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Civil

Amarchand S/O Ganeshi Lal vs State Election Commission

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Court
Rajasthan High Court
Date
5 September 2026
Case No.
CW 17700/2026
Result
Dismissed
Bench
Anoop Kumar Dhand
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16. In view of the above, this Court cannot interfere with the election process after its declaration and (10 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] publication, in terms of the bar contained under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India.

17. Accordingly, all the instant writ petitions are liable to be and are hereby dismissed. The stay applications and all pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed.”

3. For the reasons stated herein above, both the present writ petitions are dismissed. The stay applications and all pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed. (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J KuD/1-2

Filed under

Constitution of India Article 226, Constitution of India Article 243ZG, Constitution of India

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17700/2026 CNR: RJHC020850272026 | URN: CW / 37017U / 2026 1. Amarchand S/o Ganeshi Lal, Aged About 68 Years, R/o House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan. 2. Sushila Devi W/o Amarchand, Aged About 65 Years, R/o House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan. 3. Rahul Sain S/o Amarchand, Aged About 38 Years, R/o House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan. ----Petitioners Versus 1. State Election Commission, Rajasthan Through State Election Commissioner, 2Nd Floor, Development Block, Secretariat, Jaipur -302005. 2. Electoral Registration Officer, (Sub-Divisional Magistrate), Pushkar. ----Respondents Connected with S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17611/2026 CNR: RJHC020850172026 | URN: CW / 36859U / 2026 1. Sunita Devi W/o Sohan Lal, Aged About 55 Years, R/o House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan. 2. Priyanka Sain W/o Rohit Sain, Aged About 36 Years, R/o House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan. 3. Rohit Sain S/o Sohan Lal, Aged About 32 Years, R/o House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan. 4. Mohit Sain S/o Sohan Lal, Aged About 28 Years, R/o House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, (2 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan. 5. Krish Sankhala S/o Deepak Kumar Sankhala, Aged About 22 Years, R/o House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan. ----Petitioners Versus 1. State Election Commission, Rajasthan Through State Election Commissioner, 2Nd Floor, Development Block, Secretariat, Jaipur - 302005. 2. Electoral Registration Officer, (Sub - Divisional Magistrate), Pushkar. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : None present For Respondent(s) : None present JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND Order 05/09/2026 1. A perusal of the contents of both the writ petitions go to show that similarly situated controversy has already been decided by this Court in the case of Satyanarayan and Anr. vs. State Election Commission, Rajasthan and Anr. (SB Civil Writ Petition No.17867/2026) along with other connected cases vide order dated 03.09.2026. 2. For the sake of convenience, the aforesaid order dated 03.09.2026 is reproduced herewith: “1. Since common question of law and facts are involved in these instant petitions, hence with the consent of counsel for the parties arguments have been heard together in all these petitions and the same are being decided by this common order. (3 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] 2. For the sake convenience, the facts narrated in the SB Civil Writ Petition No.17867/2026 are taken into consideration. 3. The instant petition has been preferred with the following prayer: “i. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other similar writ or order directing the Respondents to include the name of Petitioners in the Final Municipal Election Electoral Roll of Ward No. 07, Nagar Parishad - Pushkar and allow the Petitioner to cast their vote in the Municipal Elections, 2026; ii. Direct the Respondents to pay costs of the present writ petition to the petitioner; and iii. Grant any other relief as the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the present facts and circumstances of the case.” 4. By way of filing the instant petition, a challenge has been led to the action of the respondents by which the names of the petitioners have been deleted from the electoral roll of Ward No. 7, Nagar Parishad, Pushkar; and a prayer has been made for issuing directions to the respondents to allow the petitioners to cast their votes in the upcoming Municipal Elections, 2026. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, the Electoral Officer has deleted their names from the voter list in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. Hence, under such circumstances, interference of this Court is warranted. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State respondents opposed the arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioners and submitted that prior to passing the order impugned and prior to deleting the names of the petitioners from the voter list, proper opportunity of hearing was provided to them. Learned counsel further submits that now the State Election Commission has declared the election programme for the upcoming Municipal Elections, hence, in terms of the bar contained under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India, interference of this Court in the election process is not warranted. In support of his contentions, counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Ors., reported in (1952) 1 SCC 94; and Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election (4 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] Commissioner, New Delhi, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405. 7. In rebuttal, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) has been subsequently considered by the Apex Court in the case of Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors. v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and Ors., reported in 2024 (18) SCC 643. Counsel submits that in view of the latest judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, interference by this Court is warranted, particularly where the action of the respondents is alleged to be arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of law. 8. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the material available on the record. 9. It has been apprised at Bar that the State Election Commission has declared the election programme by issuing the notification, which indicates that the election process would commence from 27.08.2026 and would be completed by 29.09.2026. 10. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) has held that once the election process has been initiated upon issuance of election program by the Election Commission, there can be no interference by the Court in the election schedule. The six Judges Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in this case has dealt with identical issue in para Nos.15, 20, 24 and 25, which reads as under: "15. The question now arises whether the law of elections in this country contemplates that there should be two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts having been expressly excluded), and another after they have been completed by means of an election petition. In my opinion, to affirm such a position would be contrary to the scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, which, as I shall point out latter, seems to be that any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any court. It seems to me that under the election (5 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] law, the only significance which the rejection of a nomination paper has consists in the fact that it can be used as a ground to call the election in question. Article 329(b) was apparently enacted to prescribe the manner in which and the stage at which this ground, and other grounds which may be raised under the law to call the election in question could be urged. I think it follows by necessary implication from the language of this provision that those grounds cannot be urged in any other manner, at any other stage and before any other court. If the grounds on which an election can be called in question could be raised at an earlier stage and errors, it any, are rectified, there will be no meaning in enacting a provision like Article 329(b) and in setting up a special tribunal. Any other meaning ascribed to the words used in the article would lead to anomalies, which the Constitution could not have contemplated, one of them being that conflicting view may be expressed by the High Court at the pre-polling stage and by the election tribunal, which is to be an independent body, at the stage when the matter is brought up before it. 20. It was argued that since the Representation of the People Act was enacted subject to the provisions of the Constitution, it cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. This argument however is completely shut out by reading the Act along with Article 329(b). It will be noticed that the language used in that article and in section 80 of the Act is almost identical, with this difference only that the article is preceded by the words' notwithstanding anything in this Constitution." I think that those words are quite apt to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with any matter which may arise while the elections are in the progress. 24. It may be pointed out that Article 329(b) must be read as complimentary to clause (a) of that article. Clause (a) bars the jurisdiction of the courts with regard to such law as may be made under articles 327 and 328 relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies. It was conceded before us that Article 329(b) ousts the jurisdiction of the courts with regard to matters arising between the commencement of the polling and the final selection. The question which has to be asked is what conceivable reason (6 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] the legislature could have had to leave only matters connected with nominations subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. If part XV of the constitution is a code by itself, i.e. it creates rights and provides for their enforcement by a special tribunal to the exclusion of all courts including the High Court, there can be no reason for assuming that the Constitution left one small part of the election process to be made the subject matter of contest before the High Courts and thereby upset the time schedule of the elections. The more reasonable view seems to be that article 329 covers all "electoral matters". 25. The conclusions which I have arrived at may be summed up briefly as follows :(1) Having regard to the important functions which the legislature have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognized to be a matter of first importance that elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time schedule and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over, so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted. (2) In conformity with this principle, the scheme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to anything which does not affect the "election :" and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the "election " and enable the person affected to call it in question, they should be brought up before a special tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any court while the election is in progress." 11. Similar observations have been taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), wherein above principle has been reiterated, particularly in para number 29, which reads as under: "29. Thus, there are two types of decisions, two types of challenges. The first relates to proceedings which interfere with the progress of the election. The second accelerates the completion of the election and acts in (7 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] furtherance of an election. So, the short question before us, in the light of the illumination derived from Ponnuswami, is as to whether the order for re-poll of the Chief Election Commissioner is "anything done towards the completion of the election proceeding' and whether the proceedings before the High Court facilitated the election process or halted its progress. The question immediately arises as to whether the relief sought in, the writ petition by the present appellant amounted to calling in question the election. This, in turn, revolves round the point as to whether the cancellation of the poll and the reordering of fresh poll is 'part of election' and challenging it is 'calling it in question.” 12. Considering the aforesaid proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the above noted cases, this Court is of the considered view that upon declaration of the election programme by the Rajasthan State Election Commission, the election process has been initiated and the bar contained under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India comes into operation automatically. 13. It is a settled proposition of law that, whenever conflicting views are expressed by different Benches of the Court, the law laid down by a Bench of larger strength is binding on a subsequent Bench of lesser or equal strength. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in (2005) 2 SCC 673, has laid down the following principles, which reads as under: 5. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd's case (supra) the Constitution Bench has ruled that a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court binds a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court and that judicial discipline obliges them to follow it, regardless of their doubts about its correctness. At the most, they could have ordered that the matter be heard by a Bench of three learned Judges. Following this view of the law what has been declared by this Court in Pradip Chandra Parija & Ors.'s case (supra) clinches the issue. The facts in the case were that a Bench of two learned Judges expressed dissent with another judgment of three learned Judges and directed the matter to be placed before a larger Bench of five Judges. The (8 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] Constitution Bench considered the rule of 'judicial discipline and propriety' as also the theory of precedents and held that it is only a Bench of the same quorum which can question the correctness of the decision by another Bench of the coordinate strength in which case the matter may be placed for consideration by a Bench of larger quorum. In other words, a Bench of lesser quorum cannot express disagreement with, or question the correctness of, the view taken by a Bench of larger quorum. A view of the law taken by a Bench of three judges is binding on a Bench of two judges and in case the Bench of two judges feels not inclined to follow the earlier three-Judge Bench decision then it is not proper for it to express such disagreement; it can only request the Chief Justice for the matter being placed for hearing before a three-Judge Bench which may agree or disagree with the view of the law taken earlier by the three-Judge Bench. As already noted this view has been followed and reiterated by at least three subsequent Constitution Benches referred to hereinabove. 12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt the correctness of the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of co-equal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted. (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (9 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh & Ors. and Hansoli Devi & Ors. (supra)." 14. Thus the judgment rendered by a Bench of larger strength is binding. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in such circumstances the strength of the Bench which rendered the judgment is of great significance. If a judgment has been rendered by a Bench of lesser strength and in another matter a judgment has been rendered by a Bench of higher strength, the judgment rendered by the Bench of higher strength or the larger Bench is binding. In view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law as laid down in the above noted case, this Court finds that the view taken by the Constitutional Bench in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) is binding upon this Court. 15. In the case of Union Territory of Ladakh (supra), the judgment was rendered by the two Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, whereas the judgment in N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) was rendered by the Constitutional Bench of six Hon'ble Judges. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra), the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench in N.P. Ponnuswami (supra), being a judgment of a Bench of larger strength, would prevail and would be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present cases. 16. In view of the above, this Court cannot interfere with the election process after its declaration and (10 of 10) [CW-17700/2026] publication, in terms of the bar contained under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India. 17. Accordingly, all the instant writ petitions are liable to be and are hereby dismissed. The stay applications and all pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed.” 3. For the reasons stated herein above, both the present writ petitions are dismissed. The stay applications and all pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed. (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J KuD/1-2

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