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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
HCP No.70/2026 c/w
(i) HCP No.82/2026
(ii) HCP No.46/2026
CM No.4269/2026
Reserved on: 10.09.2026
Pronounced on: 19.09.2026
Uploaded on: ______________
Operative part or full judgment: Full
1. Altaf Ahmad Sheikh
S/O Mohammad Rajab Sheikh
R/O Panzipora, Tarzoo, Krankshivam,
Tehsil Khoie, District Baramulla.
2. Muzamil Mushtaq Changa
S/O Mushtaq Ahmad Changa
R/O Yaseen Colony, Arampora,
Sopore, District Baramulla.
3. Mubashir Ahmad Gilkar
S/O Fayaz Ahmad Gilkar
R/O Naseemabad Sopore,
District Baramulla.
…Petitioner(s)
Through: Adv. Mukhtar Ahmad Makroo.
Vs.
1. Union Territory of J&K
Through Secretary to Govt.
Home Department,
Civil Sectt. Srinagar.
2. District Magistrate, Baramulla.
3. Sr. Superintendent of Police,
Baramulla.
4. Superintendent,
District Jail Bhaderwah.
5. Station House Officer,
Police Station Sopore, Baramulla.
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…Respondent(s)
Through: Dy.AG Hakim Aman Ali with
AC Nadiya Abdullah.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A. CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. Since
the
questions
of
law
and
facts
arising
for
consideration in the above referred three petitions are
substantially common, the same are proposed to be
disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking
quashment
of
the
02/DMB/PSA/2026,
respective
detention
Orders
05/DMB/PSA/2026
No.
and
03/DMB/PSA/2026 all dated 22.04.2026,
passed by
the
Baramulla,
respondent
No.2-District
Magistrate,
whereby the petitioners have been placed under preventive
detention with the stated object of preventing them from
indulging in activities prejudicial to the ‘maintenance of
Public Order’.
3. The case of the petitioners in nutshell is that their
detentions are wholly unwarranted and amount to an
impermissible use of the preventive detention mechanism
as a substitute for ordinary criminal law; that all the
petitioners were implicated in case FIR No.91/2026
registered for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 191(2), 191(3), 324(4), 125, 121(1) and 132 of
Page |3
the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, besides
Section-3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public
Property Act, 1984; that the very occurrence relied upon
by the detaining authority is already the subject matter of
the aforesaid FIR and is, therefore, capable of being dealt
with under the ordinary criminal process; that the grounds
of detention do not disclose any material from which the
detaining
authority
satisfaction
that
the
could
reasonably
petitioners,
if
arrive
not
at
the
preventively
detained, were likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to
the maintenance of Public Order; that the grounds merely
reproduce the allegations forming the subject matter of the
FIR and do not disclose any independent or additional
material demonstrating a propensity on the part of the
petitioners to disturb the even tempo of life of the
community, so as to constitute the activity prejudicial to
the ‘Public Order’.
4. The respondents, on the other hand, have opposed the
petitions by filing counter Affidavits, asserting therein that
the activities attributed to the petitioners are serious in
nature and have the potential of disturbing Public Order;
that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority
cannot be substituted by the satisfaction of the Court and
that
the
detention
orders
have
been
passed
after
consideration of the material placed before the detaining
authority; that the representations made by the petitioners
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were considered by the competent authority but were
rejected; that the mere fact that the petitioners are
involved in a criminal case cannot, by itself, render their
preventive detention illegal.
5. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that
preventive
detention
is
a
constitutionally
recognised
mechanism and that the satisfaction of the detaining
authority is ordinarily not to be substituted by the Court
with its own subjective satisfaction. At the same time, the
power of preventive detention is an exceptional power,
trenching upon the fundamental right to personal liberty,
and is therefore hedged with constitutional safeguards.
6. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India mandates that the
detenue be furnished, as soon as may be, the grounds on
which the order of detention has been made and be
afforded
the
earliest
representation
against
opportunity
the
order.
of
The
making
a
constitutional
safeguards relating to preventive detention have to be
construed
with
particular
care
because
preventive
detention is not intended to punish a person for an act
already committed but to prevent him from acting in a
particular manner in the future.
7. The distinction between “law and order” and “public
order” is fundamental to the exercise of preventive
detention jurisdiction. The Constitution Bench in ‘Dr.
Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar’ reported as 1966
Page |5
Supp SCR 709 explained that every disturbance of law
and order does not necessarily amount to a disturbance of
Public Order. The test is essentially the degree and extent
of the impact of the alleged act upon the community. The
Supreme Court has reiterated this distinction in recent
decisions. In ‘Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana’
reported
as
INSC
the
Supreme
Court
emphasised that “public order” has a narrower ambit and
is attracted only where the alleged conduct affects the
community or the public at large. The Court further held
that the detaining authority must consider relevant and
vital material, apply its mind to pertinent and proximate
circumstances and reflect its satisfaction in clear and
categorical terms. The mere recital that detention is
necessary to prevent conduct prejudicial to public order is
not by itself sufficient. Thus, the mere use of expressions
such as “prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order”
in
a detention
order
cannot
substitute
the
requirement of demonstrating, from the material relied
upon, how and in what manner the alleged conduct of the
detenue has the potential of disturbing ‘Public Order’.
8. In the present case, the main material relied upon against
the petitioners is FIR No.91/2026. The offences alleged
therein are undoubtedly serious and are required to be
investigated and dealt with in accordance with law.
However, seriousness of an offence, by itself, cannot be
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equated with disturbance of Public Order. What the
preventive detention law requires is a further satisfaction
that the conduct attributed to the detenue has such a
reach and potentiality as to disturb the even tempo of life
of the community. The distinction assumes particular
significance
in
the
present
case
because
the
very
allegations forming the basis of the detention are already
the subject matter of the criminal prosecution. Preventive
detention cannot be employed merely because the ordinary
criminal process is considered inadequate or because the
alleged offence is serious.
9. The
Supreme
Court
has
repeatedly
cautioned
that
preventive detention cannot become a substitute for
ordinary criminal law. In Nenavath Bujji (supra) the
Supreme Court specifically observed that inability of the
State's
Police
machinery
to
tackle
a
law-and-order
situation cannot furnish a justification for invoking
preventive detention.
10.
Equally important is the requirement of a live and
proximate link between the material relied upon and the
necessity for preventive detention. In ‘Sama Aruna v.
State of Telangana’ reported as 2018 (12) SCC 150, the
Supreme Court held that the detention order must be
founded upon material having a live and proximate
connection with the imperative need to detain the person,
stale material cannot be converted into the basis of
Page |7
preventive detention. The requirement of such live and
proximate link has also been reiterated by the Supreme
Court in subsequent cases. Preventive detention proceeds
upon a prognosis of future conduct; therefore, the material
must
reasonably
support
the
inference
that
unless
detained, the person is likely to indulge in conduct
prejudicial to the specified interest.
11.
In the present case, on a careful examination of the
grounds of detention, this Court finds that the detaining
authority has principally referred to the involvement of the
petitioners in the aforesaid FIR. What is conspicuously
absent is any independent material demonstrating that,
notwithstanding their facing the ordinary criminal process,
the petitioners were likely to indulge in further activities
prejudicial to maintenance of Public Order.
12.
There is another significant aspect of the matter. The
material placed before the Court does not demonstrate
that the detaining authority had before it any cogent basis
for arriving at the conclusion that the petitioners were
likely to be released from custody and, upon such release,
were likely to repeat the alleged activities.
13.
It is well settled that where a person is already in
custody in connection with a criminal case, preventive
detention cannot be ordered mechanically. The detaining
authority must demonstrate awareness of the existing
custody and must also have material before it constituting
Page |8
compelling circumstances justifying preventive detention
notwithstanding such custody. The Supreme Court has
recently reiterated this principle in Priyanka Sarkariya
v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 371, holding that where a
person is already in custody, the existence of a real
possibility of release and the likelihood of indulging in
prejudicial activities upon such release are relevant
considerations for
the subjective
satisfaction of the
detaining authority.
14. In the case at hand, the grounds of detention, as placed
before this Court, do not disclose such compelling
circumstances. There is no discernible material showing
that the petitioners were on the verge of release or that
there was a reasonable and proximate possibility of their
release followed by their indulging in activities prejudicial
to Public Order. Mere possibility of release in the abstract
cannot constitute the foundation for preventive detention.
15. It is true that the absence of a pending bail application
may not, in every conceivable case, be conclusive of the
invalidity of preventive detention. However, where the
detenue is already in custody, the detaining authority
must demonstrate from the material before it why ordinary
custody was insufficient and why preventive detention was
immediately necessary. Such satisfaction cannot rest on a
mere ipse dixit. The Court is also conscious of the limited
scope of judicial review in matters of preventive detention.
Page |9
This Court does not sit in appeal over the sufficiency of the
material or substitute its subjective satisfaction for that of
the detaining authority. However, the Court is duty bound
to examine whether the constitutional and statutory
requirements have been complied with and whether the
satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority is based
upon relevant, proximate and legally permissible material.
16. Tested on the aforesaid parameters, this Court finds that
the
detention
orders
in
the
present
cases
do
not
satisfactorily disclose the necessary nexus between the
material relied upon and the preventive purpose sought to
be achieved.
17. The petitioners have also questioned the manner in which
their representations were dealt with. It is settled that the
right
of
representation
under
Article
22(5)
of
the
Constitution of India is a valuable constitutional right and
the representation has to be considered with reasonable
expedition. At the same time, no rigid period can be
prescribed for every case; what is required is consideration
with a sense of urgency and without negligence, callous
inaction or avoidable delay. From the material placed
before
the
Court,
representations
were
however,
it
considered
appears
and
that
the
rejected.
No
convincing material has been placed before this Court to
establish any unexplained or inordinate delay in their
consideration.
P a g e | 10
18. The Court is not oblivious to the seriousness of the
allegations contained in FIR No.91/2026. The allegations
must be investigated and, if supported by evidence, the
criminal proceedings must be carried to their logical
conclusion. The petitioners shall remain subject to the
ordinary criminal law in that regard. But the seriousness
of the allegations cannot, by itself, furnish a justification
for
preventive
detention.
The
preventive
detention
jurisdiction has a distinct constitutional purpose. It is
intended to prevent future prejudicial conduct and cannot
be utilised as an additional form of punishment for an
offence already alleged to have been committed.
19. In the instant case, the detention orders do not disclose
sufficient material demonstrating that the alleged activities
of the petitioners transcended the sphere of law and order
and acquired the degree and extent of impact upon the
community necessary to constitute a disturbance of Public
Order,
nor
do
the
grounds
circumstances
warranting
notwithstanding
the
disclose
compelling
preventive
detention
petitioners'
involvement
in
the
ordinary criminal process. The subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority, therefore, stands vitiated on
account of non-application of mind to relevant and
proximate circumstances and failure to demonstrate the
requisite nexus between the material relied upon and the
necessity for preventive detention.
P a g e | 11
20. For the foregoing reasons, all the above referred three
Habeas Corpus Petitions are allowed. The respective
detention
Orders
No.
02/DMB/PSA/2026
dated
22.04.2026; 05/DMB/PSA/2026 dated 22.04.2026; and
03/DMB/PSA/2026 dated 22.04.2026
passed by the
respondent No.2-District Magistrate, Baramulla against
the petitioners are hereby quashed. The respondents are
directed to release the petitioners forthwith from preventive
detention, if their custody is not required in connection
with any other case(s).
21. Copies of this judgment shall be placed across all the
connected files.
22. Detention records are ordered to be returned to the
learned counsel for the respondents.
23. All the above referred petitions are, accordingly, disposed
of in the terms indicated above, along-with connected
application(s).
(M. A. CHOWDHARY)
JUDGE
Srinagar
19.09.2026
Muzammil. Q
Whether the order is reportable: Yes / No
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