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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUNITHA GANDHAM
WRIT APPEAL Nos: 848, 637, 849 & 919 of 2010
COMMON JUDGMENT :-(per Hon‟ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Since all these Writ Appeals are inter-related, this Court deems it
appropriate to hear these matters together and dispose of the same by way of
this Common Judgment.
2.
These writ appeals have been filed by the writ appellants/writ
petitioners, challenging the common judgment/order dated 08.06.2010 passed
by the learned Single Judge in a batch of W.P.Nos.10145, 10299, 13597,
10402, 10488, 10497 and 10206 of 2007, whereby the said writ petitions were
dismissed.
3.
Heard
Sri
K.S.Murthy,
learned
Senior
Counsel
assisted
by
Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant(s) in W.A.No.848 of
2010.
4.
Heard Sri P.Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant(s) in
W.A.Nos.637 & 849 of 2010 and Sri S.Suman Raju, learned counsel representing
Sri S.Lakshminarayana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant(s) in W.P.No.919
of 2010. They have adopted the arguments advanced by Sri K.S.Murthy, learned
Senior Counsel in W.A.No.848 of 2010.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
5.
Smt.Pulipati
Heard Sri V.Venugopal Rao, learned Senior Counsel assisted by
Radhika,
learned
counsel
for
Sri
Venkateswara
Swamivari
Devasthanam, one of the respondents, in all the writ appeals.
6.
Also heard the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition,
appearing for the State respondent Nos.1 to 3. He has adopted the arguments
advanced by Sri V.Venugopal Rao, learned Senior Counsel, in all the writ
appeals.
I.
Facts :7.
A notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act,
dispensing with the enquiry, was issued vide G.O.Ms.No.170, Revenue
(Endowments-IV) Department, dated 02.02.2005 for acquiring land to an extent
of Ac.103.8 cents in Dorasanipadu Village, Dwaraka Tirumala Mandal, West
Godavari District. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on
10.03.2005 in respect of G.O.Ms.No.170.
8.
Another notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (for short,
“the Act”) was issued in G.O.Ms.No.233, Revenue
(Endowments-IV) Department, dated 23.02.2005, by the Government of Andhra
Pradesh, in respect of an extent of Ac.0.49½ cents covered by buildings and
thatched sheds situated at Dwaraka Tirumala Village and Mandal, West
Godavari District. The Government also invoked sub-section (4) of Section 17 of
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
the Act, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Section 6
declaration was published on 16.03.2005 in respect of G.O.Ms.No.233.
9.
Initially, in the first round of litigation, W.P.No.5784 of 2005 and
batch were filed challenging the notifications under Section 4(1) r/w Section
17(4) of the Act and the declarations under Section 6 of the Act.
10.
Those writ petitions in W.P.Nos.5784 of 2005 & batch covered both
G.O.Ms.No.170, dated 02.02.2005, and G.O.Ms.No.233, dated 23.02.2005, and
were disposed of by a common order dated 29.08.2005. Accordingly, the writ
petitions were allowed, directing the Revenue Divisional Officer (LAO), Eluru,
West Godavari District, to afford an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioners
and conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act in accordance with law.
The contention of the writ petitioners therein that the purpose notified under
Section 4(1) of the Act was ambiguous, did not find any merit. But, it was held
that the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could not be dispensed with, as
there was no such urgency in the public purpose so as to invoke Section 17(4)
of the Act.
11.
The operative part of the common judgment/order in W.P.No.5784
of 2005 and batch in paragraphs 11 to 13 reads as under:
“11. It is a settled proposition that providing amenities to
pilgrims comes within the ambit of public purpose. According to
Section 4 of the L.A. Act, it is only necessary to state in the
notification that the land is needed for the public purpose. The
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
wording of Section 5-A would make it further clear that all that is
necessary to be specified in a notification under Section 4 is that
the land is needed for a public purpose. One reason for
specification of the particular public purpose in the notification is
to enable the person whose land is sought to be acquired to file
objections under Section 5-A of the Act. Unless a person is told
about the specific purpose of the acquisition, it may not be
possible for him to file a meaningful objection against the
acquisition under Section 5-A. I think that the question whether
the purpose specified in a notification under Section 4 is
sufficient to enable an objection to be filed under Section 5-A
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
The purpose for which the lands are proposed to be acquired is
mentioned in the notifications dated 16.2.2005 and 23.2.2005.
The contention of the petitioners that the purpose notified under
Section 4(1) notification is ambiguous has no merit.
12. Coming to the dispensing of the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, as on this day, possession of the lands has not
been taken, and sufficient time has elapsed since the Section
4(1) notification. In the circumstances, I deem it appropriate to
direct the 2nd respondent to afford an opportunity to the
petitioners and hold an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land
Acquisition Act.
13. In the light of the reasons recorded supra, the 2nd
respondent herein is directed to afford an opportunity to
the petitioners and to hold an enquiry under Section 5-A
of the Act, in accordance with the law. Writ petitions are
accordingly disposed of with the above directions. In the
facts and circumstances of the case, this court makes no
order as to costs.”
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
12.
An enquiry was thereafter held under Section 5-A of the Act.
13.
The respondents issued notice under Section 9(3) & 10 of the Act,
to the petitioners without publishing any declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
Such an action was challenged in W.P.No.27295 of 2005 by the writ appellants
of
W.A.No.637
of
2010,
which
was
allowed
vide
judgment
dated
27.12.2005.The notices were set aside, observing that further steps could be
taken only after a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published. The
relevant part of the judgment dated 27.12.2005 in W.P.No.27295 reads as
under :
“Therefore, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned
notice is set aside. It shall however be open to the second
respondent to complete the enquiry under Section 5-A of the
Act and proceed further In accordance with law. There shall
be noder as to costs.”
14.
The Government then published the declaration under Section 6 of
the Act on 12.04.2007 in respect of the properties and lands which were the
subject matter of W.P.No.5784 of 2005 and batch.
15.
Challenging the declaration under Section 6, dated 12.04.2007,
W.P.No.10140 of 2007 was filed and the same was dismissed along with other
writ petitions by way of a common order dated 08.06.2010.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
II.
Common Judgment/order dated 08.06.2010 in W.P.Nos.10145 of 2007
and batch :16.
The learned Single Judge held that, in issuing the publication of the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act, there was no infraction of the second
proviso to Section 6 of the Act. It was though observed that, while it is the settled
position of law that any declaration under Section 6 of the Act published after the
time stipulated under the second proviso to Section 6 of the Act is illegal and
cannot be sustained in law, but it was held that in the view of the judgment of the
learned Single Judge in W.P.No.5784 of 2005 and batch (the first round of
litigation) there was no illegality in publishing the declaration under Section 6 of
the Act, after the expiry of one year period.
17.
Learned single Judge observed that by invoking Section 17(4) of
the Act, Government dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A and
published notifications under Section 4(1) and 6 of the Act. The petitioners
challenged the entire proceedings by filing W.P.No.5784 of 2005 and batch. All
the contentions raised by them, touching the merits, were repelled. However, the
plea about dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act found favour
with this Court, and the enquiry under that provision was directed to be held. It
became necessary to set aside the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, at
least to the extent it related to the properties of the petitioners; to pave the way
for conducting enquiry under Section 5-A. For one reason or the other, no such
direction or observation emerged. The result was that the declaration under
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
Section 6 of the Act, in its entirety, remained intact. That obviously is the reason
why, the respondents have issued notice under Sections 9(3) and 10, after
conducting enquiry under Section 5 of the Act, without publication of declaration,
afresh. When they challenged those notices, this Court held that, unless a
declaration is issued afresh, notices ought not to have been given. It is a
different matter that declaration in respect of the lands was published at a later
point of time. The fact however remains that the declarations that were
published on 10-03-2005 and 16-03- 2005, by the respondents, remained intact,
and were not set aside, to the extent of the properties of the petitioners, even by
now. Hence, there is a compliance, at least on technical parlance, with the
explanation to Section 6 of the Act, vis-à-vis the properties of the petitioners.
18.
Learned Single Judge further held that even assuming that the
declarations in respect of the properties of the petitioners stood impliedly set
aside with the holding of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and subsequent
publication of another declaration, the fact remains as regards the rest of the
properties, it was published within the stipulated time, much so, award was also
passed within months.
It was the view taken that, in a case in which the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act is set aside in its entirety, on the one
hand, and the other where it is set aside in respect of part of the land proposed
to be acquired, on the other hand, warrant different approaches, in the context of
enforcing the mandate under explanation to Section 6 of the Act. With respect
to the petitioner’s land, it was observed that, it would be like an „errata‟ as in the
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
case of Section 4(1) notification, adding thereto some other items of the land
which relates between the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and
the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The
previous publication under Section 6 of the Act would stand superseded for the
additional lands under the same notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.
19.
The relevant portion of the judgment dated 08.06.2010 in
W.P.Nos.10140 of 201 and batch, reads as under:
“There is another factor that militates against the
petitioners, and it is this: assuming that the declaration in
respect of the properties of the petitioner stood impliedly set
aside, with the holding of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act
and subsequent publication of another declaration, the fact
remains that as regards the rest of the properties, it was
published within the stipulated time, so much so, award was
also passed within months. A case in which the declaration
under Section 6 is set aside in its entirety, on one hand, and the
one where it is set aside in respect of part of the land proposed
to be acquired, on the other hand, warrant different approaches,
in the context of enforcing the mandate under Explanation to
Section 6. The reason is that, with the publication of notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act, the rights of the owner of the land,
to a substantial extent get frozen, be it, as regards the future
escalation of market value, or his right to alienate the property,
etc. Instances are not lacking where the owners of the land had
to suffer on account of the undue delay in publication of the
declaration and other proceedings, such as passing of award.
The market value that remained decades together prior to the
passing of the award used to be paid. To remedy that situation,
timeframes were stipulated at two levels: one for publication of
the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, and the other for
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
passing of award. Sections 6 and 11 of the Act were
correspondingly
amended.
The
object
underlying
these
amendments is to require the authorities to be alert, or to face
the eventuality of the lapse of the entire proceedings."
20.
The learned Single Judge did not accept the contention of the writ
petitioners that the first notification/publication under Section 6 of the Act would
automatically come to an end, pursuant to the common order in W.P.No.5784 of
2005, and that it was necessary to issue a fresh publication under Section 6 of
the Act after conducting the enquiry, under Section 5-A of the Act, which was
infact conducted in the year 2007, and thereafter, the declaration was issued in
2007 (12.04.2007), which was after the statutory period of one year from the
date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act even after excluding the
period of stay and, consequently, the contention was not accepted that the
acquisition proceedings lapsed.
21.
Thus, the learned Single Judge was, of the view firstly, that the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act, as published earlier, had not been set
aside the same declaration under Section 6 of the Act continued to remain intact
and secondly, that the subsequent declaration under Section 6 of the Act in the
year 2007 was, infact, a continuation of the previous publication under Section 6
of the Act with respect to the properties of the petitioners, applying the analogy
and principle of “erratum and addendum” taking the view that since the first
publication was within the stipulated statutory period, it could not be said that the
subsequent declaration of the year 2007 was beyond the statutory period.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
III.
Writ Appeals :22.
W.A.No. 637 of 2010 has been filed by the writ appellants/writ
petitioners in W.P.No.10145 of 2007, being aggrieved by the common order of
dismissal dated 08.06.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in
W.P.Nos.10145 and batch, challenging the Land Acquisition proceedings under
notification published in G.O.Ms.No. 233 Revenue(Endowments.IV) Department
dated 23.02.2005, for issuance of draft notification u/s 4(1) and declaration in Memo
No.30006/Endowments.IV (2)/2004-14 dated 12.04.2007 in respect of land to an
extent of Ac 0.04 ½ cents and 0.06 cents situated in Sy.No. 45/1 of Dwaraka
Tirumala Village and Mandal, West Godavari District.
23.
W.A.No.848 of 2010 has been filed by the writ appellants/writ
petitioners in W.P.No.10206 of 2007 in W.P.Nos.10145 and batch, in respect of
an extent of Ac.22.70 cents situated in Sy.No.324 of Dorasanipadu Village,
Dwaraka Tirumala Mandal, West Godavari District, and W.A.No. 849 of 2010 has
been filed by the writ appellants/writ petitioners in W.P.No.10299 of 2007 in
W.P.Nos.10145 and batch, in respect of land to an extent of Ac.2-00 cents
situated in Sy.No. 314 of Dorasanipadu Village, Dwaraka Tirumala Mandal, Wesı
Godavari District, and W.A.No.919 of 2010 has been filed by the writ
appellants/writ petitioners in W.P.No.10497 of 2007 in W.P.Nos.10145 and
batch, in respect of land to an extent of Ac 20.70 cents situated in Sy.No. 313/2 of
Dorasanipadu Village, Dwaraka Tirumala Mandal, West Godavari District, all Writ
Appeals challenging the common order dated 08.06.2010.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
IV. (a)
Submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants :
24.
Sri K.S. Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants,
submitted that, after the decisions in W.P.No.5784 of 2005, dated 29.08.2005,
an enquiry was held under Section 5-A, and the State Government published
the declaration on 12.04.2007 under Section 6. Therefore, it is not a case where
the declaration has not been issued. It is also not a case where the State is
placing reliance on the first declaration. In W.P.No.10145 of 2007 impugned (in
W.A.No.637 of 2010), a direction was issued that further proceedings could be
taken only after a fresh declaration under Section 6. Therefore, a declaration is a
must, which was, in fact, published on 12.04.2007. However, it was issued after
the expiry of the period of one year from the date of the notification under
Section 4(1), even after excluding the period of stay. Therefore, the land
acquisition proceedings pursuant to the notification under Section 4 (1) have
lapsed.
25.
Sri K.S. Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants further
submitted that the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned
judgment that the Section 6 declaration dated 12.04.2007 shall be treated as an
addendum to the first declaration cannot be sustained, as there is no concept
of an addendum with respect to the second declaration under Section 6. There
has to be a fresh declaration, after the inquiry under Section 5-A, and the same
had to be published within the prescribed statutory period. He placed reliance on
the following judgments :
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
(i) Vijay Narayan Thatte and others v. State of Maharashtra
and others 1
(ii) Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and others v. State of T.N.
And Others 2
(iii) Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar and others3,
(iv) Raghunath and Others v. State of Maharashtra and
Others4
(v) Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory and
Others5,
(vi) Nandeshwar Prasad and Others v. U.P. Government and
Others Etc., 6
(vii) Ram Nivas v. State of U.P. thru and others7,
IV. (b)
Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents :
26.
Sri V. Venugopal Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents,
submitted that, in the earlier W.P.No.5784 of 2005, there was a challenge to the
notifications under Sections 4(1), 6 and 17(4), which was decided on
29.08.2005. This Court did not interfere with the land acquisition proceedings,
except to the extent of invoking Section 17(4) of the Act, and directed
compliance with the procedure under Section 5-A, which had been dispensed
with on account of the invocation of Section 17(4). However, this Court did not
interfere either with the notification under Section 4(1) or with the declaration
(2009) 9 SCC 92.
AIR 2002 SC 1334
2012 (12) SCC 443
AIR 1988 SC 1615
(2005) 13 SCC 477
1963 SCC OnLine SC 245
2020 (139) AllLR 15
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
under Section 6 of the Act. The initial declaration dated 10.03.2005 and
16.03.2005, covering G.O.Ms.No.170 and G.O.Ms.No.233 dated 23.02.2005,
therefore, remained intact.
27.
The second declaration dated 12.04.2007, after the inquiry under
Section 5-A, is to be considered as an addendum to the first declaration and, as
such, the period of limitation under the proviso to Section 6(1) is not attracted.
There can be more than one declaration in respect of the land or area covered
by the same notification under Section 4(1). He submitted that the notification
under Section 4(1) is a composite one and, equally, the declarations under
Section 6 are also composite ones, and unless the declaration under Section 6
is quashed in toto, it cannot be said that the entire declaration is liable to be
quashed. He placed reliance on the following judgments :
(i). Gunreddy Ramkoti Reddy and others v. State of Andhra
Pradesh and others8.
(ii). Abdul Hussain Tayabali etc., v. The State of Gujarat and
others9.
(iii). Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others10
(iv). K. Valli Kumari v. Special Deputy Collector, (Land Acquisition),
T.T.D., Tirupathi, Chittoor District and another11
(v) State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Moti Ratan Estates12 .
2014 (5) ALD 146
AIR 1996 SC 432
2000 (7) SCC 296
2005 (3) ALD 611
AIR 2019 SC 4149
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
28.
Sri V. Venugopal Rao, learned Senior Counsel further submitted
that if there is a stay operating against any piece of land covered under the
same notification, the authorities cannot proceed further in respect of the other
extent also. The question of expiry of the stipulated period does not arise. He
submitted that it was pleaded in the counter-affidavit of the 4th respondent that
there was a stay operating in W.P.No.7223 of 2005 (another writ petition) which
was granted in the year 2005. He further submitted that the petitioners were
afforded an opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A, and the competent
authority submitted its report to the Government, which, upon due consideration
of the objections, decided to proceed further and issued the Section 6
declaration on 12.04.2007. Thus, he submitted that there is no illegality in the
judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.Nos.10145 of 2007 and batch, and
the writ appeals deserve to be dismissed.
V.
Points for determination :29.
In view of the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for
the parties, the following points arise for consideration: (1) Whether the second publication under Section 6(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, in respect of the petitioners‟ land, issued
on 12.04.2007, is within the prescribed statutory period, after
excluding the period of stay, and is valid?
(2) Whether the second declaration under Section 6(1), dated
12.04.2007, can be considered as an addendum or erratum to
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
the first declaration under Section 6 of the Act, dated 10.03.2005
& 16.03. 2005 respectively?
(3) Whether the period of stay granted in W.P.No.7223 of 2005 in
the year 2005, which pertains to some other land covered by the
same notification under Section 4, can be excluded while
considering the statutory period under the proviso to Section 6(1)
of the Act, with respect to the petitioners‟ land, in respect of
which separate writ petitions were filed and, pursuant to the
directions issued therein, further proceedings were taken by the
State Government?
(4) Whether the impugned judgment dated 08.06.2010 passed in
W.P.Nos.10145 of 2007 and batch is liable to be maintained or
calls for interference?
VI.
Consideration/Analysis on Point Nos.1 to 4 :30.
All the points being inter-related are being taken up together.
31.
We reproduce Sections 5-A and 6 of the Act,1894, which read as
under :
Section 5-A. Hearing of objections.—
(1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4,
sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or
for a company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the
notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as
the case may be.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in
writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard
[in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf] or by pleader
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further
inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the
land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), or make
different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the
appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the
objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for
the decision of that Government. The decision of the appropriate Government
on the objections made under sub-section (1) shall be final.
(3) Where a declaration has been made under sub-section (1) of section 6, the
Collector shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, make an order for the
acquisition of the land.
Section 6 — Declaration that land is required for a public
purpose
6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose :-[(1) Where the
appropriate Government or the District Collector is satisfied that any particular
land is needed for the purpose of construction, extension or improvement of
any dwelling house for the poor, a declaration shall be made to that effect
under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or any other officer duly
authorized to certify their orders or the District Collector as the case may be,
and different declarations may be made, from time to time, in respect of
different parcels of land covered by the same notification under Section 4, subsection (1):
Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to
be awarded for such property is to be paid wholly or partly out of public
revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority]
"[Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a
notification under Section 4. sub-section (1):-(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment
and Validation) Ordinance, 1957 (1 of 1957), but before the commencement of
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of
three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the
publication of the notification:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the
compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or
wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by
a local authority.
Explanation 1.— In computing any of the periods referred to in the first
proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed
by an order of a Court shall be excluded.
Explanation 2.— Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is
to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State,
such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public
revenues.
32.
In Padma Sundara Rao (supra), the controversy was as to
whether, after quashing of the notification under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, a fresh period of one year is available to the State
Government to issue another notification under Section 6 of the Act. The matter
was before the Constitution Bench of five Judges in view of the fact that in the
earlier three-Judge Bench decision in N. Narasimhaiah and others v. State of
Karnataka and others, {1996 (3) SCC 88}, and in another case, A.S. Naidu and
others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, also decided by a three-Judge Bench,
some conflict was noticed. In the latter case, i.e., A.S. Naidu, it was held that
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
once the declaration under Section 6 of the Act had been quashed, a fresh
declaration under Section 6 could not be issued beyond the prescribed period
from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4
of the Act. Whereas, in N. Narasimhaiah, it was held that the notification issued
within a period of one year from the date of quashing of the notification under
Section 6 by the Court was validly issued, taking the view that a fresh period of
one year would be available to the State Government from the date of quashing
of the previous notification. The Constitution Bench held that, in terms of the
proviso, the declaration cannot be made under Section 6 in respect of any land
covered by the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act after the expiry of three
years or one year from the date of its publication, as the case may be. The
proviso deals with two types of situations. It provides for different periods of
limitation depending upon whether (i) the notification under Section 4(1) was
published prior to the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and
Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984; or (ii) such notification was issued after the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. In the former case, the period is three
years, whereas, in the latter case, it is one year.
33.
The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that the stipulation regarding
urgency in terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no role to play when the period of
limitation under Section 6 is reckoned.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
34.
The Hon'ble Apex Court held that, after the quashing of the
declaration, the same became non-est and was effaced. There was no bar on
issuing a fresh declaration after following the due procedure. The Hon'ble Apex
Court further held that if the legislature intended to give a new lease of life in
those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no
reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that
the legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or
injunction, clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded, and
that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The view
expressed in N. Narasimhaiah's case and followed in D.C. Nanjudaiah's case
“{1996 (10) SCC 619} was held to be not correct, and the view taken in A.S.
Naidu's case was affirmed.
35.
Paragraph Nos. 10, 13, 15 & 16 in Padma Sundara Rao (supra)
read as under :
“10. It may be pointed out that the stipulation regarding the urgency in
terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no role to play when the period of
limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. The purpose for providing the
period of limitation seems to be the avoidance of inconvenience to a
person whose land is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged
from the date of notification under Section 4(1). Section 11 provides that
the valuation of the land has to be done on the date of publication of
notification under Section 4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be
considered in determining the compensation. It provides that the market
value of the land is to be fixed with reference to the date of publication of
the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The prescription of timelimit in that background is, therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram
Chand v. Union of India [(1994) 1 SCC 44] it was held by this Court that
though no period was prescribed, action within a reasonable time was
warranted. The said case related to a dispute which arose before
prescription of specific periods. After the quashing of declaration, the
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
same became non est and was effaced. It is fairly conceded by learned
counsel for the respondents that there is no bar on issuing a fresh
declaration after following the due procedure. It is, however, contended
that in case a fresh notification is to be issued, the market value has to be
determined on the basis of the fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the
Act and it may be a costly affair for the State. Even if it is so, the interest
of the person whose land is sought to be acquired, cannot be lost sight of.
He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If the acquisition
sought to be made is done in an illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he
cannot be made to suffer on that count.
13. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and
cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the
abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or
repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v.
P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. [(2000) 5 SCC 515] ) The legislative casus
omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language
of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading
something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case [(1996) 3 SCC 88] .
In Nanjudaiah case [(1996) 10 SCC 619] the period was further stretched
to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court's order.
Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If
the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only
clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a
non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent.
15. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is
clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder [AIR
1980 Mad 251 : (1980) 2 MLJ 269 (FB)] was rendered on 22-6-1979 i.e.
much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the legislature intended
to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under
Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by
specifically providing for it. The fact that the legislature specifically
provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly
shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is
no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus
curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras
High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case.
16. The view expressed in Narasimhaiah case [(1996) 3 SCC 88] and
Nanjudaiah case [(1996) 10 SCC 619] is not correct and is overruled
while that expressed in A.S. Naidu case [ SLPs (C) Nos. 11353-55 of
1988] and Oxford case [(1995) 5 SCC 206] is affirmed.”
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
36.
In Vijay Narayan Thatte (supra) a notification under Section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act, was issued on 29.08.2002. Thereafter, a notification
under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 18.06.2003. The notification under
Section 6 was challenged. The writ petition was allowed on 21.01.2004, and the
notification under Section 6 of the Act was quashed. Subsequently, a second
notification under Section 6 was issued on 30.10.2006 by the State Government.
The question which arose for consideration was whether the notification under
Section 6 dated 30.10.2006 was valid. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the
said notification was clearly barred by clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of
the Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that a plain reading of the proviso to
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act shows that it is a general prohibition
against the whole world, and not against a particular person.
37.
The Hon’ble Apex Court held that Section 6 is couched in negative
language, and it is well settled that when a statute is couched in negative
language, it is ordinarily regarded as peremptory and mandatory in nature. The
Hon’ble Apex Court referred to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in
Padma Sundara Rao (supra) wherein it was held that the proviso to Section 6
is mandatory. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the proviso to Section 6 shows
that the language thereof is clear. There was no scope for consideration of
equity, public interest, or seeking the intention of the legislature. The notification
dated 30.10.2006 in that case, was held to be beyond the period prescribed by
the proviso to Section 6 of the Act.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
38.
Paragraph Nos. 3, 4, 17 & 21 to 24 in Vijay Narayan Thatte
(supra) reads as under :
“3. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the
Notification under Section 6 dated 30-10-2006 is valid.
4. In our opinion, the said notification was clearly barred by clause (ii)
of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act which reads as under:
“6. Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land
covered by a notification under Section 4 sub-section (1),—
(i)***
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one
year from the date of the publication of the notification:”
It can be seen from the aforesaid proviso to Section 6 that it is couched in
negative language. It is well settled that when a statute is couched in negative
language it is ordinarily regarded as peremptory and mandatory in nature. (See
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 11th Edn., 2008,
pp. 390 to 392.)
17. A plain reading of the proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
shows that it is a general prohibition against the whole world and not against a
particular person. Hence the kalanja maxim of the Mimansa system will in our
opinion apply to the proviso to Section 6.
21. In view of the above discussion, it is evident that the proviso to Section 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act is totally mandatory and bears no exceptions. In fact, a
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of
T.N. [(2002) 3 SCC 533] is clearly in support of the submission of the learned
counsel for the appellants that the proviso to Section 6 is mandatory, and hence
the Notification under Section 6 dated 30-10-2006 is time-barred.
22. In our opinion, when the language of the statute is plain and clear then the
literal rule of interpretation has to be applied and there is ordinarily no scope for
consideration of equity, public interest or seeking the intention of the
legislature. It is only when the language of the statute is not clear or ambiguous
or there is some conflict, etc. or the plain language leads to some absurdity that
one can depart from the literal rule of interpretation. A perusal of the proviso to
Section 6 shows that the language of the proviso is clear. Hence the literal rule
of interpretation must be applied to it. When there is a conflict between the law
and equity it is the law which must prevail. As stated in the Latin maxim dura
lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
23. Learned Attorney General appearing for the respondents submitted that the
judgment of the High Court dated 20-1-2004 permitted the authorities to issue a
second Section 6 notification even beyond the time provided by the proviso to
Section 6 of the Act. He has invited our intention to paras 2 and 3 of the said
judgment which read:
“2. Having gone through the record of the petition and the file which
is made available to us by Mr Patil, with respect to the acquisition of
lands of the petitioners, we are of the view that the petitioners did
not appear to have been afforded reasonable opportunity as is
required under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. No
reasons are insisted upon in justification of this conclusion which we
have arrived at as declaration under Section 6 issued concerning the
lands of the petitioners dated 29-8-2002 will have to be set aside and
the same is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioners need
inspection of the record from the office of the Land Acquisition
Officer. Mr Patil, AGP assures that within one week from today,
inspection will be offered to the petitioners. Dr. Tulzapurkar states
that the petitioners will file their objections within two weeks
thereafter.
3. All parties agree that hearing contemplated under Section 5-A by
the Special Land Acquisition Officer should be completed within
two months thereafter as far as possible. Dr. Tulzapurkar makes a
statement on instructions from the petitioners that the objections with
respect to the period within which Section 6 notification has to be
issued from the date of Section 4 notification, will not be raised by
the petitioners if the petitioners are finally aggrieved by the Section
5-A report and subsequent declaration under Section 6. Needless to
say that the Special Land Acquisition Officer should pass a reasoned
order when he considers the objections from the petitioners. The
entire proceeding will be based on Section 4 notice which has led to
the present proceedings and that notice will continue to govern the
acquisition of these lands.”
24. In our opinion, there can be no estoppel against a statute. Since the statute is
very clear, the period of limitation provided in clause (ii) of the proviso to
Section 6 of the Act has to be followed, and concessions of the counsel can have
no effect. As already stated above, the proviso is mandatory in nature, and must
operate with its full rigour vide Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [(2007) 3
SCC 470] (SCC para 17).”
39.
In Competent Authority
paragraph No.11 which reads as under :
(supra), the Hon’ble Apex held in
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
“11. About the argument based on vesting of the land in the Central
Government, it is to be seen that if the initial notification is bad, all steps taken in
pursuance thereof will fall with it. Vesting under Section 3-D(2) arises on a
declaration by the Central Government under Section 3-D(1). The declaration is
the result of disposal of objections under Section 3-C. Each step is a consequence
of earlier step and in that sense all the steps are linked to the initial notification
for acquisition under Sections 3-A(1) and (2). This initial notification has been
held to be not in accordance with law. When the foundation goes, rest of the
edifice falls. The invalid notification under Section 3-A renders all subsequent
steps invalid. Therefore, vesting of land in the Central Government in the present
case cannot be said to be lawful and it does not advance the case of the
competent authority or NHAI. Taking possession of the land is yet another step
in the same sequence and is again subject to the initial notification being held
valid. The initial notification having been invalidated, there can be no legal or
valid vesting of land in favour of the Central Government.”
40.
In Nandeshwar
Prasad and Others
(supra),
the Hon’ble
Apex held in paragraph No.13 reads as under :
“13 ……..Now if there had been no economy of words and sub-section (1-A)
had read as we have indicated above, it could not have been possißle to argue that
sub-section (4) of Section 17 also covered cases of Section 17(1-A). Therefore,
simply because for the sake oi economy of words the legislature has used the
words which it did in sub-section(1-A), it cannot be said that it was either amending
sub-section (1) or sub- section (4). In the absence of such amendment either in
sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) and in the absence of any specific provision being
introduced in Section 17 by which sub-section (4) was also to apply to the new subsection (1-A), it cannot be said that power was conferred on the State Government
to apply sub-section (4) also to case falling under sub-section (1-A), simply by the
introduction of sub- section (1-A) in the form in which it was introduced in Section
17. We are therefore of opinion that it was not open to the State Government to
say in the notification under Section 4 that proceedings under Section 5-A shall not
take place. This part of the notification under Section 4 is therefore beyond the
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
powers of the State Government. In consequence the notification under Section 6'
also as it was issued without taking action under Section 5-A must fall..……”
41.
In Ram Nivas (supra) the date of notification under Section 4 was
28-11-2005 and that of declaration under Section 6 was 11-5-2012. The
question was whether the declaration under Section 6 was within the time of one
year from the date of publication under Section 4 of the Act, excluding the period
during which stay was having been operated. The Allahabad High Court at
Paragraph Nos.33 to 42 held as under :
“33.
In view of the above well acknowledged legal principle since proviso(ii)
to Section 6 of the Act mandates for issuing of the declaration within a year from
the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, the declaration has to be made
within the said period and not otherwise.
34.
In Padmasundara Rao (Dead) Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & others (2002) 3
SCC 533, the Five Judges of the Supreme Court in reference to the period of
limitation regarding declaration under Section 6 of the Act observed that language
of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something
into it. If the legislature has specifically provided for the period of limitation and to
exclude periods covered by the stay orders, it clearly means that no other period is
intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period
of limitation other than which is prescribed under the Act.
35.
In Ashok Kumar & others Vs. State of Haryana and another (2007) 3
SCC 470 the Apex Court held that the limitation provided in proviso (ii) appended
to Section 6(1) of the Act is mandatory in nature. Any declaration made after the
expiry of one year from the date of the notification issued under Section 4 of the
Act would be void and will have no effect.
36.
A Division Bench of this court in Mahavir Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd. Vs.
State of U.P. and another (2007) 2 AWC 1162 (DB) of which one of us (P. Mithal J.)
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
was the member in context to the validity of a declaration made under Section 6 of
the Act on the ground of its limitation held that the court had no competence to
extend the period of limitation and that direction of the court to deal with the
mater in accordance with law does not extend the statutory limitation. Therefore,
a declaration or a fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Act could not have been
made after the expiry of one year excluding period of stay, from the date of
issuance of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act.
37.
In Vijay Narayan Thatte & others Vs. State of Maharastra & others
(2009) SCC 92 again in reference to a declaration under Section 6 of the Act it was
held since the statute is very clear, the period of limitation provided in proviso (ii)
to Section 6 of the Act has to be followed and even the concession of the counsel
cannot obliterate the same as it is mandatory in nature and must operate with its
full rigour.
38.
In Oxford English School Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu & others
(1995) (5) SCC 206 it has been laid down that the High Court could not have given
any direction permitting issuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act
from the date of its judgement if otherwise the limitation is over.
39.
In the State of Punjab and another Vs. Rajesh Syal (2002) 8 SCC 158 the
Supreme Court observed that it has ample jurisdiction to pass orders under Article
142 (1) of the Constitution of India that may be necessary for doing complete
justice in any case but even in exercise of that power it is more than doubtful, if it
can pass order contrary to law. Thus, it was held that court can not extend the
period of limitation.
40.
Thus, even the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India would not ordinarily grant a relief that
would be in violation of statutory provision or to do an act which may be contrary
to the express provisions of Law.
41.
In Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Bihar & others (2012) 12 SCC 443 the
court opined that a declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act after the expiry of
one year from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, is a nullity.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
42.
In view of above legal position and the mandatory requirement of
issuing a declaration within a year from the date of publication of notification
under Section 4 of the Act excluding period of stay, the impugned declaration
made under Section 6 of the Act on 11.05.2012 is patently beyond time and is not
only illegal but a nullity.”
42.
Almost the same controversy came up for consideration before this
Court in S.Pichappan (Died) and Others v. District Collector and Others 13
which were decided vide common order dated 20.01.2026 by the learned Single
Judge. Paragraph Nos.68, 69, 72 to 74 read as under:
“68.
In Padma Sundara Rao (supra) the Hon’ble Apex court
considered the three Judge Bench judgment in N.Narasimhaiah v. State of
Karnataka (1996) 3 SCC 8 and State of Karnataka v. D.C.Nanjudaiah (1995) 5
SCC 206. In Narasimhaiah’s case the notification under Section 4(1) was
published, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A and invoking urgency
clause and declaration was published within one month but the possession was
not taken due to dilatory tactics of the interested person and the court ultimately
found that the exercise of urgency power was not warranted and so it was
neither valid nor proper and directed the Government to give an opportunity to
the interested person and to conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A. It was held
that, if the enquiry is dragged for obvious reasons, declaration under Section
6(1) cannot be published within the limitation from the original date of the
publication
of
the
notification
under Section
4(1).
A valid
notification
under Section 4(1) becomes invalid. It was held that on the other hand, after
conducting enquiry as per court order and, if the declaration under Section 6 is
published within one year from the date of the receipt of the order passed by the
High Court, the notification under Section 4(1) becomes valid since the action
was done pursuant to the orders of the court and compliance with the limitation
prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of the Act
W.P.No.19806 of 2009 and W.P.No. 24126 of 2012, decided on 20.01.2026
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
would be satisfied. The Nanjudaiah’s case followed the aforesaid view as in
Narasimhaiah’s case (supra).
69.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Padma Sundara Rao (supra) held
that stipulation regarding the urgency in terms of Section 5A of the Act has no
role to play when the period of limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. The
Hon’ble Apex Court held further that, the legislative casus omissus cannot be
supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and
unambiguous and there is no scope for reading something into it. The period
could not be stretched to have the time period run from date of the order of the
High Court or from the service of High Court's order. The view taken in
Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) that the period under Section 6 proviso was from
the date of the receipt of the order of the High Court and if the declaration was
within the statutory period from the date of the order or from the date of service
of the order, the notification under Section 4(1) becomes valid, was not
approved but was overruled. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Padma Sundara Rao
(supra), held that such a view could not be reconciled with the language of
Section 6(1) and if the view was accepted it would mean that a case can be
covered by not only clauses (i) and (ii) of proviso of Section 6(1) of the Act, but
also by a non-prescribed period and the same can never be the legislative
intent. The declaration under Section 6 was quashed as the same was after the
statutory period, laying down that the legislature specifically provided for periods
covered by orders of stay or injunction which clearly showed that no other period
was intended to be excluded and that there was no scope for providing any
other period of limitation.
72.
The position of law on the aforesaid aspect is thus well settled
that
i) The declaration under Section 6 cannot be made in pursuance of
the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, after the expiry of
three years or one year, as the case may be under the proviso to
Section 6, depending upon the publication of the notification under
Section 4(1) before or after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984;
ii) In computing the period of three years or one year, as the case
may be under the proviso to Section 6 of the Act, the period during
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the
notification under Section 4(1), is stayed by an order of the Court,
shall be excluded;
iii) there is no scope of providing any other period of limitation or
excluding any other period, and
iv) the stipulation regarding the urgency in terms of Section 5A of
the Act has no role to play when the period of limitation is reckoned
under Section 6 of the Act.
73.
In the light of the aforesaid legal position, while calculating the
period under Section 6 for publication, the period during which there is stay,
shall be excluded. So, excluding that period of stay the fresh notification under
Section 6, when issued, may be within the statutory period or it may not be as
well. But, at this stage it cannot be so determined. After the decision under
Section 5A, if the notification under Section 6 is issued then such a question
may arise which may be open to be agitated at that stage in appropriate
proceedings.
74.
On Point-C, it is held that if the decision taken by the
Government under Section 5-A is for acquisition then the notification under
Section 6, can be issued only within the limitation period in terms of Section 6(1)
proviso (ii) Explanation 1, otherwise not, but in such a case fresh acquisition
proceedings can be taken in accordance with law.”
43.
In view of the Constitution Bench judgment that the provisions of
Section 6(1) are mandatory, the declaration issued beyond the period of one
year or three years, as the case may be, from the last publication of the
notification issued under Section 4(1) would be a nullity.
44.
We are also of the view, following the well-settled proposition laid
down in the aforesaid judgments, that while calculating the period of one year
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
under the proviso to Section 6(1), the period during which there was a stay in
the Court proceedings has to be excluded. In the present case, there is no
dispute that, after excluding the period of stay, the fresh publication of the
Section 6(1) notification in the year 2007 was not within the period of one year.
45.
We are also of the view that once the learned Single Judge, in the
previous proceedings in W.P.No.5784 of 2005 vide dated 29.08.2005 had
allowed the writ petition and directed holding of an enquiry under Section 5-A in
accordance with law, it cannot be said that the notification under Section 6,
which was also impugned in those petitions, survived. Even if the notification
under Section 6 was not expressly quashed by the learned Single Judge, the
necessary consequence of directing the holding of enquiry proceedings under
Section 5-A would result in the automatic cancellation or setting aside of the
publication under Section 6(1).
46.
Once it was held in those batch of W.P.No.5784 of 2005 that the
opportunity of hearing or enquiry under Section 5-A had been illegally dispensed
with, and that there was no urgency for public purpose under Section 17 so as to
dispense with the enquiry, and the notification under Section 17 was also set
aside, as a necessary consequence, the publication under Section 6 would not
stand. The reason is that Section 5-A provides for filing of objections to the
notification under Section 4(1), an opportunity of being heard, making of the
report by the Collector to the State Government, and for the appropriate
Government to take a decision thereon. The decision under Section 5-A(2) is
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
final, and thereafter, upon the State Government being satisfied, after
considering the report, the declaration under Section 6(1) is to be issued.
47.
The previous declarations under Section 6 of the Act dated
10.03.2005 and 16.03.2005 were issued without affording an opportunity of
hearing under Section 5-A. Once a direction was issued to hold an enquiry
under Section 5-A, it is only upon being satisfied with the report and finding that
the objections are not sustainable and that there is a public purpose,
notwithstanding the objections, that the State Government has to issue the
declaration under Section 6. Therefore, in a case where an enquiry is held, the
declaration follows the decision under Section 5-A. In cases where Section 17 is
invoked along with Section 4, the declaration is made immediately upon
publication of those notifications. It is not preceded by an enquiry under Section
5-A. The very pre-condition under Section 6 is that “where the appropriate
Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under Section
5-A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for the public purpose or
for a company, a declaration shall be made………”. Thus, the first declaration
under Section 6(1) was made without the Government being satisfied on the
basis of an enquiry under Section 5-A. Once the enquiry was directed by the
Court, the Section 6 publication could only be made upon satisfaction as
contemplated under Section 6 read with Section 5-A. Both declarations, one
made dispensing with Section 5-A enquiry invoking Section 17(4) of the Act, and
the other made after enquiry under Section 5-A, therefore, stand on different
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
footing. It cannot be said that the second declaration, after the enquiry, is a
continuation of the first declaration. So upon the direction of this Court in
W.P.No.5784 of 2005 to hold the enquiry under Section 5-A, the declarations
dated 10.03.2005 and 16.03.2005 issued previously under Section 6 were
rendered inefficacious and of no legal sanctity.
48.
In
Raghunath and Others (supra), the facts were that a
notification under Section 4 was issued on 22.06.1982, followed by a declaration
under Section 6 dated 15.03.1983. Both the notifications were challenged before
the High Court. The Section 4 notification was challenged on the ground of mala
fides, and the declaration under Section 6 was challenged on the ground that
the petitioners therein had not been heard on their objections before the making
of the declaration. During the pendency of the case, a statement was made on
behalf of the Government that the notification under Section 6 was being
withdrawn. After the statement was made, the writ petition was withdrawn and
disposed of accordingly. Thereafter, the petitioners were heard under Section 5A of the Act, and a fresh declaration under Section 6 was issued on 04.04.1985.
49.
There, the petitioners again filed a petition before the High Court
challenging the notification under Section 4 as being vitiated by mala fides and
non-application of mind. However, the High Court did not find any merit in the
petition, and the same was dismissed. On that count, the Hon’ble Apex Court
did not interfere, finding no reason to do so.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
50.
However, another question was raised, namely, whether the
withdrawal of the earlier declaration dated 15.03.1983 had the automatic effect
of also rendering the notification under Section 4 dated 22.06.1982 ineffective
and infructuous. That contention was also not accepted. Relying upon its own
judgment in State v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma {AIR 1966 SC 1593}, it was held
that the High Court was right in taking the view that the observations in Vishnu
Prasad Sharma (supra) were in respect of an invalid declaration under Section
6. It was held that once there was a valid declaration under Section 6, the scope
of the notification under Section 4 would get exhausted. However, that principle
could not be applied to a case where the declaration under Section 6 is proved
to be invalid, ineffective or infructuous for some reason.
51.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Raghunath and Others (supra)
observed the distinction between a case where there is an effective declaration
under Section 6, which precludes the issuance of further declarations in respect
of other parts of the land covered by the notification under Section 4 but not
covered by the declaration issued under Section 6, and a case where, for some
reason, the declaration under Section 6 is invalid. The Hon’ble Apex Court
further observed that there is no distinction between a case where a declaration
under Section 6 is declared invalid by the Court and a case in which the
Government itself withdraws the declaration under Section 6 when some
obvious illegality is pointed out.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
52.
In Raghunath and Others (supra), after withdrawal of the
previous notification by the Government, no declaration under Section 6 was
issued in view of the second notification under Section 4. In the said case,
another notification under Section 4 was issued, also covering some of the lands
which were part of the first notification under Section 4. The Hon’ble Apex Court
observed that, by issuance of the second notification under Section 4, the first
notification under Section 4 stood superseded. The Hon’ble Apex Court
provided that, in respect of the lands covered by the first notification under
Section 4, which were also covered by or comprised in the second notification
under Section 4, further proceedings regarding acquisition should be taken in
accordance with law only in pursuance of the later notification, and the
proceedings so initiated in respect of such lands by the first notification should
be deemed to have been superseded.
53.
From the aforesaid judgment, in Raghunath and Others (supra)
the principle of law that follows is that setting aside of the Section 6 notification
by the Court or its withdrawal by the State stands on the same footing. Either on
setting aside or withdrawal of the Section 6 notification, if the Section 4
notification is to be given effect to, there must be a fresh notification under
Section 6. Once such notification is to be issued, it has to be in terms of Section
6, which prescribes the period of limitation for its issuance.
54.
In the said case, it was directed to proceed with respect to the same
land which was also covered by the first notification under Section 4, for the
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
reason that the second notification covering those lands had been issued. With
respect to the land for which the second notification under Section 4 was not
issued, the Hon’ble Apex Court held clearly that the proceedings would not be
vitiated in respect thereof. It follows from the direction that, in the absence of a
notification under Section 6 with respect to those lands which were covered
under the previous notification under Section 4, further land acquisition
proceedings could not be continued. With respect to those lands which were
covered by the first notification and also the second notification, only further
proceedings could be taken in accordance with law, pursuant to the second
notification under Section 4 of the Act.
55.
Applying the said principle to the facts of the present case, with
respect to the land, or part of the land, covered under the notification under
Section 4 relating to the writ petitioners, further proceedings could be taken only
upon issuance and publication of the notification under Section 6 after an
enquiry was held under Section 5-A, and without issuing such declaration under
Section 6, further proceedings could not be continued. In the present case, the
declaration under Section was issued in the year 2007 after the enquiry was
held. However, the same has to be within the period prescribed under the
proviso to Section 6(1), which is within that period, but beyond one year from the
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. We are of the view that the
proceedings under Section 4 with respect to the petitioners’ land would lapse.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
56.
The previous declaration would not come to the rescue of the State
Government for the reasons already assigned, and the fresh declaration would
also not stand, as the same is beyond the provisions of the proviso to Section 6.
The Constitution Bench had already laid down the law that it has to be issued
within the prescribed period of limitation, and no other fact or circumstance
would prevail, except the period of stay, which is to be excluded.
57.
The learned Single Judge in the present case has taken the
alternative view that the publication under Section 6(1) was to be treated like a
corrigendum issued in the case of a Section 4(1) notification. We are of the view
that the said proposition is not correct in law and that principle cannot be applied
to a publication made under Section 6(1). It can be applied only to the
notification under Section 4(1), but that too subject to fulfilment of the
requirements of publication in the same manner as the notification under Section
4(1) is issued. However, that would not apply to a notification under Section
6(1), and the period of limitation also cannot be extended for publication under
Section 6(1) like the corrigendum issued under Section 4(1).
58.
In Anil Kumar Gupta (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that a
person who is deprived of his land can challenge the acquisition proceedings at
various stages. He can question the notification issued under Section 4(1) on
the ground of violation of the mandate contained therein, such as publication of
the notification in the Official Gazette and/or two newspapers, including one in
the regional language, or failure of the Collector to cause public notice of the
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality. He
can challenge the declaration issued under Section 6(1) on the ground of noncompliance with Section 5-A(1) and/or (2), or violation of proviso (ii) to Section
6(1). Further, the invocation of the urgency clause contained in Section 17 can
be questioned on the ground that there was no real urgency. The Hon’ble Apex
Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Padma Sundara Rao
(supra) and observed that the controversy with respect to the period for
issuance of the declaration under Section 6(1) was no more res integra, and in
view of the proposition laid down therein, the declaration issued under Section
6(1) after the period of limitation prescribed in the proviso was non-est.
59.
In Anil Kumar Gupta (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court also
considered the submission advanced therein that the quashing of the Section
6(1) notification was also relevant. With respect to the reliance placed therein by
the counsel for the respondents upon the corrigendum dated 01.07.1994, when
it was argued that, if the period of one year was counted from the date of the
corrigendum, then the declaration issued under Section 6(1) could not be
treated as having been issued beyond the period of one year. The said
submission was not accepted by the Hon’ble Apex Court for two reasons:
Firstly, it could not be shown whether the corrigendum had been published in
the manner prescribed under Section 4(1); and Secondly, the corrigendum was
issued only for correcting the typographical mistakes in the Gazette publication
of the notification issued under Section 4(1).
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
60.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Anil Kumar Gupta (supra) held that
such corrigendum would relate back to the date on which the notification under
Section 4(1) was issued, but the same could not be relied upon for recording a
finding that the declaration under Section 6(1) was issued within the period
prescribed under proviso (ii) to that section. Paragraph No.15 in Anil Kumar
Gupta (supra) reads as under:
“15. The issue needs to be examined from another angle. A person
who is deprived of his land can challenge the acquisition proceedings at
various stages. He can question the notification issued under Section 4(1)
on the ground of violation of the mandate contained therein like
publication of the notification in the Official Gazette and/or two
newspapers including the one in the regional language and failure of the
Collector to cause public notice of the substance of the notification to be
given at convenient places in the locality. He can challenge the declaration
issued under Section 6(1) on the ground of non-compliance with Sections
5-A(1) and/or (2) or violation of the first proviso (ii) to Section 6(1). In a
given case, the landowner can also challenge the notice issued under
Section 9 and the award passed under Section 11 on the ground that he had
not been heard or that the acquisition proceedings are a nullity. He can
also challenge the award if it is not made within the period prescribed
under Section 11-A. The vesting of land in the Government can be
challenged on the ground that the possession had not been taken in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. The invoking of the urgency
clause contained in Section 17 can be questioned on the ground that there
was no real urgency. There may be many more grounds on which the
landowner can challenge the acquisition proceedings. Insofar as the
appellant is concerned, he had challenged the acquisition proceedings
immediately after passing of the award and pleaded that the declaration
issued under Section 6(1) was liable to be declared a nullity because of
violation of the time-limit prescribed in the first proviso (ii). This being
the position, it is not possible to approve the view taken by the Division
Bench of the High Court that the writ petition was belated.”
61.
In view of the aforesaid judgment, on the issue of issuance of a
corrigendum, what follows is: (1) that if a corrigendum is to be issued under
Section 4, it has to be issued in the manner in which the notification is issued
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
under Section 4; and (2) the period of limitation prescribed for publication under
Section 6(1) is not to be counted from the date of publication of the corrigendum.
If the corrigendum is issued in accordance with the procedure under Section
4(1), the same shall relate back to the date of publication under Section 4(1),
i.e., to the initial publication under Section 4. Therefore, based on the
corrigendum, the period of limitation prescribed under Section 6(1) cannot be
affected.
62.
In Gunreddy Ramkoti Reddy (supra), the learned Single Judge
of this Court held that there can be more than one declaration under the Land
Acquistion Act, 1894, which is permissible in view of the amendment to Section
6 by virtue of Act 13/1967 dated 12.04.1967, which empowers the authorities to
issue different declarations. Paragraph No.20 reads as under:
“20. Yet another contention advanced by the counsel for the writ
petitioners that there cannot be more than one declaration under Section 6 of
the Act in view of the Honble apex Courts judgment in The State Of Madhya
Pradesh And Others (supra), in the considered opinion of this Court, is also
unsustainable in view of the amendment to Section 6 of the Act by virtue of Act
13/1967 dated 12.04.2007 which empowers the authorities to issue different
declarations and in support of the stand contra, the learned Government
Pleader places reliance on Abhey Ram (Dead) By Lrs And Others. (supra).”
63.
So far as the judgment in Gunreddy Ramkoti Reddy (supra) is
concerned, we are of the view that there cannot be any dispute with the
proposition laid down therein, in the facts, circumstances and the amendment in
law, as in that case. However, we are of the view that all the separate or
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
different publications under Section 6 can be issued, with respect to the land
covered under Section 4, are required to be issued strictly within the period
prescribed under the statute. There is no dispute with the legal proposition that
there can be more than one declaration or publication under Section 6(1), but in
our view, following Padma Sundara Rao (supra) all such declarations are to
be made within the statutory period, after excluding the period of stay.
64.
In Moti Ratan Estates (supra) The Hon’ble Apex Court held and
culled out the following propositions of law:
“6.5. On considering a catena of decisions of this Court, referred
hereinabove, the following propositions of law can be culled out:
(i) when the scheme of the acquisition is one, interim stay
granted in respect of one pocket of land would operate even
with respect to other pockets of land and in such a situation
the authorities are justified in not proceeding with the
acquisition proceedings and therefore the acquisition
proceedings would not lapse;
(ii) interim order of stay granted in respect of one of the
landowners would have a complete restraint for the authorities
to proceed further;
(iii) when the stay has been granted in one matter and where
the scheme was one, the authorities were justified to stay their
hands;
(iv) the extended meaning of the words "stay of the action or
proceedings under Section 11-A of the Act" would mean that
any interim effective order passed by the court which may
come in the way of the authorities to proceed further;
(v) Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act is in the widest
possible terms and there is no warrant for limiting the action or
proceedings, referred to in the explanation, to actions or
proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section
11 of the Act and therefore the period of injunction obtained by
the landholders staying the acquisition and authorities from
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
taking possession of the land has to be excluded in computing
the period of two years.”
65.
The question as involved in the present case was not for
consideration in Moti Ratan Estates (supra). The learned counsel for the
respondent sought to apply the principle laid down in the said case with respect
to the award under Section 11-A to Section 6(1).
66.
We are of the view, that so far as the declaration under Section 6(1)
is concerned, and the period prescribed for its publication, the authorities are
bound by the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, including the
Constitution Bench judgment referred to above. the State respondents
proceeded to hold the enquiry pursuant to the directions issued by the High
Court in the judgment in W.P.No.5784 of 2005, and did not challenge the same.
They also issued Section 6(1) declaration for publication in the year 2007.
67.
In view of the aforesaid, now, it cannot be said that merely because
there was an interim order in one writ petition, in which the petitioners herein
were not parties, and even the land was different from that of those petitioners,
though it may have been the subject matter of the same notification under
Section 4, that
interim order granted in that petition would prevent the
proceedings under Section 5-A from being taken, or that the period of stay in
that petition should also be taken into account for the purposes of the proviso to
Section 6(1) in the case of the present petitioners. The stay granted in the case
of one person with respect to different land cannot be made applicable to the
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
case of other petitioners, in whose case there is a specific direction by the Court
and which has been implemented.
VII.
Conclusions :68.
Thus, on consideration of the points for determination, we conclude
and hold that the second publication under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, in respect of the petitioners’ land, issued on 12.04.2007, was beyond
the prescribed statutory period of one year from the date of publication of the
notification under Section 4(1), even after excluding the period during which the
proceedings were stayed. The second publication under Section 6(1) is,
therefore, not sustainable in law. The second publication dated 12.04.2007
under Section 6(1) of the Act cannot be considered an “erratum and
addendum” to the first declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act, dated
10.03.2005 and 16.03.2005, respectively. The first publications ceased to have
any legal sanctity and stood rendered ineffective following the directions issued
in W.P.No.5784 of 2005 to conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act.
After the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was conducted, a fresh
publication under Section 6(1) of the Act was legally required to be issued. Such
publication was, in fact, issued on 12.04.2007; however, it was not issued within
the stipulated statutory period. The period of stay granted in W.P.No.7223 of
2005, which did not pertain to the land of the petitioners, cannot be excluded for
the purpose of computing the limitation under Section 6 of the Act in respect of
the petitioners’ land. Separate writ petitions had been filed in respect of the
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
petitioners’ land, and the same were allowed with directions to conduct an
enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. In one of the writ petitions, a direction was
also issued to issue notices under Section 9 of the Act after publication under
Section 6. Consequently, the impugned judgment dated 08.06.2010 passed by
the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.10145 of 2007 and the batch of writ
petitions deserves to be interfered with and is liable to be set aside.
69.
We answer the points framed in terms of paragraph No.68 supra.
VIII. Result :-
70.
In the result, W.A.Nos.848, 637, 849 and 919 of 2010 are allowed.
The Common order/judgment dated 08.06.2010 passed in W.P.Nos.10145 of
2007 and batch by the learned single Judge is set aside/quashed.
The
consequential proceedings/declarations pursuant to the notification under
Section 4(1) of the Act and Section 6 of the Act published on 10.03.2005,
16.03.2005 and 12.04.2007, only with respect to the land of the writ
petitioners/writ appellants (subject land in the writ appeals) shall stand set aside
with all necessary consequences. The acquisition proceedings pursuant to the
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act dated 02.02.2005 and 23.02.2005 with
respect to the subject land of the writ appellants cannot proceed further.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
71.
However, the respondents shall be at liberty to proceed afresh in
accordance with law, if so required.
No order as to costs.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall
also stand closed.
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
_______________________
SUNITHA GANDHAM,J
Date:
Note :- L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/o
RPD.
Whether the order is :
Speaking
Reportable
Yes/ No
Yes/ No
Reasoned
Non-Reportable
Yes/ No
Yes/ No
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUNITHA GANDHAM
(ALLOWED)
WRIT APPEAL Nos: 848, 637, 849 & 919 of 2010
Date :14.10.2026
Note :- L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/o
RPD.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
* THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUNITHA GANDHAM
+ WRIT APPEAL Nos: 848, 637, 849 & 919 of 2010
% 14.10.2026
W.P.No.848 of 2010
# Sri Avanigadda Seetha Rama Rao and
Others.
……Appellants
And:
$ The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary and Others
….Respondents.
W.P.No.637 of 2010
# Smt. Oblisetty Mangatayaru and Others.
……Appellants
And:
$ The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary and Others
….Respondents.
W.P.No.849 of 2010
# Smt. Grandhi Lakshmi Hymavathi and Others.
……Appellants
And:
$ The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary and Others
….Respondents.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
W.P.No.919 of 2010
# Sri Pamidipati Venkateswara Rao and Others.
……Appellants
And:
$ The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary and Others
….Respondents.
!Counsel for the appellants
: Sri K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel,assisted
by Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar in W.P.No.848 of 2010
Sri P.Durga Prasad in W.A.Nos.637 & 849 of 2010
Sri S.Lakshminarayana Reddy in W.P.No.919 of 2010
^Counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3
^Counsel for the respondent No.4
: Government Pleader for Land Acquisition.
: Sri V.Venugopal Rao, learned Senior Counsel
assisted by Smt.Pulipati Radhika,
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. (2009) 9 SCC 92.
2. AIR 2002 SC 1334
3. 2012 (12) SCC 443
4. AIR 1988 SC 1615
5. (2005) 13 SCC 477
6. 1963 SCC OnLine SC 245
7. 2020 (139) AllLR 15
8. 2014 (5) ALD 146
9. AIR 1996 SC 432
10. 2000 (7) SCC 296
11. 2005 (3) ALD 611
12. AIR 2019 SC 4149
13. W.P.No.19806 of 2009 and W.P.No. 24126 of 2012,
decided on 20.01.2026
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
WRIT APPEAL Nos: 848, 637, 849 & 919 of 2010
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED:
14.10.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUNITHA GANDHAM
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
Yes/No
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair
copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
____________________
SUNITHA GANDHAM, J
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
Date of reserved for orders
Date of pronouncement
Date of uploading
: 19.09.2026
: 14.10.2026
: 16.10.2026
APHC010594122010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3633]
WEDNESDAY, THE 14th DAY OF OCTOBER 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUNITHA GANDHAM
WRIT APPEAL No: 848 of 2010
Writ Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order
dt. 08-06-2010 passed in W.P. No. 10206 of 2007.
Between:
1. AVANIGADDA SEETHA RAMA RAO, S/O. LATE VENKATA RATNAM
R/O. DWARAKA TIRUMALA VILLAGE, DWARAKA TIRUMALA MANDAL,
WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
2. AVANIGADDA
CHANDRAVATHI,
W/O.
LATE
VENKATA
SATYANARAYANA R/O. DWARAKA TIRUMALA VILLAGE, DWARAKA
TIRUMALA MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
3. AVANIGADDA BAPANAIAH, W/O. LATE VENKATA RATNAM R/O.
SATYANRAYANAPURAM, VIJAYAWADA, KRISHNA DISTRICT.
4. AVANIGADDA KRISHNA KUMARI,, W/O.LATE BAPANAIAH, AGED 63
YEARS, R/O.D.NO.23-2-11, LAKSHMI NAGAR, WARD NO.44, AJITH
SINGH NAGAR, VIJAYAWADA NORTH, KRISHNA DISTRICT
5. ODUGU SUNEETHA,, D/O.LATE BAPANAIAH, AGED 49 YEARS,
R/O.D.NO.23-2-11, LAKSHMI NAGAR, WARD NO.44,
AJITH SINGH
NAGAR, VIJAYAWADA NORTH, KRISHNA DISTRICT.
6. AVANIGADDA VENKATA SYAM SUNDER,, S/O.LATE BAPANAIAH,
AGED 46 YEARS, R/O.D.NO.23-2-11,
LAKSHMI NAGAR, WARD
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
NO.44, AJITH SINGH NAGAR,
VIJAYAWADA NORTH, KRISHNA
DISTRICT. APPELLANTS NO.4 TO 6 ARE BROUGHT ON RECORD AS
LRS OF APPELLANT NO.3 AS PER C.O.DT.20/08/2024 VIDE I.A.NO.1
OF 2023.
...APPELLANT(S)
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY
REVENUE
(ENDOWMENTS)
DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT, HYDERABAD.
2. THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER CUM LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
3. THE TAHSILDAR, (MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER) DWARAKA
TIRUMALA MANDAL, DWARAKA TIRUMALA, WEST GODAVARI
DISTRICT.
4. SRI VENKATESARA SWAMY VARI DEVASTHANAM, REP. BY ITS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER DWARAKA TIRUMALA VILLAGE AND MANDAL,
WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT(S):
IA NO: 1 OF 2010(WAMP 2031 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
grant stay of all further proceedings including dispossession of the petitioners'
from the subject property admeasuring Ac. 22-70 cents in Sy. No. 324 of
Dorasanipadu Village, Dwaraka Tirumala Mandal, West Godavari District,
pursuant to the land acquisition notification dated 02-02-2005 and declaration
dated 12-04-2007, pending disposal.
IA NO: 2 OF 2010(WAMP 2546 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
vacate the interim direction granted in W.A.M.P. No. 2031 of 2010 in W.A. No.
848 of 2010, dated 16-11-2010, in the interest of justice and fair play.
IA NO: 5 OF 2010(WAMP 150079 OF 2010
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
IA NO: 1 OF 2023
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
pleased to permit the Petitioners/Proposed Petitioners No.4 to 6 to come on
record as Legal Representatives of the deceased Appellant No.3 and
consequently order to impleadment the Proposed Petitioners 4 to 6 as
Appellants No.4 to 6 in W.A.No. 848 of 2010 and as well as the interlocutory
applications in WA.No.848 of 2010 and pass
IA NO: 1 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
Pleased to permit the Petitioners/Proposed Appellants No. 7 to 9 to come on
record as Legal Representatives of the deceased Appellant No. 1 i.e.. Late
Avvanigadda Seetha Rama Rao @ Seetha Ramaiah, and pass
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. .
2. P S P SURESH KUMAR
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
2. PULIPATI RADHIKA
3. E SAMBASIVA PRATAP
WRIT APPEAL NO: 637/2010
Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal preferred against
the Order in W.P.No.10145 of 2007 dated 08.06.2010.
Between:
1. OBLISETTY MANGATAYARU, W/O. LATE NARASIMHA RAO R/O.
DWARAKA TIRUMALA, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
2. MANDAVALLI SURYA PRASADA RAO, S/O. NARAYANA MURTHY R/O.
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
DWARAKA TIRUMALA, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
3. MANDAVALLI SRI LAKSHMI,, W/O. LATE SURYA PRASADA RAO,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,R/O.DWARAKA TIRUMALA,
WEST
GODAVARI DISTRICT.
4. MANDAVALLI NAGA RAJU,, S/O. LATE SURYA PRASADA RAO,
AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS,R/O.DWARAKA TIRUMALA,
WEST
GODAVARI DISTRICT.
5. MADDU RAJA RAJESWARI LEELA DURGA,, W/O.M.KRISHNA
KIRITI,AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS,
R/O .EWS 133,HOUSING BOARD
COLONY,
NEAR NTR STATUE ,SATRAMPADU ,ELURU,
WEST
GODAVARI DISTRICT. APPELLANT NO.3 TO 5 ARE BROUGHT ON
RECORD AS LR OF APPELLANT NO.2 AS PER C.O.DT.30.09.2024
VIDE I.A.NO.1 OF 2013 IN W.A.NO.637 OF 2010.
...APPELLANT(S)
AND
1. THE GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP BY ITS, PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY,
REVENUE
(ENDOWMENTS)
DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT, HYDERABAD.
2. THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICERCUMLAND,
OFFICER, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
ACQUISITION
3. THE TAHSILDAR MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER, DWARAKA
TIRUMALA MANDAL, DWARAKA TIRUMALA, WEST GODAVARI
DISTRICT.
4. SRI VENKATESWARA SWAMY VARI DEVASTHANAM, DWARAKA
TIRUMALA VILLAGE AND MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
REP. BY ITS EXECUTIVE OFFICER.
5. S V SUDHAKARA RAO, S/O.S.V.R.G. NARASIMHA RAO CHAIRMAN
AND FOUNDER'S FAMILY, SRI VENKATESWARA SWAMY
DEVASTHANAM, DWARAKA TIRUMALA R/O.MYLAVARAM, WEST
GODAVARI DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT(S):
IA NO: 1 OF 2010(WAMP 1537 OF 2010
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
grant stay of all further proceedings including dispossession of the petitioners'
from the subject property admeasuring Ac.0.10 1/2 cents in Sy.No.45/1 of
Dwaraka Tirumala Village and Mandal, West Godavari District, pursuant to the
land acquisition notification dated 23.02.2005 and declaration dated 12.04.2007,
pending disposal of the appeal, failing which the petitioners will suffer serious
loss and injustice.
IA NO: 2 OF 2010(WAMP 2078 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
vacate the interim direction granted in WA No. 637 of 2010, dated 30-8-2010 as
extended by order dated 13-9-2010, in the interest of justice and fair play.
IA NO: 5 OF 2010(WAMP 149468 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
IA NO: 1 OF 2011(WAMP 139 OF 2011
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
vacate the interim orders dt. 30.08.2010 in WAMP No. 1537 of 2010 in WA No.
637 of 2010
IA NO: 2 OF 2011(WAMP 13129 OF 2011
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
IA NO: 1 OF 2013(WAMP 2460 OF 2013
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
permit the Petitioners 3 to 5 herein to come on record as Legal representatives
of the deceased 2nd Appellant and consequently order impleadment of the
Petitioners 3 to 5 herein as Appellants 3 to 5 in W.A.No. 637 of 2010 as well as
in W.A.M.P.No. 1537 of 2010
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. P DURGA PRASAD
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
1. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
2. P YADAGIRI RAO
3. PULIPATI RADHIKA
4. E SAMBASIVA PRATAP
WRIT APPEAL NO: 849/2010
Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal preferred against
the order dated 08.06.2010 passed in WPNo.10299/2007
Between:
1. GRANDHI LAKSHMI HYMAVATHI, W/O GRANDHI VENKATA SAYTA
LAKSHMI KANTHA RAO DOOR NO. 25-7-13, RAMA NAMA KSHETRAM,
3RD LANE, GUNTUR-522004.
...APPELLANT
AND
1. THE GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL,
SECRETARY,
REVENUE
(ENDOWMENTS)
DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT, HYDERABAD.
2. THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICERCUMLAND
OFFICER, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
ACQUISTIION,
3. THE TAHSILDAR MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER, DWARAKA
TIRUMALA MANDAL, DWARAKA TIRUMALA, WEST GODAVARI
DISTRICT.
4. SRI VENKATESWARA SWAMY VARI DEVASTHANAM, DWARAKA
TIRUMALA VILLAGE AND MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT,
REP. BY ITS EXECUTIVE OFICER.
...RESPONDENT(S):
IA NO: 1 OF 2010(WAMP 2032 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
grant stay of all further proceedings including dispossession of the petitioners'
from the subject property admeasuring Ac.2.00 cents in Sy. No. 314 of
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
Dorasanipadu Village, Dwaraka Tirumala Mandal, West Godavari District
pursuant to the Land Acquisition Notification dated 02.02.2005 and declaration
dated 12.04.2007, pending disposal
IA NO: 2 OF 2010(WAMP 2576 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
vacate the interim direction gratned in WAMP.No. 2032 of 2010 in WA.No. 849
of 2010, dt. 16.11.2010 in the interest of justice and fair play
IA NO: 5 OF 2010(WAMP 150057 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. P DURGA PRASAD
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
2. PULIPATI RADHIKA
3. E SAMBASIVA PRATAP
WRIT APPEAL NO: 919/2010
Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal prefferred
against the order dt. 8.6.2010 in W.P. No. 10497 of 2007
Between:
1. PAMIDIPATI VENKATESWARA RAO, S/O.LATE BHADRACHALAM
RESIDING AT BLOCK NO.II, II FLOOR, KASTURI APARTMENTS, NO.6
DR. RADHAKRISHNAN SALAI,
...APPELLANT
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP., BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY
REVENUE
(ENDOWMENTS)DEPARTMENT
SECRETARIAT, HYDERABAD
(RNT, J & SUN, J
W.A.Nos.848 of 2010 and batch)
2. THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICERCUMLAND
OFFICER, ELURU, W.G.DISTRICT.
ACQUISITION
3. THE TAHSILDARMANDAL REVENUE OFFICER, DWARAKA TIRUMALA
MANDAL, DWARAKA TIRUMALA,W.G.DISTRICT
4. SRI VENKATESARA SWAMY VARI DEVASTHANAM DWARKA,
TIRUMALA VILLAGE AND MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT REP
BY ITS EXECUTIVE OFFICER
...RESPONDENT(S):
IA NO: 1 OF 2010(WAMP 2130 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
stay of all further proceedings inlcuding dispossession of the petitioners from the
subject property admeasuring Ac. 20-70 cents in Sy. No. 313/2 of Sorasanipadu
village, Dwaraka Tirumala Mandal, West Godavari District pursuant to the land
acquistiion notification dt. 2.2.2005 and declaration dt. 12.4.2007 pending
disposal of the appeal, failing which the petitioners will suffer serious loss and
injustice and pass
IA NO: 2 OF 2010(WAMP 2575 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
vacate the interim direction granted in WAMP.No. 2130 of 2010 in WA.no. 919
of 2010, dt. 23.11.2010, in the interest of justice and fair play
IA NO: 5 OF 2010(WAMP 153334 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. S LAKSHMINARAYANA REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
2. PULIPATI RADHIKA
3. E SAMBASIVA PRATAP
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