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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on : 02.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on : 03.02.2026
CRL.REV.P. 775/2014
AMIT SHARMA
.....Petitioner
versus
STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
.....Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner
: Mrs. Kajal Chandra, Ms. Hatneimawi, Mr.
Ananyay Bhardwaj and Mr. Suyash Swarup,
Advs.
For the Respondent
: Mr. Raj Kumar, APP for the State with SI
Navneet Yadav, PS Connaught Place.
CORAM
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
1.
The present petition is filed challenging the judgment dated
05.12.2014 (hereafter ‘impugned judgment’), passed in CA No.
73/14, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge (‘ASJ’), Patiala
House Courts, New Delhi upheld the judgment of conviction dated
21.10.2013 and reduced the sentence awarded by order on sentence
dated 25.06.2014 in the case arising out of FIR No. 651/2004 (‘FIR’),
registered at Police Station Connaught Place.
Signed By:SHIKHA
SEHGAL
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CRL.REV.P. 775/2014
2.
By the judgment of conviction dated 21.10.2023, the learned
Trial Court convicted the petitioner for the offences under Sections
279/304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’). By the order on
sentence dated 25.06.2014, the learned Trial Court sentenced the
petitioner to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two years
for the offence under Section 304A of the IPC and to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of six months for the offence under Section
279 of the IPC. Furthermore, the petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine
of ₹5,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of three months. Both sentences were
directed to run concurrently.
3.
By the impugned judgment, the learned Appellate Court
reduced the awarded sentence of two years of simple imprisonment for
the offence under Section 304A of the IPC to six months of simple
imprisonment.
4.
The brief facts of the case are as follows:
4.1.
On 23.10.2004, information was received about an accident at
Baba Khadak Singh Marg near Hanuman Mandir, Connaught Place.
The FIR was registered on the statement of Ct Hari Charan (PW3),
who is the alleged eye witness of the incident. It is the case of the
prosecution that on the said date, at about 2:40PM, when PW3 was on
duty at Baba Khadak Singh Marg, a motorcycle coming towards
Cannaught Place Circle hit the victim, aged about 50 years old, who
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was crossing the road. Allegedly, the motorcycle was being driven by
the petitioner at a high speed in a rash and negligent manner and the
concerned road was blocked due to Kali mata procession at the
relevant time. The victim sustained fatal injuries.
4.2.
By the judgment of conviction dated 21.10.2023, the learned
Trial Court convicted the petitioner for the offences under Sections
279 and 304A of the IPC after observing that the circumstances of the
case suggest that the incident could not have occurred due to any
reason other than the rashness and negligence of the petitioner. It was
observed that despite movement of traffic being blocked on the
concerned road at the relevant time, the petitioner had entered the area
and driven his motorcycle at a high speed, as evident from the
evidence of PW3. It was further noted that the fresh damage on the
motorcycle of the petitioner was contrary to his claim that his vehicle
was not involved in the offence.
4.3.
By the impugned judgment, the learned ASJ upheld the
conviction and reduced the substantive sentence of the petitioner to six
months of simple imprisonment and payment of fine of ₹5,000/-, and
in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment of three
months.
4.4.
Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred the present
petition.
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SEHGAL
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CRL.REV.P. 775/2014
5.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner’s conviction is perverse as the same is based on conjectures
and surmises. She further submitted that the entire story of the
prosecution, including the sole eye witness, have not clarified as to
how the offending vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent
manner. She stressed that high speed alone is not sufficient to satisfy
the threshold of rashness or negligence.
6.
She further submitted that the testimony of PW3 is unreliable.
She submitted that PW3 has deposed that the motorcycle slowed down
at a distance of 70-80 m ahead of where the victim had fallen down
due to impact of the collision, where the petitioner was apprehended
by PW3. She submitted that the said assertion appears to be
improbable, which casts doubt on the case of the prosecution. She
further stressed that the eye witness is a police officer and conviction
cannot be based on his sole testimony.
7.
She submitted that an accident of such nature ought to have
caused significant mechanical damage to the offending vehicle,
however, admittedly, only the front leg guard of the motorcycle was
found to be damaged in the present case.
8.
She further submitted that if the entire road was blocked, there
was no question of the petitioner’s vehicle plying on the road. She
submitted that even as per the prosecution, auto rikshaws were present
on the road and the victim was rushed to the Hospital on one such
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Auto. She submitted that the said aspects cast further suspicion on the
case of the prosecution.
9.
She submitted that even as per the prosecution, the petitioner
did not flee from the spot and took the victim to a nearby Hospital for
immediate medical attention.
10.
Without conceding on the merits of the case, the learned
counsel further submitted that the petitioner’s sentence may be
reduced to the period already undergone by him on account of the fact
that more than two decades have passed since the incident and the
petitioner would be severely prejudiced if he is subjected to suffer the
remaining period of his sentence.
11.
Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted
that there is no infirmity in the petitioner’s conviction in the present
case. He submitted that the learned Trial Court as well as the learned
Appellate Court have rightly appreciated the material on record,
however, he conceded that the State has no objection if a lenient view
is taken in regard to the sentence.
ANALYSIS
12.
It is pertinent to note that since the petitioner has preferred a
revision petition before this Court thereby challenging the concurrent
findings of the learned ASJ and learned Magistrate, the role of this
Court is limited to assessing the correctness, legality and propriety of
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the impugned judgment. It is well settled that this Court ought to
exercise restraint, and should not interfere with the findings of the
impugned orders or reappreciate evidence solely because another view
is possible unless the impugned orders are wholly unreasonable or
untenable in law. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri : (1999) 2 SCC
452 discussed the scope of revisional jurisdiction and held as under:
“5. …... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for
and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated
even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it
would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well
as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is
brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise
tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice....”
(emphasis supplied)
13.
In the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander : (2012) 9 SCC
460, the Hon’ble Apex Court had also expounded upon the scope of
interreference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The relevant
portion of the judgment is as under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call
for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of
satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings
or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right
a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be
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a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to
scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If
one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges
that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the
decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no
compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is
based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not
exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would
have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction
of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in
a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should
not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to
keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself
should not lead to injustice ex facie...
xxx
18. …Basically, the power is required to be exercised so that
justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the court. Merely
an apprehension or suspicion of the same would not be a sufficient
ground for interference in such cases.
xxx
20. The jurisdiction of the court under Section 397 can be
exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of
an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the case
may be. Though the section does not specifically use the expression
“prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice”, the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited
one. The legality, propriety or correctness of an order passed by a
court is the very foundation of exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 397 but ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The
jurisdiction could be exercised where there is palpable error, noncompliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely
erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily...”
(emphasis supplied)
14.
The entire case of the prosecution is essentially helmed on the
deposition of the eye witness PW3. Apart from him, in the present
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case, the prosecution examined 5 witnesses in support of its case, that
is, PW1 (Senior Resident who conducted the postmortem of the
unknown victim), PW2 (police officer who had registered the FIR on
the basis of rukka sent by Investigating Officer), PW4 (clerk who
identified the signature of the doctor who had prepared the MLC),
PW5 (mechanical inspector who had inspected the offending
motorcycle) and PW6 (Investigating Officer).
15.
Although arguments in relation to contributory negligence were
agitated before the Courts below, before this Court, the petitioner has
essentially assailed his conviction on three grounds–there are flagrant
improbabilities and infirmities in the case of the prosecution;
reliability of the eye witness, who is a police constable; and no cogent
evidence which shows rashness or negligence on part of the petitioner.
16.
Firstly, insofar as the improbabilities and infirmities in the case
of the prosecution are concerned, it is argued that the prosecution has
failed to establish as to how the petitioner’s vehicle was plying on the
road if the same had been blocked for facilitating the procession. It is
further argued that only the front leg of the offending motorcycle
suffered damage and such limited mechanical damage belies the case
of the prosecution. After considering the said arguments at length, the
learned Trial Court has rightly rejected the same.
Pertinently, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code
of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’), while the petitioner
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maintained that he was falsely implicated, he categorically admitted
his presence at the spot of the incident and stated that PW3 had asked
for his help in taking the victim to the hospital. It is also rightly
appreciated by the learned Trial Court that it was not the duty of the
prosecution to establish as to how the petitioner managed to enter the
road where vehicular movement was stopped due to procession.
Entertaining the possibility of the petitioner having entered
there stealthily or by hoodwinking the police officials on duty, the
learned Trial Court rightly noted that the case of the prosecution will
not fail due to the said aspect, especially when there is no reason as to
why the petitioner would have been falsely implicated in the present
case. Moreover, the petitioner has not led any evidence to bely the
assertion of PW3 that the road was blocked due to the procession.
PW3 has duly explained that though this fact was not mentioned in his
statement under Section 161 of the CrPC, he had mentioned the same
to the IO. Although some doubt is raised on account of the presence of
the auto, in which the victim was taken to the hospital, the possibility
of the said vehicle also stealthily plying on the road cannot be negated.
The said aspect is not so glaring so as to merit reappreciation of
evidence in detail and for this Court to draw a different conclusion.
As far as the damage to the vehicle is concerned, as noted by
the learned Trial Court, the fresh damage detected on the motorcycle,
as also proved by PW5, corroborates the case of the prosecution.
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SEHGAL
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In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
opinion that the said argument raised by the petitioner has no merit.
The allegations levelled against the petitioner and the entire case of
the prosecution are not implausible or far-fetched so as to warrant his
acquittal in the present case.
17.
Secondly, it is also argued that the evidence of PW3 is rendered
suspicious due to him being a police officer. It is well-settled that
evidence of police officials cannot be discarded merely due to absence
of any corroboration from an independent person. There is no general
rule that police officers cannot be sole eye witnesses in a criminal case
and reliability of their evidence depends on the facts of the case. In the
present case, PW3 was posted for duty at the spot of the incident at the
relevant time. Moreover, in his statement under Section 313 of the
CrPC, the petitioner has himself admitted to the presence of PW3 on
the spot of the incident. In such circumstances, when the presence of
PW3 on the spot of the incident is duly explained and the defence has
failed to make out a case of false implication, the evidence of PW3
cannot be discarded solely due to his position as a Constable.
Doubt is also sought to be raised on the reliability of the eye
witness, as he deposed that the motorcycle was stopped 70-80m away
from the spot of occurrence due to the impact. This Court finds no
merit in the said argument either. PW3 has duly explained that he had
apprehended the petitioner at a distance of 70-80m from the spot of
collision and the motorcycle was slow due to the impact. The slowing
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down of the vehicle after the incident, and PW3 getting the
opportunity to apprehend the petitioner is not inconceivable.
18.
Thirdly, it is argued that there is no evidence to show rashness
and negligence on part of the petitioner. While PW3 has deposed that
the vehicle of the petitioner was coming at a very high speed before it
struck the victim, it is argued that high speed alone cannot be a
determining factor of rashness and negligence. The said argument has
also been rightly rejected by the Courts below. It has been aptly
appreciated by the learned Trial Court that although high speed alone
may not reflect rashness or negligence, in the peculiar circumstances
of the present case, where the accident took place on a road which was
blocked on account of the procession, the petitioner ought to have
taken due care to ensure the safety of the present pedestrians. The
speed of the petitioner in such circumstances is indicative of rashness
and negligence. The principle of respondent ipsa loquitur has also
been rightly applied to note that the accident would not have occurred
if not for the negligence of the petitioner in venturing on a blocked
road and driving at a high speed.
19.
As noted above, at the stage of revision, this Court is not
required to reappreciate evidence and it can interfere only in face of
palpable and glaring perversity. As discussed above, the Courts below
have aptly appreciated the material on record and the petitioner’s
conviction is backed by rational reasoning. This Court is thus of the
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SEHGAL
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opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out any case which
warrants interference with the impugned judgment.
20.
Insofar as the sentence of the petitioner is concerned,
pertinently, the incident took place on 23.10.2004 and more than
twenty years have elapsed since then. The record indicates that the
petitioner’s sentence was suspended on 27.01.2015 after he spent
about 42 days in custody. The petitioner has remained on bail since
then and he was also on bail during the course of the trial.
21.
Pertinently, no minimum sentence of imprisonment is
prescribed for the offences under Section 304A of the IPC and Section
279 of the IPC. At this juncture, this Court deems it apposite to note
that the reformative purpose of sentencing as well.
22.
In the case of Parkash Chandra Agnihotri v. State of M.P. :
1990 Supp SCC 764, the Hon’ble Apex Court while upholding the
conviction of the appellant therein for the offence under Section 304A
of the IPC, the Hon’ble Apex Court had reduced the sentence of the
accused to only payment of fine. The relevant portion of the order is as
under:
“…The occurrence took place on February 18, 1972. The
appellant has throughout been on bail. He has been sentenced to
six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 250. We are of
the view that it would be rather harsh to send the appellant to jail
after 18 years of the occurrence. The ends of justice would be met
if the appellant is asked to pay a fine of Rs 2000. The sentence is
thus converted to a fine of Rs 2000. On realisation the amount
shall be paid to the family of the deceased girl. The amount be
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deposited with the trial court within two months from today and the
trial court shall disburse the same to the parents of the girl and in
the absence of the parents to the next of kin of the girl. In default of
the payment of fine the appellant shall undergo imprisonment for
six months.”
(emphasis supplied)
23.
Placing reliance on the aforesaid case, this Court had recently
commuted the sentence of the accused in the case of Charan Singh v.
State : 2026:DHC:171 although he had spent a mere 10 days in
custody by taking his age as well as ailing health of his wife in
consideration. In the present case as well, this Court is of the opinion
that no purpose would be served by relegating the petitioner to
undergo the remaining period of carceral punishment after more than
twenty years have passed since the incident. Interests of justice would
be met if the sentence imposed upon the petitioner is reduced to the
period already undergone by him.
24.
In view of the above, without interfering with the conviction of
the petitioner, his sentence is reduced to the imprisonment already
suffered by him and payment of fine of ₹5,000/-. It is stated that the
fine has already been paid by the petitioner.
25.
The present petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
26.
The bail bond and surety furnished by the petitioner stand
discharged.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
FEBRUARY 3, 2026/‘KDK’
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