The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
21. In view of the above overall facts and analysis, orders impugned deserve no interference by this Court and the writ petition is hence, dismissed.
22. Stay application and pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (REKHA BORANA),J 97/RASHMI
Full Judgment Text
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[2026:RJ-JP:26565]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16735/2025
URN: CW / 38112U / 2025
Avinash Kumar Meena Son Of Sh. Shivram Meena, Aged About
38 Years, Resident Of Village And Post Ancher, Tehsil Chouth Ka
Barwada, District Sawaimadhopur, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
The General Manager, Network-II, State Bank Of India,
Human Resources Department, Local Head Office, CScheme, Jaipur Rajasthan.
2.
State Bank Of India, Appeals And Review Department,
Corporate Centre, 8th Floor, State Bank Bhawan, Madma
Cama Road, Mumbai-400021- India.
3.
State Bank Of India, Through Regional Business Office-6,
Man Town, Sawaimadhopur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Vikas Kabra
Mr. Rohit Rajliwal
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Vikram Pratap Singh
Mr. Rajat Sharma
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA
Order
14/07/2026
1.
The present writ petition has been filed aggrieved of order
dated 03.05.2024 (Annexure-1) whereby the competent authority
observed that because the petitioner failed to report for duty
despite notice dated 19.01.2024 having been served upon him,
the same would amount to voluntary vacation of employment
w.e.f. 04.03.2024. Vide the said order, the petitioner was directed
to pay three months emoluments within 15 days.
[2026:RJ-JP:26565]
2.
(2 of 7)
[CW-16735/2025]
Order dated 14.10.2024 (Annexure-2) whereby the appeal
as preferred by the petitioner against order dated 03.05.2024
stood dismissed, is also under challenge in the present writ
petition.
3.
The case of the petitioner is that he applied for grant of
Extraordinary Leave (EOL) soon after his absence from service but
the same was never considered by the respondent Authorities.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
remained absent from duty since 19.07.2023 and soon after, he
applied for EOL on 30.07.2023. Subsequently, he again requested
for grant of EOL and extension thereof vide continuous e-mails,
but the same were never taken into consideration whereas the
petitioner was entitled for EOL in terms of Rule 37 of the State
Bank of India Officer’s Services Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘Rules of 1992’). Counsel submits that as per the said
rule, EOL for a maximum period of 720 days could have been
granted. The same could have been granted even for more than a
period of 90 days at one stretch, if sufficient reasons were
reflected. Herein the petitioner specifically averred that because of
his personal family issues, he could not join and hence his EOL
ought to have been granted and extended.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that it is
not the case where the notices as served on the petitioner were
not replied to. Rather notice dated 19.01.2024 was instantly
replied on 02.02.2024 and vide the said reply, a request for grant
of EOL was made. While relying upon proviso to Rule 40 of the
Rules of 1992, counsel submits that even the Appellate Authority
could have considered the submission made by the petitioner and
[2026:RJ-JP:26565]
(3 of 7)
[CW-16735/2025]
could have directed for sanction of EOL for the period during he
remained absent, as admittedly the said period was less than 720
days.
6.
Learned counsel lastly submits that the period of absence of
the petitioner be directed to be converted to EOL and he be
directed to be reinstated.
7.
Per contra Counsel for the respondent-Bank submits that the
petitioner remained absent since 19.07.2023 without applying for
any leave and without any information. Prior to that, he had
already been transfered from Sawai Madhopur to Gangapur City
vide order dated 15.07.2023. He was even relieved on 19.07.2023
but then, he never reported at Gangapur City and remained
absent from duty. Various notices were served on the petitioner
directing him to join but of no avail.
8.
Counsel submits that the only reason assigned by the
petitioner for his non-joining was some personal reason. The said
reason was also not substantiated by any document. In that
event, there was no reason available with the competent authority
to grant him EOL.
9.
Counsel further submits that no specific or extraordinary
reason was pleaded by the petitioner even before the Appellate
Authority so as to justify his case for grant of EOL. Hence, the
appeal as preferred by the petitioner was also rightly rejected by
the Appellate Authority.
10.
Heard the counsels. Perused the record.
11.
The following facts are admitted on record:
(i)
The petitioner remained absent from duty since 19.07.2023,
without applying for any leave and without any prior information.
[2026:RJ-JP:26565]
(ii)
(4 of 7)
[CW-16735/2025]
The first application through e-mail for grant of EOL was
submitted by him on 23.07.2023.
(iii) The first memo calling upon him to report on duty was served
on 30.09.2023.
(iv) All the applications as submitted by the petitioner through email reflected only one reason for his absence i.e, some personal
family reason, no specific cause was averred in any of the said
applications.
(v) Vide communication dated 20.10.2023 (Annexure-R/3) the
petitioner was informed that his request for EOL has been rejected
by the competent authority.
(vi) Most of the notices calling upon the petitioner to join the duty
were not only served but even responded to by the petitioner.
(vii) Notice dated 19.01.2024 was served on the petitioner, to
which he replied on 02.02.2024.
(viii) Even after service of notice dated 19.01.2024, the petitioner
did not report on duty within the stipulated period of 30 days.
12.
Rule 40(3) of the Rules of 1992 reads as under:
"Where an officer who has not submitted an
application for leave or where an officer having
submitted his application was refused sanction of
leave, absents himself for a period of 90 or more
consecutive days or overstays the sanctioned
leave by 90 or more consecutive days
notwithstanding the provisions of sub-rule(2), the
Bank may at any time thereafter give a notice to
the officer at his last known address available
with the bank calling upon him to report for duty
within 30 days of the notice. If the officer does
not report for duty within the stipulated
period, he may, by an order of the
Appointing Authority, be deemed to have
voluntarily vacated his employment on the
expiry of the said period set out in the
notice. In such cases the officer shall also be
[2026:RJ-JP:26565]
(5 of 7)
[CW-16735/2025]
liable to pay to the Bank such notice monies as
are payable in case of resignation as if he has
been permitted to pay the emoluments in lieu of
notice.
Provided, however, that an officer may
appeal to the competent authority within a period
of three years from the date of order recording
voluntary vacation under the aforesaid rule. The
Competent Authority shall consider such appeal to
treat the said order as rescinded if it is satisfied
that the officer was prevented by any sickness
incapacitating him from reporting for duty within
the prescribed time or for any other sufficient
cause, and pass such orders as it may deem fit in
the circumstances of the case."
13.
As per the above provision, if an Officer absents himself for a
period of 90 or more consecutive days, the only requirement is
that a notice of 30 days is to be served on him. The provision
specifically provides that if the Officer does not report for duty
within the stipulated period, it would be deemed that he has
voluntarily vacated his employment on the expiry of the period set
out in the notice.
14.
Admittedly, the notice in terms of Rule 40(3) was served on
the petitioner. The petitioner having not reported on duty within
the period of 30 days stipulated in notice dated 19.01.2024, the
action taken thereupon in terms of Rule 40(3) of the Rules of 1992
cannot be termed to be in contravention of any law. The order
impugned dated 03.05.2024 hence, was rightly passed in terms of
Rule 40(3) of the Rules of 1992.
15.
So far as the ground raised by Counsel for the petitioner to
the effect that the complete period of absence of the petitioner
could have been and ought to have been converted to EOL is
concerned, Rule 37 of the Rules of 1992, provides as under:
[2026:RJ-JP:26565]
(6 of 7)
[CW-16735/2025]
"37.(1) An officer shall be eligible for extraordinary
leave on loss of pay for not more than 360 days
during the entire period of service. Such leave may
not be availed of except for sufficient reasons not
more than 90 days at a time.
Provided that in very special circumstances, the
competent authority may grant extraordinary leave
on loss of pay to an officer upto a total period of
720 days.
………
………
37.(2) Subject to any other rule, extraordinary
leave may be granted in combination with or in
continuation of any kind of leave and the competent
authority may commute retrospectively periods of
absence without leave into extraordinary leave."
16.
A bare perusal of the above provision reflects that no EOL
can be granted for more than 90 days at one stretch to any
Officer. It is only for sufficient reasons that the same can be
granted. Evidently, in the present matter no reason, whatsoever,
was specified by the petitioner as to why he remained absent from
duty and was unable to join. A mere averment of some personal
reason cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed to be a
sufficient reason. Further, it is the discretion of the Competent
Authority to conclude whether the reason assigned would qualify
as a sufficient reason or not.
17.
Herein, it is an admitted fact that the request for EOL by the
petitioner was rejected at the very first instance and he was duly
informed of the same. Despite the same, he did not report on
duty, rather continued to pray for extension of the EOL. In the
specific opinion of this Court, when the request for EOL had been
[2026:RJ-JP:26565]
(7 of 7)
[CW-16735/2025]
rejected at the very first instance, there was no question of
extension.
18.
Further, without any sufficient reason been assigned, the EOL
even otherwise could not have been granted for more than a
period of 90 days at one stretch.
19.
One more relevant aspect which deserves consideration is
that earlier too, the petitioner remained on unauthorized leave for
a period of 76 days commencing from the month of September,
2022 which was sanctioned by the Competent Authority and
permitted to be converted to EOL.
20.
The most relevant aspect which also requires consideration is
that despite the petitioner having remained absent from duty
since 19.07.2023, he was given an opportunity to report/rejoin
vide notice dated 19.01.2024 i.e., after a period of more than six
months. Had the petitioner intended to report on duty, he
definitely would have rejoined within a period of 30 days, but he
refrained from doing so and again requested for extension of EOL,
that too, without any specific or sufficient reason.
21.
In view of the above overall facts and analysis, orders
impugned deserve no interference by this Court and the writ
petition is hence, dismissed.
22.
Stay application and pending application(s), if any, stand
disposed of.
(REKHA BORANA),J
97/RASHMI
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