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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision:16.02.2026
+
ARB.P. 45/2026
AKASH ARORA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh, Ms.
Aanchal Bindal & Mr. Deepak
Kumar, Advocates.
versus
KAMLESH DEVI SHARMA
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajesh Ranjan, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition, filed under Section 11(5) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeks appointment of an
Arbitrator for the purpose of resolution of disputes that are stated to
have arisen inter se the parties arising out of the Agreement dated
15.05.2012, which was renewed every year on 17.05.2013, 20.05.2014
and 01.06.2015, and which was valid till 31.05.2016, after which the
said Agreement was not renewed between the parties.
2.
The present Petition has come to be filed as a result of the
Petitioner withdrawing the Civil Suit being CS (COMM.) 286/2022
titled “Grand Chemical Works v. P.R. Enterprises”2 vide Order
Act
Civil Suit
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BHATIA
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ARB.P. 45/2026
dated
06.09.2025,
passed
by
the
learned
District
Judge
(Commercial Court) – 05, West District, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi3. The said Civil suit was filed by the Petitioner for the recovery
of Rs. 5,02,937/- (Rupees Five Lakh Two Thousand Nine thirty seven
only) along with pendente lite and future interest @ 24% p.a.
3.
The recovery of the said amount is contended to be the subject
matter in respect of which disputes have arisen and as a result thereof,
the present Petition has been preferred.
4.
Admittedly, the Respondent chose to raise a jurisdictional
objection as to the maintainability of the said Civil Suit before the
learned Commercial Court and to this effect, filed an application under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for rejection of
the plaint on the ground that an arbitration clause exists in the
Agreement as between the parties and as a result thereof, a Civil suit
was not maintainable.
5.
In addition thereto, the Respondent herein had preferred an
Application under Section 8 of the Act before the learned Commercial
Court, contending that in view of the arbitration clause , the parties be
referred to arbitration.
6.
All the above stated Applications also came to be disposed of as
a result of the suit itself being withdrawn by the Petitioner.
7.
At the outset, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent submits that the present Petition is not maintainable,
inasmuch as the Petitioner had earlier instituted a Civil Suit before the
learned Commercial Court in disregard of the express arbitration
clause in the Agreement. It is further contended that such conduct, in
Commercial Court
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BHATIA
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effect, amounts to approbation and reprobation, as the Petitioner,
having elected to pursue a Civil Suit despite the existence the
arbitration clause and now, seeks to press into service the very same
arbitration clause for the purpose of seeking relief in the present
Petition.
8.
Learned counsel for the Respondent further submits that the
present Petition is not maintainable on the ground of being barred by
limitation, since at the time of withdrawing of the suit no liberty was
granted by the learned Commercial Court to prefer the present Petition
and over three months and thirty days have elapsed since the cause of
action arose.
9.
Learned counsel for the Respondent, in support of the same,
submits that the disputes between the parties arose as early as in the
year 2021, and the Civil Suit came to be withdrawn only on
06.02.2025 and the present Petition has been preferred thereafter,
therefore, the present Petition is clearly barred by limitation.
10.
Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that the parties had
earlier submitted themselves to Arbitration which commenced upon
the reference of the disputes under the same Agreement by virtue of
an Order dated 21.08.2023, passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court. He submits that the disputes as raised therein have been
adjudicated upon and a Petition under Section 34 of the Act, being
OMP (COMM) 385/2025, in respect of the Arbitral Award dated
19.07.2025 passed therein, is pending before this Court.
11.
Learned counsel for the Respondent further submits that the
Petitioner, having not chosen to raise a counterclaim to the said
Arbitral proceedings, cannot, by way of a fresh referral to arbitration,
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BHATIA
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seek to have the disputes adjudicated upon.
12.
Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of both parties
at length.
13.
Before adverting to the rival submissions, it is apposite to note
that the legal position governing the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act is no longer res integra. A
three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning4, after taking into consideration
the
authoritative
pronouncement
of
the
seven-Judge
Bench
in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act,
1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re5, comprehensively delineated the
contours of judicial intervention at the stage of Section 11of the
Act. The excerpt of Krish Spg (supra) reads as under:“(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act
110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and
agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In
cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been
vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a
party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the
arbitrators.
111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration
in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The
parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from
those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken in SBP &
Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed in Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8
and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature
was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A)
in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to compel
parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the scope
of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are
different.
(2024) 12 SCC 1
(2024) 6 SCC 1
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BHATIA
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112. The difference between Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the
1996 Act is also evident from the scope of these provisions. Some
of these differences are:
112.1. While Section 8 empowers any “judicial authority” to refer
the parties to arbitration, under Section 11, the power to refer has
been exclusively conferred upon the High Court and the Supreme
Court.
112.2. Under Section 37, an appeal lies against the refusal of the
judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, whereas no such
provision for appeal exists for a refusal under Section 11.
112.3. The standard of scrutiny provided under Section 8 is that of
prima facie examination of the validity and existence of an
arbitration agreement. Whereas, the standard of scrutiny under
Section 11 is confined to the examination of the existence of the
arbitration agreement.
112.4. During the pendency of an application under Section 8,
arbitration may commence or continue and an award can be passed.
On the other hand, under Section 11, once there is failure on the
part of the parties in appointing the arbitrator as per the agreed
procedure and an application is preferred, no arbitration
proceedings can commence or continue.
113. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined
to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section
7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also
limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement should be in writing.
114. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16
implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited
to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration
agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry,
which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16.
The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement
taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.
115. The aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose — firstly, it
allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration
agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence
of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the
arbitration agreement in depth.
****
117. In view of the observations made by this Court in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996
& the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, it is clear that the
scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to
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BHATIA
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hold that the observations made inVidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 and adopted inNTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra
Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 385 that the jurisdiction of the Referral Court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent
decision inInterplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC
1.
****
119. The question of “accord and satisfaction”, being a mixed
question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Arbitral Tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the
parties. Thus, the negative effect of competence-competence would
require that the matter falling within the exclusive domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal, should not be looked into by the Referral Court,
even for a prima facie determination, before the Arbitral Tribunal
first has had the opportunity of looking into it.
120. By referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an
arbitrator by exercise of the powers under Section 11, the Referral
Court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of the
contracting parties that the specified disputes shall be resolved by
arbitration. Mere appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal does not in
any way mean that the Referral Court is diluting the sanctity of
“accord and satisfaction” or is allowing the claimant to walk back
on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it ensures that the
principle of arbitral autonomy is upheld and the legislative intent of
minimum judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is given full
effect. Once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it is always open
for the defendant to raise the issue of “accord and satisfaction”
before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the
Arbitral Tribunal, that the claims raised by the claimant can be
adjudicated.
121. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex facie meritless”,
although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they
require the Referral Court to examine contested facts and
appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of
enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the
principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and
judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.
122. Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal at the stage of Section 11
petition also does not mean that the Referral Courts forego any
scope of judicial review of the adjudication done by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The 1996 Act clearly vests the national courts with the
power of subsequent review by which the award passed by an
arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by any of the parties to the
arbitration.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:28:57
ARB.P. 45/2026
*****
126. The power available to the Referral Courts has to be construed
in the light of the fact that no right to appeal is available against
any order passed by the Referral Court under Section 11 for either
appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator. Thus, by delving
into the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal at the nascent stage of
Section 11, the Referral Courts also run the risk of leaving the
claimant in a situation wherein it does not have any forum to
approach for the adjudication of its claims, if its Section 11
application is rejected.
127. Section 11 also envisages a time-bound and expeditious
disposal of the application for appointment of arbitrator. One of the
reasons for this is also the fact that unlike Section 8, once an
application under Section 11 is filed, arbitration cannot commence
until the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted by the Referral Court. This
Court, on various occasions, has given directions to the High
Courts for expeditious disposal of pending Section 11 applications.
It has also directed the litigating parties to refrain from filing bulky
pleadings in matters pertaining to Section 11. Seen thus, if the
Referral Courts go into the details of issues pertaining to “accord
and satisfaction” and the like, then it would become rather difficult
to achieve the objective of expediency and simplification of
pleadings.
128. We are also of the view that ex facie frivolity and dishonesty
in litigation is an aspect which the Arbitral Tribunal is equally, if
not more, capable to decide upon the appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the parties. We say so because the Arbitral Tribunal
has the benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and
pleadings in much more detail than the Referral Court. If the
Referral Court is able to see the frivolity in the litigation on the
basis of bare minimum pleadings, then it would be incorrect to
doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the
same inference, most likely in the first few hearings itself, with the
benefit of extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.”
(emphasis supplied)
14.
The decision in Krish Spinning (supra) thus unequivocally
reiterates that the Referral Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 11of the Act, is required to confine itself to a prima facie
examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and nothing
beyond. The Court’s role is facilitative and procedural, namely, to give
effect to the parties’ agreed mechanism of dispute resolution when it
has failed, without embarking upon an adjudication of contentious
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BHATIA
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factual or legal issues, which are reserved for the Arbitral Tribunal.
15.
The Apex Court has further clarified that tests such as “ex facie
meritless” or “eye of the needle”, which necessitate an evaluation of
contested facts or a preliminary appreciation of evidence, are
inconsistent with the modern arbitration framework that accords
primacy to arbitral autonomy and restricts judicial interference.
Accordingly, while the Referral Court must ensure that a valid
arbitration agreement prima facie exists, all substantive objections,
including those relating to accord and satisfaction, limitation, or other
jurisdictional issues, are to be raised before and decided by the
Arbitral Tribunal in the first instance, subject thereafter to statutory
remedies available under the Act.
16.
Now, turning to the contentions as raised by the Respondent, as
regards the contention that the Petitioner is barred by the principles of
approbation and reprobation, this Court is of the view that the present
Petition is not barred by principles of approbation and reprobation,
since at the stage of Section 11 of the Act, such a ground does not fall
for consideration by the Court.
17.
Additionally, this Court is of the view that the Respondent itself
had filed an Application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and
Section 8 of the Act, and it expressly sought that the matters be
referred to Arbitration. The withdrawal of the suit and preferring the
present Petition, in the Court’s opinion is, therefore, maintainable.
18.
With respect to the aspect of whether there was any liberty
granted or not, the learned Commercial Court has recorded in clear
terms “The plaintiff shall be at liberty to pursue the available remedy
as per law”. Therefore, the contention of the respondent insofar as
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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liberty to file the present petition is concerned does not inspire the
confidence of this Court. The present petition has been filed pursuant
to the liberty so granted and this Court is of the opinion that it is
maintainable as per law.
19.
Further, as regards to the contention whether the present
Petition is barred by limitation, this Court is of the view that since, as
discussed herein above, the scope of enquiry in a Petition under
Section 11 of the Act is extremely constricted and whether or not the
claims themselves are barred by limitation is a mixed question of law
and facts that the learned Arbitrator can take a decision on. Prima
facie, in view of the fact that Petitioner had earlier chosen to suit and
thereafter withdrew the same, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 14
of the Limitation Act.
20.
It is trite law that a counterclaim is in the nature of a separate
suit altogether and since the present Petition is preferred for the
purpose of seeking reliefs which would essentially have been in the
nature of counter claim in the first Arbitration, the Petitioner is neither
stopped nor precluded nor barred from filing the present petition.
21.
The material on record indicates that the parties entered into an
Agreement dated 15.05.2012 and Clause 12 of the Agreement
envisages the Arbitration Clause. The same is reproduced herein under
for ready reference:
“12. Any and all disputes, controversies, differences, termination
arising between the parties hereto out of or in relation to this
agreement or any breach thereof shall be finally settled by
arbitrator appointed by each party.”
22.
In view of the fact that disputes have arisen inter se the parties
and there being an arbitration clause stipulated in the Agreement, there
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BHATIA
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ARB.P. 45/2026
is no impediment in appointing the sole Arbitrator.
23.
Material on record further indicates that the valuation of the
present dispute is stated to be approximately Rs. 5 lakhs.
24.
Accordingly, Mr. Shyam Sharma, Advocate (Mobile No.
9810153965), is appointed as the Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes
inter se the parties.
25.
The learned Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration
proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite
disclosures as required under Section 12(2) of the Act.
26.
The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to fee in accordance
with the Fourth Schedule of the Act or as may otherwise be agreed to
between the parties and the learned Arbitrator.
27.
The parties shall share the learned Arbitrator's fee and arbitral
cost, equally.
28.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
29.
Needless to state, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy.
All rights and contentions of the parties in this regard are reserved.
30.
Let the copy of the said order be sent to the learned Arbitrator
through the electronic mode as well.
31.
Accordingly,
the
present
Petition
along
with
pending
application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the above-stated terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 16, 2026/tk/va/dj
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:28:57
ARB.P. 45/2026
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