Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17700/2026
CNR: RJHC020850272026 | URN: CW / 37017U / 2026
1.
Amarchand S/o Ganeshi Lal, Aged About 68 Years, R/o
House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi
Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan.
2.
Sushila Devi W/o Amarchand, Aged About 65 Years, R/o
House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi
Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan.
3.
Rahul Sain S/o Amarchand, Aged About 38 Years, R/o
House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi
Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan.
----Petitioners
Versus
1.
State Election Commission, Rajasthan Through State
Election Commissioner, 2Nd Floor, Development Block,
Secretariat, Jaipur -302005.
2.
Electoral Registration Officer, (Sub-Divisional Magistrate),
Pushkar.
----Respondents
Connected with
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17611/2026
CNR: RJHC020850172026 | URN: CW / 36859U / 2026
1.
Sunita Devi W/o Sohan Lal, Aged About 55 Years, R/o
House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla,
Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan.
2.
Priyanka Sain W/o Rohit Sain, Aged About 36 Years, R/o
House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla,
Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan.
3.
Rohit Sain S/o Sohan Lal, Aged About 32 Years, R/o
House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla,
Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan.
4.
Mohit Sain S/o Sohan Lal, Aged About 28 Years, R/o
House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar, Jogiyo Ka Mohalla,
(2 of 10)
[CW-17700/2026]
Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist. Ajmer, Rajasthan.
5.
Krish Sankhala S/o Deepak Kumar Sankhala, Aged
About 22 Years, R/o House No. 36, Near Patwar Ghar,
Jogiyo Ka Mohalla, Badi Basti, Pushkar-305022, Dist.
Ajmer, Rajasthan.
----Petitioners
Versus
1.
State Election Commission, Rajasthan Through State
Election Commissioner, 2Nd Floor, Development Block,
Secretariat, Jaipur - 302005.
2.
Electoral Registration Officer, (Sub - Divisional Magistrate), Pushkar.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
None present
For Respondent(s)
:
None present
JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND
Order
05/09/2026
1.
A perusal of the contents of both the writ petitions go to
show that similarly situated controversy has already been decided
by this Court in the case of Satyanarayan and Anr. vs. State
Election Commission, Rajasthan and Anr. (SB Civil Writ
Petition No.17867/2026) along with other connected cases
vide order dated 03.09.2026.
2.
For the sake of convenience, the aforesaid order dated
03.09.2026 is reproduced herewith:
“1. Since common question of law and facts are
involved in these instant petitions, hence with the
consent of counsel for the parties arguments have been
heard together in all these petitions and the same are
being decided by this common order.
(3 of 10)
[CW-17700/2026]
2. For the sake convenience, the facts narrated in the
SB Civil Writ Petition No.17867/2026 are taken into
consideration.
3. The instant petition has been preferred with the
following prayer:
“i. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any
other similar writ or order directing the
Respondents to include the name of Petitioners in
the Final Municipal Election Electoral Roll of Ward
No. 07, Nagar Parishad - Pushkar and allow the
Petitioner to cast their vote in the Municipal
Elections, 2026;
ii. Direct the Respondents to pay costs of the
present writ petition to the petitioner; and
iii. Grant any other relief as the Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and proper under the present facts
and circumstances of the case.”
4. By way of filing the instant petition, a challenge has
been led to the action of the respondents by which the
names of the petitioners have been deleted from the
electoral roll of Ward No. 7, Nagar Parishad, Pushkar;
and a prayer has been made for issuing directions to the
respondents to allow the petitioners to cast their votes
in the upcoming Municipal Elections, 2026.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that
without affording any opportunity of hearing to the
petitioners, the Electoral Officer has deleted their names
from the voter list in utter violation of the principles of
natural justice. Hence, under such circumstances,
interference of this Court is warranted.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State respondents opposed the arguments raised by
the counsel for the petitioners and submitted that prior
to passing the order impugned and prior to deleting the
names of the petitioners from the voter list, proper
opportunity of hearing was provided to them. Learned
counsel further submits that now the State Election
Commission has declared the election programme for
the upcoming Municipal Elections, hence, in terms of the
bar contained under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution
of India, interference of this Court in the election
process is not warranted. In support of his contentions,
counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment passed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N.P.
Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal
Constituency and Ors., reported in (1952) 1 SCC
94; and Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election
(4 of 10)
[CW-17700/2026]
Commissioner, New Delhi, reported in (1978) 1 SCC
405.
7. In rebuttal, counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioners submitted that the judgment passed by the
Apex Court in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami (supra)
has been subsequently considered by the Apex Court in
the case of Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors. v.
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and
Ors., reported in 2024 (18) SCC 643. Counsel submits
that in view of the latest judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
Court, interference by this Court is warranted,
particularly where the action of the respondents is
alleged to be arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of
law.
8. Heard and considered the submissions made at the
Bar and perused the material available on the record.
9. It has been apprised at Bar that the State Election
Commission has declared the election programme by
issuing the notification, which indicates that the election
process would commence from 27.08.2026 and would
be completed by 29.09.2026.
10. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N.P.
Ponnuswami (supra) has held that once the election
process has been initiated upon issuance of election
program by the Election Commission, there can be no
interference by the Court in the election schedule. The
six Judges Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in
this case has dealt with identical issue in para Nos.15,
20, 24 and 25, which reads as under:
"15. The question now arises whether the law of
elections in this country contemplates that there
should be two attacks on matters connected with
election proceedings, one while they are going on
by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 226of the Constitution
(the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts having
been expressly excluded), and another after they
have been completed by means of an election
petition. In my opinion, to affirm such a position
would be contrary to the scheme of Part XV of
the Constitution and the Representation of the
People Act, which, as I shall point out latter,
seems to be that any matter which has the effect
of vitiating an election should be brought up only
at the appropriate stage in an appropriate
manner before a special tribunal and should not
be brought up at an intermediate stage before
any court. It seems to me that under the election
(5 of 10)
[CW-17700/2026]
law, the only significance which the rejection of a
nomination paper has consists in the fact that it
can be used as a ground to call the election in
question. Article 329(b) was apparently enacted
to prescribe the manner in which and the stage
at which this ground, and other grounds which
may be raised under the law to call the election
in question could be urged. I think it follows by
necessary implication from the language of this
provision that those grounds cannot be urged in
any other manner, at any other stage and before
any other court. If the grounds on which an
election can be called in question could be raised
at an earlier stage and errors, it any, are
rectified, there will be no meaning in enacting a
provision like Article 329(b) and in setting up a
special tribunal. Any other meaning ascribed to
the words used in the article would lead to
anomalies, which the Constitution could not have
contemplated, one of them being that conflicting
view may be expressed by the High Court at the
pre-polling stage and by the election tribunal,
which is to be an independent body, at the stage
when the matter is brought up before it.
20. It was argued that since the Representation
of the People Act was enacted subject to the
provisions of the Constitution, it cannot bar the
jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writ under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This argument
however is completely shut out by reading the
Act along with Article 329(b). It will be noticed
that the language used in that article and in
section 80 of the Act is almost identical, with this
difference only that the article is preceded by the
words'
notwithstanding
anything
in
this
Constitution." I think that those words are quite
apt to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court
to deal with any matter which may arise while
the elections are in the progress.
24. It may be pointed out that Article 329(b)
must be read as complimentary to clause (a) of
that article. Clause (a) bars the jurisdiction of the
courts with regard to such law as may be made
under articles 327 and 328 relating to the
delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of
seats to such constituencies. It was conceded
before us that Article 329(b) ousts the
jurisdiction of the courts with regard to matters
arising between the commencement of the
polling and the final selection. The question
which has to be asked is what conceivable reason
(6 of 10)
[CW-17700/2026]
the legislature could have had to leave only
matters connected with nominations subject to
the jurisdiction of the High Court under article
226 of the Constitution. If part XV of the
constitution is a code by itself, i.e. it creates
rights and provides for their enforcement by a
special tribunal to the exclusion of all courts
including the High Court, there can be no reason
for assuming that the Constitution left one small
part of the election process to be made the
subject matter of contest before the High Courts
and thereby upset the time schedule of the
elections. The more reasonable view seems to be
that article 329 covers all "electoral matters".
25. The conclusions which I have arrived at may
be summed up briefly as follows :(1) Having regard to the important functions
which the legislature have to perform in
democratic countries, it has always been
recognized to be a matter of first importance that
elections should be concluded as early as
possible according to time schedule and all
controversial matters and all disputes arising out
of elections should be postponed till after the
elections are over, so that the election
proceedings may not be unduly retarded or
protracted.
(2) In conformity with this principle, the scheme
of the election law in this country as well as in
England is that no significance should be
attached to anything which does not affect the
"election :" and if any irregularities are
committed while it is in progress and they belong
to the category or class which, under the law by
which elections are governed, would have the
effect of vitiating the "election " and enable the
person affected to call it in question, they should
be brought up before a special tribunal by means
of an election petition and not be made the
subject of a dispute before any court while the
election is in progress."
11. Similar observations have been taken by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill
(supra), wherein above principle has been reiterated,
particularly in para number 29, which reads as under:
"29. Thus, there are two types of decisions, two
types of challenges. The first relates to
proceedings which interfere with the progress of
the election. The second accelerates the
completion of the election and acts in
(7 of 10)
[CW-17700/2026]
furtherance of an election. So, the short
question before us, in the light of the
illumination derived from Ponnuswami, is as to
whether the order for re-poll of the Chief
Election Commissioner is "anything done
towards the completion of the election
proceeding' and whether the proceedings before
the High Court facilitated the election process or
halted its progress. The question immediately
arises as to whether the relief sought in, the
writ petition by the present appellant amounted
to calling in question the election. This, in turn,
revolves round the point as to whether the
cancellation of the poll and the reordering of
fresh poll is 'part of election' and challenging it
is 'calling it in question.”
12. Considering the aforesaid proposition of law as laid
down by the Apex Court in the above noted cases, this
Court is of the considered view that upon declaration of
the election programme by the Rajasthan State Election
Commission, the election process has been initiated
and the bar contained under Article 243-ZG of the
Constitution
of
India
comes
into
operation
automatically.
13. It is a settled proposition of law that, whenever
conflicting views are expressed by different Benches of
the Court, the law laid down by a Bench of larger
strength is binding on a subsequent Bench of lesser or
equal strength. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra
Community & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.,
reported in (2005) 2 SCC 673, has laid down the
following principles, which reads as under:
5. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd's case
(supra) the Constitution Bench has ruled that a
decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court
binds a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court
and that judicial discipline obliges them to follow
it, regardless of their doubts about its
correctness. At the most, they could have
ordered that the matter be heard by a Bench of
three learned Judges. Following this view of the
law what has been declared by this Court in
Pradip Chandra Parija & Ors.'s case (supra)
clinches the issue. The facts in the case were
that a Bench of two learned Judges expressed
dissent with another judgment of three learned
Judges and directed the matter to be placed
before a larger Bench of five Judges. The
(8 of 10)
[CW-17700/2026]
Constitution Bench considered the rule of 'judicial
discipline and propriety' as also the theory of
precedents and held that it is only a Bench of the
same quorum which can question the correctness
of the decision by another Bench of the coordinate strength in which case the matter may
be placed for consideration by a Bench of larger
quorum. In other words, a Bench of lesser
quorum cannot express disagreement with, or
question the correctness of, the view taken by a
Bench of larger quorum. A view of the law taken
by a Bench of three judges is binding on a Bench
of two judges and in case the Bench of two
judges feels not inclined to follow the earlier
three-Judge Bench decision then it is not proper
for it to express such disagreement; it can only
request the Chief Justice for the matter being
placed for hearing before a three-Judge Bench
which may agree or disagree with the view of the
law taken earlier by the three-Judge Bench. As
already noted this view has been followed and
reiterated by at least three subsequent
Constitution Benches referred to hereinabove.
12. Having carefully considered the submissions
made by the learned senior counsel for the
parties and having examined the law laid down
by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid
decisions, we would like to sum up the legal
position in the following terms :(1) The law laid down by this Court in a
decision delivered by a Bench of larger
strength is binding on any subsequent Bench
of lesser or co-equal strength.
(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt
the correctness of the view of the law taken
by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of
doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can
do is to invite the attention of the Chief
Justice and request for the matter being
placed for hearing before a Bench of larger
quorum than the Bench whose decision has
come up for consideration. It will be open
only for a Bench of co-equal strength to
express an opinion doubting the correctness
of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may
be placed for hearing before a Bench
consisting of a quorum larger than the one
which pronounced the decision laying down
the law the correctness of which is doubted.
(3) The above rules are subject to two
exceptions :
(9 of 10)
[CW-17700/2026]
(i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the
discretion of the Chief Justice in whom
vests the power of framing the roster and
who can direct any particular matter to be
placed for hearing before any particular
Bench of any strength; and
(ii) In spite of the rules laid down
hereinabove, if the matter has already
come up for hearing before a Bench of
larger quorum and that Bench itself feels
that the view of the law taken by a Bench
of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt,
needs correction or reconsideration then
by way of exception (and not as a rule)
and for reasons it may proceed to hear the
case and examine the correctness of the
previous decision in question dispensing
with the need of a specific reference or the
order of Chief Justice constituting the
Bench and such listing. Such was the
situation in Raghubir Singh & Ors. and
Hansoli Devi & Ors. (supra)."
14. Thus the judgment rendered by a Bench of larger
strength is binding. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held
that in such circumstances the strength of the Bench
which rendered the judgment is of great significance. If
a judgment has been rendered by a Bench of lesser
strength and in another matter a judgment has been
rendered by a Bench of higher strength, the judgment
rendered by the Bench of higher strength or the larger
Bench is binding. In view of the aforesaid settled
proposition of law as laid down in the above noted case,
this Court finds that the view taken by the
Constitutional Bench in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami
(supra) is binding upon this Court.
15. In the case of Union Territory of Ladakh (supra),
the judgment was rendered by the two Judges Bench of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, whereas the judgment in
N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) was rendered by the
Constitutional Bench of six Hon'ble Judges. Therefore,
in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community
(supra), the judgment rendered by the Constitution
Bench in N.P. Ponnuswami (supra), being a judgment
of a Bench of larger strength, would prevail and would
be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the
present cases.
16. In view of the above, this Court cannot interfere
with the election process after its declaration and
(10 of 10)
[CW-17700/2026]
publication, in terms of the bar contained under Article
243-ZG of the Constitution of India.
17. Accordingly, all the instant writ petitions are liable
to be and are hereby dismissed. The stay applications
and all pending applications, if any, also stand
dismissed.”
3.
For the reasons stated herein above, both the present writ
petitions are dismissed. The stay applications and all pending
applications, if any, also stand dismissed.
(ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J
KuD/1-2
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review