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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.44/2025
Askir Ali, S/O. Late Achaddar Ali, resident of Yeazekhowra, P.O.-Babur
Bazar, P.S.- Irani (earliar, P.S.-Kailashahar), District-Unakoti Tripura.
……… Appellant(s).
VERSUS
1. Mabaswir Ali, Husband of late Karibunnessa, resident of Irani, Kailashahar,
P.O.- Irani Bazar, P.S.- Irani, District-Unakoti Tripura.
2. Mafik Ali, S/O. Late Karibunnessa & Mabaswir Ali, resident of Irani,
Kailashahar, P.O.- Irani Bazar, P.S.- Irani, District-Unakoti Tripura.
3. Rabeya Begam, D/O. Late Karibunnessa and Mabaswir Ali, resident of
Irani, Kailashahar, P.O.- Irani Bazar, P.S.-Irani, District-Unakoti Tripura.
4. Mujib Ali, S/O. Late Karibunnessa and Mabaswir Ali, resident of Irani,
Kailashahar, P.O.-Irani Bazar, P.S.-Irani, District-Unakoti Tripura.
5. Motahir Ali alias Matassir Ali, S/O. Late Karibunnessa and Mabaswir Ali,
resident of Irani, Kailashahar, P.O.-Irani Bazar, P.S.-Irani, District-Unakoti
Tripura, presently at-Qatar, Middle East Asia.
………Respondent(s).
Along with
CRP No.01/2026
Askir Ali, S/O. Late Achaddar Ali, resident of Yeazekhowra, P.O.-Babur
Bazar, P.S.- Irani (earliar, P.S.-Kailashahar), District-Unakoti Tripura.
……… Petitioner(s).
VERSUS
1. Mabaswir Ali, Husband of late Karibunnessa, resident of Irani, Kailashahar,
P.O.- Irani Bazar, P.S.- Irani, District-Unakoti Tripura.
2. Mafik Ali, S/O. Late Karibunnessa & Mabaswir Ali, resident of Irani,
Kailashahar, P.O.- Irani Bazar, P.S.- Irani, District-Unakoti Tripura.
3. Rabeya Begam, D/O. Late Karibunnessa and Mabaswir Ali, resident of
Irani, Kailashahar, P.O.- Irani Bazar, P.S.-Irani, District-Unakoti Tripura.
4. Mujib Ali, S/O. Late Karibunnessa and Mabaswir Ali, resident of Irani,
Kailashahar, P.O.-Irani Bazar, P.S.-Irani, District-Unakoti Tripura.
5. Motahir Ali alias Matassir Ali, S/O. Late Karibunnessa and Mabaswir Ali,
resident of Irani, Kailashahar, P.O.-Irani Bazar, P.S.-Irani, District-Unakoti
Tripura, presently at-Qatar, Middle East Asia.
………Respondent(s).
For Appellant/Petitioner(s)
: Mr. Sankar Lodh, Advocate,
Mr. Kishalay Roy, Advocate,
Mr. Subham Majumder, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)
: Mr. Bibek Banerjee, Advocate,
Ms. Ruma Majumder, Advocate.
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
Date of hearing & judgment
: 30.01.2026.
Whether fit for reporting
: YES.
COMMON JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. Sankar Lodh, counsel appearing for the appellant/
petitioner and Mr. Bibek Banerjee, counsel appearing for the respondents.
2.
The appellant in this Second Appeal as well as the petitioner in
the CRP is the principal defendant (for short ‘the petitioner’) in Title Suit
No.16 of 2015 on the file of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kailashahar,
Unakoti District.
3.
The respondents No.1, 2 & 3 in the RSA as well as in the CRP
(for short ‘the respondents 1 to 3') had filed the said suit for a declaration of
their right, title and interest in the suit schedule property and for a perpetual
injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with their possession of
the suit schedule property.
4.
There was also a counter claim by the petitioner in the same suit.
5.
After contest, the suit was dismissed on 21.12.2024.The trial
Court, while considering the counter claim, granted a mandatory injunction in
favour of the petitioner and directed the respondents No.1, 2 & 3 to vacate
the construction made over the suit schedule land. It thus partly decreed the
counter claim in favour of the petitioner. However, to the extent the petitioner
claimed declaration that they were possessing the suit land adversely since
03.03.1999, the said relief was denied by the trial Court.
6.
The respondents No.1, 2 & 3 did not file any appeal against the
judgment of the trial Court.
7.
But the petitioner filed Title Appeal No.15 of 2025 before the
District Judge, Unakoti Judicial District, Kailashahar, Tripura along with a
Civil Misc.(Condonation) Application No.13 of 2025 to condone the delay of
59 days in filing the said appeal.
8.
In the application seeking condonation of delay filed under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner contended that the judgment of
the trial Court was rendered on 21.12.2024 and the decree therein was drafted
on 03.01.2025. He stated that application for obtaining certified copies of the
judgment and decree was made on 13.01.2025 and they were given to the
petitioner on 06.02.2025, but on account of illness, he could not file the
Appeal within the period of 30 days prescribed by law and presented the same
on 08.05.2025. Thus, the delay in filing the appeal occurred and it is required
to be condoned. He had also filed prescriptions from certain Doctors who
advised him during the relevant period to take bed rest from time to time.
9.
This application was opposed by the respondents No.1, 2 & 3
who alleged that there is no proper day to day explanation for condonation of
delay and so the application should be dismissed. They also alleged that the
plea of the petitioner that he could not contact his lawyer on account of his
illness is a concocted and false story.
The order of the District Judge:
10.
By order dt.01.09.2025, Civil Misc.(Condonation) No.13 of 2025
was dismissed by the District Judge, Unakoti District, Kailashahar holding
that there is a delay of 100 days in filing the appeal and not 59 days.
11.
In the said order, the District Judge held that though the judgment
of the trial Court was pronounced on 21.12.2024 and the decree was prepared
on 03.01.2025, the delay of 10 days till 13.01.2025 for filing application
seeking certified copy of the same was not explained by petitioner. He also
held that even though the certified copy was ready on 01.02.2025, the
petitioner received it on 06.02.2025 and did not explain the delay of 4 days in
taking the same.
12.
He then referred to the prescriptions of Doctors produced by the
petitioner and held that those prescriptions indicated that the petitioner was
only asked to take rest, that it was only an advice and he did not establish that
he was in a condition which required complete rest. He also held that the
prescriptions were not duly certified. He therefore held that there was nothing
on the part of the petitioner to show that he was not in a position to take lawful
steps for filing the appeal as required.
13.
He also noted that according to the plea of the petitioner, he had
gone to Guwahati for personal reasons, that for presentation of the appeal,
physical appearance of the petitioner was not necessary and all that he needed
to do was to engage a lawyer who could have prepared the memo of appeal
and filed it in the Court along with the certified copy of the judgment; that the
petitioner could not do even the simple thing for the period of 100 days. He
also criticized the application for condonation of delay stating that it was
made in a mechanical manner.
14.
Having dismissed the application Civil Misc.(Condonation)
Application No.13 of 2025 for condonation of delay, a consequential order
was passed on 01.09.2025 in T.A. No.15 of 2025 dropping the appeal and
disposing it as uncontested in view of the said order passed in the delay
condonation petition.
15.
Challenging the order dt.01.09.2025 in Civil Misc.(Condonation)
No.13 of 2025, the petitioner filed CRP No.01 of 2026 under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India and challenging the decree dt.01.09.2025 dismissing
the T.A. No.15 of 2025, he filed RSA No.44 of 2025.
16.
At the outset, counsel for the respondents No.1, 2 & 3 sought to
contend that against the order dismissing the application for condonation of
delay, a Revision under Article 227 of the Constitution does not lie and the
said order is also appealable.
17.
Counsel for the respondents No.1, 2 & 3 had cited the judgment
of Agartala Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Union of India &
others v. Ved Prakash Srivastava1 and another judgment of the Tripura High
Court in the case of Maran Chandra Shil and Ors. v. Smt. Laxmi Rani
Chowdhury & another2.
18.
This contention is refuted by the counsel for the appellant/
petitioner.
19.
In the judgment in Ved Prakash Srivastava (1 supra), a Revision
under Section 115 of the CPC was filed against an order passed by the District
Judge, West Tripura, Agartala on 02.05.1995 in Title Appeal No.79 of 1994
whereby the District Judge dismissed the application for condonation of delay
in presenting the memo of appeal and also the appeal itself.
A view was expressed in the said judgment that no revision
which would lie against the said order and that the order dismissing the appeal
can be challenged in Second Appeal because it is an appeal against an order of
rejection of plaint by way of an appeal under Section 107(2) of CPC.
(1998) 3 GLR 176
AIR 2014 TRIPURA 36
20.
In my opinion, the learned Judge who decided the said case ought
to have noticed that though a common order was pronounced in that case
rejecting the application for condonation of delay and also dismissing the
appeal, the order dismissing the appeal, being a decree, an appeal would lie
under Section 100 CPC against it.
21.
But as regards the order rejecting the application for condonation
of delay, the said order is not a judgment or decree and, therefore, no appeal
lies against the same under Section 100 CPC. Consequently, in 1998 (when
the said decision was given) when the Civil Procedure Code,1908 had not
been amended and the amendment happened only in 2002 vide Code of Civil
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, a revision under Section 115 of CPC
could have been maintained against the order dismissing an application for
condonation of delay in presenting the appeal, and a Second Appeal would lie
against the consequential decree and judgment in the First Appeal dismissing
the First Appeal.
22.
The learned Single Judge erred in holding that only an appeal lies
against both orders, i.e. the order dismissing the application for condonation of
delay and the order consequently dismissing the First Appeal.
23.
The learned Single Judge ought to have noticed that though in
that case a common order was passed by the District Judge for both the
application for condonation of delay and the First Appeal, as far as the
petitioner therein was concerned, there were in fact two different remediesone of Revision under Section 115 CPC against the order rejecting the
application for condonation of delay and the other a Second Appeal against
the order dismissing the First Appeal.
24.
Therefore, in my opinion, the said decision does not lay down a
correct principle of law that only a Second Appeal lies against an order
dismissing an application for condonation of delay and that a Revision cannot
lie under Section 115 of CPC. To the extent the said judgment held that an
appeal lies against the decree dismissing the First Appeal under Section 100
CPC, however, the said judgment is correct.
25.
In Maran Chandra Shil (2 supra) also an application under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India was filed challenging an order passed
by the District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur in Civil Misc. Case No.27 of
2004 whereby the District Judge had rejected the application made under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 82 days in
preferring the appeal and consequently dismissed the First Appeal preferred
against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. In that case also, there was
a single order passed on 21.09.2004 dealing with both the application for
condonation of delay in filing the First Appeal and also deciding the appeal. In
para-22, the learned Single Judge held as under:
"22.
So, according to this Court, dismissal of an
application for condonation of delay and consequent thereto
dismissal of appeal is a decree and against such a decree a
second appeal lies. When the statute prescribed an appeal
against the said decree then a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution is not permissible. The aforesaid view of this
Court gets support from the decision of the Apex Court in Miss
Maneck Custodji Surjarji V Sarafazali Nawabali Mirza, AIR
1976 SC 2446 wherein the Apex Court while considering the
order passed by the Bombay High Court disposing a Special
Civil Application exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution, noted inter alia, that :
“it is very difficult to appreciate the reasoning
behind the order made by the High Court. It is to say
the least an extraordinary order which flies in the
face of law and judicial procedure. The respondent
had clearly a legal remedy available to him by way
of an appeal against the decree of the City Civil
court and this remedy was not only adequate but
more comprehensive than the one under Art. 227 of
the Constitution. Even so, for some inexplicable
reasons, the respondent chose to prefer a Special
Civil Application under Art. 227 of the Constitution
and Vaidya, J., entertained the Special Civil
application and granted relief to the respondent
casting to the winds the well-settled principle that
the High Court does not ordinarily, in exercise of its
discretion, entertain a special civil application
under Art. 227 of the Constitution where an
adequate alternative legal remedy is available to the
applicant. It is true that this principle is not rigid
and inflexible and there can be extraordinary
circumstances where despite the existence of an
alternative legal remedy, the High Court may
interfere in favour of an applicant, but this was
certainly not one of such extraordinary cases. It is
indeed difficult to see how the learned Judge could
entertain a Special Civil Application against a
decree passed by a subordinate court when the
procedural law allows an appeal against it and that
appeal lies to the High Court itself. It must be
realized that the jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the
Constitution is an extraordinary jurisdiction which
is to be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases
and it is not to be exercised as if it were an appellate
jurisdiction or as if it gave unfettered and
unrestricted power to the High Court to do whatever
it liked.”
As the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume
unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or
wrong decisions, it must be restricted to cases of grave
dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental
principles of law or justice where grave injustice would be
done unless the High Court interferes."
26.
To the extent the learned Single Judge in that case held that
where the statute prescribes an appeal against the decree, a petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution was not permissible and that against the
dismissal of the First appeal, which is a decree, a Second Appeal would lie, he
is undoubtedly correct.
27.
But to hold that an order dismissing an application for
condonation of delay is also appealable, is not correct.
28.
Again the learned Single Judge in that case seems to lose sight of
the fact that though it was a common order, it dealt with both the application
for condonation of delay and the appeal itself.
29.
To the extent the District Judge had dismissed the application for
condonation of delay, no appeal is provided in the Civil Procedure Code.
Therefore, challenge to the said order rejecting the application for condonation
of delay can only be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of
the amendment made to the CPC in 2002 restricting the scope of Section 115
CPC.
30.
Therefore, in that case also, there ought to have been an RSA
under Section 100 CPC against the dismissal of the First Appeal by the First
Appellate Court and a Revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
insofar as the District Court had rejected the application for condonation of
delay.
31.
Therefore, for the same reason both the judgment in Ved Prakash
Srivastava (1 supra) and the judgment in Maran Chandra Shil & others (2
supra) to the extent they held that only a Second Appeal lies against an order
dismissing an application for condonation of delay and not an application
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, are not correct.
32.
I therefore hold that CRP No.01 of 2026 filed by the petitioner
therein challenging the order dt.01.09.2025 in Civil Misc.(Condonation)
No.13 of 2025 rejecting the application for condonation of delay is certainly
maintainable and the objection raised by the respondents that it is not
maintainable, is rejected.
33.
I also hold that T.A. No.15 of 2025 was rejected only in view of
the dismissal of the Civil Misc.(Condonation) No.13 of 2025, by the judgment
dt.01.09.2025 and against the decree dismissing the said appeal, RSA No.44
of 2025 is certainly maintainable.
34.
Coming to the merits of the Revision CRP No.01 of 2026, the
decree of the trial Court was passed only on 03.01.2025 though the judgment
was pronounced on 21.12.2024. Therefore, the limitation for filing the First
Appeal can only be counted from the date the decree is prepared, i.e.
03.01.2025. Admittedly, the appeal was presented on 08.05.2025 and the gap
between the dates on which the decree was prepared and the appeal was filed
is 125 days.
35.
Since the application for obtaining certified copy was filed on
13.01.2025 and it was made ready on 01.02.2025, the 18 days time covered by
that period is also liable to be excluded.
36.
There is no dispute that the time prescribed for preferring the
First Appeal from judgment of trial court to the First Appellate Court is 30
days . If the said period of 30 days and the 18 days period referred to supra are
deducted from the total period of 125 days, the actual delay in filing the
appeal is only 77 days and not 100 days as was noted by the Court below or
59 days as was stated by the petitioner in the delay condonation application.
37.
Be that as it may, it has been the pleading of the petitioner/
appellant that there was a Winter Vacation of the Court and so the decree was
prepared only thereafter on 03.01.2025, but he fell ill on 01.01.2025 and he
was advised to bed rest for 10 days. It was stated that he again fell ill and was
advised to bed rest from 07.02.2025 and as his condition remained serious,
another doctor advised him to take 4 weeks' rest; so there was a delay in
contacting the counsel and he could do so only on 23.02.2025. He also stated
that the engaged counsel had gone away to Guwahati and had come only on
08.04.2025, that the petitioner again had serious fever and was advised bed
rest for 4 weeks from 30.03.2025 and thus delay in filing the appeal occurred.
33. The view of the trial Court that the short delay of 10 days in applying for
certified copy and another 4 days delay in receiving it was not properly
explained and also that the prescriptions filed by the petitioner/appellant only
advised rest and it cannot be said that he would require complete rest, is
utterly perverse and cannot be sustained.
38.
The fact remains that application for certified copy was made and
it was received and due to illness, the petitioner/appellant could not
immediately take steps to file the First Appeal. The delay has been
satisfactorily explained.
39.
In this view of the matter, the order dt.01.09.2025 in Civil Misc.
(Condonation) No.13 of 2025 cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the
said application is allowed.
40.
Since the only reason for dismissal of the First Appeal was the
dismissal of the application for condonation of delay on 01.09.2025 in Civil
Misc.(Condonation) No.13 of 2025, once the said order is set aside and the
delay is condoned, the order dismissing the First Appeal cannot be sustained
and is accordingly set aside as well.
41.
Consequently, CRP No.01 of 2026 is allowed and RSA No.44 of
2025 is also allowed and the Title Appeal No.15 of 2025 is restored to the file
of the Court of the District Judge, Unakoti District, Kailashahar and the same
shall be decided on merits after hearing both sides in accordance with law.
42.
This exercise shall be completed by 30.04.2026.
43.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)
Pulak
PULAK BANIK
Date: 2026.02.04 16:13:28 +05'30'
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