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2026:CGHC:9510
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPL No. 242 of 2019
•
Ashok Kumar Agrawal, S/o Late Govind Ram, Aged About 58 Years, R/o
H.No.9, Sai Heritage Colony, Near Dhimarpur Chowk, Raigarh, District
Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
1. Smt. Badka Dai Bairagi, W/o Late Ghasidas Bairagi, R/o Bhola Gali, Indira
Nagar Raigarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.
2. Commissioner, Workmens Compensation Act, Labor Court Raigarh,
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Ankit Singhal, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1
:
Mr. Roop Ram Naik, Advocate.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput
Order on Board
24/02/2026
1. Heard.
2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing the order dated
30.09.2019
passed
by
the
learned
Commissioner
For
Employees
Compensation, Labour Court Raigarh (C.G.) (for short ‘Commissioner’) in
Case No.16/E.C. Act/2016 (Miscellaneous), whereby an application under
Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short ‘CPC’) filed by
the petitioner for setting aside an ex parte award dated 23.11.2012 in Case
No.27/W.C. Act/2006 was rejected.
Digitally
DEEPTI signed
by
JHA
DEEPTI
JHA
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No.1 filed an
application under Section 10 of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 (for
short ‘the Act of 1923’) seeking compensation on account of death of the
deceased Thaneshwar Das Bairagi in an accident that occurred on
20.04.2005. As per the pleadings of the claim application, the deceased was
employed as a driver with the petitioner. He further submits that deceased
along with family members of the petitioner went to Kharsiya in the Car
bearing Registration No. DL-2C-2151. He met with an accident and died. As
per the further pleadings, the deceased was aged about 24 years and was
being paid for Rs.4,000/- per month, as a driver. Thus, seeking compensation
of Rs.4,36,940/-, the said application was filed. Learned counsel for the
petitioner further submits that the notice of the said application was received
by the petitioner and written statement was also filed. Thereafter, the
application of the respondent was dismissed vide order dated 06.12.2006.
This led to file an appeal under the Act of 1923 before this Court, which was
registered as MAC No.95/2007. This Court vide its order dated 22.07.2011
allowed the appeal in part and remanded the matter back to the
Commissioner for fresh adjudication of the same. Thereafter, as the petitioner
was not represented before this Court in the said MAC, the learned
Commissioner issued notice to the petitioner. He further submits that in the
said accident along with deceased/Thaneshwar Das Bairagi, the son of the
petitioner also passed away and under duress, they shifted their resident
from Raigarh to Jharsugda. As the notices were sent on the Raigarh address
of the petitioner, the same could not be served and thereafter the notice was
served upon the petitioner through paper publication at Raigarh. He submits
that as the petitioner was residing at Jharsugda, he was not aware with
regard to the publication of the notice of the case at Raigarh and was
proceeded ex parte before the learned Commissioner. Thereafter, an ex
parte award dated 23.11.2012 was passed by the learned Commissioner and
Rs.4,07,700/- was awarded as compensation. As the amount of award could
not be deposited, the execution proceedings were carried out by the
respondent No.1 and he came to know that the execution was filed against
him for recovery of the same. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner moved an
application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC before the Commissioner, inter
alia pleaded that the petitioner has shifted to Jharsugda and proper service of
the notice was not made upon him. Thus, he was not aware with regard to
the pendency of the case before the learned Commissioner and the ex parte
impugned award dated 23.11.2012 may be set aside. By the impugned order,
the learned Commissioner has dismissed the application and treating it to be
barred by limitation and also on merit. He submits that in the first round, the
claim case of respondent No.1 was dismissed and the petitioner shifted to
Jharsudga. In all fairness, the learned Commissioner ought to have allowed
the application and decided the case on merits. He further submits that
petitioner had already deposited Rs.2,25,000/- in compliance of the order
dated 02.12.2019 passed by this Court, no prejudice would be caused to the
respondents, if the claim application filed by the respondent No.1 is decided
on merits.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 opposes the submission made by
the counsel for the petitioner and submits that petitioner was not able to
prove that he had shifted to Jharsugda by cogent and prudent evidence. He
submits that his shop is still running at Raigarh and earlier notice issued to
the petitioner was refused by him and publication was made on the last
known address of the petitioner at Raigarh, thus, proper service of the notice
of the claim application was effected upon the petitioner. However, he is not
in a position to dispute that in compliance of the order passed by this Court,
an amount of Rs.2,25,000/- has already been deposited by the petitioner and
the same has been received by the respondent No.1.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record carefully.
6. There is no dispute to the fact that initially the claim application filed by the
respondent No.1 came to be dismissed by the learned Commissioner. An
appeal was preferred, in which, the petitioner was served, but not
represented. This Court vide its order dated 22.07.2011 passed in MAC
No.95/2007, remanded the matter back for fresh consideration and upon
which notices were issue to the petitioner. Though, the award was passed in
the year 2012 and the application for setting aside the same was filed in the
year 2016 after lapse of about 3 years.
7. Perusal of the record would indicate that the petitioner was not represented
in the claim application, after the remand was made by this Court. Perusal of
the application filed by the petitioner would indicates that said accident his
son has also passed away and his wife sustained severe injuries. It also
indicates that on account of death of his son, his mental condition
deteriorated and no other major male member was in the family. He used to
run a shop named & styles as Ratan Automobiles and could not carried out
the business later on, suffered monetary losses and his business was shut
down. Thereafter, on account of which, his wife along with other two children
started living in Jharsugda from the year 2006. The petitioner underwent a
heart surgery at Hyderabad and from 2006 till 2015, he was living in
Jharsugda. For his personal work, he came to the RTO Office Raigarh (C.G.)
and came to know from his acquaintance that some case is pending before
the Labour Court. On an enquiry being made, he came to know that award
has been passed against the petitioner.
8. From the record, it appears that the notice of the execution by registered
mode has been sent to the petitioner at his address at Raigarh and the same
was returned unserved, stating that address is wrong. In the proceedings
before the learned Commissioner, petitioner examined himself and
categorically stated that he is residing at Jharsugda from 2006 to 2015. He
further stated that he did not receive any notice from the learned
Commissioner with regard to the pendency of the case and publication of the
notice in “Raigarh Sandesh” is a local newspaper, which is not distributed in
Jharsugda. It has been categorically stated that the notice published on
15.08.2012 was not known to the petitioner. He has further stated that he
was told by some acquaintance with regard to the case pending before the
Commissioner and thereafter, the said application was filed. He was
subjected to the cross-examination by the respondent and nothing important
was brought on record to disbelief the evidence of the petitioner. In support of
his application, another witness namely Mani Ram was also examined, who
has also deposed that on account of severe injuries, heart ailment, petitioner
along with his family started living in Jharsudga from 2006 to 2015. It has
been further stated by this witness that the petitioner and his family never
lived in Raigarh from 2006 to 2015 and his house was locked. In crossexamination he denied that his tyre shop is still opened and denied the
suggestion that petitioner did not live in Jharsugda from 2006 to 2015. Yet
evidence of another witness namely Santosh Kumar Agrawal was recorded,
who was also deposed in the same line. No witness was examined on behalf
of the respondent No.1.
9. The learned Commissioner observed that no documents with regard to the
petitioner that he is living in Jharsudga from 2006 to 2015 has been filed and
also observed that in the affidavit filed under Order 8 Rule 14 of CPC, he has
mentioned his address of Raigarh. The learned Commissioner also observed
that in the original case, his advocate has appeared on his behalf. The
learned Commissioner did not find the reasons assigned by the petitioner for
filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC with considerable period
of delay. Thus, dismissed the application.
10. While deciding the application, the learned Commissioner has entered into
the merits of the case and in the operating portion has also observed that the
application was filed with a considerable period of delay. The petitioner made
a specific pleading that from 2006 to 2015, he was not residing in Raigarh
and was residing at Jharsugda. To buttress this fact, he also examined the
two witness. However, the fact remains that after the remand was made by
this Court, notice to the petitioner was not served in accordance with law. The
publication was made in a daily local newspaper and according to the
petitioner, the same is not distributed in Jharsugda, where he was residing.
11. The law is well settled that the period of delay is non sine qua non for
deciding the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. In many occasions, shorter period of delay may not be
condoned and in some occasions, longer period of delay may be condoned.
The Court simply has to see is to whether the person was able to show
sufficient cause for not preferring the application within a period of limitation.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of N. Balakrishnan Versus M.
Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 observed as under:“A court knows that refusal to condone delay would
result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause.
There is no presumption that delay in approaching
the court is always deliberate. This Court has held
that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction
so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala
Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575]
and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator,
Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. It must be
remembered that in every case of delay there can be
some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That
alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut
the door against him. If the explanation does not
smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a
dilatory strategy the court must show utmost
consideration to the suitor. But when there is
reasonable ground to think that the delay was
occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then
the court should lean against acceptance of the
explanation. While condoning delay the Could should
not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be
borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would
have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It
would be a salutary guideline that when courts
condone the delay due to laches on the part of the
applicant the court shall compensate the opposite
party for his loss.
In this case explanation for the delay set up by the
appellant was found satisfactory to the trial court in
the exercise of its discretion and the High Court went
wrong in upsetting the finding, more so when the High
Court was exercising reversional jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the respondent must be compensated
particularly because the appellant has secured a sum
of Rs. Fifty thousand from the delinquent advocate
through the Consumer Disputes Riderless Forum.
We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the
impugned order by restoring the order passed by the
trial court but on a condition that appellant shall pay a
sum of Rupee Ten thousand to the respondent (or
deposit it in this court within one month from this
date.”
13. The parameters to decide the application has elaborately been discussed in
the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Versus Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649
in para 21, which reads thus:“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles
that can broadly be culled out are:
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with
an application for condonation of delay, for the
Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are
obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood
in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard
being had to the fact that these terms are basically
elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to
the obtaining fact-situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal
the technical considerations should not be given
undue and uncalled for emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part
of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant
fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause
public mischief because the Courts are required to
be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is
no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be
allowed a totally unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay
and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the
former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to
the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first
one warrants strict approach whereas the second
calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the
fundamental principle is that the Courts are required
to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of
both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the
Courts should be vigilant S.A. No.331 of 2013 not to
expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a
litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by
taking recourse to the technicalities of law of
limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinized and the approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given
some acceptable latitude.”
14. Ofcourse, the period of delay in filing the application appears to be of
considerable length, but itself could not be a ground to deny the relief as
claimed by the petitioner.
15. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the above stated cases, this Court is of the opinion that petitioner was able to
show sufficient cause for not filing the application in due course of time, thus,
application for condonation of delay is allowed and delay in filing the
application for setting aside the ex parte award is condoned.
16. This leads me to the question as to whether, the application under Order 9
Rule 13 of CPC filed by the petitioner could be allowed. As discussed earlier,
the specific ground has been raised by the petitioner that he started living in
Jharsudga for a long period. This aspect is also supported by his 2
witnesses. Though, there may be some discrepancies in their evidence, but
also taking into consideration that the publication of the notice was made at
the Raigarh, whereas the petitioner was residing in Jharsudga and the
grounds upon which the learned Commissioner has rejected the application,
does not appear to be based upon the proper appreciation of the facts and
circumstances of the case and the petitioner was denied the relief by the
learned Commissioner exercising the power with material irregularity.
17. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that impugned order cannot
sustained the scrutiny of the Court and warrant interference in this writ
petition. Thus, the impugned order dated 30.09.2019 & ex parte award dated
23.11.2012 are hereby set aside and the Claim Case No.16/E.C. Act/2016
(Miscellaneous) & Case No.27/W.C. Act/2006 are restored to its original
number.
18. Another aspect of the matter, which requires consideration by this Court that
an award of Rs.4,07,700/- was passed by the learned Commissioner and out
of which, Rs.2,25,000/- has already been deposited and the same was
received by the respondent No.1. The case is two decades old, thus it would
be appropriate that a direction be issued to the learned Commissioner to take
decision on the application of the respondent No.1 filed under Section 10 of
the Act of 1923 expeditiously.
19. It is expected that the learned Commissioner would make all endeavour to
conclude the proceedings within a period of 6 months from the next date of
appearance of the parties. The parties shall appears before the learned
Commissioner on 1st April, 2026.
20. It is observed that the amount which has been deposited by the petitioner in
compliance of the interim order passed by this Court, shall not be
recoverable from the respondent No.1 and it would be subject to outcome of
the award passed by the learned Commissioner.
21. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is allowed as indicated hereinabove.
22. Record be sent back to the Commissioner along with the copy of this order.
23. Interlocutory application(s), pending if any, also stands disposed of.
Sd/(Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge
Deepti Jha
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