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2026:CGHC:7569-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 942 of 2025
Ashok Kumar Gatpalli S/o Late Suraiya Gatpalli Aged About 30 Years
Posted
As
Peon,
At
Government
High
School,
Benglur,
Block-
Bhairamgarh, District- Bijapur, Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of School
Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur
(C.G.)
2 - Collector Tribal Welfare, District- Bijapur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Assistant Commissioner Tribal Welfare, District- Bijapur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - District Education Officer District- Bijapur, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Block Education Officer Block - Bhairamgarh, District- Bijapur,
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
Digitally
signed by
VED
PRAKASH
VED
DEWANGAN
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN Date:
2026.02.12
18:55:10
+0530
For Appellant
:
Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, Advocate
For Respondents/State
:
Mr. Praveen Das, Addl. Advocate General
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
11/02/2026
1.
Heard Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant as well as Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional
Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents/State on
I.A. No. 2 of 2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of
17 days in preferring the instant appeal.
2.
On due consideration and for the reasons mentioned in the
application, the same is allowed and the Delay of 17 days in filing the
present writ appeal stands condoned.
3.
With the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties,
and in the interest of justice, the Court proceeds to hear and decide
the present writ appeal finally.
4.
The present writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High
Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, has been preferred by
the appellant challenging the order dated 17.09.2025 passed by the
Hon’ble Single Judge in WPS No. 10580 of 2025, whereby the writ
petition filed by the appellant seeking quashing of the impugned
termination order dated 19.02.2025 issued by the District Education
Officer, Bijapur, was disposed of directing the appellant to approach
the appellate authority. The appellant, in the writ petition as well as in
the present appeal, has assailed the termination order on multiple
grounds, including violation of principles of natural justice, lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the District Education Officer to pass such
an order, failure to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed under
Rule 14 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1966, and arbitrariness in retrospectively applying the
Finance Department Circular dated 22.03.2018 reducing the period
of deemed resignation from five years to three years.
5.
The facts of the case, as emerges from the pleadings of the appeal,
are that, the appellant, Ashok Kumar Gatpalli, son of Late Suraiya
Gatpalli, was appointed as Peon in the Government service under
the
Tribal
Welfare
Department
pursuant
to
the
policy
of
compassionate appointment issued by the State Government in a
letter dated 10.02.2012, in consequence of the tragic demise of his
father in a Naxalite incident. The appointment order dated
30.09.2014 was issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Tribal
Welfare, Bijapur, and the appellant joined his duties at Boys Ashram,
Koshalnar, Block Bhairamgarh, District Bijapur on 15.10.2014.
*******The appellant served diligently and with utmost sincerity;
however, in mid-2015, he developed serious urological and renal
complications
requiring
continuous
medical
treatment
and
hospitalization. The appellant was admitted to District Hospital,
Jagdalpur, and later to CHC Usoor, and medical certificates were
issued recommending leave on medical grounds initially from
15.07.2015 to 29.12.2015, and subsequently extending the leave till
20.06.2016.
*******During the period of his medical leave, a temporary
transfer/attachment order dated 30.01.2016 was issued by the Block
Education
Officer,
Bhairamgarh,
attaching
the
appellant
to
Government High School, Benglur. It is significant to note that this
order was only temporary in nature and did not affect the appellant’s
substantive posting, which remained at Boys Ashram, Koshalnar,
under the Tribal Welfare Department.
*******On partial recovery, the appellant reported for duty at
Government High School, Benglur on 29.11.2016, submitting a
medical fitness certificate (Form–4) issued by CHC Usoor, and a
written representation expressing his readiness to resume duties.
Despite this, the authorities neither acknowledged his joining nor
issued any order confirming or denying his resumption of service.
*******Subsequent medical certificates dated 11.12.2017 confirmed
that the appellant’s medical condition required further rest and leave.
The
appellant
consistently
submitted
representations
seeking
regularization of his medical leave and permission to resume duties,
including
applications
dated
04.04.2018
to
the
Assistant
Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, 19.06.2019 to the District Education
Officer, and 21.07.2019 and 07.11.2019 to the Collector, Bijapur, all
reflecting his bona fide intention to continue service, including on a
‘no work, no pay’ basis. Despite these repeated efforts, the
authorities failed to consider or acknowledge his requests.
*******In disregard of the appellant’s medical justification and
repeated representations, a purported departmental inquiry was
initiated, and, vide impugned order dated 19.02.2025, the District
Education Officer, Bijapur, terminated the appellant from service,
relying on Rule 11 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Leave) Rules,
2010, and Rule 18 of the Chhattisgarh Fundamental Rules, along
with Finance Department Circular dated 22.03.2018, declaring that
absence exceeding three years would be deemed as resignation. No
show cause notice, charge sheet, or opportunity of hearing was
provided to the appellant, and the alleged departmental inquiry report
was never furnished, thereby violating the principles of natural
justice.
*******It is also noteworthy that the impugned termination order was
issued by the District Education Officer, who is not the appointing
authority of the appellant. The appellant’s substantive posting
continued to remain under the Tribal Welfare Department, and
therefore the authority issuing the termination order lacked
jurisdiction. The procedure mandated under Rule 14 of the
Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1966, requiring service of articles of charge, statements of
imputations, lists of documents and witnesses, and an opportunity to
file written defense and personal hearing, was wholly disregarded.
*******Further, the Finance Department Circular dated 22.03.2018,
which reduced the period of deemed resignation from five years to
three years, was applied retrospectively to the appellant’s absence
commencing in 2015, which is prior to the issuance of the circular.
Such retrospective application adversely affects the vested rights of
the appellant and is impermissible under Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India.
*******Aggrieved by the termination order, the appellant approached
this Court by filing WPS No. 10580 of 2025. The learned Single
Judge disposed of the writ petition on 17.09.2025, directing the
appellant to avail the alternative departmental appellate remedy,
without considering the jurisdictional conflict between the Tribal
Welfare Department and the School Education Department, the
violation of natural justice, and the procedural infirmities in the
termination proceedings.
6.
Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
would submit that, the impugned termination order dated 19.02.2025
issued by the District Education Officer (DEO), Bijapur, is wholly
without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The appellant was
appointed as Peon under the policy of compassionate appointment
by the Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, Bijapur, following the
demise of his father in a Naxalite incident. The Assistant
Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, is the competent appointing authority
and continues to hold the power to regulate, supervise, or take
disciplinary action in respect of the appellant.
*******Learned counsel submits that the State has filed a policy in
respect of AC Tribal schools, wherein it has been mentioned that the
AC Tribal schools have been merged into the School Education
Department. However, it is submitted that such administrative merger
does not confer jurisdiction on the DEO to terminate the services of
employees whose substantive appointment lies under the Tribal
Welfare Department. In the instant case, the DEO passed the
impugned termination order, whereas the appellant’s substantive
posting and service continue to be under the Tribal Welfare
Department. Therefore, the DEO, belonging to the School Education
Department, is not the competent authority to pass the termination
order.
*******It is further submitted that the Assistant Commissioner, Tribal
Welfare, being the appointing authority of the appellant, is the only
competent authority to initiate, consider, or pass any disciplinary
action or termination order in respect of the appellant. The State has
itself admitted, in its additional reply, that the petitioner was
transferred temporarily to Government High School, Benglur, under
the School Education Department. This fact clearly demonstrates that
the DEO’s jurisdiction was only limited to the temporary attachment
and that the impugned termination order issued by him is wholly
without authority.
*******Learned counsel submits that the impugned order was passed
without issuance of any show cause notice, charge sheet, or articles
of charge. No opportunity was ever given to the appellant to file a
written statement of defense or to be heard in person, in complete
violation of Rule 14 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. The alleged departmental inquiry
report was never furnished to the appellant despite his specific
request, and this violation of natural justice renders the impugned
order void ab initio.
*******The temporary transfer of the appellant has been explicitly
admitted by the State in its additional reply. Hence, the contention
that the DEO is competent to terminate the appellant’s service is
wholly untenable. The impugned order is therefore an exercise of
authority by a person who had no power to pass such an order, and
is liable to be quashed.
*******Learned counsel further submits that the appellant’s absence
from duty was entirely due to medical reasons, duly certified by
competent government medical authorities. He repeatedly submitted
representations expressing his willingness to resume duties,
including on a ‘no work, no pay’ basis. Despite this, the DEO and
other
authorities
failed
to
consider
or
acknowledge
his
representations, and terminated his services arbitrarily. This conduct
on the part of the respondents is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution of India.
*******In view of the above, it is respectfully submitted that, (i) the
impugned termination order dated 19.02.2025 passed by the DEO,
Bijapur, is without jurisdiction and void ab initio; (ii) the DEO, not
being the appointing authority, had no power to pass the said order;
(iii) the appellant’s substantive posting continues under the Tribal
Welfare Department, and the Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Welfare,
being the competent authority, alone can initiate or pass any
disciplinary
proceedings
or
termination;
(iv)
the
temporary
transfer/attachment of the appellant to the School Education
Department has been admitted by the State in its additional reply; (v)
the impugned termination order being arbitrary, illegal, and passed in
violation of natural justice, deserves to be quashed; and (vi) the
appellant may be reinstated to his substantive post under the
Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, with all consequential
benefits and continuity of service.
*******Learned counsel, therefore, prays that this Hon’ble Court may
be pleased to allow the present writ appeal and grant such other
relief(s) as deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7.
Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for
the State submits that, the present writ appeal is not maintainable in
view of the efficacious statutory remedy available to the appellant
under Rule 23 read with Rule 27 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. The learned Single
Judge, while disposing of WPS No.10580/2025, has already granted
liberty to the appellant to prefer an appeal against the order of
termination and has protected him from objection on limitation.
Instead of availing the said remedy, the appellant has invoked the
intra-court appellate jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. In service
matters involving disciplinary proceedings, where disputed questions
of fact arise, the statutory appellate forum is the appropriate remedy.
*******It is not disputed that the appellant was appointed on
30.09.2014 as Peon in the Boys Tribal Hostel School on
compassionate grounds. However, pursuant to the Government
Order dated 10.03.2015 issued by the General Administration
Department, the management, supervision and control of schools run
by the Tribal Development Department, Urban Administration
Department and School Education Department were centralized
under the School Education Department to ensure administrative
uniformity. Consequent to this policy decision, disciplinary and
service control over such employees vested in the School Education
authorities. The appellant was transferred from Boys Hostel, Kaushal
Nagar to Government High School, Benglur, District Bijapur, and
thereafter remained under the administrative control of the School
Education Department. Hence, the District Education Officer had the
requisite jurisdiction to pass the impugned order.
*******The record clearly establishes that the appellant remained
unauthorizedly absent from duty from 15.09.2015 onwards without
sanctioned leave. Though he relies upon certain medical certificates,
mere submission of such certificates does not amount to automatic
sanction of leave under the service rules. Show cause notices were
issued on 24.10.2019 and again on 08.10.2024. A departmental
enquiry was initiated on 05.11.2024, an Enquiry Officer was
appointed, and notice was issued to the appellant to appear on
30.01.2025. The appellant neither participated in the enquiry nor
submitted any satisfactory explanation. Upon completion of the
enquiry, the report was submitted and the termination order dated
19.02.2025 was passed.
*******The impugned order has been passed in accordance with Rule
11 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 2010 and Rule
18 of the Fundamental Rules, read with the Finance Department
Circular
dated
22.03.2018,
which
provides
that
continuous
unauthorized absence beyond three years shall be treated as
deemed resignation. The appellant’s absence was prolonged and
continuous, and therefore the competent authority was justified in
invoking the said provisions. There is no retrospective application, as
the misconduct was continuing in nature and subsisted even after
issuance of the circular.
*******In view of the above facts and circumstances, there is neither
lack of jurisdiction nor violation of principles of natural justice.
Adequate opportunity was afforded to the appellant, but he failed to
avail the same. The learned Single Judge rightly relegated the
appellant to the statutory appellate remedy. The present writ appeal,
being devoid of merit and substance, deserves to be dismissed.
8.
In response to the reply filed by the State, learned counsel appearing
fo the appellant has filed the rejoinder, in which he submits that the
entire defence of the State rests upon a fundamentally erroneous
interpretation of the Government Order dated 10.03.2015. The
respondents seek to justify the jurisdiction of the District Education
Officer by loosely asserting a “merger” of departments; however, a
plain and clause-wise reading of the said order demonstrates that it
pertains exclusively to the administrative unification of government
schools from primary to higher secondary level. The order does not
contemplate transfer of residential welfare institutions such as Boys
Ashram (Hostel), nor does it effect a wholesale transfer of appointing
or disciplinary authority over hostel staff. The attempt of the State to
stretch the scope of the notification beyond its textual limits is legally
unsustainable.
*******It is undisputed that the appellant was appointed on
compassionate grounds vide order dated 30.09.2014 by the Assistant
Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, District Bijapur, and was substantively
posted at Boys Ashram (Hostel), Koshalnar. The appellant has never
been substantively absorbed into the School Education Department,
nor has any order been placed on record demonstrating a lawful
transfer of his cadre or disciplinary control. The impugned termination
order dated 19.02.2025 has been issued by the District Education
Officer, an authority belonging to a different department, who is
neither the appointing authority nor shown to be vested with
disciplinary powers over employees of Tribal Welfare hostels. In
service jurisprudence, competence of the authority goes to the root of
the matter; an order passed by an authority lacking jurisdiction is void
ab initio.
*******A careful reading of Clause (4) of the Government Order dated
10.03.2015 expressly preserves the responsibility of residential
arrangements of ashram schools and hostels with the Tribal Welfare
Department. This clause clearly indicates a conscious legislative and
administrative intent to retain control over residential welfare
institutions. Further, Clause (11) provides that employees of
Educational Cadre-B shall continue to receive promotions, transfers
and service benefits in accordance with the rules of their parent
department and within their pre-determined territorial jurisdiction.
Even assuming, without admitting, that the appellant could be
categorized under such cadre, his service conditions and disciplinary
control would remain governed by the Tribal Welfare Department.
The respondents have selectively relied upon Clause (8) while
ignoring these limiting provisions, thereby presenting an incomplete
and distorted reading of the order.
*******Without prejudice to the jurisdictional objection, the impugned
termination order is vitiated by gross procedural irregularity. The
termination amounts to a major penalty, yet no proper charge-sheet
conforming to Rule 14 of the CCA Rules was served, no articles of
charge were framed in the prescribed manner, and no inquiry report
was furnished to the appellant. The appellant had, upon recovery,
physically reported for duty in 2017 and submitted medical fitness
certificates along with written representations. The respondents
neither passed a speaking order accepting nor rejecting his joining,
thereby keeping him in a state of administrative uncertainty. Having
failed to act at the relevant time, the respondents cannot now
retrospectively characterize the period as unauthorized absence
without addressing their own inaction.
*******The belated issuance of show cause notices after years of
silence, coupled with refusal to consider the appellant’s bona fide
attempts to resume duty, renders the action arbitrary and violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The respondents have failed to
rebut the central issue of lack of jurisdiction and have not provided
any cogent explanation for disregarding the appellant’s medical
condition and representations. In these circumstances, the impugned
termination order suffers from jurisdictional error, violation of statutory
procedure and breach of principles of natural justice, and therefore
deserves to be set aside by this Hon’ble Court.
9.
The State counsel has also filed the additional reply in the case, in
which he submits that, the impugned order of termination dated
19.02.2025 has been passed strictly in accordance with law and by
the competent authority after the petitioner remained continuously
and repeatedly absent from duty without authorization. The record
reflects
that
the
petitioner
was
unauthorizedly
absent
from
15.07.2015 to 30.12.2015, thereafter continued to remain absent till
26.06.2016, and again remained absent till 29.11.2016. Such
prolonged and unexplained absence constitutes grave misconduct
under the applicable service rules. Departmental proceedings were
accordingly initiated and culminated in the order impugned, which
does not suffer from procedural or jurisdictional infirmity.
*******It is further submitted that by virtue of the Government Order
dated 10.03.2015 issued by the General Administration Department,
the management and control of schools run under the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe Department and other departments were
brought under the administrative control of the School Education
Department to ensure uniformity and efficient governance. The
petitioner seeks to rely selectively upon Clause 2 and Clause 4 of the
said order; however, those clauses are inapplicable to the factual
matrix of the present case. Clause 4 pertains specifically to
appointments in residential schools, whereas the petitioner, though
initially appointed as a Peon at Boys Ashram, Kaushal Nagar on
compassionate grounds, was subsequently attached to High School
Benguluru, District Bijapur, vide order dated 30.01.2016.
*******The petitioner’s own documents (Annexure P/4) and pleadings
in paragraph 8.4 of the writ petition unequivocally establish that his
services stood attached to High School Benguluru. The petitioner
accepted the said attachment without demur and, upon reporting on
29.11.2016, submitted a medical certificate and thereafter addressed
a representation dated 19.06.2017 to the District Education Officer
seeking sanction of medical leave and permission to continue as
Peon in Higher Secondary School, Benguluru. Having invoked the
jurisdiction of the District Education Officer for service benefits, the
petitioner is estopped from contending that the School Education
Department lacked administrative or disciplinary control over him.
*******It is humbly submitted that the Government Order dated
10.03.2015 vested full administrative control and management of the
concerned institutions with the School Education Department.
Consequently, the District Education Officer was fully competent to
exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over the petitioner. The contention
that the petitioner continued exclusively under the Tribal Welfare
Department is factually incorrect and contrary to the documentary
record. The plea of lack of jurisdiction is therefore devoid of merit and
deserves outright rejection.
*******In view of the petitioner’s repeated unauthorized absence,
acceptance of attachment under the School Education Department,
and the statutory competence of the District Education Officer to
initiate and conclude disciplinary proceedings, the impugned order
does not warrant interference under appellate jurisdiction. The writ
appeal is devoid of substance, raises no substantial question of law,
and is liable to be dismissed with costs.
10.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material annexed with the writ petition as well as the writ appeal.
11.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon
perusal of the record, this Court is of the considered view that the
present writ appeal does not merit interference. The learned Single
Judge has relegated the appellant to the statutory appellate remedy
available under Rule 23 read with Rule 27 of the Chhattisgarh Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. It is well
settled that where an efficacious alternative remedy is available, writ
jurisdiction ought not to be invoked except in exceptional
circumstances such as patent lack of jurisdiction, violation of
principles of natural justice, or infringement of fundamental rights.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR
1958 SC 86; Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks,
(1998) 8 SCC 1; and Union of India v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC
882, has consistently held that availability of an effective alternative
remedy is a sound rule of self-restraint. In the present case, none of
the exceptional contingencies warranting bypass of the statutory
appellate forum are made out.
12.
The principal contention of the appellant relates to alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the District Education Officer to pass the impugned
termination order. However, the material placed on record indicates
that pursuant to the Government Order dated 10.03.2015 issued by
the General Administration Department, administrative control and
management of institutions run by various departments, including
Tribal Welfare, were centralized under the School Education
Department. The appellant was admittedly attached to Government
High School, Benglur, and had reported there for duty. He addressed
representations to the District Education Officer seeking sanction of
leave and continuation in service. Having accepted administrative
control and sought service benefits from the School Education
authorities, the appellant cannot now approbate and reprobate by
disputing the disciplinary jurisdiction of the said authority. The
doctrine of approbation and reprobation, as explained in Rajasthan
State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v.
Diamond & Gem Development Corporation, (2013) 5 SCC 470,
precludes such inconsistent pleas.
13.
Even otherwise, the question whether disciplinary control validly
stood vested in the School Education Department pursuant to the
Government policy decision involves examination of factual and
service record aspects, which are appropriately adjudicated by the
statutory appellate authority. The Supreme Court in Union of India v.
P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, has held that judicial review in
disciplinary matters is confined to the decision-making process and
not the merits of the decision, and that adequacy or sufficiency of
evidence cannot be reappreciated by the writ court. The appellant
seeks a re-evaluation of departmental records, which falls outside the
limited scope of intra-court appellate review at this stage.
14.
On the aspect of alleged violation of natural justice, the record
reveals that show cause notices were issued, a departmental enquiry
was initiated, an Enquiry Officer was appointed, and opportunity was
granted to the appellant to participate in the proceedings. The
appellant chose not to avail the opportunity. It is settled law that
principles of natural justice cannot be stretched to protect an
employee who deliberately abstains from participating in the enquiry.
In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, and
Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC
529, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that unless prejudice is
demonstrated, mere technical violation would not vitiate disciplinary
proceedings. The appellant has failed to establish any specific
prejudice occasioned to him.
15.
The contention regarding retrospective application of the Finance
Department Circular dated 22.03.2018 is equally untenable. The
absence of the appellant was continuous and extended well beyond
the issuance of the circular. Continuous unauthorized absence
constitutes a continuing misconduct. The Supreme Court in MCD v.
Prem
Chand
Gupta,
(2000)
SCC
115,
and
Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali
Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, has held that prolonged unauthorized
absence is a grave misconduct warranting disciplinary action and
that courts should not ordinarily interfere with such decisions. In the
present case, the authority invoked the relevant Leave Rules and
Fundamental Rules applicable at the time when the misconduct
subsisted. No vested right of the appellant has been demonstrated to
have been taken away retrospectively.
16.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no perversity,
patent illegality, or jurisdictional error in the order of the learned
Single Judge relegating the appellant to the statutory remedy. The
issues raised involve disputed questions of fact and examination of
departmental records, which are more appropriately addressed by
the appellate authority under the CCA Rules, 1966. Interference in
intra-court
appellate
jurisdiction
under
Section
2(1)
of
the
Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 is
therefore unwarranted.
17.
Accordingly, the present writ appeal is dismissed. The appellant
shall be at liberty to avail the statutory appellate remedy, if so
advised, and if such appeal is preferred within a period of thirty days
from today, the appellate authority shall consider the same on its own
merits, in accordance with law, without raising the objection of
limitation. No order as to costs.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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