The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
14. 09.2019 at about 10:00 p.m., after returning from the field, he was informed by the accused's sister Rukmani Dhanwar that the accused had assaulted his wife Shanti Dhanwar with a tangi on the back of her neck following a quarrel. On entering the house, he found his daughter lying unconscious with a bleeding injury on the back of her neck. Based on the report (Ex.P/11), FIR was registered initially under Section 307 of the IPC against the accused. The injured was immediately taken to Community Health Centre, Tamnar, where PW-7 Dr. Abhishek Patel medically examined her and found an incised wound measuring 8 × 2 × 2 cm on the posterior aspect of the neck caused by a sharp-edged weapon and referred her to District Hospital, Raigarh for better treatment. Despite treatment, she succumbed to the injuries on 25.10.2019. Thereafter, merg proceedings were initiated, inquest was conducted and the dead body was sent for post-mortem examination. PW-8 Dr. Devaraj Behera conducted the post-mortem and found a sutured wound on the back of the neck with fracture of the C-5 spine, torn spinal ligament and swollen spinal cord with blood clots. The doctor opined that the death was caused due to shock resulting from septicemia consequent to the neck injury and that the death was homicidal in nature. Consequently, the offence was converted to one under Section 302 of the IPC. The spot map of the plac…
34. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word "especially" means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, "especially within the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience.” 16 The seizure of the tangi from the appellant and the medical opinion that the injury could have been caused by the said weapon further corroborate the prosecution case. As such, the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant-accused who had caused the fatal injury to the deceased. Acco…
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Digitally signed
by ALOK
SHARMA
ALOK
Date:
SHARMA 2026.07.29
17:23:20
+0530
CGHC010413952025
2026:CGHC:31936-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1993 of 2025
1 - Aniruddha Dhanwar S/o Shri Bhagat Ram Aged About 27 Years Present
Aged 32 Years, R/o Laldipa Amaghat, Thana - Tamnar, Distt.- Raigarh (C.G.)
... Appellant(s)
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate Raigarh, Distt.Raigarh (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Rajendra Patel, Advocate.
For State
:
Mr. Sumit Singh, Dy. Advocate General.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
27/07/2026
Per, Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice.
Vide order dated 31.10.2025, the appeal was admitted for final hearing.
Though the matter was listed for consideration of I.A. No. 01/2025, an
application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, however, with
the consent of the parties, the appeal is being finally heard as the
appellant has been in jail since 16.09.2019. Accordingly, I.A. No.
01/2025 is disposed of.
The present appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has been filed by the appellant against the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
09.09.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge
Gharghoda, District Raigarh (C.G.), in Sessions Trial No.15/2020,
whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the
following manner:Conviction
Sentence
Under Section 302 of Indian Imprisonment for Life and fine of Rs.
Penal Code
1,000/-, in default of payment of fine
Additional R. I. of 01 month.
The brief facts of the case are that, on 15.09.2019, the father of the
deceased, namely Pusau Dhanwar (PW-17), lodged a report at Police
Station Tamnar alleging that he had come to the house of his daughter
Shanti Dhanwar and her husband Aniruddh Dhanwar, to attend the
Chhathi ceremony of their son and was staying there. In the night of
14.09.2019 at about 10:00 p.m., after returning from the field, he was
informed by the accused's sister Rukmani Dhanwar that the accused
had assaulted his wife Shanti Dhanwar with a tangi on the back of her
neck following a quarrel. On entering the house, he found his daughter
lying unconscious with a bleeding injury on the back of her neck.
Based on the report (Ex.P/11), FIR was registered initially under
Section 307 of the IPC against the accused. The injured was
immediately taken to Community Health Centre, Tamnar, where PW-7
Dr. Abhishek Patel medically examined her and found an incised
wound measuring 8 × 2 × 2 cm on the posterior aspect of the neck
caused by a sharp-edged weapon and referred her to District Hospital,
Raigarh for better treatment. Despite treatment, she succumbed to the
injuries on 25.10.2019. Thereafter, merg proceedings were initiated,
inquest was conducted and the dead body was sent for post-mortem
examination. PW-8 Dr. Devaraj Behera conducted the post-mortem
and found a sutured wound on the back of the neck with fracture of the
C-5 spine, torn spinal ligament and swollen spinal cord with blood
clots. The doctor opined that the death was caused due to shock
resulting from septicemia consequent to the neck injury and that the
death was homicidal in nature. Consequently, the offence was
converted to one under Section 302 of the IPC.
The spot map of the place of occurrence was prepared by the
Investigating Officer vide Ex.P/22. During the course of investigation,
one iron tangi produced by the accused was seized vide seizure memo
Ex.P/1 in the presence of witnesses and blood-stained soil, plain soil
and another iron tangi were seized from the place of occurrence vide
seizure memo Ex.P/2. The seized tangi was sent for query to PW-7 Dr.
Abhishek Patel, who opined in his query report Ex.P/7 that the injury
sustained by the deceased could have been caused by the said tangi
and that the injury was of such a serious nature that it was sufficient in
the ordinary course to cause death. The seized articles, namely, the
tangi, blood-stained soil and plain soil, were forwarded for chemical
examination to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Bilaspur. As
per the FSL report Ex.P/20, blood was detected on the blood-stained
soil, whereas no blood was detected on the tangi and the plain soil.
Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were
recorded and after completion of the usual investigation, charge-sheet
was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Gharghoda, District Raigarh for the offences under Sections 307 and
302 of the IPC. The case was committed to the Court of learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Gharghoda, District Raigarh for its trial.
The learned trial Court framed charge against the accused for the
offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The accused abjured
the guilt, denied the charge and claimed to be tried.
In order to prove the charge against the accused, the prosecution has
examined as many as 17 witnesses. Statement of the accused under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. has also been recorded, in which he denied the
circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence and
submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence.
After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by
the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused and
sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence
this appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution
has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are
material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses which cannot be made the basis to convict him
for the offence in question. He would further submit that there is no
eye-witness to the incident and the case of the prosecution is based on
circumstantial evidence, which does not form a complete chain pointing
towards the guilt of the appellant. He would further submit that the
material witnesses have not supported the prosecution case and the
seizure of the alleged weapon of offence and the medical evidence are
not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for the commission of the
offence. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of
the IPC deserves to be set aside by extending the benefit of doubt to
him. In the alternative, he would further submit that even if the
prosecution case is accepted in its entirety, the offence would not travel
beyond the scope of Section 304 of the IPC. Therefore, by altering his
conviction from the offence under Section 302 of the IPC to Section
304 of the IPC, his sentence may be reduced to the period already
undergone.
10 On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and would
submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt. Though some of the prosecution witnesses have turned hostile,
the evidence of the remaining witnesses is fully reliable and is duly
corroborated by the medical and documentary evidence. It is further
submitted that the appellant assaulted the deceased with a tangi, the
weapon of offence was seized from him and the medical evidence
establishes that the injuries sustained by the deceased could have
been caused by the said weapon. Therefore, there is ample evidence
against the appellant that he committed the murder of the deceased.
The learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence available
on record and passed the impugned judgment of conviction and
sentence, which needs no interference.
11 We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival
submissions made herein-above and went through the records with
utmost circumspection.
12 The first question for consideration would be, whether the death of
deceased Shanti Dhanwar was homicidal in nature?
13 The trial Court, after appreciating the oral as well as documentary
evidence available on record, particularly relying upon the testimony of
Dr. Abhishek Patel (PW-7), who first examined the injured, and Dr.
Devaraj Behera (PW-8), who conducted the post-mortem examination,
has come to the conclusion that the deceased sustained a sharp-cut
injury on the posterior aspect of her neck and that her death was
caused due to shock resulting from septicemia consequent to the said
injury. Both the doctors have categorically opined that the injury could
not have been caused by a fall and that the death was homicidal in
nature. Their medical evidence stands duly corroborated by the
testimony of Pusau Dhanwar (PW-17), Sanjay Dhanwar (PW-3) and
other evidence on record, which establishes that the deceased
sustained the fatal injury in the house of the accused and later
succumbed to the same during treatment. As such, we are of the
considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that the
death of deceased Shanti Dhanwar was homicidal in nature is a finding
of fact based on the evidence available on record. It is neither perverse
nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding.
14 Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the
accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question,
which the learned trial Court has recorded in the affirmative by relying
upon the testimony of Pusau Dhanwar (PW-17), Sanjay Dhanwar (PW3), Prem Sagar Rathia (PW-2) and the medical evidence of Dr.
Abhishek Patel (PW-7) and Dr. Devaraj Behera (PW-8). Though
Rukmani Dhanwar (PW-1) did not support the prosecution case, the
evidence of the aforesaid witnesses clearly establishes that the
deceased sustained the fatal tangi injury in the house of the appellant,
was immediately taken for treatment and ultimately succumbed to the
injury.
15 In the case of Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2023) Live Law
(SC) 861 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 33 and 34 has held as
under:
“33. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, states as under:
"106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
Illustration (a) When a person does an act with some
intention other than that which the character and
circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving
that intention is upon him.(b) A is charged with travelling on
a railway without a ticket, The burden of proving that he
had a ticket is on him.
34. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above
provides that when any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is
upon him. The word "especially" means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the
accused. The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal
trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule
of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section
101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a)
lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the
burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is
certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the
contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases
in which it would be impossible or at any rate
disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish
the facts which are, "especially within the knowledge of the
accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or
inconvenience.”
16 The seizure of the tangi from the appellant and the medical opinion that
the injury could have been caused by the said weapon further
corroborate the prosecution case. As such, the learned trial Court has
rightly held that it is the appellant-accused who had caused the fatal
injury to the deceased. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.
17 The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration,
whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to
Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to
murder and their conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or
Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellants?
18 The Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of
Haryana 1 has observed as under:“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the
case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the
existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to
have committed the offence of culpable homicide without
premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon
a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual
manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section
300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I)
IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid
appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under
Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the
commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years
and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine,
he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one
year.”
19 The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of
Haryana2 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into
consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused
with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which
state as under :“23. These are some factors which are required to be
taken into consideration before awarding appropriate
sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative
1 (2002) 3 SCC 327
2 (2009) 15 SCC 635
in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen
fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as
under :
(a) Motive or previous enmity;
(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur
of the moment;
(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while
inflicting the blow or injury;
(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or
the victim died after several days;
(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
(f) The age and general health condition of the
accused;
(g)
Whether
the
injury
was
caused
without
premeditation in a sudden fight;
(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting
the injury and the force with which the blow was
inflicted;
(i) The criminal background and adverse history of
the accused;
(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the
death was because of shock;
(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against
the accused;
(l) Incident occurred within the family members or
close relations;
(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after
the incident.
Whether the accused had taken the injured/the
deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that
he/she gets proper medical treatment ?
These are some of the factors which can be taken
into consideration while granting an appropriate
sentence to the accused.
24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only
illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view,
proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the
bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour
of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives
appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be
according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of
the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view
while convicting and sentencing the accused.”
20 Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda, their Lordships of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is
likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause
death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10
years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out
an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the
prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such
death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that
such act of his is likely to cause death.
21 Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of
Chhattisgarh 3 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in
paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are
to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder
Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC
(Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220,
para 7)
“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must
be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii)
there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in
3 (2017) 3 SCC 247
a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not
taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel
manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor
its I relevant who offered the provocation or started
the assault. The number of wounds caused during
the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is
important is that the occurrence must have been
sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must
have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender
must not have taken any undue advantage or acted
in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a
person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon
which is handy and causes injuries, one of which
proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of
this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.
” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of
law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section
300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been
explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)
“9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if
death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a
sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken
undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the
person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all
the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to
be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to
Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal 4 (2017)
3 SCC 2472024:CGHC:9062 DB 11 Code, 1860. It
takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires
that there must be no time for the passions to cool
down and in this case, the parties had worked
themselves into a fury on account of the verbal
altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat
between two or more persons whether with or
without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any
general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a
sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a
quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend
upon the proved facts of each case. For the
application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show
that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no
premeditation. It must further be shown that the
offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in
cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue
advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair
advantage”.
22 In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that if there is intention and not knowledge, the same would be case of
Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and
not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be
a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.
23 Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State
(NCT of Delhi) has laid down four ingredients which should be tested
to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC,
which reads as under:
“16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC shows that the following four ingredients are
required:
(i) There must be a sudden fight;
(ii) There was no premeditation;
(iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and
(iv)The offender had not taken any undue advantage
or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.”
24 According to the medical evidence, the deceased had sustained a
single incised injury on the posterior aspect of her neck measuring 8 ×
2 × 2 cm, resulting in fracture of the C-5 spinous process, rupture of
the spinal ligament and injury to the spinal cord, which ultimately
caused her death due to shock consequent to septicemia. The
evidence on record further establishes that immediately before the
incident, the appellant had demanded money from the deceased for
consuming liquor and, upon her refusal, assaulted her with a tangi on
the neck. From the evidence of the witnesses, it emerges that on the
night of the incident, while the appellant and the deceased were having
dinner, a dispute arose between them, during which the appellant
caused injuries to the deceased. The post-mortem report reveals that
only one injury was found on the body of the deceased, and the
appellant did not repeat the blow. The deceased died after more than
one month of the incident. Thus, the act of the appellant squarely falls
within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, and it cannot be held that
the appellant had the intention to cause the death of the deceased.
Therefore, we are of the considered view that the act of the appellant
would fall under Section 304 Part II of the IPC instead of Section 302 of
the IPC.
25 Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C.
is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-II of
I.P.C. and sentenced for the period already undergone by him.
26 The appellant is reported to be in jail since 16.10.2019. He shall be
released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
27 The criminal appeal filed by the appellant is partly allowed to the
extent indicated herein above.
28 Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Aniruddha Dhanwar is
directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one
surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be
effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the
event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or
for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof,
shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
29 The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back
to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.
Alok
Sd/-
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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