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GAHC040006432026
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
(ITANAGAR BENCH)
Case No. : IA(C)/98/2026
All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union
Head Office at NEFA Club Building, Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh, duly represented
by tis General Secretary, Shri Mato Bui, Son of Shri Talom Bui, Office of the All
Arunachal Pradesh Students Union, Head Office at NEFA Club Building, Itanagar,
Arunachal Pradesh.
VERSUS
Arunachal Pradesh Chakma Students Union and 8 Ors
represented by its General Secretary, Abhish Chakma, Office of the Arunachal
Pradesh Chakma Students Union, Avoipur, PO and PS Diyun, Changlang District,
Arunachal Pradesh 792103 2:Abhish Chakma
Age: 33
Occupation :
General Secretary
Office of the Arunachal Pradesh Chakma Student Union Avoipur
PO Diyun
PS Diyun
Changlang District
Arunachal Pradesh 792103
3:Arunachal Pradesh Hajong Students Union
Age: 0
Occupation :
represented by tis President
Ragu Nath Hajong
Office of the Arunachal Pradesh Hajong Student Union
PO Diyun
PS Diyun
Changlang District
Arunachal Pradesh.
4:Ragu Nath
Page No.# 2/10
Age: 0
Occupation :
President
Arunachal Pradesh Hajong Students Union
Son of Late Promesuwar Hajong
resident of Village Madhupur - II
PO Diyun
PS Diyun
Changlang District
Arunachal Pradesh 792103
5:The Union o India
Age: 0
Occupation :
represented by the Secretary
Ministry of Home Affairs
Govt of India
Shastri Bhawan
New Delhi 110001
6:The State of AP
Age: 0
Occupation :
represented by the Secretary/ Joint Secretary to the Govt of Arunachal Pradesh
Political Department
Civil Secretariat
Block No.4
3rd Floor
Itanagar
Arunachal Pradesh 791111
7:The Deputy Commissioner
Age: 0
Occupation :
Changlang
Office of the Deputy Commissioner
Changlang District
Arunachal Pradesh 792120
8:The Deputy Commissioner
Age: 0
Occupation :
Namsai
Office of the Deputy Commissioner
Namsai District
Arunachal Pradesh 792103
9:The Deputy Commissioner
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Age: 0
Occupation :
Office of the Deputy Commissioner
Yupia
Papum Pare District
Arunachal Pradesh 79111
Advocate for the Petitioner
: N Jollaw,
Advocate for the Respondent : D Ghosh, Marto Kato,DSGI,GA (AP)
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MITALI THAKURIA
ORDER
04.06.2026
Heard Shri N. Jollaw, learned counsel for the applicant. Also heard Dr. Colin
Gonsalves, learned Senior Counsel, who has appeared online assisted by Ms. D.
Ghosh, learned counsel for the opposite parties/ writ petitioners, who is physically
present.
2.
The instant interlocutory application has been filed by the applicant praying for
its impleadment in the connected PIL/19/2025 as respondent no. 6.
3.
Shri Jollaw, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the subject
matter of the writ petition emanates from certain complaints, including representation
dated 18.07.2022 on the aspect of grant of Residential Proof Certificate to the people
of Chakma community which led to passing of the impugned orders which are the
subject matters of challenge in the connected PIL/19/2025. The learned counsel has
submitted that in the said PIL, the applicant has not been made a party respondent. It
is submitted that the applicant is a necessary party as it is at its instance that the
impugned orders have been passed.
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4.
Per contra, Dr. Gonsalves, learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party has
strenuously objected to the impleadment application. He has fairly submitted that
though usually such objection is not raised in an impleadment application, the present
case is different. He has submitted that serious observations have been made by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a number of cases relating to the present applicant’s
conduct. The learned Senior Counsel has specifically referred to the observations
made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Human Rights
Commission Vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh , reported in (1996) 1 SCC 742 made in
paragraphs 14 and 15 which are pressed into service:
“14.It is further submitted by the first respondent that under the Constitution, the
State of Arunachal Pradesh enjoys a special status and, bearing in mind its
ethnicity, it has been declared that it would be administered under Part X of the
Constitution. That is the reason why laws and regulations applicable during the
British regime continue to apply even today. The settlement of Chakmas in large
numbers in the State would disturb its ethnic balance and destroy its culture and
identity. The special provisions made in the Constitution would be set at naught if
the State's tribal population is allowed to be invaded by people from outside. The
tribals, therefore, consider Chakmas as a potential threat to their tradition and
culture and are, therefore, keen that the latter do not entrench themselves in the
State. Besides, the financial resources of the State without Central assistance,
which is ordinarily not forthcoming, would throw a heavy burden on the State
which it would find well-nigh impossible to bear. In the circumstances, contends
the first respondent, it is unfair and unconstitutional to throw the burden of such a
large number of Chakmas on the State.
15.We are unable to accept the contention of the first respondent that no threat
exists to the life and liberty of the Chakmas guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution and that it has taken adequate steps to ensure the protection of the
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Chakmas. After handling the present matter for more than a year, the NHRC
recorded a prima facie finding that the service of quit notices and their admitted
enforcement appeared to be supported by the officers of the first respondent. The
NHRC further held that the first respondent had, on the one hand, delayed the
disposal of the matter by not furnishing the required response and had, on the
other hand, sought to enforce the eviction of the Chakmas through its agencies. It
is to be noted that at no time has the first respondent sought to condemn the
activities of the AAPSU. However, the most damning facts against the first
respondent are to be found in the counter-affidavit of the second respondent. In
the assessment of the Union of India, the threat posed by the AAPSU was grave
enough to warrant the placing of two additional battalions of CRPF at the disposal
of the State Administration. Whether it was done at the behest of the State
Government or by the Union on its own is of no consequence; the fact that it had
become necessary speaks for itself. The second respondent further notes that after
the expiry of the deadline of 30-10-1994, the AAPSU and other tribal student
organisations continued to agitate and press for the expulsion of all foreigners
including the Chakmas. It was reported that the AAPSU had started enforcing
economic blockades on the refugee camps, which adversely affected the supply of
rations, medical and essential facilities, etc., to the Chakmas. Of course the State
Government has denied the allegation, but the independent inquiry of the NHRC
shows otherwise. The fact that the Chakmas were dying on account of the
blockade for want of medicines is an established fact. After reports regarding lack
of medical facilities and the spread of malaria and dysentery in Chakma
settlements were received, the Union Government advised the first respondent to
ensure normal supplies of essential commodities to the Chakma settlement. On
20-9-1995 the AAPSU, once again, issued an ultimatum citing 31-12-1995 as the
fresh deadline for the ousting of Chakmas. This is yet another threat which the
first respondent has not indicated how it proposes to counter.”
5.
The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that a party, whose conduct is
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inherently criminal in nature, should be excluded from an adjudication process. He has
additionally submitted that the lis which is in connection with a challenge to the
cancellation of the Residential Proof Certificate would be defended by the State and
would represent all the affected communities. He has submitted that the application
for impleadment is misconceived as the applicant neither a necessary party nor an
appropriate party and therefore, the instant IA is liable to be dismissed.
6.
The rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties have
been duly considered.
7.
An application for impleadment is normally considered in a liberal manner. The
only requirement of an applicant seeking impleadment is to show that such applicant
has an interest in the lis, the result of which would also affect it. In the instant case, it
is not in dispute that there is a representation dated 18.07.2022 by the applicant
which had culminated in the impugned orders. There is a specific averment in
paragraph 13 of the connected PIL which read as follows:
“13. That, on 11.07.2022 a team claimed to be associated with All Arunachal
Pradesh Students' Union (AAPSU) had visited the Office of the Extra Assistant
Commissioner, Diyun and for checking the official records of the Extra Assistant
Commissioner's
Office.
Thereafter,
the
All-Arunachal
Pradesh
Students'
Union(AAPSU) had alleged that the Extra Assistant Commissioner was issuing the
Residential Proof Certificate illegally and demanded the suspension of the
Residential Proof Certificates issued to the Chakmas and Hajongs and ban on
issuing the fresh Residential Proof Certificate. The All-Arunachal Pradesh Students'
Union, hereinafter “AAPSU” submitted a representation dated 18.07.2022 to the
Chief Minister also demanded the suspension of Extra Assistant Commissioner,
Diyun and other officials who had issued such Residential Proof Certificates and
gave an ultimatum to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh to act against the
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erring officials within 15 days. The AAPSU has issued another circular dated
22.07.2022 calling upon all the District Students Union to attend the special
meeting on 28.07.2022 to exert pressure upon the Government of Arunachal
Pradesh followed by press conferences from time to time to mount pressure
upon the Government.”
8.
While the learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party/ writ petitioner has
strenuously argued that serious observations have been made by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court against the applicant in a number of cases questioning its conduct, we are of
the view that the said aspect may be a consideration in the final adjudication of this
matter and cannot be come into the way of the present applicant seeking its
impleadment in the lis before us. As mentioned above, it is because of the initiative of
the applicant, the impugned orders have been passed which are the subject matters
of challenge in the connected PIL.
9.
The expressions “proper party” and “necessary party” have been explained by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. It has been laid down that a
necessary party is one in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by
the Court. On the other hand, a proper party is one whose presence would enable the
court to effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit.
10.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent case of M/S J.N. Real Estate Vs.
Shailendra Pradhan, reported in 2025 INSC 611, after discussing the earlier
judgments, including the judgment in the case of Mumbai International Airport (P)
Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. , reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417
has elaborately explained the aforesaid concept. It would be beneficial to quote the
relevant extracts which are as hereunder:
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“22. This Court in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency
Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417,
explained the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC. In the unique facts
which existed therein, there was a likelihood that the appellant would secure
a right/interest in the suit property if the suit for specific performance
instituted by the respondent against the Airport Authority of India was
dismissed. It was held, that in such a factual circumstance and such being
the right asserted by the appellant, it cannot be made a party to the suit for
specific performance. While holding so, it was observed that although the
general rule is that the plaintiff, being dominus litis, may choose the persons
against whom he wishes to litigate and seek relief, yet this rule of
impleadment would be subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2)
wherein courts are vested with the discretion to strike out or add parties to
a suit depending on whether their impleadment is deemed necessary or
proper. It was held that, even in suits for specific performance, a court may,
at any stage of the proceedings, implead a person who is found to be a
necessary party or proper party.
23. In Mumbai International Airport (supra), this Court explained the import
of the expressions “necessary party” and “proper party” as thus:
‘14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of
the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or
even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to
be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party:
(a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant,
but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may
be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely
adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short,
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the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is
found to be a necessary party or proper party.
15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a
party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by
the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable
to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary
party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely,
effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the
suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the
decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or
necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the
wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a
right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the
plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to
the suit for specific performance.’
24. It is limpid in the aforesaid observation that if a party is found to either
a necessary or proper party, the court would have the jurisdiction to implead
him, even against the wishes of the plaintiff concerned. …
…
…
29. It was observed that the court may exercise discretion in impleading a
person who is a ‘proper party’ upon an application by a non-party to the suit
for specific performance. If the court is of the view that the impleadment of
such a proper party will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause
of action, it may either refuse to implead such person or order for his
impleadment on certain conditions. However, even otherwise, the court
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would not be precluded from impleading a ‘proper party’ unconditionally in
its discretion.”
11.
In view of the above, we are unable to accept the objections raised on behalf of
the opposite party/ writ petitioner towards the impleadment of the applicant. We are
of the view that the discretion conferred upon us, if exercised in favour of impleading
the applicant would be towards the furtherance of justice. We are also of the opinion
that it is only giving a right to the applicant for an audience in the present adjudication
process and the ultimate decision in the connected PIL would be strictly on the merits
of the case advanced by the rival parties.
12.
Accordingly, the IA is allowed and the aforesaid applicant is impleaded as the
respondent no. 6 in the connected PIL/19/2025. The opposite party/ writ petitioner is
accordingly directed to file amended cause title incorporating the applicant as the
respondent no. 6.
13.
Consequently, the respondent no. 6 would be at liberty to file its response to
the PIL for which, this Court grants 3 weeks’ time.
14.
The instant IA accordingly stands disposed of.
15.
Registry is directed to list the connected PIL/19/2025 on 30.06.2026, a date
agreed to by the learned counsel for the parties.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
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