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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP No. 35 of 2022
Date of Decision: 16.02.2023
Asset Reconstruction Company
(India) Limited (ARCIL)
Vs.
J.U.D. Cements Ltd. & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. P. Agrawal, Adv.
Mr. D. Das, Adv.
Mr. V. Shriram, Adv.
Mr. P. Lyngdoh, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. K. Paul, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S. Panthi, Adv.
:
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The instant Revision Petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, has been filed assailing the impugned order dated
28.01.2022, passed by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, East
Jaintia Hills in Misc. Case No. 1 of 2022, in T.S. No. 1 of 2022, as also
the impugned order dated 17.08.2022, whereby the petitioner has been
directed to maintain status quo till disposal of the suit.
2.
The case in brief is that, the petitioner an Asset Reconstruction
Company, is holding security interest over the respondent No. 1
company’s assets, such as the cement plant, land, mining leases,
corporate guarantees, etc., on account of the respondent No. 1, being
declared a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) by the original lender banks
in December, 2013. In connection with restructuring of the loans
availed by the respondent No. 1, multiple agreements had been entered
into for the same, but however, on account of repeated defaults by the
respondent No. 1 on its payment obligations, the petitioner issued a
revocation notice dated 15.12.2021, calling upon it to pay the entire
outstanding amount of Rs.695,28,65,735/- as on 15.12.2021.
Thereafter, on 03.01.2022, the petitioner published an Expression of
Interest (EOI), for acquisition of strategic equity stake and/or
assignment of debt exposure of the petitioner in the respondent No. 1
company.
3.
The respondent No. 1 and 2, then filed the Title Suit No. 1 of
2022, along with Misc. Case No. 1 of 2022, against the petitioner under
Order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC, seeking a permanent injunction of the
revocation notice dated 15.12.2021 and the Expression of Interest (EOI)
published on 03.01.2022. The learned Court below, then vide order
dated 28.01.2022, passed an ex parte interim order, directing the parties
to maintain status quo, to which the petitioner had preferred an
application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC, to set aside the order
dated 28.01.2022. The said application however, came to be rejected,
and by order dated 17.08.2022, the learned Trial Court, made the
injunction order passed on 28.01.2022, absolute till disposal of T.S. No.
1 of 2022. Hence the instant Revision Application.
4.
Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. P.
Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner, while alluding to the facts,
submits that, the respondent No. 1 had availed loans from a consortium
of eight banks, who were the original lenders and the said loans were
secured by way of a first charge on the assets of the respondent. In 2018,
the learned Senior counsel submits, the original lenders assigned all
rights title and interest in relation to the loans availed by the respondent
along with the assets known collectively as security interest, to the
petitioner in two phases, and pursuant to the request of respondent No.
1, the total debt was initially restructured as per terms of the sanction
letter dated 01.03.2018, and thereafter in terms of letter dated
10.04.2018. The learned Senior counsel then submits that, the
respondent No. 1, then agreed to – (i) convert INR 17.36 Crores of the
debt into equity shares of Respondent No. 1 as per the Investment
Agreement dated 14.11.2018 (“Investment Agreement”) and (ii) pledge
51.87% equity shares with the Petitioner in terms of the Share Pledge
Agreement dated 29.11.2019.
5.
The learned Senior counsel further submits that, since the
respondent No. 1 did not honour its payment obligations, the petitioner
and the respondent No. 1, entered into a Restructuring Agreement dated
03.10.2019 (“Restructuring Agreement”) to consolidate the terms of
restructuring, and specifically incorporated the previous terms of
restructuring under letters dated 01.03.2018 and 10.04.2018. However,
he submits inspite, of multiple rounds of restructuring, the respondent
No. 1, defaulted in its payment obligations, but as a final opportunity at
the request of the respondent No. 1, the repayment schedule under the
Restructuring Agreement, was further modified in terms of a
communication by email dated 14.06.2022. The respondent No. 1, he
submits, even to the modified restructuring defaulted, to which the
petitioner had no recourse, but to issue a revocation letter dated
15.12.2021, to the respondent No. 1, revoking the restructuring
proposal and reinstating all the liabilities of respondent No. 1, which
aggregated to Rs.695.28/- crores, as on 15.12.2021 (Revocation
Notice).
6.
The learned Senior counsel submits that, it was at this juncture
that, an invitation for Expression of Interest (EOI) dated 03.01.2022,
was published, inviting bids for sale of its equity stake and assignment
of its debts in respondent No. 1, under Section 5 of The Securitisation
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), to which the respondent No. 1 and 2
filed the Title Suit before the Court of Assistant Deputy Commissioner,
East Jaintia Hills, to restrain the petitioner from taking any steps
consequent to the Revocation Notice and Expression of Interest (EOI).
7.
The learned Senior counsel submits that, the petitioner has
come by way of Article 227, as the orders passed by the Lower Court,
are erroneous and beyond its jurisdiction. It is submitted that, by an
express agreement entered into by the parties, for restructuring as per
clause 10 thereof, all disputes had been made subject to the jurisdiction
of Courts and Tribunals of Mumbai and Guwahati, and that the
respondent No. 1 at clause 10.1.3 of the agreement, had agreed to not
challenge this jurisdiction. In support of his submissions, the learned
Senior counsel has cited the following two decisions;
i)
Swastik Gases Private Limited vs. Indian Oil
Corporation Limited (2013) 9 SCC 32
ii)
Brahmani River Pellets Limited vs. Kamachi Industries
Limited (2020) 5 SCC 462.
8.
It is further submitted, that by reading the Restructuring
Agreement, Investment Agreement and Share Pledge Agreement, it
was a clear intention of the petitioner and the respondent No. 1, to
confer jurisdiction only on the Courts of Guwahati or Mumbai, since
all contracts entered into between the parties provided for jurisdiction
of the Courts of Guwahati and Mumbai. As such, he submits, in view
of the agreement of the parties on jurisdiction and exclusion of
jurisdiction of other Courts, there is no occasion for this Court to send
the matter back to the Civil Court to decide jurisdiction.
9.
The learned Senior counsel has contended that, the impugned
order are also ex facie in violation of Section 41(b) of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, and deserve to be set aside, inasmuch as, this Section
prohibits any Court from granting injunction, which restrains any
person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not
subordinate to that, from which injunction is sought. The injunction
order, he submits by directing the petitioner to maintain status quo, has
effectively nullified the right of the petitioner to revoke the
restructuring, inspite of the default by respondent No. 1, and has also
the effect of restraining the petitioner from exercising its legal rights to
initiate and prosecute proceedings for recovery of the outstanding debts
before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Act,
1993 and before the National Company Law Tribunal under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. It is also further asserted by
the learned Senior counsel that, the impugned orders are in violation of
the public policy of India, as they have prevented the petitioner, from
taking any steps for recovery/resolution of the outstanding debts owed
to it by the respondent No. 1, whose account has already been declared
as a Non-Performing Asset. In this context, the judgment of Board of
Control for Cricket in India vs. Cricket Association of Bihar & Ors.
(2015) 3 SCC 251, has been cited.
10.
It has also been urged that, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts
is ousted by the operation of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which
he submits, provides that, Civil Courts do not have jurisdiction in
respect of any action taken, or to be taken by a secured creditor under
this Act, and the impugned orders have in effect even prohibited the
petitioner from taking steps under Section 13 of this Act, which
therefore, is a clear violation of Section 34. With regard to, the point of
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, being applicable to future situations,
the learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on the case of Mardia
Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2004) 4 SCC 311.
The learned Senior counsel concludes his submissions, by praying that
the impugned orders be set aside to enable the petitioner to exercise its
legal and statutory rights to initiate proceedings before the competent
jurisdictional courts and tribunals as per the Restructuring Agreement
and applicable law for recovery, resolution in respect of the admitted
outstanding debt of nearly Rs.700 crores, owed by respondent No. 1.
11.
Mr. K. Paul, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Panthi,
learned counsel for the respondent has firstly submitted that, the order
impugned being appealable, revisionary jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution of India, cannot be invoked. He further submits that,
the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Lower Court by
filing written statement, issues and even an application under Order 39
Rule 4 of the CPC, but no challenge was made as to the maintainability
of the title suit before the Trial Court under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which
should have been made in the first instance. He submits even in the
instant Revision Application, only the impugned orders, that is, orders
dated 28.01.2022 and 17.08.2022, have been assailed and there is no
challenge to the principal proceedings. As such, he contends, the
Revision Application under Article 227 of the Constitution, is not
maintainable. The following decisions have been cited by the learned
Senior counsel;
i)
A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan & Ors.
(2000) 7 SCC 695
ii)
Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev & Ors. vs. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. (2011) 2 SCC 782
iii)
Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana
Sabai & Ors. vs. Tuticorin Educational Society & Ors.
(2019) 9 SCC 538.
12.
Learned Senior counsel then submits that, the issue of territorial
jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact, and cannot be
challenged in a summary proceeding under revisionary jurisdiction
before this Court, as evidence has to be led to establish this claim and
further that, the instant petition has been filed only to avoid the issue of
limitation. The learned Senior counsel has raised technical objections
about the affidavit in support of the instant Revision being defective,
and also that, the pleadings have not been verified. Learned Senior
counsel has placed reliance on the case of Madhav Rao vs. Khunru
Balappa & Ors. reported in (2004) 11 SCC 161, to support his
argument on the issue of territorial jurisdiction.
13.
Coming to the crux of the matter, the learned Senior counsel
submits that, the Investment Agreement which was executed on
14.11.2018, provides for dispute resolution by way of arbitration with
the venue at Guwahati, as per clause 24.1 and 24.2. He submits that, it
was provided in this Investment Agreement, that the Courts of
Guwahati, Assam shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction over the
arbitration proceedings. The learned Senior counsel then submits that
on 03.10.2019, the Restructuring Agreement was executed followed by
the Share Pledge Agreement on 29.11.2019, which however on the
letter dated 15.12.2021, issued by the petitioner, the said restructuring
stood cancelled and revoked with immediate effect. It is contended that,
by the cancellation, the situation reverted back to the first agreement
dated 14.11.2018, and its terms was thus binding on the parties, and the
subsequent terms contained in the Restructuring Agreement dated
03.10.2019, became null and void. He therefore asserts, as this
agreement, that is the Investment Agreement, provides at clause 24.2,
that nothing shall preclude a party from seeking interim equitable or
injunctive relief, the filing of the suit by the respondent shall not be a
waiver of the right of the parties to pursue any other remedy or relief
through arbitration. He therefore submits, the Revision Application not
being maintainable, the same is liable to be dismissed.
14.
Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner
in reply to this argument, has submitted that, the Investment Agreement
is not the primary document but, also a restructuring document which
is clear from the recitals contained therein at clause E and F. He submits
that, it is grossly incorrect to state that, the revocation of the
Restructuring Agreement would make the Investment Agreement, the
primary document that will hold the field, and further submits that, as
per clause 7.4 of the Restructuring Agreement dated 03.10.2019, it has
been clearly provided that even if the Restructuring Agreement is
revoked, the respondent No. 1 is required to continue honouring its
obligations under the Restructuring and Investment Agreements, which
includes the obligations to not challenge the jurisdiction of the Courts
and Tribunals of Mumbai and Guwahati. He further contends that it is
a settled position of law, that words like ‘exclusive’ and ‘non-exclusive’
while conferring jurisdiction are of no significance and what is relevant
is the intention of the parties. On this aspect, he has again cited the
judgment of Swastik Gases Private Limited vs. Indian Oil Corporation
Limited (supra).
15.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Shorn of other
details, it is clear that the proceedings, arose from the publication of the
Expression of Interest (EOI) on 03.01.2022, on the revocation of the
restructuring proposal, and the re-instatement of all the liabilities of the
respondent No. 1, which aggregated to nearly 700 crores. By the said
EOI, bids were invited for sale of equity stake and assignment of debts
under Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act, and the respondent to defeat the
same, had then filed the Title Suit to restrain the petitioner from taking
any further steps in furtherance of the EOI, which was granted by the
Trial Court initially on 28.01.2022 and made absolute on 17.08.2022.
From the records, it appears that, the petitioner herein, contested the
suit and had filed a written statement and also the suggested issues. As
noted earlier, challenge has been made to the proceedings and the orders
passed by the Lower Court on the following grounds, that is, lack of
jurisdiction, the bar created by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, and
Section 41(b) of The Specific Relief Act, 1963.
16.
On the point of jurisdiction, as per the Restructuring Agreement
dated October 3, 2019, it is noted that, at clause 10 specifically clause
10.1 (10.1.1 and 10.1.2), the parties had agreed that, all disputes will be
subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts and Tribunals at Mumbai and
Guwahati. The said clauses for the sake of convenience, are reproduced
hereinbelow;
“10.1 Governing Law and Jurisdiction
10.1.1.
This Agreement shall be governed,
construed and interpreted in accordance with the
laws of India and the Borrower agrees that courts
and tribunals of Mumbai, Maharashtra and
Guwahati, Assam shall have the jurisdiction to
settle any disputes which may arise out of or in
connection with this Agreement and that
accordingly any suit, action or proceedings
(together referred to as “Proceedings”) arising
out of or in connection with this Agreement may
be brought in such courts or the tribunals and the
Borrower irrevocably submits to and accepts for
itself and in respect of its property, generally and
unconditionally, the jurisdiction of those courts
or tribunals.
10.1.2.
The Borrower irrevocably waives
any objection now or in future, to decide of the
venue of any Proceedings in the courts and
tribunals at Mumbai, Maharashtra and/or
Guwahati, Assam and any claim that any such
Proceedings
have
been
brought
in
an
inconvenient forum and further irrevocably
agrees that a judgment in any Proceedings
brought in the courts and tribunals at Guwahati,
India shall be conclusive and binding upon it and
may be enforced in the courts of any other
jurisdiction, (subject to the laws of such
jurisdiction) by a suit upon such judgment, a
certified copy of which shall be conclusive
evidence of such judgment, or in any other
manner provided by Applicable Law”.
17.
A plain reading of the above noted clauses, in the view of this
Court, has clearly expressed the intention of the parties, that in any
dispute to the agreement, the Courts at Mumbai and Guwahati, Assam
would have jurisdiction. On this aspect, the judgment cited by the
petitioner that is, Swastik Gases Private Limited (supra) has a distinct
bearing on this point. Paragraphs – 31, 32, 33 and 37, wherein this point
has been discussed are reproduced hereinbelow;
“31. In the instant case, the appellant does not dispute
that part of cause of action has arisen in Kolkata. What
appellant says is that part of cause of action has also
arisen in Jaipur and, therefore, the Chief Justice of the
Rajasthan High Court or the designate Judge has
jurisdiction to consider the application made by the
appellant for the appointment of an arbitrator
under
Section
11.
Having
regard
to
Section
11(12)(b) and Section 2(e) of the 1996 Act read with
Section 20(c) of the Code, there remains no doubt that
the Chief Justice or the designate Judge of the
Rajasthan High Court has jurisdiction in the matter.
The question is, whether parties by virtue of Clause 18
of the agreement have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction
of the courts at Jaipur or, in other words, whether in
view of Clause 18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of
Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been
excluded?
32.
For answer to the above question, we have to see
the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement
which provides that the agreement shall be subject to
jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that
whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement
the words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ or ‘exclusive
jurisdiction’ have not been used but this, in our view, is
not decisive and does not make any material difference.
The intention of the parties - by having clause 18 in the
agreement – is clear and unambiguous that the courts at
Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the
courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so
because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like
clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing
to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that
expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making
a provision that the agreement is subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have
impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts.
Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the
courts at a particular place and such courts have
jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an
inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude
all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section
23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither
forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It
does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any
manner.
33.
The above view finds support from the decisions
of this Court in Hakam Singh, A.B.C. Laminart,
R.S.D.V. Finance, Angile Insulations, Shriram City,
Hanil Era Textiles and Balaji Coke.
37.
In my opinion, the very existence of the exclusion
of jurisdiction clause in the agreement would be
rendered meaningless were it not given its natural and
plain meaning. The use of words like “only”,
“exclusively”, “alone” and so on are not necessary to
convey the intention of the parties in an exclusion of
jurisdiction clause of an agreement. Therefore, I agree
with the conclusion that jurisdiction in the subjectmatter of the proceedings vested, by agreement, only in
the Courts in Kolkata”.
18.
Though arguments has been put forward by the respondents
that, with the revocation of the Restructuring Agreement dated
03.10.2019, the original Investment Agreement dated 14.11.2018,
would be revived, and further that at clause 24.2 thereof, it was
provided that, no party was precluded from seeking equitable or
injunctive relief, or both and that, the pursuit of this relief would also
not stand as a bar to seeking resolution through arbitration, this
contention is of no relevance, inasmuch as, ‘Restructuring Documents’
as defined in the Restructuring Agreement has also included the
‘Investment Agreement’. As such therefore, the Restructuring
Agreement having taken into its fold, the Investment Agreement, it
cannot be held that with the revocation of the Restructuring Agreement,
the Investment Agreement dated 14.11.2018, would hold sway. Further,
on the ouster of jurisdiction, sufficient materials are available as to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Mumbai and Guwahati over the
dispute. The judgment placed by the respondents that is, Madhav Rao
vs. Khunru Balappa & Ors.(supra), is of no assistance to them, as it
concerns a case where only bald statements were made on the lack of
jurisdiction and no materials were placed to substantiate the same.
19.
On the same point however, this Court cannot ignore the fact
that, the petitioner did not take the point of lack of jurisdiction in the
first instance, but rather, put it up as a suggested issue and also took part
in proceedings before the Trial Court, and on the injunction being made
absolute, have come before this Court. This however, in the view of this
Court, cannot be a factor that will prevent the aspect of lack of
jurisdiction of the Trial Court being considered.
20.
This Court will now examine, as to whether the suit was also
barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which has laid down as
follows;
“34. Civil court not to have jurisdiction.- No civil
court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit
or proceeding in respect of any matter which a
Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate
Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to
determine and no injunction shall be granted by
any court or other authority in respect of any
action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any
power conferred by or under this Act or under the
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)”.
21.
Section 34 as noted above, has cast a bar on Civil Courts in
entertaining any suit of proceeding in respect of any matter, which a
Debts Recovery Tribunal is empowered to take up, and more
importantly, in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance
of powers conferred by SARFAESI Act or Recovery of Debts Act,
1993.
22.
Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, speaks of enforcement of
security interest, where a borrower who is under a liability to a secured
creditor under security arrangement makes a default in repayment as
provided in Section 13(2), or fails to discharge his liability in full within
the period specified, which is provided in Section 13(4). The decision
of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra),
in the considered view of this Court, will be applicable to the instant
case, wherein it has been held that, the bar of Civil Court applies to all
such matters, which may be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal. Paragraph – 50 which is relevant, is reproduced
hereinbelow;
“50. It has also been submitted that an appeal is
entertainable before the Debts Recovery Tribunal
only after such measures as provided in subsection (4) of Section 13 are taken and Section
34 bars to entertain any proceeding in respect of
a matter which the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the
appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine.
Thus before any action or measure is taken under
sub-section (4) of Section 13, it is submitted by
Mr. Salve one of the counsel for the respondents
that there would be no bar to approach the civil
court. Therefore, it cannot be said that no remedy
is available to the borrowers. We, however, find
that this contention as advanced by Shri Salve is
not correct. A full reading of section 34 shows
that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in
respect of matters which a Debts Recovery
Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to
determine in respect of any action taken "or to be
taken in pursuance of any power conferred under
this Act". That is to say, the prohibition covers
even matters which can be taken cognizance of
by the Debts Recovery Tribunal though no
measure in that direction has so far been taken
under sub-section (4) of Section 13. It is further
to be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in
respect of a proceeding which matter may be
taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter in
respect of which an action may be taken even
later on, the civil court shall have no jurisdiction
to entertain any proceeding thereof. The bar of
civil court thus applies to all such matters which
may be taken cognizance of by the Debts
Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in
which measures have already been taken under
sub-section (4) of Section 13”.
[Emphasis supplied]
23.
The proceedings therefore, in view of the specific bar imposed
by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, will no doubt be not maintainable
in law, as the non-discharge of liabilities to the secured creditor will
surely come within the purview of a dispute that should go before the
Debts Recovery Tribunal. The impugned orders in this regard, having
in effect restrained the petitioner from seeking relief under a special act,
are hit by Section 34.
24.
On the point of the orders being violative of Section 41(b) of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963, this Court finds force in the submissions
of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that, a Court cannot
grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting a proceeding
in a Court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction. This submission is
accepted, inasmuch as, by the impugned orders, the petitioner has been
effectively restrained from instituting other proceedings before a
special forum, which is not subordinate to the Lower Court, that is, the
Debts Recovery Tribunal or before the Company Law Tribunal.
Section 41(b) reads as follows;
“41.
Injunction
when
refused.-
An
injunction cannot be granted(a) …………..
(b) to restrain any person from instituting
or prosecuting any proceeding in a
court not subordinate to that from
which the injunction is sought.”
25.
The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Cotton Corporation of India Limited vs. United Industrial Bank
Limited & Ors. reported in (1983) 4 SCC 625, is also relevant to be
referred to on this point, of which extract of Paragraph – 7 and 9 is
quoted hereinbelow;
“7.
Part III of the Act …………………..
The Legislature manifestly expressed its
mind by enacting Section 41 (b) in such
clear and unambiguous language that an
injunction cannot be granted to restrain
any person, the language takes care of
injunction acting in personam, from
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding
in a court not subordinate to that from
which injunction is sought. Section 41(b)
denies to the court the jurisdiction to grant
an injunction restraining any person from
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding
in a court which is not subordinate to the
court from which the injunction is sought.
In other words, the court can still grant an
injunction restraining a person from
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding
in a court which is subordinate to the court
from which the injunction is sought. As a
necessary corollary, it would follow that
the court is precluded from granting an
injunction restraining any person from
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding
in a court of co-ordinate or superior
jurisdiction. This change in language
deliberately adopted by the Legislature
after taking note of judicial vacillation has
to be given full effect.
9.
Viewed from a slightly different
angle, it would appear that the legal system
in our country envisages obtaining of
redressal of wrong or relief against unjust
denial thereof by approaching the court set
up for the purpose and invested with power
both substantive and procedural to do
justice that is to grant relief against
invasion or violation of legally protected
interests which are jurisprudentially called
rights. If a person complaining of invasion
or violation of his rights is injuncted from
approaching the court set up to grant relief
by an action brought by the opposite side
against whom he has a claim and which he
wanted to enforce through court, he would
have first to defend the action establishing
that he has a just claim and he cannot be
restrained from approaching the court to
obtain relief. A person having a legal right
and
complains
of
its
violation
or
infringement, can approach the court and
seek relief. When such person is injuncted
from approaching the court, he has to
vindicate the right and then when
injunction is vacated, he has to approach
the court for relief. In other words, he
would have to go through the gamut over
again: When defending against a claim of
injunction the person vindicates the claim
and right to enforce the same. If successful
he does not get relief but a door to court
which was bolted in his face is opened.
Why should he be exposed to multiplicity
of proceedings? In order to avoid such a
situation the Legislature enacted Section
41(b) and statutorily provided that an
injunction cannot be granted to restrain
any person from instituting or prosecuting
any proceeding in a court not subordinate
to that from which the injunction is sought.
Ordinarily a preventive relief by way of
prohibitory injunction cannot be granted
by a court with a view to restraining any
person from instituting or prosecuting any
proceeding and this is subject to one
exception enacted in larger public interest,
namely, a superior court can injunct a
person from instituting or prosecuting an
action in a subordinate court with a view to
regulating the proceeding before the
subordinate courts. At any rate the court is
precluded by a statutory provision from
granting an injunction restraining a
person from instituting or prosecuting a
proceeding in a court of coordinate
jurisdiction or superior jurisdiction. There
is an unresolved controversy whether a
court can grant an injunction against a
person from instituting or prosecuting a
proceeding before itself but that is not
relevant in the present circumstances and
we do not propose to enlarge the area of
controversy.”
[Emphasis supplied]
26.
Coming to the maintainability of the instant Revision
Application under Article 227 of the Constitution, it is correct that
procedural appeal was available to the petitioner in assailing the
impugned orders which has not been availed of, but rather interference
is sought, by praying for the invocation of the powers of
superintendence by this Court. It is a common refrain that, in cases
where alternative remedy is available in terms of the CPC, Courts are
normally reluctant to exercise supervisory jurisdiction, but it is also true
that depending upon the peculiar facts of a case, a remedy of appeal
may not always be a bar in the exercise of such powers. The instant case
to the mind of the Court, is such a case, wherein, the manner of
involvement of public money is clearly against public policy, and a
secured creditor is being thwarted from taking steps for recovery of
outstanding debts from the respondent No. 1, whose account has
already been declared a non-performing asset. Article 227 of the
Constitution, vests in the High Court the power to interfere in cases of
erroneous assumption of jurisdiction or acting beyond the jurisdiction
conferred and to correct a patent error, procedural or otherwise.
27.
Looking into the peculiar facts of the instant case as
aforementioned, the judgments cited by the learned Senior counsel for
the respondents on the restraint to exercise of powers under Article 227
of the Constitution, that is, Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev & Ors. vs.
State of Maharashtra & Ors. (supra) and Virudhunagar Hindu
Nagardal Dharma Paribalna Sabal & Ors. vs. Tuticorin Educational
Society & Ors. (supra), therefore will not be applicable, as the facts of
these cases, rest on different circumstances.
28.
Though the proceedings before the Trial Court, have not been
specifically challenged by the petitioner, but looking into the totality of
the facts and circumstances of the case, from the point of jurisdiction,
operation of the SARFAESI Act, the Specific Relief Act, 1963, no
useful purpose will be served by remanding the matter back to the
Lower Court, to first decide on the point of jurisdiction. The bar to Civil
Courts in such matters, which are to be governed under special laws and
relief sought for available under the Debt Recovery and Insolvency
Laws, are overwhelming factors that have weighed in the mind of this
Court in coming to this finding. It may also be noted that, there can be
no estoppel against law, and whatever actions that may have been taken,
otherwise by the petitioner, in the proceedings before the Lower Court,
cannot take away the right from it seeking relief under the relevant
statutes. A judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in B.E.
Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal & Anr. vs. Chhattisgarh
Investment Limited reported in (2015) 12 SCC 225, at paragraph – 12
and 13 to show the futility of remand to decide on jurisdiction had held
as follows;
“12. In light of the legal position
exposited in Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. and
Associated Contractors and having regard
to Clause 13 of the agreement, as noted
above, the jurisdiction of the District
Judge, Raipur is ousted and, therefore, he
cannot be said to have any jurisdiction in
dealing
with
the matter.
The
only
competent court of jurisdiction is the court
at Goa.
13.
In what we have discussed above, we
do not think that it is necessary to send the
matter back to the District Judge, Raipur
for determination of the jurisdiction as
contended by the learned counsel for the
respondent. In our view, relegating the
parties to the District Judge, Raipur to
determine the question of jurisdiction will
be unnecessary and futile exercise.”
29.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, this Court in exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, deems
the instant case to be a fit case for interference, in view of the error of
law apparent on record. As such, the impugned orders 28.01.2022 and
17.08.2022, are accordingly quashed and set aside, and the Learned
Lower Court in view of the specific bar in such matters is held to be
without jurisdiction to try T.S. No. 1 of 2022, pending in its Court.
30.
As ordered above, the instant Revision Application stands
allowed.
31.
No order as to costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
16.02.2023
“D.Thabah-PS”
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