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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
DATED : 04.07.2019
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl. L.P. No. 11 of 2017
Petitioner
:
Ankit Sarda
versus
Respondent
:
Kailash Agarwal
Application under Sub Section 4 of Section 378 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Jorgay Namka and Ms. Tashi Doma Sherpa, Advocates for
the Petitioner.
Mr. Rahul Rathi, Advocate for the Respondent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
O R D E R (ORAL)
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
By filing the application under Section 378(4) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Petitioner herein who was
the Complainant before the learned trial Court, seeks leave to
Appeal against the impugned Judgment dated 01.12.2016, of
the learned Judicial Magistrate, East Sikkim at Gangtok in
Private Complaint Case No. 04 of 2015 (Ankit Sarda v. Kailash
Agarwal), by which, the Respondent herein was acquitted of the
offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 (hereinafter, “N.I. Act”).
2.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner advanced the
contention that the Petitioner is a businessman trading in Stock
Exchange and had business dealings with the Respondent herein
CRL.L.P. No.11 of 2017
Ankit Sarda
vs. Kailash Agarwal
(the accused before the learned trial Court). In October, 2014,
the Respondent issued a Cheque to the Petitioner of AXIS Bank,
Gangtok Branch, marked as Exhibit 1. The Cheque when
presented by the Petitioner for encashment before the HDFC
Bank, Gangtok Branch was dishonoured with the remark
“insufficient funds.” The Petitioner consequently issued Legal
Notice to the Respondent on 11.11.2014, demanding repayment
of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs) only, covered by Exhibit 1.
The Respondent failed to comply with the Legal Notice of the
Petitioner upon which the Petitioner filed Private Complaint Case
supra on 31.12.2014. It is strenuously urged by learned Counsel
for the Petitioner that the said Complaint was well within the
period of limitation prescribed under Section 138(c) and Section
142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act. That, on completion of trial before the
learned trial Court, the impugned Judgment was pronounced on
01.12.2016, wrongly acquitting the Respondent by overlooking
the vital materials on record apart from misreading the
provisions of law and erroneously calculating the period of
limitation, hence the Petitioner be allowed to file his Appeal.
3.
Vehemently resisting the stance of the Petitioner‟s
Counsel, learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that the
concerned Cheque, Exhibit 1 was issued on 10.10.2014. On
07.11.2014 the said Cheque was dishonoured on the grounds as
mentioned by the Petitioner. Notice under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act came to be issued on 11.11.2014. In this context, reliance
was placed on Exhibit 3 which is the Notice issued to the
Respondent. On the same day it was despatched by registered
CRL.L.P. No.11 of 2017
Ankit Sarda
vs. Kailash Agarwal
AD to the Respondent i.e. 11.11.2014 and the Notice came to be
delivered on 12.11.2014. Admittedly no documents have been
filed by either party to establish receipt of the Notice by the
Respondent on 12.11.2014, however on this count the attention
of this Court was drawn by learned Counsel for the Respondent
to the cross-examination of the Petitioner. It was urged that in
his
cross-examination
before
the
learned
trial
Court
the
Petitioner has unequivocally admitted that the Notice marked
Exhibit 3 is dated 11.11.2014 and was delivered to the accused
on 12.11.2014. That, on such admission of the Petitioner nothing
further remains to be contested on the fact of the date of
delivery of Notice. That, Section 138 of the N.I. Act requires that
the payee or the holder of the cheque, as the case may be, is to
make a demand for the payment of the required amount of
money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the
cheque, within thirty days from the receipt of information by
him, from the Bank, regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid. The drawer of such cheque is to make payment of the
said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to
the holder of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the
said notice. It is admitted that the Notice, Exhibit 3 was issued
within thirty days of the Cheque being dishonoured. When the
accused fails to make payment within fifteen days of the receipt
of Notice, then Section 142 of the N.I. Act mandates that the
Complaint ought to be made within one month of the date on
which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso
to Section 138 of the N.I. Act. That, in the instant case since
CRL.L.P. No.11 of 2017
Ankit Sarda
vs. Kailash Agarwal
Notice was delivered on 12.11.2014, fifteen days thereof expired
on 27.11.2014, hence the Complaint ought to have been filed on
28.12.2014 but came to be filed only on 31.12.2014 thereby
leading to a delay of two days. That, although the delay is of two
days, the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act requires
that if such delay has occurred then the Complainant is required
to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a
Complaint within such period, upon which, the Court if so
convinced, may take cognizance of the Complaint. That the
Petitioner failed to take the required steps as mandated by law
before the learned trial Court, hence his prayer deserves no
consideration and his petition seeking leave to Appeal ought to
be rejected. In order to fortify his submissions, reliance was
placed on Keshav Chouhan v. Kiran Singh and others1, Surekha
Sandip Hajare v. Instacomp through Partner Sanjeev Shivapurkar and
another2 and M/s Saketh India Ltd. v. M/s India Securities Ltd. 3
4.
The rival contentions of learned Counsel for the
parties were heard in extensor and given due consideration. I
have also perused the documents on record of the learned trial
Court as well as the citations made at the Bar.
5.
Admittedly the Cheque in question was issued on
10.10.2014
which
was
dishonoured
vide
Memo
dated
07.11.2014. Notice, Exhibit 3, was issued to the Respondent by
the Petitioner on 11.11.2014 and delivered on 12.11.2014.
Although it is true that no written documents establish delivery
2015 (4) M.P.L.J. 230
2004 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 408
1999 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 153
CRL.L.P. No.11 of 2017
Ankit Sarda
vs. Kailash Agarwal
of Notice on 12.11.2014 but reference to the cross-examination
of the Petitioner before the learned trial Court relied on by
learned Counsel for the Respondent indubitably establishes as
follows;
“… It is true that the said notice marked as
exbt-3 is dated 11.11.2014. It is true that the
postal receipt (exbt-4) is dated 11.11.2014. ... It
is true that the said notice was delivered to the
accused on 12.11.2014. …”
At this juncture, we may pertinently refer to Section 58 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provides as hereunder;
“58. Facts admitted need not be proved.-No
fact need to be proved in any proceeding which
the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit
at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they
agree to admit by any writing under their hands,
or which by any rule of pleading in force at the
time they are deemed to have admitted by their
pleadings: Provided that the Courts may, in its
discretion, require the facts admitted to be
proved otherwise than by such admissions.”
The unequivocal admission of the Petitioner supra leaves no
manner of doubt that not only was the Notice issued on
11.11.2014 but was also delivered to the Respondent on
12.11.2014. The cross-examination of the Petitioner was not
retracted at any point in time.
6.
The air on delivery of Notice having been cleared, I
now deem it essential to address the question of limitation as
envisaged in Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act. In Haru Das Gupta
v. State of West Bengal4
a two Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held as follows;
“… When a period of time running from a
given day or event to another day or event is
prescribed by law or fixed by contract and the
(1972) 1 SCC 639
CRL.L.P. No.11 of 2017
Ankit Sarda
vs. Kailash Agarwal
question arises whether the computation is to be
made inclusively or exclusively of the firstmentioned or of the last-mentioned day, regard
must be had to the context and to the purpose
for which the computation has to be made.
[Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd. ed.) Vol. 37,
p. 92]. There is, however, a volume of authority
in England showing that where a certain thing has
to be done within a specified period, the day on
which the cause of action arose is to be excluded
from computation and the day on which such
action is taken is to be included. …
5. … The rule is well-established that where
a particular time is given from a certain date
within which an act is to be done, the day on that
date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths
Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company).
[(1904) KB 1 at 5]. This rule was followed
in Cartwright v. Maccormack [(1963) 1 All ER 11
at 13] where the expression “fifteen days from the
date of commencement of the policy” in a cover
note issued by an insurance company was
construed as excluding the first date and the cover
note to commence at midnight of that day, and
also
in Marren v. Dawson
Bentley
&
Co.
Ltd. [(1961) 2 QB 135], a case for compensation
for injuries received in the course of employment,
where for purposes of computing the period of
limitation the date of the accident, being the date
of the cause of action, was excluded. (See
also Stewart v. Chadman [(1951)
KB
792]
and In re North, Ex parte Wasluck [(1895) 2 QB
264]). Thus, as a general rule the effect of
defining a period from such a day until such a day
within which an act is to be done is to exclude the
first day
and to
include the last day.
[See Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd ed.), Vol.
37, pp. 92 and 95.] There is no reason why the
aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently
and for so long should not also be applied here.
6. In computing the period of three months
from the date of detention, which was February 5,
1971, before the expiration of which the order or
decision for confirming the detention order and
continuation of the detention thereunder had to be
made, the date of the commencement of
detention namely, February 5, 1971, has to be
excluded. So done, the order of confirmation was
made before the expiration of the period of three
months from the date of detention.
....................................................................”
(Emphasis supplied)
CRL.L.P. No.11 of 2017
Ankit Sarda
vs. Kailash Agarwal
In M/s. Saketh India Ltd. v. M/s. India Securities Ltd. 5, a two Judge
Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while citing the aforestated
decision with approval observed as hereunder;
“7. The aforesaid principle of excluding the
day from which the period is to be reckoned is
incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1) specifically
provides that in computing the period of limitation
for any suit, appeal or application, the day from
which such period is to be reckoned, shall be
excluded. Similar provision is made in sub-section
(2) for appeal, revision or review. The same
principle is also incorporated in Section 9 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 which, inter alia,
provides that in any Central Act made after the
commencement of the General Clauses Act, it
shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding
the first in a series of days or any other period of
time, to use the word „from‟, and, for the purpose
of including the last in a series of days or any
other period of time, to use the word „to‟.
8. Hence, there is no reason for not
adopting the rule enunciated in the aforesaid case
which is consistently followed and which is
adopted in the General Clauses Act and the
Limitation Act. Ordinarily in computing the time,
the rule observed is to exclude the first day and
to include the last. Applying the said rule, the
period of one month for filing the complaint will
be reckoned from the day immediately following
the day on which the period of 15 days from the
date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer,
expires. Period of 15 days in the present case,
expired on 14th October, 1995. So cause of
action for filing complaint would arise from 15th
October, 1995. That day (15th October) is to be
excluded for counting the period of one month.
Complaint is filed on 15th November, 1995. The
result would be that the complaint filed on 15th
November is within time. …”
More recently the ratio supra of M/s. Saketh India Ltd. was cited
with approval by a three Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd. and another6 as
under;
1999 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 153
AIR 2013 SC 3283
CRL.L.P. No.11 of 2017
Ankit Sarda
vs. Kailash Agarwal
“25. Having considered the question of law
involved in this case in proper perspective, in
light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion
that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of
law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating
the period of one month, which is prescribed
under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period
has to be reckoned by excluding the date on
which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL
Import USA does not lay down the correct law.
Needless to say that any decision of this Court
which takes a view contrary to the view taken in
Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us,
do not lay down the correct law on the question
involved in this reference. The reference is
answered accordingly. …”
7.
Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act provides that the
Complaint is to be made within one month of the date on which
the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to
Section 138 of the Act. Pertinently it may be noticed that
Section 142(1)(b) does not clarify as to how many days one
month would comprise of. In such a circumstance, it could be
deduced that the term “one month” would be a calendar month
in terms of Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act which
provides as follows;
“3. Definitions.- In this Act, and in all
Central Acts and Regulations made after the
commencement of this Act, unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context,.............................................................
(35) “month” shall mean a month reckoned
according to the British calendar; …”
8.
In the instant case, it is clear that fifteen days from
12.11.2014 after delivery of Notice expired on 27.11.2014. The
cause of action for filing the Complaint therefore arose from
28.11.2014. On the anvil of the ratiocinations extracted supra
the computation of limitation for one month would commence
on 29.11.2014. The Complaint however came to be filed only on
31.12.2014 evidently beyond the period prescribed by the
CRL.L.P. No.11 of 2017
Ankit Sarda
vs. Kailash Agarwal
statute. The learned trial Court in the impugned Judgment
opined that the case was time barred as the matter came to be
filed only on 31.12.2014. No error arises on this conclusion. It is
also clear that the Petitioner failed to bring to the Notice of the
learned trial Court that a delay in filing the Complaint had
occurred neither did he take steps as required under the proviso
to Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act.
9.
In conclusion, considering the entire gamut of facts
and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the
Petitioner not only failed to lodge the Complaint on time but is
also guilty of having approached the learned trial Court with
unclean hands. Hence the petition deserves to be and is
accordingly rejected.
10.
Consequently, no leave to Appeal is granted.
11.
Criminal Leave Petition No. 11 of 2017 stands
disposed of accordingly.
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
04.07.2019
ml
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