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2026:CGHC:2399-DB
ASHOK
SAHU
NAFR
Digitally signed
by ASHOK
SAHU
Date:
2026.01.16
18:26:27 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1638 of 2018
{Arising out of judgment dated 28.09.2018 passed in Sessions Trial No.65/2016 by
the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Manendragarh, District Korea}
Ramlal, S/o. Late Dhani Ram, Aged About 50 Years, R/o. Village
Pasauri, Police Station Kelhari, District Korea, Chhattisgarh.
--- Appellant
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station Kelhari, District
Korea, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent
For Appellant
:
Ms. Usha Chandrakar, Advocate
For Respondent
:
Dr. Surendra Kumar Dewangan, Panel
Lawyer
&
CRA No. 1771 of 2018
1 - Ashok Kumar. S/o. Nand Kumar, Aged About 40 Years, R/o.
Village-
Pasouri,
Chhattisgarh.
Police
Station-
Kelhari,
District-
Korea,
2 - Smt. Madhuri, W/o. Ashok Kumar, Aged About 35 Years, R/o.
Village-
Pasouri,
Police
Station-
Kelhari,
District-
Korea,
Chhattisgarh.
---Appellants
Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police
Station- Kelhari, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent
For Appellant
:
Ms. Nirupama Bajpai, Advocate
For Respondent
:
Dr. Surendra Kumar Dewangan, Panel
Lawyer
(Division Bench)
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma
Judgment on Board
(15.01.2026)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1.
Ashok Kumar (A-1) and his wife Smt. Madhuri (A-2) both
have preferred Criminal Appeal No.1771/2018 and Ramlal
(A-3) has preferred Criminal Appeal No.1638/2018. Since
common question of law and facts are involved in both the
appeals and have been arisen from Sessions Trial No.
65/2016, they have been clubbed together, heard together
and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2.
Both the appeals filed under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. are
directed against the impugned judgment dated 28.09.2018
passed by learned Second Additional Sessions Judge,
Manendragarh, District Korea in Sessions Trial No.65/2016,
by which, the appellants herein have been convicted and
sentenced as under :
CONVICTION
SENTENCE
U/s. 302 read with
: Life imprisonment and
Section 34 of IPC.
fine of Rs. 1000/- in
default of payment of
fine amount, 6 months’
additional
simple
imprisonment.
U/s. 201 read with
: Rigorous imprisonment
Section 34 of IPC.
for 5 years and fine of
Rs.1000/-, in default of
payment of fine amount,
months’
additional
simple imprisonment.
Both the sentence to run concurrently.
3.
Case of the prosecution, in short, is that in the intervening
night of 29.10.2015 at 3:00 A.M. to 02.11.2015, Ashok Kumar
(A-1) and his wife Smt. Madhuri (A-2) along-with Ramlal
(A-3) and Kamla Prasad (died on 13.09.2018) all in
furtherance of their common intention caused the death of
Mukesh Kumar, brother of Ashok Kumar (A-1), by stabbing
screw driver on his neck and in order to screen themselves
from the legal punishment, they thrown the dead body into
the dam and thereby committed the aforesaid offences. The
matter was reported to the police by Nand Kumar (PW-1),
pursuant to which, Merg Intimation was registered vide Ex.P6, FIR was registered vide Ex.P-33, Inquest was conducted
vide Ex.P-7 and dead body of deceased Mukesh Kumar was
subjected to post-mortem, which was conducted by Dr.
Mahesh Singh (PW-7), who proved the post-mortem report
vide Ex.P-26-A, in which, no definite opinion can be given
regarding cause of death. Pursuant to memorandum
statement of the appellants vide Ex.P-12, Ex.P14, Ex.P-16 &
Ex.P-18, wooden juwa was seized vide Ex.P-13 from Ashok
Kumar (A-1), nylon robe was seized vide Ex.P-15 from
Madhuri (A-2), bamboo stick was seized vide Ex.P-17 from
Kamla Prasad (died) and blood-stained shirt & screw driver
was seized vide Ex.P-19 from Ramlal (A-3), which were sent
for chemical examination to FSL and as per the FSL report
(Ex.C-1 to C-3), blood was found over the seized articles.
After due investigation, the appellants were charge-sheeted
for the aforesaid offences to the jurisdictional criminal court
and the case was ultimately committed to the Court of
Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in
which, the appellants abjured their guilt and entered into
defence stating that they have not committed any offence
and they have been falsely implicated.
4.
In order to bring home the offences, prosecution examined
as many as 18 witnesses and exhibited 44 documents alongwith Ex.C-1 to Ex.C-3
and
the accused/ appellants in
support of their defence have neither examined any witness
nor exhibited any document.
5.
The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence on record, convicted the appellants herein for the
aforesaid offences as mentioned in the opening paragraph of
this judgment, against which the present appeal has been
preferred.
6.
Ms. Nirupama Bajpai, learned counsel appearing for
appellants Ashok Kumar & Smt. Madhuri (A-1 & A-2), would
submit that the incriminating circumstances as culled out by
the trial Court in para 36, 37 & 39 of its judgment are not
established at all and the appellants (A-1 & A-2) have been
convicted on the basis of surmises & conjectures, therefore,
they are entitled for acquittal and the appeal deserves to be
allowed.
7.
Ms. Usha Chandrakar, learned counsel appearing for
appellant Ramlal (A-3), would submit that conviction of the
appellant (A-3) is not sustainable at all and therefore, he is
entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt and the
appeal deserves to be allowed.
8.
Dr. Surendra Kumar Dewangan, learned State counsel,
would submit that the prosecution has been able to bring
home the offences beyond reasonable doubt and the trial
Court has rightly convicted the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) for
the aforesaid offences as all the incriminating circumstances
were found to be established and, as such, the appeal
deserves to be dismissed.
9.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered
their rival submissions made herein-above and went through
the records with utmost circumspection.
10.
The case of the prosecution is not based on direct evidence,
it is based on circumstantial evidence. The five golden
principles which constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a
case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down
by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1,
which must be fulfilled for convicting an accused on the basis
of circumstantial evidence in paragraph 153 as under: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled before
a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established:
(1) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be
fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and
not 'may be' established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be
proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was
held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra2 where the following
observations were made:
Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental
distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long
and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty,
(1984) 4 SCC 116
(1973) 2 SCC 793
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that
in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.”
11.
The trial Court has found established the following
incriminating circumstances :
(i)
That, appellant Ramlal (A-3) has given extra-judicial
confession to Nand Kumar (PW-1) that he along-with other
co-accused persons have committed murder of deceased
Mukesh Kumar.
(ii)
That, non-explanation on the part of the accused
persons about the incident.
(iii)
That, recovery of rope from Madhuri (A-3) and blood
was found from the other seized articles i.e. wooden juwa,
bamboo stick, screw driver and shirt of Ramlal pursuant to
their memorandum statements.
(iv) Motive of the offence.
12.
We will discuss the aforesaid incriminating circumstances
one by one.
13.
The
first
incriminating
circumstance
is
extra-judicial
confession. The so called extra-judicial confession is said to
have given by Ramlal (A-3) to father of deceased
Nandkumar (PW-1) on 11.01.2016 as per Ex.P-1 i.e. written
complaint made by Nandkumar (PW-1) and as per Ex.P-9
i.e. statement of Nandkumar (PW-1) recorded under Section
161 of Cr.P.C. with a delay of 2 months and 11 days, but
there is no explanation for such in ordinate delay in making
the extra-judicial confession.
14.
The Supreme Court in the matter of Subramanya v. State of
Karnataka3 has declined to accept the extra-judicial
confession and held in para 51 to 56 as under :“51. The date of the alleged crime is 23-8-2010.
The so-called extra-judicial confession, said to
have been made by Seetharam Bhat (Accused 3)
is dated 9-12-2010. We fail to understand why all
of a sudden Seetharam (Accused 3) after a
period of almost four months, thought fit to make
an extra-judicial confession before PW 7 H.T.
Yogesh involving himself and the appellant herein
in the alleged crime.
52. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and
true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied
upon by the Court. The confession will have to be
(2023) 11 SCC 255
proved like any other fact. The value of the
evidence as to confession, like any other
evidence, depends upon the veracity of the
witness to whom it has been made. The value of
the evidence as to the confession depends on the
reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It
is not open to any court to start with a
presumption that extra-judicial confession is a
weak type of evidence. It would depend on the
nature of the circumstances, the time when the
confession was made and the credibility of the
witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such
a confession can be relied upon and conviction
can be founded thereon if the evidence about the
confession comes from the mouth of witnesses
who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely
inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom
nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate
that he may have a motive for attributing an
untruthful statement to the accused, the words
spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous
and unmistakably convey that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by
the witness which may militate against it. After
subjecting the evidence of the witness to a
rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the
extra-judicial confession can be accepted and
can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the
test of credibility.
53. Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of
evidence and the court must ensure that the
same inspires confidence and is corroborated by
other prosecution evidence. It is considered to be
a weak piece of evidence as it can be easily
procured whenever direct evidence is not
available. In order to accept extra-judicial
confession, it must be voluntary and must inspire
confidence. If the court is satisfied that the extra-
judicial confession is voluntary, it can be acted
upon to base the conviction.
54. Considering the admissibility and evidentiary
value of extra-judicial confession, after referring
to various judgments, in Sahadevan v. State of
T.N. [(2012) 6 SCC 403 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 146],
this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 410-11, para
15)
“15. …15.1. In Balwinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, [1995 Supp (4) SCC 259 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 59] this Court stated the principle that :
(SCC p. 265, para 10)
‘10. An extra-judicial confession by its
very nature is rather a weak type of
evidence and requires appreciation with a
great deal of care and caution. Where an
extra-judicial confession is surrounded by
suspicious circumstances, its credibility
becomes doubtful and it loses its
importance.’
*
*
*
15.4. While explaining the dimensions of the
principles governing the admissibility and
evidentiary
value
of
an
extra-judicial
confession, this Court in State of Rajasthan v.
Raja Ram [(2003) 8 SCC 180 : 2003 SCC (Cri)
1965] stated the principle that : (SCC p. 192,
para 19)
‘19. An extra-judicial confession, if
voluntary and true and made in a fit state
of mind, can be relied upon by the court.
The confession will have to be proved like
any other fact. The value of the evidence
as to confession, like any other evidence,
depends upon the veracity of the witness
to whom it has been made.’
The Court further expressed the view that :
(SCC p. 192, para 19)
‘19. … Such a confession can be relied
upon and conviction can be founded
thereon if the evidence about the
confession comes from the mouth of
witnesses who appear to be unbiased,
not even remotely inimical to the
accused, and in respect of whom nothing
is brought out which may tend to indicate
that he may have a motive of attributing
an untruthful statement to the accused,…’
*
*
*
15.6. Accepting the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession, the Court in Sansar Chand
v. State of Rajasthan [(2010) 10 SCC 604 :
(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 79] held that : (SCC p. 611,
para 29)
‘29. There is no absolute rule that an
extra-judicial confession can never be the
basis of a conviction, although ordinarily
an extra-judicial confession should be
corroborated by some other material.
[Vide Thimma & Thimma Raju v. State of
Mysore [(1970) 2 SCC 105 : 1970 SCC
(Cri) 320] , Mulk Raj v. State of U.P. [1959
SCC OnLine SC 23 : AIR 1959 SC 902],
Sivakumar v. State of T.N. [(2006) 1 SCC
714 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 470], paras 40 &
41, Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v.
State of Maharashtra [2009) 11 SCC
262 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1320] and
Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B. [(2008) 15
SCC 449 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1082]’ ”
(emphasis supplied)
55. It is well settled that conviction can be based
on a voluntarily confession but the rule of
prudence requires that wherever possible it
should be corroborated by independent evidence.
An extra-judicial confession of accused need not
in all cases be corroborated. In Madan Gopal
Kakkad v. Naval Dubey [Madan Gopal Kakkad v.
Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
598] , this Court after referring to Piara Singh v.
State of Punjab [Piara Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1977) 4 SCC 452 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 614] , held
that the law does not require that the evidence of
an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be
corroborated. The rule of prudence does not
require that each and every circumstance
mentioned in the confession must be separately
and independently corroborated.
56. The sum and substance of the aforesaid is
that an extra-judicial confession by its very nature
is rather a weak type of evidence and requires
appreciation with great deal of care and caution.
Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded
by suspicious circumstances, its credibility
becomes doubtful and it loses its importance like
the case in hand. The Courts generally look for an
independent reliable corroboration before placing
any reliance upon an extra-judicial confession.
15.
Even otherwise, the extra judicial confession is a weak piece
of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of
care and caution. In order to accept extra-judicial confession,
it must be voluntary and must inspire confidence. In the
present case, the extra-judicial confession was made on
11.01.2016 and the incident is of intervening night of
29.10.2015 to 02.11.2015 and, as such, there is unexplained
delay of more than 2 months in making extra-judicial
confession and therefore, it would be inappropriate to accept
the extra-judicial confession as incriminating piece of
evidence. In that view of the matter, the delayed extra-judicial
confession is of no use to the prosecution to base the
conviction.
16.
The second incriminating circumstance is that the trial Court
has applied Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act on the
ground that explanation has not been offered with regard to
the incident.
17.
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act states as under:
“106. Burden of proving fact especially within
knowledge.—When any fact is especially within
the knowledge of any person, the burden of
proving that fact is upon him.”
18.
In this regard, the Supreme Court in the matter of Manharan
Rajwade v. State of Chhattisgarh4 on the point of invoking
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act have held in
paragraph 7 as under:“7. For invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act,
the prosecution ought to have discharged the
burden on it by adducing cogent evidence to prove
the appellant’s presence at the relevant time in his
house. In this case, going by the evidence of PW1, the deceased had already died before 5:00
p.m., and the said witness stated that the
appellant came back home at 7:00 p.m. There is
no evidence to prove the theory of the last seen
together. Therefore, the prosecution has not
discharged the burden on it to prove that the
4 2024 INSC 560
appellant was last seen together with the
deceased wife. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence
Act cannot be invoked to shift the burden on the
appellant.”
19.
It is not the case of the prosecution that the appellants were
seen in the house of deceased Mukesh Kumar on the date
and time of offence and merely because of explanation has
not been given by the appellants, Section 106 of the Evidence
Act would not be applicable. As such, the trial Court has
wrongly invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act to base the
conviction of the appellants and the findings in this regard is
hereby set aside.
20.
The third incriminating circumstance is that pursuant to
memorandum statement of the appellants, wooden juwa was
recovered from Ashok Kumar (A-1), nylon rope was recovered
from Smt. Madhuri (A-2) and screw driver & shirt was
recovered from Ramlal (A-3). However, the trial Court has
taken the statement made in the memorandum of the
appellants, whereby they have stated that they have caused
the death of Mukesh Kumar. In this regard, the decision
rendered in the matter of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
and Others vs. State of Karnataka5 may be noticed herein,
wherein the Supreme Court has held in para 61 as under :
5 (2024) 8 SCC 149
61. The statement of an accused recorded by a
police officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is
basically a memorandum of confession of the
accused recorded by the investigating officer during
interrogation which has been taken down in writing.
The confessional part of such statement is
inadmissible and only the part which distinctly leads
to discovery of fact is admissible in evidence as laid
down by this Court in State of U.P. v. Deoman
Upadhyaya [1960 SCC OnLine SC 8 : AIR 1960 SC
1125] .
21.
In that view of the matter, the statement made in the
memorandum statement is of no use to the prosecution
except the recovery of articles from the appellants, however it
cannot be held that seized articles were used in commission
of offence in absence a close link between discovery of
material object and its use in commission of offence in light of
decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mustkeem
Alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan6.
Therefore, the
incriminating statement made in the memorandum cannot be
relied upon to base the conviction and also the seizure of
articles are of no use to the prosecution to base the conviction
of the appellant.
22.
The fourth incriminating circumstance is the motive of offence.
So far as the motive of offence is concerned, the appellants
(A-1 & A-2) have the strong motive of property dispute
6 (2011) 11 SCC 724
pending before the Court, but it cannot be alone ground to
base the conviction for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C.
23.
In serious offences like murder, the Court always searches for
the motive and the motive always plays an important role.
Motive
is
of
great
importance
in
cases
based
on
circumstantial evidence, and there is absence of such motive,
it is always a circumstance in favour of the accused and
against the prosecution. Motive, however adequate, cannot
sustain a criminal charge in absence of clear and cogent
evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused and motive alone
can hardly be a ground for conviction in absence of any other
circumstantial evidence. [See: Sampath Kumar v. Inspector
of Police, Krishnagiri7]
24.
Similarly, only blood was found in the T-shirt of Ramlal (A-3),
but it was not ascertained that blood was human blood. In the
matter of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr.8
their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that if
the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution, then it may be sufficient
if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is
7 (2012) 4 SCC 124
(2019) 7 SCC 781
of human origin, even though the blood group is not proved
and held as under :-
“24. In the instant case, then, we could have
placed some reliance on the recovery, had the
prosecution at least proved that the blood was of
human origin. As observed supra, while
discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the
prosecution has tried to concoct the case from
stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive
material indicating that the stained blood was of
human origin and of the same blood group as that
of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court
to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the
weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not
help the case of the prosecution.”
25.
Thus, in view of the decision of Supreme Court in the matter
of Balwan Singh (supra), the recovery of blood-stained
articles is of no use to the prosecution, as no human blood
was found.
26.
In that view of the matter, the trial Court is absolutely
unjustified in convicting the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) for
the offences in question, as the prosecution has failed to
complete the chain of circumstances as enumerated in
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) and, as such, the
appellants are entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of
doubt.
27.
In view of the above, the impugned judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 28.09.2018 is set aside. The
appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) stand acquitted giving them
benefit of doubt from the charges framed against them for
the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 and
offence under Section 201 read with Section 34 of I.P.C. The
appellants are already on bail, they need not surrender;
however, their bail bonds shall remain in force for a period of
six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437A of the Cr.P.C.
28.
In the result, both the criminal appeals are allowed.
29.
Let a certified copy of this judgment along-with the original
record be transmitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith
for necessary information & action, if any.
Sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge
Ashok
Sd/(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge
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