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[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 14796/2026
CNR: RJHC020912912026 | URN: CRLMB / 27232U / 2026
Alka W/o Shivratan Mot, R/o Thethar, P.s. Rajiyasar, Distt.
Sriganganagar, Currently Ward No. 38 Sangam Vihar, Suratgarh,
Distt. Sriganganagar.
----Petitioner
Versus
State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Sudhir Vyas, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Shree Ram Dhakar, PP
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
REPORTABLE25/09/2026
1.
The jurisdiction of this court has been invoked by way of
filing an application under Section 438 CrPC at the instance of
accused-petitioner.
The
requisite
details
of
the
matter
are
tabulated herein below:
S.No.
Particulars of the Case
1.
FIR Number
39/2024
2.
Concerned Police Station
Special Police Station (SOG)
3.
District
ATS & SOG
4.
Offences alleged in the FIR
Sections 419, 420, 120-B of
IPC and Sections 4,5,6 of The
Rajasthan Public Examination
(Prevention of Unfairmeans)
Act, 1992 and Section 66D of
IT Act.
5.
Offences added, if any
-
6.
Date of passing of
impugned order
14.09.2026
(2 of 11)
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
2.
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
The concise facts of the case as alleged in the FIR are that
during investigation of FIR No. 10/2024, it came to light that an
organised gang involved in paper leaks and facilitating cheating
through Bluetooth devices had conspired to leak the question
paper
of
the
Supervisor
(Women
Empowerment)
Direct
Recruitment Examination, 2018. The examination was conducted
by the Rajasthan Subordinate and Ministerial Services Selection
Board for 180 posts, with one of the examination centres being
Shri Ramsahai Adarsh Secondary School, Bikaner, operated by
accused Dinesh Singh Chauhan. It is alleged that Dinesh Singh
Chauhan, in connivance with Tulchharam Kaler, Paurav Kaler and
Rajaram @ Raju Matrix, facilitated the question paper being taken
out of the examination centre before commencement of the
examination. Rajaram @ Raju Matrix allegedly photographed the
question paper and forwarded it through WhatsApp to Paurav
Kaler, who got it solved with the assistance of other members of
the gang. The answers were thereafter allegedly supplied to
candidates appearing in the examination through Bluetooth
devices in lieu of monetary consideration, resulting in certain
candidates being selected by use of unfair means and thereby
causing wrongful
gain to them
and corresponding loss
to
deserving candidates. Accordingly, the FIR came to be registered
for offences under Sections 419, 420 and 120-B IPC, Sections 4, 5
and 6 of the Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair
Means) Act, 1992 and Section 66-D of the Information Technology
Act.
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
(3 of 11)
3.
of
Having
apprehension
being
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
arrested
in
the
afore-
mentioned matter, the petitioner has prayed for anticipatory bail
on the ground that no case for the alleged offences is made out
against her and her incarceration is not warranted. There are no
factors at play in the case at hand that may work against grant of
anticipatory bail to the accused-petitioner and she has been made
an accused based on conjectures and surmises.
4.
Contrary to the submissions of learned counsel for the
petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for
the complainant oppose the bail application and submit that the
present case is not fit for grant of anticipatory bail.
5.
Having considered the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor and having
gone through the contents of the FIR, the statements of the
prosecution witnesses and the material placed on record, this
Court finds that the name of the petitioner does not find mention
in the FIR. It is also not the case of the prosecution that any of
the prosecution witnesses, in their statements recorded during
investigation, has attributed any specific role or involvement to
the petitioner.
5.1
It is further noticed that the alleged occurrence pertains to
the recruitment process of the year 2018 and the examination in
question was conducted in the year 2019, whereas the FIR came
to be registered only in the year 2024. During the course of
investigation, separate charge-sheets came to be filed against
different persons at different stages. However, neither in the first
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
(4 of 11)
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
charge-sheet dated 25.09.2025 nor in the subsequent chargesheet dated 25.09.20266 is there any whisper regarding the
present petitioner, either as an accused, a witness, or as a person
having any connection with the alleged occurrence. Thus, the
material collected during the investigation over a considerable
period does not disclose any direct or indirect incriminating
circumstance against the petitioner.
5.2
It is also to be noticed that the chain of investigation, as
projected by the prosecution, proceeds from one disclosure to
another, namely, A naming B, B naming C and C, in turn, naming
D. At this stage, this Court is not inclined to enter into any
conclusive
adjudication
with
regard
to
the
admissibility
or
evidentiary worth of such disclosures, which are matters to be
examined at the appropriate stage of trial. However, when the
question concerns the curtailment of personal liberty, the Court
cannot remain oblivious to the nature and legal character of the
material sought to be relied upon. The investigation is certainly
required to be protected and the investigating agency ought not to
be unnecessarily interfered with in the discharge of its statutory
function. At the same time, the right to personal liberty, being a
constitutionally protected right, cannot be curtailed merely on the
basis of a chain of revelations, the legal sanctity and evidentiary
value of which are themselves subject to serious scrutiny in law.
More importantly, the persons from whom such revelations are
stated to have emanated would ordinarily not step into the
witness-box as prosecution witnesses merely for the purpose of
(5 of 11)
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
proving the contents of their own disclosures, nor can the
prosecution, at this stage, project such statements as substantive
evidence against the present petitioner. The prosecution may
certainly place such material before the Investigating Officer and
proceed with the investigation on the basis thereof, but an
assertion made in the course of investigation does not, by itself,
acquire the character of substantive evidence so as to justify
continued deprivation of liberty. This Court, therefore, consciously
refrains from recording any final finding upon the admissibility or
evidentiary worth of the aforesaid material, lest it may prejudice
either side at the stage of trial. Nevertheless, for the limited
purpose of considering the question of personal liberty, it cannot
be lost sight of that the material presently projected against the
petitioner substantially rests upon successive disclosures and the
connecting
link
sought
to
be
established
therefrom.
The
investigating agency may take the risk of proceeding upon such
leads
during
investigation,
but
the
Court,
while
exercising
jurisdiction concerning personal liberty, cannot permit a person to
remain incarcerated merely on the strength of a bald and simple
assertion which, by itself, does not presently disclose substantive
evidentiary
material
having
the
requisite
legal
force.
The
investigation must be permitted to take its own course; however,
the liberty of an individual cannot be made to await the uncertain
outcome of material whose evidentiary worth remains seriously
open to scrutiny.
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
5.3
(6 of 11)
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
What now appears to have emerged is an endeavour, after
submission of the charge-sheets, to bring the petitioner within the
ambit of the prosecution case on the basis of certain material
which, at this stage, does not appear to have the support of any
independent
or
substantive
evidence.
A
person
cannot
be
subjected to the rigours of arrest merely because, at a subsequent
stage, an investigating agency forms an opinion that such person
ought also to be arrayed as an accused. The foundation for such a
course must have some tangible material having a nexus with the
alleged offence. Mere conjectures, surmises or premises cannot,
by themselves, take the place of legal proof.
5.4
The chronology of the matter also assumes significance. The
alleged recruitment pertains to the year 2018, the examination
was conducted in 2019, and the criminal case was instituted only
in 2024. Thereafter, investigation proceeded and charge-sheets
were submitted on different occasions against other persons. Even
after such investigation and filing of the charge-sheets, the
petitioner did not figure therein. The belated attempt to implicate
the petitioner, in the absence of any specific allegation against her
in the FIR or in the statements of the witnesses and without any
material of a direct or indirect nature connecting her with the
alleged offence, requires to be viewed with due circumspection.
5.5
Further it must be considered that, prior to the insertion of
the provision for anticipatory bail in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (now incorporated under Section 482 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), there existed no
(7 of 11)
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
express statutory mechanism seeking pre-arrest protection in
non-bailable offences. Recognizing this legislative vacuum, the
41st
Report
of
the
Law
Commission
of
India
extensively
deliberated upon the necessity and desirability of incorporating
such a safeguard in the criminal procedure framework, so as to
protect
individuals
from
arrest
in
frivolous
or
vindictive
prosecutions. In Para 39.9 of its Report, the Law Commission
underscored the growing misuse of the criminal process wherein
influential individuals were often able to orchestrate the arrest of
their rivals in false or frivolous cases -sometimes with the intent to
harass, disgrace, or exert pressure by ensuring their incarceration
even for a few days. The Commission also acknowledged that in
many such instances, there were no reasonable grounds to
apprehend that the accused would either abscond or misuse the
liberty granted to them on bail.
5.6
It was, therefore, recommended that where the Court is
satisfied that post-arrest, bail would be a logical and inevitable
consequence, it must be empowered to exercise its discretion to
grant pre-arrest bail in appropriate cases. Importantly, the
Commission advised that this power be conferred solely upon the
High Court and the Court of Session, with directions to take effect
at the time of arrest or thereafter. To this end, a draft provisionproposed as Section 497A-was outlined, which broadly resembles
the anticipatory bail provision eventually codified as Section 438 in
the Cr.P.C., 1973.
(8 of 11)
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
5.7
Significantly,
recommending
the
rigid
Law
statutory
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
Commission
conditions
refrained
from
the
of
for
grant
anticipatory bail, noting that it would neither be practicable nor
desirable to attempt an exhaustive enumeration. Doing so, in their
considered view, risked prejudging the case at the pre-trial stage.
Instead, the Commission reposed trust in the judicial discretion of
superior courts to evaluate each matter on its own merits and to
refrain from making any observations that could prejudice a fair
trial.
The
present
statutory
framework
and
jurisprudence
surrounding anticipatory bail thus finds its origins in these
principled recommendations. The overarching object is to prevent
unwarranted arrest and detention in cases where, even after
arrest, the accused is otherwise likely to be granted bail. This
legislative intent continues to inform the judicial approach to prearrest bail applications under both the old and the new Codes.
5.8
It
is
pertinent
to
reflect
upon
the
guiding
principles
enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joginder Kumar v.
State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260, wherein the Court emphatically
observed that "no arrest can be made because it is lawful for the
police officer to do so. The existence of power to arrest is one
thing, the justification for the exercise of it is quite another." The
Court underscored that arrest should not be used as a punitive
tool, particularly when the investigation can proceed without
custodial detention. In the present case, the petitioner is a woman
hailing
from
a
socially
background,
and
the
and
stigma
economically
backward
attached
custodial
to
rural
arrest-
(9 of 11)
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
especially for a household woman with no antecedents and no
demonstrated
role
in
the
alleged
offence-would
irreparably
damage her dignity, social standing, and familial harmony. The
disproportionate consequences of arrest in such circumstances,
despite the lack of necessity for custodial interrogation, militates
against the very spirit of personal liberty guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution. When liberty is at stake and arrest itself
appears unwarranted in light of available facts, the statutory
discretion vested under Section 438 Cr.P.C. must be exercised to
prevent
undue
hardship
and
social
prejudice.
When
it
is
presumable that she would be released on bail upon her
production
before
the
Court,
there
exist
no
compelling
circumstances that would justify subjecting her to the cycle of
arrest, incarceration, and subsequent release.
5.9
Reference may also be made to the judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors., reported in AIR 2011 SC 312, and Sushila
Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in AIR 2020 SC 831.
5.10 The petitioner is a lady. The offence alleged does not carry
punishment of death or imprisonment for life. The statutory
consideration governing arrest and detention of a woman,
including the protection contemplated under Section 480 of the
BNSS, also deserves due consideration. There is nothing on
record, at this stage, to suggest that the petitioner is likely to
abscond or evade the process of law merely because she is
granted protection from arrest. Nor has any specific circumstance
(10 of 11)
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
been demonstrated which would make her custodial interrogation
indispensable.
5.11 This Court is conscious of the fact that the investigation of
offences relating to competitive examinations must be conducted
fairly and effectively. At the same time, the power of investigation
cannot be permitted to operate upon mere suspicion detached
from supporting material. The longer the investigation has
continued and the more the material has been crystallised through
statements and charge-sheets, the greater is the necessity of
examining
whether
there
exists
a
tangible
connecting
circumstance before depriving a person of personal liberty.
6.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
absence of the petitioner’s name in the FIR, the absence of any
specific allegation against her in the statements of the prosecution
witnesses, the filing of two separate charge-sheets without any
reference to her alleged involvement, and the absence of any
apparent independent material connecting her with the alleged
occurrence, cumulatively persuade this Court to extend the
protective
umbrella
of
anticipatory
bail.
The
subsequent
endeavour to implicate her, without a corresponding foundational
material emerging from the investigation, does not, at this stage,
furnish sufficient ground to justify her custodial arrest and the
Court ought not to hesitate in extending the protection of
anticipatory bail, particularly where the custodial interrogation of
the petitioner-ladys is not shown to be imperative.
[2026:RJ-JP:39244]
7.
(11 of 11)
[CRLMB-14796/2026]
Needless to say, none of the observations made herein above
shall affect the rights of either of the parties during trial and this
Court refrains from commenting on the niceties of the matter.
8.
Accordingly, the instant bail application under Section 438
Cr.P.C. is allowed. The S.H.O/I.O/Arresting Officer, Police Station
SOG, District ATS & SOG in F.I.R. No. 39/2024 is directed that in
the event of arrest of the petitioner she shall be released on bail,
provided she furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/with two sureties in the sum of Rs.25,000/- each to the
satisfaction of the S.H.O/I.O/Arresting Officer of the concerned
Police Station on the following conditions:(i)
that the petitioner shall make herself available
for interrogation by a police officer as and when
required;
(ii) that the petitioner shall not directly or
indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise
to any person acquainted with the facts of the case
so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to
the court or any police officer, and
(iii) that the petitioner shall not leave India
without previous permission of the court.
(FARJAND ALI),J
27/YOGESH KUMAR
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