Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 307 of 2022 with
WP(C) No. 308 of 2022
Date of Decision: 24.02.2023
Shri. Hemanta Choudhury
Vs. North Eastern Electric
Power Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Shri. Ajit Ranjan Das
Vs. North Eastern Electric
Power Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. S. Sen, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. V.K. Jindal, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. V. Kumar, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
Both these writ petitions being similarly situated and
identical in facts, are being disposed of by this common Judgment and
Order. In these writ petitions, the prayers of the writ petitioners are for
declaring Office Orders No. 251 and 252 both dated 10.12.2021, passed
by the Chairman & Managing Director, NEEPCO Limited imposing
the major penalty of ‘reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay
by one stage for one year with cumulative effect’ and the decision of
the appellate authority to stand by these orders as conveyed by letter
dated 20.06.2022, to be illegal and unconstitutional.
2.
The brief facts are that both the writ petitioners are
presently holding the post of Deputy General Manager (C), and while
they were holding the post of Senior Manager (C), were assigned duties
at Kameng Hydro Electric Project of NEEPCO in Arunachal Pradesh
between December, 2012 and July, 2015. Apart from site activities, the
writ petitioners were involved in other technical matters, which
involved the stockpiling of River Bed Materials (RBM) of sand and
boulders at the site in Kimi, Arunachal Pradesh, the details of which,
that is, Challan No. Volume of RBM were recorded by the field staff
and co-signed by an officer of the NEEPCO, and of the contractor.
Based on these stockpiles and the measurement thereof, the contractors
who supplied the materials, raised bills which were then processed for
payment. The writ petitioners in this connection, were served with
letters issued by the respondents, wherein it was stated that, in the
course of investigation, in the matter of payment to contractors in the
said project, it was observed that, for the carriage/transportation of
RBM from different government approved quarries, some vehicles
used by the contractors were found to be scooters, cars, ambulance, etc.
The petitioners were asked for comments as to the specific role in this
matter, relating to payment made against non-genuine trips.
3.
Replies had then been submitted by the petitioners, which were
however found unsatisfactory, and a memorandum dated 02.01.2020,
was issued by the respondent No. 2, whereby the Disciplinary
Authority, proposed to hold an inquiry against the petitioners, as per
Rule 29 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of NEEPCO.
Statements and articles of charge, were framed against the writ
petitioners, and the inquiry proceedings then commenced. The Inquiry
Officer, on the completion of the inquiry, then by reports dated
10.06.2021 and 11.06.2021 respectively, found that the charges framed
against the writ petitioners could not be established and that many of
the vehicles listed in various challans, which were mentioned as fake
in the vigilance report could not be proved as such. The Disciplinary
Authority however, disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer,
and the tentative reasons for the disagreement were communicated to
the writ petitioners vide letter dated 10.08.2021. Replies were then
submitted by the petitioners to the said reasons, which however, were
found to be not convincing by the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter,
by office orders, major penalties was imposed on the petitioners.
Though, appeals were preferred against the orders, the same were
dismissed. Hence, the instant writ petitions before this Court.
4.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
5.
Mr. S. Sen, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
petitioners to the articles of charge had submitted their replies and
categorically denied the allegations by contending therein that, during
the period under reference, the writ petitioners were involved in various
other official and technical duties and as such, their constant presence
at the stockpile yard was not possible and that, other officials like the
Deputy Manager, Assistant Manager, including other staff of the
corporation were engaged to record the details of vehicles, as well as,
to take measurement of the materials. He further submits that, in the
reply it had been stated that, there was no scope for the writ petitioners
to ascertain the genuineness of the registration numbers of vehicles for
processing of the bills, and also that, there was no provision that, the
registration certificate of vehicle was to be verified, but that, the stock
measurement register was regularly inspected by them and had been
found to be in order as per procedure. The learned counsel has also
taken this Court to the other details of the written statements/replies,
and also to the recorded proceedings of the inquiry, apart from the
statement of the presenting officer in the inquiry proceedings.
6.
Learned counsel then submits that, after being found not
culpable by the Inquiry Officer, and that the charges could not be
established, the Disciplinary Authority while disagreeing with the
findings, by Office Orders No. 251 and 252 both dated 10.12.2021, had
noted that the reasons for disagreement was that, the views of the Chief
Vigilance Officer was also obtained on the findings of the inquiry, and
thereafter, imposed the major penalty of reduction to a lower stage in a
time scale of pay by one stage for one year with cumulative effect. The
learned counsel contends that, the disagreement to the inquiry report as
reflected from the office order was on the reason that, the same was per
the opinion of the Chief Vigilance Officer, and as such, the imposition
of such penalty based on an opinion, the writ petitioners were not privy
to, is not only illegal for being based on extraneous considerations, but
also in violation of the requirements of Rules 27, 28 and 29 of the
NEEPCO Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules. The learned counsel
submits that this illegal action has also resulted in the promotion of the
petitioner being kept on hold. In support of his arguments, the learned
counsel has placed reliance on the case of Punjab National Bank &
Ors. vs. Kunj Behari Misra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84, and the case
of State Bank of India & Ors. vs. D.C. Aggarwal & Anr. reported in
(1993) 1 SCC 13, on the points of disagreement with the inquiry report
and non-supply of opinion of the Chief Vigilance Officer.
7.
Mr. V.K. Jindal, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. V.
Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent submits that, the power of
the respondent No. 2 (CMD), to disagree with the findings of the
Inquiry Officer is not in question, and has referred to clause 30.2 of the
CDA Rules of NEEPCO, which allows the Disciplinary Authority if it
disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Authority, on any articles of
charge, to record its reasons for such disagreement and to record its
own findings on such charges. Learned Senior counsel submits that it
is acting on this power, vested with the respondent No. 1 that, the
impugned orders had been passed. He further submits that the judgment
cited by the petitioner, that is, Punjab National Bank & Ors. vs. Kunj
Behari Misra (supra) supports the case of the respondents, inasmuch
as, the Principles of Natural Justice means to secure justice, and that,
ample opportunity had been accorded to the petitioners to represent
against the reasons of disagreement.
8.
The learned Senior counsel further submits that, the case had
arisen after extensive investigation by the Vigilance and the CBI, and
that, the writ petitioners had never asked for a copy of the Chief
Vigilance Officer’s report or applied for the same, and that, though
reply was sought from the writ petitioners on the point of disagreement,
the replies were totally evasive and did not answer to the allegations.
Learned Senior counsel then contends that, with the show cause being
given and reply received, there is no question of the Principles of
Natural Justice being violated. The findings he submits, are not based
only on the CVO’s views, or that there was any harm in obtaining his
opinion, and he lastly submits that, there being no irregularity in the
proceedings, as the writ petitioners have been given ample opportunity,
and the action of the respondents being as per the CDA Rules, both the
writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
9.
After considering the submissions advanced by the parties, shorn
of all the other details and facts concerning the inquiry proceedings and
the charges that have been levelled against the writ petitioners, what
emerges are only the question as to whether due procedure established
by law was adopted in the course of proceedings, and whether the writ
petitioners were offered adequate opportunity to defend themselves. As
has been noted earlier, major penalty was imposed, after the replies to
the reasons for disagreement were found insufficient by the
Disciplinary Authority. This Court is therefore, to examine only this
aspect as to whether, adequate opportunity was afforded to the
petitioners at this stage.
10.
A compelling point, has been raised by the petitioners that, the
Disciplinary Authority while disagreeing with the findings of the
Inquiry Authority, had based one of the reasons for disagreement on
the views of the CVO, a copy of which was never supplied to them. For
the sake of convenience, the relevant extract from one of the impugned
orders dated 10.12.2021, which is identically worded in both Office
Orders No. 251 and 252, is reproduced hereinbelow;
“And whereas an Inquiry was ordered by the
Disciplinary Authority vide Office Order No. 69 issued
under
Memo
No.
Pers/21/144/3304-3308
dated
03.02.2020 in exercise of the powers conferred under
Rule 29 of the NEEPCO Conduct Discipline and Appeal
Rules. And whereas extension of period of inquiry was
accorded vide office order 101 dated 21.08.2020 and
office order no. 131 dated 26.03.2021.
And whereas, the Inquiry Officer had submitted
the Inquiry Report dated 11.06.2021, containing 26
(twenty-six) pages, recording his findings against the
charges levelled against the charged officer according to
which the charges were “Not Proved”. The views of the
CVO were obtained on the findings of the Inquiry
Officer. After careful consideration of the Inquiry report
and the views of the CVO, the undersigned being the
Disciplinary Authority and after application of mind
communicated to Shri. Hemanta Choudhury, Dy.
General Manager (C), NEEPCO Ltd., Guwahati Vide
letter No. No./Pers/21/144/10189 dated 10.08.2021 the
disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on
the following grounds and directed him submit his
response within 7 (seven) days from receipt of this
communication.”
11.
The fact that, the Disciplinary Authority relied upon the views
of the CVO cannot be denied by the respondents, as also the fact that,
the views of the CVO were never communicated to the petitioners.
Though arguments has been forwarded by the learned Senior counsel
for the respondents, that even the Rules did not provide for the same,
however, in the opinion of this Court, once the views of the CVO have
been taken into consideration, the same will constitute crucial materials
which were used against the petitioners, to which they were not privy
to. This will in effect, amount to the violation of the Principles of
Natural Justice, which no doubt vitiates the proceedings. The
judgments cited in this regard, are of relevance on the point discussed
above. On the non-supply of the CVO’s views or recommendations,
the Supreme Court in the judgment of State Bank of India & Ors. vs.
D.C. Aggarwal & Anr. (supra) at Para – 4 has held as follows;
“4. Although correctness of the order
passed by the High Court was assailed from
various aspects, including the power of the
High Court to interfere on quantum of
punishment in writ jurisdiction, but we
propose to confine ourselves only to the
question of effect of non-supply of CVC
recommendations and if the order was
invalid and void on this score only it is not
necessary to decide any other issue. Law on
natural justice is so well settled from a
series of decisions of this Court that it leaves
one bewildered at times, that such bodies
like State Bank of India, who are assisted by
hierarchy of law officers, commit such basic
and fundamental procedural errors that
courts are left with no option except to set
aside
such
orders.
Imposition
of
punishment on an employee, on material
which is not only not supplied but not
disclosed
to
him,
has
not
been
countenanced by this Court. Procedural
fairness is as much essence of right and
liberty as the substantive law itself.”
12.
Similarly, on the point of disagreement with the Inquiry
Authority and Natural Justice, the case of Punjab National Bank &
Ors. vs. Kunj Behari Misra (supra), at Para – 18 and 19 has also held
as follows;
“18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry
proceedings can be conducted either by an
enquiry officer or by the disciplinary
authority itself. When the enquiry is
conducted by the enquiry officer, his report
is not final or conclusive and the
disciplinary proceedings do not stand
concluded. The disciplinary proceedings
stand concluded with decision of the
disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary
authority which can impose the penalty and
not
the
enquiry
officer.
Where
the
disciplinary authority itself holds an
enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be
granted by him. When the disciplinary
authority differs with the view of the
enquiry officer and proposes to come to a
different conclusion, there is no reason as
to why an opportunity of hearing should not
be granted. It will be most unfair and
iniquitous that where the charged officers
succeed before the enquiry officer, they are
deprived of representing to the disciplinary
authority before that authority differs with
the enquiry officer's report and, while
recording a finding of guilt, imposes
punishment on the officer. In our opinion,
in any such situation, the charged officer
must have an opportunity to represent
before the disciplinary authority before
final findings on the charges are recorded
and punishment imposed. This is required
to be done as a part of the first stage of
enquiry as explained in Karunakar case.
19. The result of the aforesaid discussion
would be that the principles of natural
justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2).
As
a
result
thereof,
whenever
the
disciplinary authority disagrees with the
enquiry authority on any article of charge,
then before it records its own findings on
such charge, it must record its tentative
reasons for such disagreement and give to
the delinquent officer an opportunity to
represent before it records its findings. The
report of the enquiry officer containing its
findings will have to be conveyed and the
delinquent officer will have an opportunity
to persuade the disciplinary authority to
accept the favorable conclusion of the
enquiry officer. The principles of natural
justice, as we have already observed,
require the authority which has to take a
final decision and can impose a penalty, to
give an opportunity to the officer charged of
misconduct to file a representation before
the disciplinary authority records its
findings on the charges framed against the
officer.”
13.
In view of the stated position as discussed hereinabove, and also
the settled law on these aspects, this Court holds that the petitioners
were deprived of adequate opportunity to defend themselves due to the
non-supply of the views of the CVO, which had been relied upon by
the Disciplinary Authority, in disagreeing with the findings of the
Inquiry Authority. The proceedings before the Disciplinary Authority
being vitiated are therefore set aside, as also the impugned Office
Orders No. 251 and 252 both dated 10.12.2021 and the order of the
Appellate Authority dated 20.06.2022.
14.
Needless to add, the Disciplinary Authority, if it deems fit, will
be at liberty to re-commence the proceedings by first providing the
views of the CVO, and affording full opportunity to the petitioners to
reply to all the reasons for disagreement.
15.
These writ petitions accordingly are allowed.
16.
No order as to costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
24.02.2023
“D. Thabah-PS”
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review