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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of reserving Judgment: 7th July, 2026
Date of decision: 1st October, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+
CRL.A. 1266/2013
SANJEEV MATHUR
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Krishan Kumar, Mr. Anubhav
Kumar, Mr. Shivam Bedi and Mr.
Aman Bhati, Advs.
Appellant-in-person.
versus
STATE
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Mukesh Kumar, APP for State
with Insp. Sandeep Singh, PS Anti
Corruption Branch, GNCT of Delhi.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV
JUDGMENT
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J.
1.
The Appellant Sanjeev Mathur was found guilty and convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred to as the „PC Act‟) through the Judgment dated
19.09.2013 (hereinafter referred to as the „Impugned Judgment‟) and was
accordingly, sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment („RI‟) for a
period of 2 ½ years along with a fine of ₹ 10,000/- and in default of payment
of fine, he was to undergo Simple Imprisonment („SI‟) for a period of six
months through the Order on Sentence dated 24.09.2013. Although, the
learned Trial Court found it fit to give the benefit of doubt to the Appellant
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with respect to the charges levelled against him under Section 13(1)(d) of the
PC Act. Through the instant appeal, he has assailed the finding of guilt
primarily on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the
foundational and essential factum of demand and acceptance beyond
reasonable doubt and that the electronic evidence principally relied upon by
the learned Trial Court was neither legally admissible nor sufficiently
reliable to sustain the conviction.
2.
The prosecution‟s case succinctly, is that the complainant, Ajit Kumar
(PW-7), who was working as a parking attendant at an Authorised NDMC
parking at Kasturba Gandhi Marg (Mercantile Building), New Delhi,
exceeded the area earmarked for parking and a vacant land at Vakil Lane
was also encroached upon to run the parking. The Appellant, SI Sanjeev
Mathur, posted at PS Barakhamba Road, was stated to be the In-charge of
the said area. It was alleged that when the Appellant got wind of the
complainant‟s illegal parking facility operating in Vakil Lane, he demanded
a monthly bribe of ₹3,000/- from the complainant for permitting him to
continue the use of the area beyond the authorised parking. According to the
complainant‟s version, pursuant to the said demand, a sum of ₹3,000/- was
paid to the Appellant in November 2008. Incidentally, prior to the alleged
demand, Ajit Kumar (PW-7) had already lodged a complaint against one Ajit
Tyagi (PW-17), which too was being handled by the Appellant, resulting in
repeated interactions between the complainant and the Appellant. Growing
weary of the inaction of the Appellant and demand of monthly bribe, the
complainant, approached the Anti-Corruption Branch (hereinafter referred to
as „ACB‟), where he was advised to record his conversations with the
Appellant for verification of the alleged demand. After multiple unsuccessful
attempts, the complainant, using the recording device supplied by the ACB,
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entered PS Barakhamba Road on 13.11.2008 and allegedly recorded his
conversation with the Appellant, while SI Ramesh Kumar (PW-13) remained
outside the Police Station. The recording was, thereafter, handed over to the
ACB, transferred to a computer, transcribed and converted into CDs. The
specimen voice samples were also obtained and sent to the Forensic Science
Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as „FSL‟) for examination subsequently.
The formal complaint Ex. PW-7/A was ultimately lodged on 19.12.2008,
pursuant to which FIR No. 43/2008 was registered at PS Anti-Corruption
Branch.
3.
The investigation carried out in the case ultimately shaped up in a
chargesheet, which was filed under Sections 7 & 13 of the PC Act read with
Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 („IPC‟) by the ACB against the
Appellant, who was arrested on 21.02.2009 and subsequently, released on
bail. He pleaded not guilty to the formal charge framed and served upon him
under Sections 7, 13(i)(d), 13(2) of the PC Act.
4.
In support of its case, the prosecution examined a total of 22
witnesses. The witnesses included the complainant Ajit Kumar (PW-7),
officials who proved the relevant complaint, posting and transfer records,
witnesses connected with the recording and seizure of the electronic
evidence, Panch witness associated with voice identification and recording
of specimen voices, the expert from the FSL Dr. C.P. Singh (PW-20), the
Sanctioning Authority Sh. S. Dash (PW-21), and the Investigating Officer
Inspector Kailash Chand (PW-22). The prosecution also brought in the
relevant documentary and electronic evidence, including the complaint Ex.
PW7/A, the seizure memos, transcript of the recorded conversation, CDs and
the FSL report, etc.
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5.
After completion and conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the
incriminating circumstances/evidence coming on record were put to the
Appellant in order to give an opportunity to explain and his statement under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to
as „Cr.P.C.‟) was recorded. The Appellant denied having demanded or
accepted ₹3,000/- from the complainant and claimed that he was falsely
implicated by the complainant owing to a grudge nursed by him due to the
Appellant‟s so called inaction towards the complainant‟s prior complaint
against Ajit Kumar Tyagi. He further claimed that he was not posted at the
concerned Police Station at the relevant time and that he was attached with
the Election Commission. The Appellant was, however, found guilty and
convicted under Section 7 of the PC Act, while being acquitted of the charge
under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.
6.
At the outset, learned counsel for the Appellant has assailed the
conviction primarily on the ground that the complainant (PW-7), the very
person from whom the alleged demand was made and the very person who
put the machinery of the Anti-Corruption Branch into motion, did not
support the prosecution on the material aspect of demand and acceptance. He
was declared hostile. It has been submitted that PW-7 specifically denied
that the Appellant had demanded ₹3,000/- from him as monthly bribe or that
he had accepted the amount or made any such demand. Further that PW-7, in
his deposition before the learned Trial Court had stated that the only reason
he had originally approached the Anti-Corruption Branch was not due to any
demand made by the Appellant or any subsequent payment he had made
pursuant to any demand, but to trigger some development in the earlier
complaint which he had filed against Ajit Tyagi (PW-17).
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7.
Learned counsel for the Appellant has further submitted that PW-7‟s
testimony concerning the formal complaint (Ex. PW-7/A) is such that it
renders the formal complaint into nothing more than a false pretence to
trigger unwarranted action against the Appellant in the form of the present
case. Learned counsel for the appellant has specifically pointed out that
although PW-7 admitted that the complaint was in his handwriting and bore
his signatures, but he has clearly stated in cross-examination that, while
copying the contents of the complaint from a paper that had already been
prepared by the ACB, he had specifically informed the ACB officials that
the same were factually incorrect and that he had never stated that the
Appellant had demanded or accepted any bribe from him. Reliance in this
context, has been placed upon B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC
55, by the learned counsel for the Appellant in support of his contention that
where the complainant does not support the allegation of demand and there
is no reliable independent proof thereof, the conviction cannot be sustained.
8.
Learned counsel for the Appellant has also drawn this Court‟s
attention towards the electronic evidence relied upon by the learned Trial
Court. It has been submitted that the Compact Disk („CD‟) containing the
electronic recording (of the pre-raid verification) relied upon by the
prosecution was admitted without the compliance of Section 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as „Evidence Act‟).
Learned counsel for the Appellant has relied upon Anvar P.V. v. P.K.
Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, in support of his submission that the statutory
requirements governing electronic evidence cannot be dispensed with. It has
been further submitted that the original recording device was never
produced, that the computer upon which the recordings were transferred was
a shared computer and that the files were not password protected, thus, the
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sanctity of such evidence is questionable. Hence, the electronic evidence
cannot be looked into.
9.
Learned counsel for the Appellant has further pointed out to some
material discrepancies in the FSL report (Ex. PW-20/B) concerning the
identification of the questioned and specimen voices. It is submitted that,
upon comparison of the FSL report (Ex. PW-20/B) with the transcript (Ex.
PW-19/C), the questioned voices appear to have been marked in reverse,
inasmuch as „Exhibit Q1‟, which the FSL report reflects that the voice of the
Appellant has been compared with the specimen voice „Exhibit S1‟, i.e. with
the voice of the complainant. Whereas, „Exhibit Q2‟, which the FSL report
treats as the complainant‟s voice has been compared with „Exhibit S2‟, i.e.
stated to be the voice of the Appellant. Evidently, this mix up is disastrous
for the prosecution. Dr. C.P. Singh (PW-20), who was the Acting Assistant
Director (Physics) at the Forensic Science Laboratory, Sector-14, Rohini,
Delhi, also admitted that he had used the transcript for marking „Q1‟ and
„Q2‟ i.e. speakers of the respective voices. It has also been submitted that the
learned Trial Court itself noticed the apparent error in identification of the
speakers and found the FSL opinion on voice matching unreliable.
10.
Learned counsel for the Appellant has also pointed out the
discrepancy between the „Sony‟ cassette mentioned in the seizure
proceedings and the „T-Series‟ cassette received by the FSL. Further,
reliance has been placed upon the evidence of Ct. Ashok Kumar (PW-9) and
Inspector Akhilesh Swaroop Yadav (PW-18), who were asked to identify the
Appellant‟s voice. The PW-9 seemed unsure when the question was put to
him and stated that he was not completely sure that the voice heard by him
was that of the Appellant and also stated that the CD was not properly
audible. The PW-18 also stated that the voice merely „appeared similar‟ to
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that of the Appellant and that he was not an expert in voice identification and
that the recording contained disturbances and intermittent breaks. Thus, it is
submitted, that nothing substantial is on record on this count as well.
11.
Learned counsel for the Appellant has also relied upon the
deficiencies in the recorded Anti-Corruption proceedings and related
proceedings. SI Ramesh Kumar (PW-13) admitted that no departure entry
was made on either 12.11.2008 or 13.11.2008, despite acknowledging that
such entries were ordinarily made. SI Ramesh Kumar (PW-13) also admitted
that no Panch or Shadow witness accompanied him and PW-7 to PS
Barakhamba Road.
12.
Lastly, it has been submitted that there was an unexplained delay of
about one month in lodging the formal complaint. The successful recording
exercise allegedly took place on 13.11.2008, whereas the formal complaint
was lodged only on 19.12.2008. It is further submitted that there was no
recovery of the alleged bribe amount, no identified currency and no
independent witness to the alleged payment, demand or any subsequent
interaction between the Appellant and the complainant. The learned Trial
Court itself found the prosecution unsuccessful in proving acceptance and
consequently acquitted the Appellant under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.
According to the defence, in these circumstances, the prosecution cannot
sustain the conviction under Section 7 of the PC Act either, that too, on the
strength of the evidence led which is not aboveboard, rather shaky and thus,
highly unreliable.
13.
Learned APP has not only stood by and supported the impugned
judgment, but asserted that, notwithstanding the fact that the complainant
(PW-7) has resiled from material portions of his earlier version, his
testimony cannot be discarded in toto. It has been submitted that PW-7
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admitted several material circumstances, including that he had approached
the Anti-Corruption Branch, had been instructed to record his conversations
with the Appellant and had, in fact, recorded conversations, handed over the
recording to the ACB and subsequently identified and signed the relevant
seizure and recording documents including the formal complaint itself. The
prosecution further relies upon the complainant‟s (PW-7) admission that
during the conversation, the Appellant referred to the amount of ₹3,000/- as
monthly “rishwat”.
14.
It has been further submitted by the learned APP that the
prosecution‟s case does not rest solely upon the oral testimony of PW-7 and
that of the evidence of other material witnesses, when read cumulatively,
provides corroboration to the prosecution‟s case. In this regard, reliance has
been placed upon the deposition of SI Ramesh Kumar (PW-13), who
accompanied complainant (PW-7) to PS Barakhamba Road on 13.11.2008,
remained outside while PW-7 entered the police station with the recording
devices and thereafter heard the recording when it was played at the ACB
office. Learned APP submits that his testimony corroborates the fact that the
recording exercise was undertaken by PW-7 pursuant to his report to the
ACB and the recording was thereafter brought back to the ACB and not only
played, but a transcription too was prepared.
15.
The prosecution has further relied upon the deposition of SI Karnail
Singh (PW-19), who stated that the recording devices were handed over to
him after PW-7 returned from the police station, that he transferred the
recordings to the computer, heard them and, with the assistance of PW-7,
prepared the relevant transcript. According to the learned APP, the evidence
of PW-13 and PW-19, when read in conjunction, corroborates the recording
proceedings and the subsequent handling and processing of the recorded
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material, thereby lending support and corroboration to the prosecution‟s
case.
16.
With regards to the veracity and admissibility of the electronic
evidence, learned APP has submitted that the identity of the Appellant‟s
voice was not dependent solely upon the complainant. Ct. Ashok Kumar
(PW-9) and Ins. Akhilesh Swaroop (PW-18), both of whom had interacted
with the Appellant during his posting at PS Barakhamba Road, identified the
voice in the CD and found it similar to that of the Appellant. Reliance has
also been placed upon the evidence of Dr. C.P. Singh (PW-20), the FSL
expert, who examined the CD and specimen voice samples and reported that
there was no indication of alteration in the audio recording and that the
questioned and specimen voices were of the same persons.
17.
As regards to the alleged manipulation of the recorded evidence,
learned APP submits that the mere fact that the recording was subsequently
enhanced does not establish fabrication. Dr. C.P. Singh (PW-20) explained
that the recording was referred for enhancement because of unwanted noise
and that, after enhancement, the voice material could still be utilised for
speaker identification. Tampering in the files has been specifically ruled out
by the expert at the instance of the ACB.
18.
Learned APP has further submitted that the absence of recovery of the
earlier payment of ₹3,000/-, does not by itself, obliterate the offence under
Section 7 of the PC Act, particularly where the prosecution‟s case regarding
the demand is founded upon both the recorded conversation and the formal
complaint. It has been submitted that the subsequent failure to establish
acceptance explains the acquittal under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, but
does not automatically negate the proof or the finding of the separate act of
demand. It has been further submitted that the Appellant was admittedly a
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police officer posted at PS Barakhamba Road and was In-charge of and
dealing with matters concerning the area in question. The complainant‟s
prior complaint against Ajit Tyagi had admittedly been assigned to the
Appellant, pursuant to which the complainant had, on multiple occasions,
met him in that connection. Learned APP, therefore, submits that the
recorded conversation, read in the context of the admitted interaction
between the parties and the unauthorised parking activity along with the
contents of the formal complaint, furnishes and creates a reliable chain of
events which in turn, provides sufficient evidence of the demand being
connected with the Appellant in the light of his official position as a public
servant.
19.
According to the learned APP, the evidence must be appreciated
cumulatively rather than being nitpicked witness-wise, in isolation. The
hostility of the complainant, the alleged deficiencies in the recording
procedure and the technical objections concerning the electronic evidence,
according to the State, do not erase the substantive admissions of the
complainant (PW-7) or the corroborative evidence of the other prosecution
witnesses that have been brought on record. Learned APP, therefore, submits
that the learned Trial Court correctly placed reliance upon the electronic
evidence along with the testimonies of key witnesses, the formal complaint
and the portions of the complainant‟s testimony that stays true to the
prosecution‟s case and arrived at the finding of guilt under Section 7 of the
PC Act.
20.
Having considered the rival submissions and examined the evidence
on record, the main controversy that takes centre stage in the present appeal
may first be narrowed down by identifying certain facts which are not
disputed. The status of the Appellant as a police officer and, therefore, as a
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public servant, is not in dispute. It is also established that the complainant
(PW-7) had an earlier complaint lodged against Ajit Tyagi which was
assigned to the Appellant for inquiry and it was in pursuance of this very
complaint that the parties had interacted with each other multiple times, prior
to the main events that has brought the present case into being. The
prosecution, however, was required to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
essential factual foundation for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act,
namely that the Appellant demanded or otherwise sought to obtain illegal
gratification in connection with the performance or purported performance
of an official act. The question, therefore, is not merely whether the parties
interacted or whether a conversation took place, but whether the evidence
relied upon to establish the alleged demand is of such quality and reliability
that brings the case in the realm of beyond reasonable doubt, and that a
finding of guilt can safely rest upon it.
21.
Section 7 of the PC Act, as applicable to the present case, is
reproduced herein below for ready reference:
7. [Offence relating to public servant being bribed. [Substituted by
Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.]
- Any public servant who,(a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an
undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause
performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear
or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by
another public servant; or
(b)obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage
from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest
performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such
duty either by himself or another public servant; or
(c)performs or induces another public servant to perform
improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance
of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an
undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years
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but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to
fine.
22.
The first and most important witness in this regard is the complainant
himself examined as, PW-7. However, at this point, it is clear that his
testimony presents a materially divided and somewhat distorted picture. On
the one hand, he accepts several surrounding and attending circumstances
but turns around on the vital aspects. He admits that he had a complaint
pending against Ajit Tyagi, that the said complaint was assigned to the
Appellant and that he met the Appellant in connection with the same. He
further accepts that he approached the Anti-Corruption Branch and was
advised to record his conversations with the Appellant. He made attempts to
do so by, initially, purchasing recording devices at his own expense,
thereafter participated in a further recording exercise using devices supplied
through the ACB, then finally handing over the recordings to the officials.
He also admits the seizure of the CDs prepared from those recordings and
identifies his signatures on the relevant documents relating to the recordings
and the formal complaint as well. The relevant portion of the complainant
Ajit Kumar‟s (PW-7) examination-in-chief is reproduced hereunder for
reference:
“I went to Anti- Corruption Branch and met senior officer who
guided me to record the conversation if any between Ajit Kumar
Tyagi and SI Sanjeev Mathur regarding any transaction of bribe
giving and bribe taking. I was also guided to deal with SI Sanjeev
Mathur and tried to have a transaction of giving bribe to him.
I purchased a mobile phone with recording facility. I met SI
Sanjeev Mathur thereafter many times but every time I was put off.
I failed to lay my hands on SI Sanjeev Mathur and therefore again
went to the Anti Corruption Branch. I was again sent back with the
suggestion to record the conversation of any transaction of bribe
giving and bribe taking with SI Sanjeev Mathur and only then
action could be taken against SI Sanjeev Mathur.
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I recorded my conversation with SI Sanjeev Mathur 2-3 times on
my mobile phone but failed to record any conversation regarding
demand of bribe. The conversations recorded by me was handed
over to the officials of the Anti Corruption Branch. The same was
heard and verified by them after sending me away from their room.
I was called inside the room after a short while and was informed
that a CD of the conversation recorded in my mobile phone had
been got prepared. I was given one instrument by the officials of
Anti Corruption Branch and informed them. Thereafter, the
officials of Anti Corruption Branch asked me to leave and return as
and when I was called. I returned the instrument of recording to SI
Ramesh Kumar.”
23.
On the other hand, when we look towards the evidence which reaches
the central allegation of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification,
PW-7 expressly denies the same, almost at every turn. He specifically denied
that the Appellant had harassed him in relation to any demand or that he
demanded ₹3,000/- from him as monthly bribe and further denied that any
such demand was made when he pursued his earlier complaint against Ajit
Tyagi. The relevant portion of PW-7‟s cross-examination, where he had
deposed as mentioned above, has been reproduced hereunder:
“It is correct that in my complaint Ex.PW7/A, I have mentioned my
name, address and the fact that I was working as an Attendant in
an authorised parking. It is incorrect to suggest that SI Sanjeev
Mathur harassed me and demanded Rs.3,000/- as monthly bribe.
(Confronted with portion Mark „A‟ to „A‟ in Ex.PW7/A wherein it is
so recorded). It is incorrect to suggest that as and when I pressed
on my complaint against Ajit Singh Tyagi, accused SI Sanjeev
Mathur used to threaten me and demanded Rs. 3,000/- as monthly
bribe (Confronted with portion Mark „B‟ to „B‟ in Ex.PW7/A
wherein it is so recorded). It is incorrect to suggest that in the
month of November, 2008 under threat and pressure took Rs.
3,000/- from me as bribe and told me that I should pay Rs. 3,000/on a monthly basis thereafter.”
24.
With regard to the formal complaint (Ex. PW-7/A), PW-7 has stated
in cross-examination that, when he copied the complaint Ex. PW-7/A, he
had informed the ACB officials that its contents were factually incorrect and
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that he had never stated that the Appellant had demanded or accepted a bribe
from him. The relevant portion reads as under:
“when the complaint Ex. PW-7/A was copied by me, I had pointed
out to the officials of Anti Corruption Branch that the same was
factually incorrect as I never stated that SI Sanjeev Mathur had
demanded or accepted the bribe from me in fact I only wanted to
complain that SI Sanjeev Mathur had not taken any action on my
complaint against Ajit Singh Tyagi.”
25.
It is trite law that the testimony of a hostile witness is not effaced
completely from the record merely because the witness has resiled from his
earlier version. Those portions which are otherwise reliable and find
corroboration in the evidence on record may be acted upon. The question,
however, is not whether every statement of PW-7 is to be rejected merely
because he was declared hostile. The question is whether the portions of his
testimony relied upon by the prosecution, when tested against his categorical
denial of demand and acceptance, furnish a sufficiently reliable foundation
for conviction. In this context, reference can be made to the judgment of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in K.P. Tamilmaran v. State by Deputy
Superintendent of Police, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 958. The relevant portion
of which has been reproduced hereunder:
“36. It is though trite and much overstated but the maxim “falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus”, is not applicable to our criminal justice
system. It is for the Court to distinguish the wheat from the chaff
while dealing with the depositions of a hostile witness. Courts can
rely upon that part of the deposition of a hostile witness which is
corroborated by other evidence on record. This Court in Bhajju v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 327 discussed the worth of
the evidence of a hostile witness in the following words:
“36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile witnesses can
also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it
supports the prosecution version of the incident. The evidence of
such witnesses cannot be treated as washed off the records, it
remains admissible in trial and there is no legal bar to base the
conviction of the accused upon such testimony, if corroborated by
other reliable evidence…”
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If part of the evidence of a hostile witness corroborates with other
reliable evidence, then that part of the evidence is admissible. Once
a prosecution witness has been declared hostile and then crossexamined by the prosecution, then it is for the Court to evaluate the
veracity of the testimony. There can be several reasons for a
witness to turn hostile and the court must also look into these
factors while evaluating the evidence given by a hostile witness. It
is an uncomfortable reality in our criminal Courts for a
prosecution witness to turn hostile. But then the purpose of a Trial
Court is to go to the truth of the matter. Whatever evidence is there
before the Court must be examined, tested, corroborated (whenever
necessary), before a verdict can be finally given.”
26.
The learned Trial Court itself noticed this difficulty and recorded that,
solely from PW-7‟s oral testimony, it could not be held beyond reasonable
doubt that the Appellant had demanded or accepted the bribe and, therefore,
proceeded to seek corroboration from the electronic evidence. In light of the
same, the electronic evidence thus assumes decisive significance in the
present case.
27.
However, before delving into the electronic evidence on record, this
Court finds it appropriate to take a closer look into the conduct of PW-7 after
his initial approach to the ACB. If his present explanation is accepted prima
facie, that his only object or actual intention in approaching the AntiCorruption Branch was to exert pressure upon the police machinery, through
the Appellant, so as to secure action on his complaint against Ajit Tyagi, but
his subsequent conduct is difficult to be reconciled entirely with that
explanation. The record clearly shows that PW-7 did not merely lodge a
complaint and leave the matter there. He returned to the ACB, purchased a
mobile phone with recording facilities, made repeated attempts to record his
interactions with the Appellant and thereafter participated in a further
recording exercise with ACB officials. Such conduct is not, by itself, proof
of the truth of the allegation of demand, but it is a circumstance, which
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merits consideration while assessing whether his subsequent complete denial
can be accepted without reservation.
28.
The entire exercise pertaining to the obtaining of the recorded
conversation between the Complainant and the Accused is also
independently corroborated, to the extent of the exercise itself, by SI
Ramesh Kumar (PW-13). PW-13 deposed that on 12.11.2008, he
accompanied PW-7 to PS Barakhamba Road with recording devices but no
successful recording could be made. On the following day, i.e. 13.11.2008,
he again accompanied PW-7, who entered the police station with the
recording devices while PW-13 remained outside. The complainant, upon
his return, informed that he had successfully recorded the conversation.
They, thereafter, returned to the Anti-Corruption Branch and handed over
the recording devices to SI Karnail Singh. The relevant portion of SI
Ramesh Kumar‟s examination-in-chief is reproduced hereunder for
reference:
“On 12.11.2008, i was posted in the Anti Corruption Branch and
on that day, I on instructions of my senior officials alongwith the
complaint Ajit Kumar went to the Police Station at Bara Khamba
Road along with two secret recorders. On that day, we were unable
to meet the person demanding bribe.
On the next day i.e. 13.11.2008, I again along with Ajit Kumar
went to PS-Bara Khamba Road. Ajit Kumar hid both the recorders
on his person and went inside the PS-Bara Khamba Road and I
remained outside and waited for him to return. Ajit Kumar came
out and told me that he had been successful in recording the
demand and acceptance of bribe and we returned to the PS-Anti
Corruption Branch and handed over the audio recorder to SI
Karnail Singh”
29.
SI Karnail Singh (PW-19) further deposed that he received the
recording devices after PW-7 returned from the Police Station, transferred
the recordings to the computer, heard them and prepared the relevant
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transcript with the assistance of PW-7. His evidence, therefore, corroborates
the subsequent handling and processing of the material. However, neither
PW-13 nor PW-19 was a witness to the conversation which took place inside
the Police Station. Their testimony can establish that a recording exercise
took place and that the material was subsequently processed. It cannot, by
itself, establish the contents of the conversation.
30.
The complaint Ex. PW-7/A also requires consideration. It is admitted
that the complaint was written in PW-7‟s handwriting and bears his
signatures. However, on the most material aspect of the formal complaint,
i.e. its contents, PW-7 subsequently stated that the same had been copied by
him, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. This subsequent denial
undoubtedly affects the weight that can be attached to the complaint and the
extent to which its contents can be relied upon. Thus, what remains on
record is that PW-7 does not dispute having written and signed the
complaint, and that the same was duly brought on record and considered by
the learned Trial Court. However, in view of PW-7‟s subsequent deposition,
the contents of the complaint cannot, by themselves, be treated as
substantive evidence of the truth of the allegations contained therein.
31.
The explanation furnished by PW-7 regarding the purpose of
approaching the Anti-Corruption Branch also sits somewhat uneasily with
his assertion that he had objected to the factual contents of the complaint. If
his sole purpose was merely to secure action or exert pressure in relation to
his earlier complaint against Ajit Tyagi, then there appears to be little reason
for him to have simultaneously pursued a complaint containing specific
allegations of demand and acceptance before the very authority which he
claims he had approached only for that collateral purpose. This internal
inconsistency creates a very unstable conundrum in which PW-7‟s
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subsequent denial is to be assessed. It does not, however, by itself prove that
the allegations contained in Ex. PW-7/A were true.
32.
The evidence of Ajit Tyagi (PW-17) also requires consideration, albeit
with some restraint. PW-17 stated that PW-7 used to tell him that the
Appellant was demanding ₹3,000/- to ₹6,000/- from him for permitting him
to run the unauthorised parking and maintained this position in crossexamination. However, PW-17 had no personal knowledge of any demand
made by the Appellant to PW-7. His evidence regarding what PW-7 told him
is, therefore, not direct evidence of the Appellant‟s demand. At its highest, it
establishes that PW-7 had previously made such an allegation to PW-17. The
prior dispute between the two witnesses may be considered while assessing
their credibility, but it cannot convert this hearsay account into substantive
proof that the Appellant actually demanded the gratification. The official
nexus between the parties nevertheless stands independently established. HC
Ravinder Kumar (PW-1) proved that the complaint lodged by PW-7 against
Ajit Tyagi had been assigned to the Appellant and that an inquiry report had
thereafter been submitted by him. PW-7 also deposed regarding his repeated
interaction with the Appellant in connection with that complaint. Inspector
Akhilesh Swaroop (PW-18) accepted that Vakil Lane formed part of
Division-II and that the Appellant was the Division Officer, while also
accepting that, despite his temporary attachment elsewhere, the Appellant
continued to frequent PS Barakhamba Road in connection with his pending
work. PW-17 similarly deposed regarding the Appellant‟s knowledge of the
unauthorised parking activity and his summoning of PW-7 to the Police
Station.
33.
These circumstances discussed in the preceding paragraphs, establish
the opportunity and official nexus between the parties, but they do not, in
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themselves, establish the demand of illegal gratification. There is, however,
one significant admission made by PW-7 concerning the conversation which
he admittedly had with the Appellant. Though, PW-7 categorically denied
that the Appellant had demanded ₹3,000/- from him as bribe, he nevertheless
accepted that the Appellant, during the said conversation, referred to himself
as a professional SI, spoke of his standard of living and, in the same breath,
stated that even ₹3,000/- as monthly “rishwat” was on the lesser side. The
significance of this admission cannot be brushed aside merely because the
witness subsequently denied the allegation of demand. At the same time,
caution must be exercised in attributing to the statement a meaning which
goes beyond what PW-7 himself has admitted. The statement, by its tenor,
undoubtedly contains a reference to a recurring monthly payment and
therefore lends some support to the prosecution‟s version. However, in the
absence of the admissible contents of the recording and in view of PW-7‟s
categorical denial that the Appellant had actually demanded the amount from
him, the admission cannot, standing by itself, establish that the Appellant
was in fact making a demand or attempting to obtain illegal gratification
from PW-7. It is, therefore, a relevant corroborative circumstance, but
cannot be treated as a substitute for proof of the alleged demand.
34.
This brings us to dealing with the principal difficulty confronting the
prosecution‟s case, namely the admissibility of the electronic evidence,
which at the trial stage, supplied the principal corroboration for the portions
of PW-7‟s testimony upon which the prosecution relied. The CD containing
the recorded material and the transcript (Ex. PW-19/C) prepared therefrom
were relied upon to establish the contents of the conversation between the
complainant and the Appellant concerning the alleged demand. At this stage,
the learned counsel for the Appellant has raised the submission that no
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certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has been
produced by the prosecution and that the original recording devices were not
produced before the FSL or before the learned Trial Court.
35.
The legal position in this regard has been authoritatively settled by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, wherein it was held that the certificate
contemplated under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act is a
condition precedent to the admissibility of electronic evidence produced as
secondary evidence and that oral evidence cannot substitute for such
certificate. The relevant portion reads as under:
“61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required
under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility
of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar
P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1
SCC (Cri) 24] ... Oral evidence in the place of such certificate
cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory
requirement of the law.”
36.
However, Arjun Panditrao (supra) also provides a slim exception to
the requirement under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, where the
original electronic device from which the electronic record was produced is
itself produced before the Court, the relevant portion has been reproduced
hereunder:
“34. Quite obviously, the requisite certificate in sub-section (4) is
unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be
done by the owner of a laptop computer, a computer tablet or even
a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that
the device concerned, on which the original information is first
stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where “the
computer”, as defined, happens to be a part of a “computer
system” or “computer network” (as defined in the Information
Technology Act, 2000) and it becomes impossible to physically
bring such network or system to the court, then the only means of
proving information contained in such electronic record can be in
accordance with Section 65-B(1), together with the requisite
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certificate under Section 65-B(4). This being the case, it is
necessary to clarify what is contained in the last sentence in para
24 of Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 :
(2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC
(L&S) 108] which reads as “… if an electronic record as such is
used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act …”.
This may more appropriately be read without the words “under
Section 62 of the Evidence Act,…”. With this minor clarification,
the law stated in para 24 of Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K.
Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1
SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] does not need to be
revisited.”
37.
The present case, however, does not fall within that exception. The
original recording device used by the complainant to record the conversation
between him and the Appellant on 13.11.2008 was not produced at the time
of trial. As per the deposition of SI Karnail Singh (PW-19), the recording
devices, after the recording exercise, were handed over to him, whereafter he
transferred the recordings contained therein to the ACB computer and
subsequently prepared the CD from the electronic files stored on that
computer. Thus, PW-19 was the custodian of the computer on which the
recording was subsequently stored and processed. However, he was unable
to produce before the learned Trial Court, the original electronic record i.e.
the device on which the conversation was first recorded and stored. The
computer itself, therefore, contained a derivative copy of the original
recording and could not, merely by virtue of PW-19 having custody of it,
convert the CD subsequently prepared therefrom into primary electronic
evidence. Indeed, PW-19 admitted that the said computer was not password
protected and was accessible to other members of the ACB, a circumstance
which further demonstrates that his custody of the computer cannot be
equated with production and proof of the original electronic record.
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38.
In these circumstances, the CD containing the recording constituted
secondary electronic evidence, and its admissibility was consequently
governed by Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. The reasoning adopted
by the learned Trial Court that the oral testimony of PW-19, being the
custodian of the computer, could substitute for the statutory certificate under
Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, therefore cannot be sustained in
view of the subsequent authoritative pronouncement in Arjun Panditrao
(supra). At the risk of repetition, this court reiterates the decision in Arjun
Panditrao (supra) wherein it has been expressly clarified that the certificate
under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act is unnecessary only where
the original electronic record itself is produced as primary evidence. Where,
instead, a copy or computer output derived from the original electronic
record is relied upon, the statutory requirements of Section 65B of the
Evidence Act must be complied with. The mere examination of a person
who handled, stored or processed the electronic files on a computer does not
dispense with that requirement, especially when the computer was accessible
to multiple persons and was not in exclusive control of PW-19. In the
present case, neither the original recording device nor the original electronic
record first stored therein was produced before the Court. In the absence of a
certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, the CD and the
transcript prepared therefrom could not, therefore, be treated as admissible
secondary electronic evidence.
39.
In view of the aforesaid legal position, reliance cannot be placed upon
the contents of Ex. P-1 or Ex. PW-19/C for the purpose of establishing that
the Appellant made the alleged demand. Nor is it necessary, in view of this
finding, to determine the remaining disputed questions concerning the
precise identification of Q1 and Q2, the discrepancy in the recording
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medium or the reservations expressed by the voice-identification witnesses.
Those questions go to the reliability of evidence which, in any event, cannot
be relied upon for proving the demand in the absence of compliance of
Section 65B of the Evidence Act.
40.
It must, however, be made clear that exclusion of the electronic record
does not automatically result in the exclusion of every other piece of
evidence in a case such as this. The difficulty, however, arises from the
deposition of PW-7, the complainant. In cases involving allegations of
demand of illegal gratification, the testimony of the complainant assumes
particular significance and is required to be examined with due scrutiny.
This is so because, in most such cases, the prosecution‟s case originates from
the complaint of the complainant and the allegations of demand are, in the
first instance, founded upon his account of the interaction with the accused.
In the present case, however, the evidence given by the complainant vide his
complaint and deposition in court, even if accepted at face value, does not by
itself establish the context necessary to conclude that the Appellant thereby
demanded illegal gratification from him. Therefore, PW-7‟s testimony
cannot be treated as an indirect substitute for the contents of an inadmissible
electronic record. The other objections concerning the recording procedure,
including the absence of departure entries and the absence of a shadow or
Panch witness, may therefore be considered only as surrounding
circumstances. Likewise, the evidence of PW-9 and PW-18 concerning
voice identification and the FSL opinion of PW-20 cannot independently
cure the fundamental defect in admissibility of the electronic record. Once
the CD and transcript themselves cannot be relied upon to establish the
contents of the conversation, the question whether the voices appearing
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therein were correctly identified loses much of its significance for the
present appeal.
41.
The delay in lodging the formal complaint also requires some
consideration, while prima facie, it does not appear to have caused any
prejudice to either side. The successful recording exercise took place on
13.11.2008, whereas the formal complaint was lodged on 19.12.2008. The
prosecution has explained the delay by stating that further efforts were made
to record the subsequent monthly demand, but the Appellant was transferred
in the intervening period, following which the formal complaint was lodged.
This explanation prevents the delay from being treated as wholly
unexplained. Nevertheless, once the electronic material itself is excluded, the
interval assumes some relevance in assessing the overall reliability of the
prosecution‟s version, particularly, since no subsequent trap or recovery took
place.
42.
The absence of recovery or acceptance must also be kept distinct from
the question of demand. There was no raid conducted in this case due to the
Appellant‟s subsequent transfer. Likewise, there is no recovery of the
alleged ₹3,000/-, no identified currency and no witness who saw the alleged
earlier payment. The learned Trial Court, on that basis, extended the benefit
of doubt to the Appellant under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. That
conclusion does not automatically disprove a prior demand. However, it
does mean that the prosecution cannot rely upon the alleged completed
transaction as an independent circumstance corroborating the existence of
the demand.
43.
The prosecution has sought to overcome this evidentiary difficulty by
relying upon the expressions “agrees to accept” and “attempts to obtain”
contained in Section 7 of the PC Act. It is correct that the provision
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contemplated conduct which could fall short of a completed transaction
resulting in the actual receipt of illegal gratification. However, the mere
existence of those expressions does not dispense with proof of the conduct
constituting such agreement or attempt. The prosecution would still have to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant had agreed to accept or
attempted to obtain illegal gratification. The failure to prove acceptance
cannot, by itself, be converted into an affirmative finding of an attempt to
obtain gratification.
44.
The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2023) 4 SCC 731, while considering the statutory scheme governing the PC
Act, held that the relevant facts may be established through direct or
circumstantial evidence, but emphasized the necessity of proving the
foundational facts in issue. In the conventional case involving a demand by a
public servant followed by tender and receipt of gratification, the
prosecution must establish the demand and acceptance/receipt in accordance
with the particular provision invoked. The alternative expressions “agrees to
accept” or “attempts to obtain” therefore, cannot be employed merely as a
means of avoiding an evidentiary failure in proving the substantive
ingredients of the prosecution case. The relevant portion of Neeraj Dutta
(supra) is reproduced hereunder for reference:
“88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised
as under:
88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification
by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine
qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public
servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the
prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification
and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in
issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the
nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
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88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand
and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by
circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and
documentary evidence.
88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand
and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the
following aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there being
any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts
the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of
acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need
not be a prior demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and
the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded
gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a
case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand
for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is
an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-giver
and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be
proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere
acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything
more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore, under
Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must
be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted
by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a
prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribegiver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the
public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and
acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made
by a court of law by way of an inference only when the
foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and
documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis
of the material on record, the court has the discretion to raise a
presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand
has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a
presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the
absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”, or has died
or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of
illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any
other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by
documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by
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circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result
in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.
88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof
of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a
presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a
motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said
presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption
or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also
subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20
of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in
sub-para 88.5(e), above, as the former is a mandatory
presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.”
45.
Applying the above principles laid out in Neeraj Dutta (supra), to the
facts and evidence on record, the prosecution‟s case rests substantially upon
the alleged prior/recurring demand of ₹3,000/- per month and the allegation
that an earlier payment of ₹3,000/- had already been made pursuant to the
said demand. The alleged payment has not been proved, there is no recovery,
no independent witness to the payment and no admissible electronic
evidence establishing the alleged acknowledgment of such payment.
46.
Once the electronic evidence is excluded, the evidence bearing upon
the demand consists principally of the complainant‟s own testimony and the
surrounding circumstances already noticed. PW-7‟s conduct in approaching
the ACB and attempting to obtain a recording may show that he sought to
substantiate his grievance against the Appellant. It does not, however,
establish what the Appellant actually demanded illegal gratification from the
complainant for “looking the other way” while he continued to run his illegal
parking facility. Likewise, PW-7‟s admission regarding the reference to
₹3,000/- as a monthly bribe is a relevant circumstance, but in the absence of
admissible evidence of the conversation in its entirety, it cannot by itself
establish that the Appellant demanded illegal gratification from him.
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47.
The principle governing appreciation of hostile testimony does not
alter this conclusion. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
testimony of a hostile witness is not washed off the record and those portions
which are found reliable and corroborated may be relied upon, as recognised
by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in K.P. Tamilmaran (supra). This Court is,
therefore, entitled to rely upon the admissible portions of PW-7‟s testimony
after putting the same through thorough scrutiny. The result of prioritizing
and picking out those admissible portions is that, those admissible portions
establish the complainant‟s interaction with the Appellant, his approach to
the ACB, the recording exercise and his admission regarding the ₹3,000/statement, but they fail to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
Appellant demanded illegal gratification.
48.
The present case in hand is materially different from a case where,
despite the complainant turning hostile, there remains an admissible
recording, independent direct evidence of demand through the deposition of
Panch witnesses/ independent witnesses, recovery of the demanded amount,
or some other reliable evidence establishing the demand. Here, the person
from whom the demand was allegedly made i.e. PW-7, has expressly denied
it. The only other person who had interacted with both the Appellant and the
complainant, Ajit Tyagi (PW-17), despite his deposition, has no personal
knowledge of the alleged demand. The electronic material relied upon by the
prosecution is inadmissible for want of compliance with Section 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act, the original recording device was not produced and the
alleged acceptance of the earlier payment has not been established.
49.
The circumstances on record may give rise to suspicion regarding the
supposed dealings between the complainant and the Appellant, and may also
raise questions regarding the reason for the complainant‟s subsequent
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departure/hostility from the prosecution‟s case. However, suspicion,
irrespective of how strong it may be, cannot substitute substantive evidence
and proof. The prosecution was required to establish not merely that the
Appellant and PW-7 interacted, or that ₹3,000/- was discussed between
them, but that the Appellant demanded or otherwise sought to obtain illegal
gratification in the manner alleged by the prosecution.
50.
The burden remained upon the prosecution throughout to establish the
essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. While the
conduct of a witness may furnish corroboration and may affect the
assessment of his credibility, it cannot relieve the prosecution of the
obligation to prove the fact in issue. In the present case, the circumstances
relied upon by the prosecution, even when considered cumulatively, do not
cross that threshold.
51.
The acquittal under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act recorded by the
learned Trial Court also requires no interference. The prosecution has failed
to establish actual acceptance or obtainment of the alleged gratification, and
the absence of recovery or proof of payment remains uncontroverted. Since
the present appeal concerns the conviction under Section 7 of the PC Act,
then there is no basis for disturbing the benefit of doubt already extended to
the Appellant on that count and in any case the prosecution has not even
assailed it.
52.
Accordingly, while the conduct of PW-7 and the circumstances
surrounding the complaint and recording exercise raise legitimate questions
regarding his subsequent departure from the prosecution version, those
circumstances cannot substitute for proof of the essential ingredient of
demand. The prosecution has thus, failed to establish the charge under
Section 7 of the PC Act beyond reasonable doubt.
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53.
The conviction of the Appellant under Section 7 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, recorded by the learned Trial Court vide judgment
dated 19.09.2013, therefore, cannot be sustained and is accordingly, set
aside. The Appellant is acquitted of the said charge.
54.
The finding of acquittal under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act requires
no interference. The appeal is accordingly allowed and stands disposed of
together with pending application(s), if any.
55.
Copy of this judgment be transmitted to the learned Trial Court and
Prison Authorities for information and necessary compliances.
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J
OCTOBER 01, 2026/ij
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