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W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM: GANGTOK
(Civil Extra Ordinary Jurisdiction)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH: MR. JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN, JUDGE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W. P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
1.
Alok Kumar Singh,
GS-185067H, LDC,
Presently posted at HQ CE (P) SWASTIK,
C/o 99 APO
PIN - 931717.
2.
Anil Singh,
GS-186002F, OPTR. COMMN.
Presently posted at SIGNAL SECTION,
HQ CE (P) SWASTIK,
C/o 99APO,
PIN - 931717.
3.
Master Baitha, OPTR. COMMN.
GS-182276P,
Presently posted at SIGNAL SECTION,
HQ CE (P) SWASTIK,
C/o 99APO,
PIN - 931717.
4.
Surjit Singh,
GS-185223F, DVR/MT,
Presently posted at SIGNAL SECTION,
HQ CE (P) SWASTIK,
C/o 99APO,
PIN - 931717.
5.
Vinod D,
GS-182268W, OPTR. COMMN.,
Presently posted at SIGNAL SECTION,
HQ CE (P) SWASTIK,
C/o 99APO,
PIN - 931717.
.… Petitioners
versus
1.
The Union of India,
Principal Controller of Defence,
Account (Border Roads) Seema Sadak
Bhawan,
Ring Road, Delhi Cant,
New Delhi.
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
2.
Headquarter,
Director General Border Roads,
Seema Sadak Bhawan,
Ring Road, Delhi Cant,
New Delhi-110010.
3.
The Pay Account Office,
GREF Centre, Dighi Camp-Pune-15,
4.
Office of the Account Officer
Project Swastik,
C/o 99 APO
PIN - 931717.
5.
Headquarter Project Swastik,
C/o 99 APO
PIN - 931717.
…. Respondents
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India.
Appearance:
For Petitioners
:
Mr. Zangpo Sherpa and Mr.
Jushan Lepcha, Advocates.
For Respondent
Nos. 1 to 5.
:
Mr. Karma Thinley, Central
Government Counsel.
Mr.
Karma
Thinley
Gyatso,
Advocate.
Date of hearing
:
28.02.2020
Date of Judgment
:
17.03.2020
-------------------------------------------------------------------------JUDGMENT
(17.03.2020)
Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J
1. The present writ petition involves the interpretation of
Fundamental Rule 22. Is only a promotee entitled to the
benefit of one notional increment or even a government
servant
re-appointed
to
a
post
responsibilities of greater importance?
carrying
duties
and
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
2. The petitioners who were appointed as Pioneers (PNRs)
appeared for a departmental examination in which they were
successful and appointed in the following manner under the
respondents:
Sl.
Particulars
No.
3. The
Date of
appointment as
PNRs
Date of appointment
in different
capacities
1.
Alok Kumar Singh,
Petitioner No.1
03.07.2002
01.01.2009 as LDC
2.
Anil
Singh,
Petitioner no.2
02.11.2002
23.12.2009
as
telephone operator
3.
Master
Baitha,
petitioner no.3
28.03.2001
04.08.2010 as radio
operator
4.
Surjit
Singh,
petitioner no.4
19.07.2002
09.12.2008 as driver
(mechanical
transport)
5.
Vinod D. petitioner
no.5
20.03.2001
24.06.2009 as radio
operator
petitioners
are
presently
posted/stationed
at
Headquarter, Project Swastik at Gangtok.
4. The petitioners seek the benefit of fundamental Rule 22
applicable to them and have been pursuing their cause
before different authorities.
5. The petitioners contend that they are entitled to the
notional increment as envisaged in Fundamental Rule 22 as
the duties and responsibilities now attached to them carry
duties and responsibilities of greater importance than those
attached to the post of Pioneer initially held by them.
6. The petitioners also contend that many similarly placed
had approached the High Court of Delhi pursuant to which
the High Court disposed Writ Petition (C) 4462/2015 by an
order dated 05.05.2015 with a direction that the writ
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
petition would be treated as a representation to the Principal
Controller of Defence Accounts (Border Roads Organization)
the respondent no.1 herein and that a reasoned decision
would be taken and conveyed. On 11.01.2017 the office of
the respondent no.1 issued a letter to the respondent no.2
directing them to give the benefit of one notional increment
to one of the petitioners i.e. Abhimanyu Kumar. A perusal of
the said letter dated 11.01.2017 (Annexure P-3) reflects that
the case of Abhimanyu Kumar who was also a Pioneer and
later re-appointed as Lower Division Clerk (LDC) was
considered by the competent authority and it was decided
that his pay should be fixed by increasing one notional
increment in the lower post. The respondents admit these
facts as matters of record.
7. The petitioners have also highlighted various instances
where other government servants similarly placed have been
given the benefit of one notional increment. The petitioners
contends that on the basis of letter dated 08.02.2017 of the
office of the respondent no.1 the fixation of pay on reappointment
from
communication/driver
Pioneer
(mechanical
to
LDC/operator
transport)
was
implemented in all the projects under Headquarter, Director
General,
Border
Road.
The
petitioners
have
annexed
photocopies of the relevant pay fixation pro forma with audit
report of Shine Kumar U and Shamsher Kumar who had
earlier held the posts of Pioneer and later been re-appointed
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
as LDC and various others who have been given the benefit
of one notional increment. The respondents admit these
facts as matter of record.
8. The petitioners further contend that pay fixation has
already been approved of
two officers - Hari Kumar P
(Border Task Force stationed at Chandmari, Gangtok,
Sikkim) and Rajpal Singh Rawat (Border Task Force
stationed at Kalimpong, West Bengal) both Pioneers who
were re-appointed as Radio Operators. Hari Kumar P’s pay
was fixed on his re-appointment by granting two increments,
one annual increment and second on account of promotion
to Radio Operator. Rajpal Singh Rawat was granted one
notional increment in the scale of lowest post on reappointment. In the counter-affidavit the respondents have
not denied that the above orders have been passed and in
fact admit the same as matters of record.
9. The respondents are not too clear about the position they
desire to take. In the initial affidavit filed by respondent
nos.2 and 5 it is stated that the grant of notional increment
is under the domain of the respondent nos.1, 3 and 4. It is
stated that the respondent no.4 has concurred and audited
pay fixation of the petitioners on 26.12.2017; processed the
matter to the office of the respondent no.3 in the year 2017
itself; on receipt of the same the respondent no.3 would
process the pay fixation of the petitioner and “shall
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
accordingly credit the increment amount due to the petitioners
in their respective statement of accounts.” It was also stated
that the process of pay fixation of one notional increment
has already been initiated by the concerned authorities at
Project Swastik. However, in the counter-affidavit filed
subsequently on 21.03.2018 and additional affidavit dated
08.04.2019 the position the respondents collectively took
was slightly different. The respondents now contend that the
petitioners were not promoted but were re-appointed in
various categories of Group C and as such they would not be
entitled to the benefit of Fundamental Rule 22. The
respondents contend that since the respondent no.1 have
clarified that cases of re-appointment after qualifying open
competitive
examination
should
be
treated
as
fresh
appointment and pay in such re-appointment cases were to
be fixed by giving pay protection.
10. The respondents admit that there is a difference in
opinion between the offices of different executive authorities.
A reading of the counter-affidavit gives an indication that the
concerned authorities have not been able to take a firm
decision in the matter and therefore, the file is being
processed from one authority to the other without any
concrete decision. It may not be necessary to enumerate and
detail
all
the
communications
exchanged
except
the
important ones, as it seems imperative to give a quietus to
the issue by a judicial pronouncement.
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
11. On 08.02.2017 the office of the respondent no.1 wrote
to the respondent no.2 that as per “paragraph 12” of RPR
2008 the pay on re-appointment after 01.01.2006 shall be
fixed
as
per
Fundamental
Rule
and
Swamy’s
interpretation of service rules also clarify that pay should be
fixed by increasing one notional increment in the lower
posts. It was clarified at the bar that “RPR, 2008” referred to
in the communication is short for the Central Civil Services
(Revised Pay) Rules, 2008. Hence, the respondent no.1
advised the respondent no.2 to review all such type of cases
pointing out that pay has been fixed granting one notional
increment. On 20.02.2017 the respondent no.2 wrote to all
project Swastik and other offices advising them to review all
such type cases as the office of the respondent no.1 vide
letter dated 08.02.2017 had advised increase of one notional
increment in the lower posts on re-appointment. However,
on
22.03.2017
the
respondent
no.4
opined
in
its
communication to Controller of Defence Accounts (BR), (CDA
(BR)) Guwahati that it was of the considered view that
individuals
re-appointed
after
passing
competitive
examination is treated as fresh recruits and are not entitled
for grant of notional increment on pay fixation on reappointment. On 30.05.2017 the office of the CDA (BR)
wrote to respondent no.5 stating that the case regarding reappointment of Pioneer to Operator (communication) has
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
been examined and that cases of re-appointment after
qualifying open competitive examination should be treated
as fresh appointment and pay in such cases were to be fixed
by giving pay protection. It was also commented that in view
of the clarification issue by the main office vide letter dated
08.02.2017 fixation on re-appointment to higher post from
lower post should be fixed by granting one notional
increment as per Fundamental Rule 22 and Swamy’s
interpretation of service rules. On 25.07.2017 the Chief
Engineer of respondent no.5 wrote to the office of the
respondent no.1 stating that in spite of its clear position in
letters dated 11.01.2017 and 08.02.2017 his task force was
still not given the benefit. The Chief Engineer further pointed
out that it had come to his knowledge that the pay fixation
had been complied with in all projects as also two of his task
forces but there was an inhibition with respondent no.4 and
the increments of seven persons named in the appendix
including the petitioners were pending in spite of repeated
communications. The intervention of the respondent no.1
was solicited. He pointed out otherwise the pay fixation had
been implemented across the board and so it was unfair to
limit restrictions to troupes of only his headquarters. On
13.02.2018 the respondent no.1 wrote to various authorities
under it stating that a clarification has been received from
the respondent no.2 in which it has been clearly mentioned
that as per paragraph 6 (a) of the policy letter dated
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
22.10.1974 re-appointment means fresh appointment and
hence all re-appointment cases may be treated as fresh
appointments. On 04.04.2018 the respondent no.1 wrote to
its various authorities stating that all previous circulars like
letter
dated
08.02.2017
regarding
re-appointment
are
superseded by letter dated 13.02.2018. A perusal of the
letter dated 22.10.1974 shows that it sought to deal with reappointment of serving gref personnel to various trades. The
said letter enumerates the circumstances which may
necessitate re-appointment of serving individuals to another
trade. It deals with pre-requisites for re-appointment;
it
elaborates what should be informed to the individuals in
writing and acknowledgement obtained; the procedure for
re-appointment
and
the
fixation
of
seniority
on
re-
appointment. However, it does not deal with fixation of pay.
Paragraph 6 thereof which is relied upon is quoted under:
“6. Re-appointment more than once:
(a) Every re-appointment
appointment.”
means
a
fresh
12. The dispute has arisen primarily due to lack of
cohesive interpretation of the Fundamental Rule 22 by the
respondents and whether it would apply to the petitioners
who were initially appointed as Pioneers in a substantive
capacity and later appointed as LDC, telephone operator,
radio operator and driver again in a substantive capacity.
Although from the communications that have come on
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
record it seems that the respondent no.1 has in fact held
that Fundamental Rule 22 must be applied to the case of the
petitioners but it is the respondent no.4 and CDA (BR)
Guwahati which holds the view that cases of re-appointment
should be treated as fresh appointment and therefore not
entitled to the notional increment.
13. Fundamental Rule 22(I)(a)(1) reads as under:
“F.R. 22 (I) The initial pay of a Government servant who
is appointed to a post on a time-scale of pay is regulated
as follows:(a) (1) Where a Government servant holding a
post, other than a tenure post, in a
substantive or temporary or officiating
capacity is promoted or appointed in a
substantive, temporary or officiating capacity,
as the case may be, subject to the fulfillment
of the eligibility conditions as prescribed in
the relevant recruitment Rules, to another
post carrying duties and responsibilities of
greater importance than those attaching to
the post held by him, his initial pay in the
time scale of the higher post shall be fixed at
the stage next above the notional pay arrived
at by increasing his pay in respect of the
lower post held by him regularly by an
increment at the stage at which such pay has
accrued or [rupees one hundred only],
whichever is more. …”
14. The
Supreme
Court
had
occasion
to
examine
Fundamental Rule 22(I)(a)(1) in Government of India and Ors.
v. B. Anil Kumar & Ors.1 in a case relating to promotion to a
post. It was held:“19. A plain reading of FR 22(I)(a)(1), quoted
above, would show that where a government
servant holding a post is promoted to another
post carrying duties and responsibilities of
greater importance than those attaching to
the post held by him, “his initial pay in the
timescale of the higher post” shall be fixed at
the stage next above the notional pay arrived
at by increasing his pay in respect of the
lower post held by him regularly by an
increment at the stage at which such pay has
accrued. Thus, on promotion to a post
1 (2010) 6 SCC 419
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
carrying duties and responsibilities of greater
importance, a government servant is entitled
to his initial pay “in the timescale of the
higher post”. In the present case, the higher
post to which the respondents were promoted
after 1-1-1986 was the post of Assistant
Superintendent. If, therefore, the special pay
of Rs 75 as has been awarded by the Board
of Arbitration is for the higher post of
Assistant Superintendent, the respondents
would be entitled to the benefit of special
pay, but if the special pay was only for the
Assistant Superintendents then serving, and
not for the post of Assistant Superintendent,
the respondents would not be entitled to the
benefit of special pay having been promoted
after 1-1-1986.”
xxxxxxxxx
“22. In our considered opinion, the 1986
Rules and FRs 22 and 25 have to be read
consistently with the equality clauses in
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and so
read, all the Assistant Superintendents who
are performing the same nature of duties and
responsibilities would be entitled to the
special pay and to deny such benefit of
special pay to the respondents, who have
been promoted to the post of Assistant
Superintendents after 1-1-1986, would
violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
……………..”
15. However, the cases relating to the petitioners do not
involve promotion.
16. The Supreme Court in Syed Abdul Qadir v. State of
Bihar2 held:
“37. FR 22-C, which was substituted even prior
to the issuance of the Resolution dated 18-121989, and was replaced by FR 22(I)(a)(1) and FR
22(I)(a)(2), read thus:
“22-C.Notwithstanding anything
contained in these Rules, where a
government servant holding a post in a
substantive, temporary or officiating
capacity is promoted or appointed in a
substantive, temporary or officiating
capacity to another post carrying duties
and responsibilities of greater importance
than those attaching to the post held by
him, his initial pay in the timescale of the
higher post shall be fixed at the stage
next above the pay notionally arrived at
by increasing his pay in respect of the
lower post by one increment at the stage
at which such pay has accrued:
Provided that the provisions of this
Rule shall not apply where a government
(2009) 3 SCC 475
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
servant holding a Class I post in a
substantive, temporary or officiating
capacity is promoted or appointed in a
substantive, temporary or officiating
capacity to a higher post which is also a
Class I post.
A reading of FR 22-C makes it clear that benefit
of an additional increment would be extended to
a government servant in the event of his being
promoted or appointed to a substantive,
temporary or officiating capacity to another post
carrying duties and responsibilities of greater
importance than those attaching to the post held
by him. ”
[emphasis supplied]
17.
Admittedly, the petitioners were initially appointed as
Pioneers in Group D category under the respondents.
Thereafter,
they
went
through
a
recruitment
process
through proper channel and having been successful in the
departmental examinations, were appointed in different
capacities in Group C category. The posts of Pioneer as well
as the new Group C posts the petitioners hold are posts
under the respondents. There is also no dispute that by this
process the petitioners migrated from Group D posts to
Group C posts. A perusal of Fundamental Rule 22 reflects
that the incumbent must be a government servant holding a
post other than a tenure post. It is not the case of the
respondents
that
the
petitioners
are
not
government
servants and that they were not holding any post other than
a tenure post. Fundamental Rule 22 provides that the
government servant could be holding the post in a
substantive or temporary or officiating capacity. It is also not
the case of the respondents that the petitioners were not
holding the post of Pioneer in substantive, temporary or
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
officiating capacity. In fact it is admitted that the petitioners
were holding the posts in substantive capacity. In such a
situation if the incumbent government servant is appointed
and is otherwise eligible under the recruitment Rules to
another post he is entitled to the notional increment as per
Fundamental Rule 22. The only condition thereafter would
be that the post to which he is promoted or appointed must
carry duties and responsibilities of greater importance than
those attached to the post held by him. It is also not the
case of the respondents that the petitioner were not
otherwise eligible under the recruitment Rules. Suffice it to
say
that
the
respondents
admit
the
petitioners’
appointments.
18. The petitioners have categorically asserted that the post
now held by them carry higher duties and responsibilities of
greater importance as compared to the post of Pioneers. The
respondents do not dispute this fact and in fact admit the
same as matters of record. There is also no dispute that
Fundamental Rule 22 is applicable in the present case. The
fact that various similarly placed government servants have
been
given
notional
increment
does
show
that
the
respondents have applied Fundamental Rule 22 for them.
Normally this Court would hesitate to examine a claim of
parity when such officers have not been made a party.
However, the orders passed in their favour granting one
notional increment have not been considered bad by the
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
respondents in spite of the position they take in the counteraffidavit. The respondents also do not deny the assertion of
the petitioners that those officers who have been granted one
notional increment were similarly placed. The admitted
records also reveal that they were in fact similarly placed.
19. However, the respondents contend that the petitioners’
appointments are rather “re-appointments” and therefore, it
should be treated as “fresh appointments” disentitling the
petitioners to the notional increment. It is the respondents’
contention that on being re-appointed to the new posts held
by the petitioners, the petitioners have relinquished all their
rights to the post of pioneers which was earlier held by
them.
In
fact
the
respondents
submit
that
in
the
reappointment letter the petitioners had to submit discharge
certificate relinquishing their rights whatsoever to the post
they were holding and the petitioners were not promoted but
reappointed. The petitioners admit this fact as matters of
record. However, this Court is of the view that respondents
cannot be permitted to rely upon such relinquishment of
rights granted under law to deprive the petitioners what is
legally permissible. Fundamental Rule 22 includes cases of
promotion as well as appointment to a post. Otherwise there
was no reason for the words “or appointed” to be used after
the
words
“is
promoted”
in
Fundamental
Rule
22.
Fundamental Rule 22 seeks to regulate the initial pay of a
government servant who is appointed to a post on a time
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
scale of pay. Thus the relinquishment of rights of post of
Pioneer by the petitioners would not change the purpose of
Fundamental Rule 22 or its application to the petitioners on
their subsequent appointment. It envisages a situation
where a government servant holding a post is either
promoted or appointed to another post carrying duties and
responsibilities of greater importance than those attaching
to the post held earlier. The word used in Fundamental Rule
22 is “appointed”. The word appointment would include reappointment or fresh appointment and therefore, the
difference sought to be drawn in the appointment of the
petitioners and thereby to deprive them of the benefit seems
lame. If the rule making authority had desired to draw such
a difference it would have done so in the rule itself. It may
not
be
correct
to
read
into
the
clear
language
of
Fundamental Rule 22 what is not there. If the other
conditions as envisaged in Fundamental Rule 22 stand
satisfied failure to grant the benefit envisaged would be
illegal. Further, on their own admission the respondents
have extended the benefit of notional increment under
Fundamental Rule 22 to various government servants
identically placed. It is not the case of the respondents that
the
benefit
so
granted
to
them
has
been
reversed.
Consequently, the failure to grant similar benefit to the
petitioners who otherwise fulfill all the requirements under
W.P. (C) No. 67 of 2017
Alok Kumar Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & ors.
Fundamental Rule 22 would also violate Article 14 and 16 of
the Constitution of India.
20. Resultantly,
the
writ
petition
is
allowed.
The
respondents are directed to grant the petitioners the benefits
under Fundamental Rule 22 from the date and in the
manner they are entitled to.
21. No order as to costs.
(Bhaskar Raj Pradhan)
Judge
17.03.2020
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