plaintiff has filed a civil suit on
21.12.2021 for recovery of Rs. 1,44,000/- against the petitioner/
defendant with the pleading that the defendant borrowed an amount
of Rs. 1,45,000/- from the plaintiff on 05.04.2015. It was agreed
between the parties that the defendant shall pay the interest @ 1%
per month on the amount of loan and the said amount of loan was to
be repaid within three months. At the time of borrowing the amount,
the defendant also executed a hand note/acknowledgment on
05.04.2015. The defendant repaid an amount of Rs. 500/- on
02.04.2018, Rs. 300/- on 01.04.2021, Rs. 200/- on 20.11.2021, but
failed to repay the remaining amount of Rs. 1,44,000/-. The
defendant was served with a legal demand notice dated 01.05.2021
through registered AD post and when the defendant neither repaid
the borrowed amount nor replied the notice, the civil suit has been
filed by the plaintiff for recovery of the remaining borrowed amount of
Rs. 1,44,000/- along with the interest.
3.
The suit was filed on 21.12.2021 and on 23.12.2021 summons was
ordered to be issued to the defendant and the case was fixed for
04.02.2022. Due to COVID-19 pandemic the proceeding of the case
was adjourned for 17.03.2022, however in the meantime on
02.03.2022 an application for urgent hearing along with the
settlement deed was filed by both the parties for the reason that both
the parties are willing to settle their dispute and the case may be
placed before the Lok Adalat. On 02.03.2022, the defendant made
his appearance in the case through his counsel and thereafter the
case was fixed on 10.03.2022 for filing of the certain documents with
respect to proper identity of the defendant. Thereafter on 10.03.2022,
the case was ordered to be placed before the Lok Adalat which was
to be held on 12.03.2022. On that day before the National Lok
Adalat, bench No. 21, District Court, Bilaspur a settlement deed was
submitted by the parties, however for want of no objection certificate
from the department where the defendant is employed, the case was
adjourned for 12.04.2022. Another urgent hearing application was
filed on 23.03.2022 for placing of the case before the mediator for
mediation between the parties and the case was referred for
mediation to the Mediation Centre, District Court, Bilaspur. On
29.03.2022, a mediation report was submitted by the Mediation
Centre and ultimately the case was taken up for hearing on
04.05.2022 and on that day on the basis of the said compromise and
mediation report, the judgment and decree has been passed by the
learned trial Court for recovery of Rs. 1,44,000/- along with the
interest @ 0.50 % per month from the date of judgment till its
realization, against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff. It was
also the condition of the decree that the said amount of Rs.
1,44,000/- shall be paid by the defendant in the monthly installment
of Rs. 5000/- from his salary by its attachment. The said judgment
and decree dated 04.05.2022 is under challenge in the present writ
petition.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned
judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is illegal,
arbitrary and perverse. The learned trial Court should have
considered that the suit of the plaintiff itself was not maintainable for
want of the document of money lending license of the plaintiff as
required under Section 11-H read with Section 3(1)(a) and (b) and
Section 7 of the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934. Before
passing the decree or considering the compromise, the learned trial
Court should have satisfied itself for due compliance of the
mandatory provision of Money Lenders Act, 1934. He would also
submit that the signature of the defendant was obtained by the
plaintiff under coercion and the compromise was not on the free will
of the defendant. The plaintiff is a well known influential person who
involved in money lending business and extorting money from the
employees and putting them in fear of losing their employment. The
genuineness of the compromise ought to have been examined by the
learned trial Court, yet the decree has been passed, therefore, the
impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside.
5.
On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondent
opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner
and would submit that the petitioner/defendant is an employee of
South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Bilaspur and not a layman. He
borrowed an amount of Rs. 1,45,000/- from the respondent on
05.04.2015 and executed a hand note/acknowledgment for the
same. When he has not repaid the amount, the respondent has filed
the suit for recovery of the remaining borrowed amount. The
petitioner duly represented through his counsel before the learned
trial Court and after knowing fully well his position, he entered into
compromise on 12.03.2022 for repayment of Rs. 1,44,000/- in the
monthly installment of Rs. 5000/- which was to be attached from his
salary. On 12.03.2022, before the learned National Lok Adalat, the
matter could not be finalized for want of no objection service from the
concerned
department,
where
the
petitioner
was
employed,
thereafter the matter was referred for mediation and the mediation
report was also submitted on 29.03.2022, in which also the petitioner
was agreed to repay the amount of Rs. 1,44,000/- in the monthly
installment of Rs. 5000/- which was to be attached from his salary.
On the basis of the said mediation report, the judgment and decree
has been passed on 04.05.2022. The said compromise dated
12.03.2022 and mediation report submitted on 29.03.2022 and the
judgment and decree dated 04.05.2022 have not been challenged by
the petitioner for about 2 ½ years and it has only been challenged in
the present writ petition which is filed on 16.10.2024. The petitioner
was an educated person and employee of South Eastern Coalfields
Limited. Knowing fully well the executed hand note/acknowledgment
of the borrowed amount, he was represented in the suit through his
counsel and he duly executed Vakalatnama in favour of his counsel,
thereafter a compromise deed was also executed on 02.03.2022,
10.03.2022, 23.03.2022 and 26.03.2022 and thereafter he also
appeared before the Mediation Centre and in his presence the
mediation report was prepared with respect to settlement between
the parties and he also signed the mediation report. Since the date
from his appearance before the learned trial Court till the passing of
the decree, the petitioner was having ample opportunity to deny the
compromise, yet he willingly entered into compromise on his own
free will and after such a long time, he challenged the said
compromise decree, which is not bona fide. At this stage the
maintainability of the suit cannot be objected, when the defendant
have entered into compromise in the suit. He would also submit that
Section 11-H of the Money Lenders Act, 1934, it provided that the
plaintiff should have hold a valid registration certificate, which the
plaintiff has in his possession. Filing of the certificate along with the
plaint was not necessary and it can be filed at the subsequent stage
also, therefore, the ground raised by the petitioner in the present writ
petition is misconceived and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
6.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival
submissions and perused the documents annexed with the writ
petition.
7.
The main ground of challenge in the present writ petition by the
petitioner is that the plaintiff/respondent has not filed the registration
certificate of his being the money lender under the Chhattisgarh
Money Lenders Act, 1934, the plaint itself was not maintainable as
provided under Section 11-H of the Act of 1934 and therefore, the
compromise between the parties, if any cannot be considered for
passing of the decree. When the objection raised by the petitioner in
view of Section 11-H of the Act of 1934, it would be necessary to
notice here the said provision, which reads as under:“11-H. Suit not to proceed without registration
certificate, etc. - No suit for the recovery of a
loan advanced by a money-lender shall proceed
in a civil court until the court is satisfied that he
holds a valid registration certificate or that he is
not required to have a registration certificate by
reason of the fact that he does not carry on the
business of money-lending in any of the district of
Chhattisgarh.
8.
From perusal of Section 11-H of the Act of 1934 provided only for
holding a valid registration certificate, however, there is no restriction
for maintaining a civil suit without filing the same along with the
plaint. The requirement is only that the plaintiff should have hold the
valid registration certificate under the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders
Act, 1934. Section 11-H provided that, no suit for recovery of a loan
shall proceed until the court is satisfied that the plaintiff hold a valid
registration certificate of money lending in the area. It is nowhere
provided that he should annexed the copy of the certificate along with
the plaint. From perusal of the order sheet dated 21.12.2021 and
23.12.2021 (Annexure P/2) after satisfying the proper presentation of
the suit, the civil suit was ordered to be registered and summons was
issued to the defendant. Further, from perusal of the copy of the
plaint annexed at page No. 21 and his affidavit annexed at page No.
24, he clearly disclosed that the plaintiff is a registered money lender,
which could not be rebutted by the defendant.
9.
When the defendant appeared in the case on 02.03.2022 through his
counsel and entered into compromise before National Lok Adalat,
before Mediation Centre and signed the documents without raising
any objection at that time, it can be hold that he was well within the
knowledge of entire proceeding and consent of repayment of
borrowed amount in installments. It is not a case where on a singular
instance his signature has been obtained and which was placed
before the court for compromise, but on various instances he
appeared before the National Lok Adalat, Mediation Centre and has
signed various documents of compromise to settle the dispute. He
was having ample opportunity to deny the settlement, if he actually
not willing to settle the dispute. After about 2 ½ years of entering into
settlement the challenge of the compromise decree on the ground
that maintainability of the suit cannot be said to be bona fide or the
compromise suffered from coercion upon the defendant.
10.
Another important aspect which cannot be ignored is that the
compromise decree was passed on 04.05.2022, whereas the present
writ petition has been instituted only on 16.10.2024 after a lapse of
more than 2 ½
years. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor
demonstrated any sufficient cause explaining the enormous delay in
approaching this Court. During this entire period, no steps appear to
have been taken for questioning the compromise deed or the decree
passed by the learned trial Court based on the compromise between
the parties. A party who consciously enters into a compromise and
thereafter remains silent for several years cannot be permitted to
invoke the extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India as a matter of course. The
unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner itself
constitutes an additional ground for declining interference with the
impugned decree.
11.
The learned trial Court has passed the decree considering the
compromise between the parties and mediation report submitted on
29.03.2022 and the said compromise decree cannot be upset on the
ground of maintainability of the suit, particularly when the grounds
raised by the petitioner regarding maintainability of the suit is
misconceived as the filing of the registration certificate under the
Money Lenders Act, 1934 is not necessary along with the plaint, but
what is necessary to have the registration certificate with the
petitioner.
12.
It is also pertinent to notice that the impugned award has been
passed on the basis of a compromise voluntarily entered into
between the parties. The petitioner not only signed the compromise
deed but the compromise was also arrived at the Mediation Centre
and mediation report was submitted before the learned trial Court
acknowledging the settlement. Once a party has consented to the
terms of settlement and a compromise decree has been passed on
such consent, the same cannot ordinarily be assailed by invoking
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution merely
on grounds which were available prior to the compromise. A
compromise decree stands on a different footing and can be
questioned only on limited grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation
or coercion of a serious nature, duly pleaded and established. Except
making bald allegations, the petitioner has placed no material on
record to substantiate the plea of coercion. Therefore, the challenge
to the compromise decree itself is not maintainable in the facts of the
present case.
13.
The challenge raised by the petitioner to the compromise decree is
also liable to be rejected in view of the settled principles laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court governing the field. In Pushpa Devi
Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, while considering the effect of Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3-A
of the Code of Civil Procedure, held in paragraph 17 that:
“17. The position that emerges from the amended
provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a
consent decree having regard to the
specific bar contained in Section 96(3)
CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the
order
of
the
court
recording
the
compromise (or refusing to record a
compromise) in view of the deletion of
clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for
setting aside a compromise decree on the
ground that the compromise was not lawful
in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an
estoppel and is valid and binding unless it
is set aside by the court which passed the
consent decree, by an order on an
application under the proviso to Rule 3
Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a
party to a consent decree to avoid such
consent decree, is to approach the court
which recorded the compromise and made
a decree in terms of it, and establish that
there was no compromise. In that event,
the court which recorded the compromise
will itself consider and decide the question
as
to
whether
there
was
a
valid
compromise or not. This is so because a
consent decree is nothing but contract
between parties superimposed with the
seal of approval of the court. The validity of
a consent decree depends wholly on the
validity of the agreement or compromise on
which it is made.”
14.
In the present case, the petitioner voluntarily entered into the
compromise before the National Lok Adalat as well as Mediation
Centre and the learned trial Court passed the decree on the basis of
such compromise. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to
assail the compromise decree in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
15.
Therefore, in view of the aforesaid consideration, I do not find any
good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree
passed by the learned trial Court based on the compromise between
the parties.
16.
Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review