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APHC010691672025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3521]
FRIDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 13183/2025
Between:
1.AJAY KUMAR SUGANDH, S/O SH. JEET RAI SUGANDH,
PROPRIETOR OF M/S. SUGANDH OIL CHEMICALS, 2/53B, NORTH
AVENUE ROAD, LAXMI MARKET, PUNJABI BAGH, NEW DELHI110026 AT PRESENT RESIDING AT 96, HARSH VIHAR, PITAMPURA,
PS-RANIBAGH, NEW DELHI - 110034 AND PERMANENT RESIDENT
OF 171, HARSH VIHAR, PITAMPURA, PS RANIBAGH, NEW DELHI110034 CURRENTLY IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY IN CENTRAL JAIL
(NELLORE)
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1.STATE THROUGH THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER, SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION TEAM (SIT) ADDITIONAL SUPERINTENDENT OF
POLICE, TIRUPATI
2.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT
AMARAVATI.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1.VENKAT CHALLA
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1.P S P SURESH KUMAR, Spl. Public Prosecutor for CBI
2.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
Criminal Petition has been filed under Sections 480 and 483 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’), seeking to
enlarge the petitioner/Accused No.16 on bail in Cr.No.470 of 2024 of Tirupati
East Police Station, Tirupati District, registered against the petitioner/Accused
No.16 herein and some other accused for the offences punishable under
Sections 61(2), 274, 275, 299, 316(5), 318(3), 318(4), 336(3), 340(2), 238,
and Section 49 read with 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short
‘the BNS’), Sections 120-B, 272, 273, 295A, 409, 418, 420, 468, 471, 201,
109 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the I.P.C.,’) and
Sections 7, 8, 9 & 10 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity ‘the
P.C.Act’).
2.
Provenance of the case of the prosecution is that, M/s A.R. Dairy Food
Private Limited, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu, in collusion with certain other accused,
committed the offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust with common
intention supplying adulterated and substandard cow ghee to the Tirumala
Tirupati Devasthanams (TTD), thereby causing wrongful loss to the institution
and deliberately hurting the religious sentiments of Hindu devotees of Lord Sri
Venkateswara Swamy; that despite the tender conditions mandating supply of
10 lakh kilograms of Agmark Special Grade cow ghee pursuant to the tender
notification dated 12.03.2024, finalized on 08.05.2024 and supply order issued
on 15.05.2024, the accused supplied four tankers of ghee on 12.06.2024,
20.06.2024, 25.06.2024 and 04.07.2024 which, upon confidential testing at
NDDB CALF Laboratory, Anand, Gujarat, was found to be adulterated with
vegetable and animal fat–based substances including lard, thereby violated
the tender agreement clauses and committed acts of deception for wrongful
gain; and basing upon the said laboratory report dated 12.07.2024, the
complainant, P.Murali Krishna, General Manager (Procurement), TTD, lodged
a complaint on 25.09.2024 before the Station House Officer, East Police
Station, Tirupati.
3.
Sri K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Venkat Challa,
learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the arrest of Accused No.16 is
not merely irregular but is a grave illegality striking at the very root of
constitutional protections guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution of India. The Petitioner was repeatedly served with notices under
Section 35(3) of ‘the BNSS’, which he scrupulously complied with by
appearing before the investigating authorities, furnishing documents, and
cooperating with the inquiry. The issuance of such notices itself presupposes
that the investigating agency had concluded that arrest was not necessary. In
such circumstances, the subsequent arrest without obtaining prior judicial
sanction under Section 35(6) of ‘the BNSS’ amounts to a blatant violation of
statutory safeguards. The arrest memo and remand report are conspicuously
silent on this crucial aspect, thereby demonstrating that the arrest was
affected in complete disregard of the law of the land. The deprivation of liberty
in this manner is wholly unconstitutional, arbitrary, and unsustainable in law.
4.
Learned Senior Counsel further contends that the remand order dated
07.11.2025 passed by the Learned Additional District & Sessions Judge is
vitiated by non-application of mind and suffers from manifest perversity. The
order records incorrect facts, fails to acknowledge the presence of the
Petitioner’s counsel, and does not reflect any consideration of the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner. The Learned Additional
District & Sessions Judge, in a mechanical manner, granted judicial custody
without examining whether the statutory requirements for arrest and remand
had
been
satisfied.
The
remand
order
is
thus
founded
upon
misrepresentations made by the investigating agency and is devoid of any
independent judicial scrutiny. Such an order, passed late at night without
proper deliberation, undermines the sanctity of judicial process and results in
serious miscarriage of justice.
5.
Sri K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel submits that the Petitioner was
initially treated as a witness, his premises were searched, and no incriminating
material was recovered. He voluntarily furnished GST returns, invoices, and
ledger accounts spanning several years, which clearly establish that he is a
trader of refined oils and chemicals. The allegation that he supplied chemicals
in place of refined oil is wholly baseless, fabricated, and unsupported by any
documentary or physical evidence. The records produced by the Petitioner
demonstrate regular trading in refined oils with various entities, including
Harsh Traders and Harsh Foodz. The attempt of the investigating agency to
fasten liability upon the Petitioner for the alleged adulteration of ghee supplied
to TTD is therefore wholly misconceived and unsustainable.
6.
Learned Senior Counsel emphasizes that the Petitioner has been
subjected to discriminatory and arbitrary treatment. Accused No.17, who was
similarly placed, was spared arrest merely because he acceded to the
coercive demands of the investigating agency and made a false statement as
desired by them. The Petitioner, on the other hand, was arrested solely
because he refused to make a false confession and insisted upon maintaining
the truth. Such differential treatment between similarly situated individuals is
wholly unjustified, arbitrary, and violative of the principle of equality before law
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The investigating agency cannot be
permitted to reward falsehood and punish truthfulness.
7.
Sri K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the
offences alleged against the Petitioner do not attract the rigours of Section
316(5) of ‘the BNSS’ (erstwhile Section 409 of ‘the I.P.C.,’) or the provisions of
‘the P.C.Act.,’ as the Petitioner is neither a public servant nor connected with
TTD. The invocation of these provisions against him is legally untenable and
amounts to abuse of process. The settled position of law is that penal
provisions must be strictly construed, and their application cannot be extended
to individuals who do not fall within their ambit. The attempt of the
investigating agency to apply these provisions to the Petitioner is therefore
wholly misconceived and liable to be rejected.
8.
Learned Senior Counsel further argues that the investigation qua the
principal accused persons was concluded in May 2025, and all of them have
already been enlarged on bail. The Petitioner’s alleged role, even if taken at
face value, is remote and unconnected with the supplies made to TTD. The
prosecution case is that the Petitioner supplied refined oils to Harsh Traders
and Harsh Foodz, who in turn supplied products to other entities, which
ultimately reached TTD. Even if this chain is accepted, there is nothing to
suggest that the Petitioner had knowledge of the end use of his products or
that he was complicit in adulteration. By no stretch of imagination can liability
for adulteration of ghee supplied to TTD be fastened upon the Petitioner.
9.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the arrest of the Petitioner is in
direct violation of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh
Kumar v. State of Bihar1, wherein it was categorically held that arrest should
not be made in a routine manner and that statutory safeguards must be strictly
adhered to. The Petitioner’s arrest, despite his cooperation and compliance
with notices under Section 35(3) of ‘the BNSS’, is a flagrant violation of this
binding precedent. The SIT has acted in complete disregard of the directions
of the Hon’ble Apex Court, thereby rendering the arrest illegal and
unconstitutional.
10.
Sri K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel also points out that the
allegations of non-cooperation, evasive replies, and potential tampering of
evidence are wholly unsubstantiated. The Petitioner has consistently joined
(2014) 8 SCC 273
investigation, produced documents, and answered queries truthfully. The
vague assertions of the SIT cannot justify curtailment of liberty, particularly
when no material evidence supports such claims. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India2 has held that liberty cannot be curtailed
based on subjective satisfaction of the investigating agency without tangible
material. The arrest of the Petitioner in the present case is therefore wholly
illegal and unsustainable.
11.
Learned Senior counsel prays that the Petitioner, who has been
wrongfully incarcerated, be enlarged on bail. The continued detention of the
Petitioner serves no purpose, as investigation against the principal accused is
complete, and there is no likelihood of the Petitioner tampering with evidence
or influencing witnesses. The Petitioner has been cooperating with the
investigation, and his liberty deserves protection under the constitutional
mandate. Bail ought to be granted to restore the Petitioner’s fundamental
rights and to prevent further miscarriage of justice.
12.
Per contra, Mr. P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor
for CBI has vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and submits that the
present petition filed by Accused No.16 is a calculated attempt to secure
liberty despite the existence of overwhelming incriminating material. The
petitioner seeks to portray himself as a mere trader in oils and chemicals, but
the investigation has revealed that he was not engaged in bona fide trade but
in a deliberate and fraudulent scheme of supplying prohibited chemical
(2024) 7 SCC 576
substances under false invoices. The petitioner’s conduct is not an isolated
act of negligence but a conscious and deliberate participation in a conspiracy
of grave magnitude, which has shaken the faith of millions of devotees of Lord
Sri Venkateswara Swamy.
13.
It is further submitted that the petitioner’s role is not peripheral but
central. He knowingly supplied monoglycerides and acetic acid esters under
the guise of edible oils such as coconut oil and palm oil. These substances
were subsequently used in the adulteration of ghee meant for sacred
prasadam. The deliberate falsification of invoices demonstrates mens rea and
conscious participation in the conspiracy. The petitioner cannot claim
innocence when the very invoices raised by his firm conceal the true nature of
the chemicals supplied.
14.
Learned Special Public Prosecutor contends that the sanctity of the
prasadam of Lord Sri Venkateswara Swamy is not an ordinary matter of
commerce but a matter of deep religious faith. The petitioner’s actions,
therefore, transcend mere economic offences and amount to sacrilege, hurting
religious sentiments and endangering public health. The gravity of the offence
is compounded by the fact that adulterated ghee was supplied for preparation
of laddus, thereby endangering public health and religious sentiments
simultaneously.
15.
Mr. P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor argues that
the petitioner colluded with principal conspirators Pomil Jain (A-3) and Vipin
Jain (A-4), who were directors of entities directly engaged in adulteration. The
invoices raised by the petitioner’s firm, M/s Sugandh Oil & Chemicals, were
deliberately falsified to conceal the true nature of the chemicals supplied. This
collusion is not speculative but is evidenced by financial trails, witness
statements, and documentary evidence.
16.
It is urged that the petitioner’s conduct demonstrates a deliberate
attempt to deceive regulatory authorities and the Tirumala Tirupati
Devasthanams (TTD). The petitioner’s actions strike at the very sanctity of the
prasadam, which is not an ordinary commodity, but a sacred offering
consumed by millions of devotees. The petitioner’s fraudulent conduct,
therefore, amounts to a direct assault on religious sentiments and public
health.
17.
Learned Special Public Prosecutor submits that during the investigation,
SIT officials observed blue colour iron drums loaded with material with peeledoff labels lying on the ground in the petitioner’s godown premises. Upon
verifying the labels, it was found that the drums contained monoglycerides
manufactured by IL SHIN WELLS CO. LTD., Korea, and imported by Raghubir
Saran Overseas, New Delhi. This discovery clearly establishes that the
petitioner was in possession of prohibited chemical substances, which were
subsequently supplied under false invoices.
18.
It is further contended that the petitioner deliberately issued false and
fake invoices with mala fide intention to conceal the true nature of the
chemical substances being supplied for adulteration. The petitioner’s conduct
demonstrates a deliberate attempt to mislead authorities and to facilitate
adulteration of ghee meant for sacred prasadam. The petitioner’s actions,
therefore, amount to a deliberate and conscious participation in a criminal
conspiracy.
19.
Learned Special Public Prosecutor argues that the petitioner’s conduct
cannot be dismissed as mere negligence or inadvertence. The deliberate
falsification of invoices, the possession of prohibited chemical substances,
and the collusion with principal conspirators demonstrate a conscious and
deliberate participation in a criminal conspiracy. The petitioner’s actions,
therefore, amount to a deliberate and conscious participation in a criminal
conspiracy of grave magnitude.
20.
It is contended that the petitioner’s role cannot be trivialised as a mere
supplier of goods. The investigation has revealed that the invoices raised by
his firm were not innocent clerical errors, but deliberate falsifications intended
to disguise the true nature of the substances supplied. By describing
monoglycerides and acetic acid esters as “refined coconut oil” or “palm oil,”
the petitioner consciously misled both the purchasing entities and the
regulatory authorities. This act of misrepresentation is not only fraudulent in
nature but also evidences a clear mens rea, thereby bringing the petitioner
squarely within the ambit of criminal conspiracy.
21.
Learned Special Public Prosecutor further submits that the petitioner’s
conduct must be viewed in the broader context of the conspiracy. The
adulterated ghee was ultimately used in the preparation of sacred prasadam,
which is consumed by millions of devotees. The petitioner, by knowingly
supplying chemicals that were unsuitable for human consumption, facilitated
the adulteration process and thereby endangered public health. This is not a
case of a commercial dispute or a minor irregularity in trade; it is a grave
offence that undermines both religious sanctity and consumer safety. The
petitioner’s actions, therefore, assume a dimension far more serious than
ordinary economic offences.
22.
Mr. P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor argues that
the petitioner’s evasive behaviour during investigation further strengthens the
inference of guilt. Despite repeated notices, he failed to produce his mobile
phone and other electronic devices used during the relevant period, and he
gave
evasive
replies
when
questioned
about
them.
Such
conduct
demonstrates a deliberate attempt to suppress evidence and obstruct the
investigation. The petitioner’s non-cooperation is not a mere procedural lapse
but a conscious stratagem to conceal incriminating material. In these
circumstances, custodial interrogation was not only justified but necessary to
unravel the larger conspiracy and to secure crucial evidence.
23.
Learned Special Public Prosecutor argues that the petitioner’s conduct
cannot be dismissed as mere negligence or inadvertence. The deliberate
falsification of invoices, the possession of prohibited chemical substances,
and the collusion with principal conspirators demonstrate a conscious and
deliberate participation in a criminal conspiracy. The petitioner’s actions,
therefore, amount to a deliberate and conscious participation in a criminal
conspiracy of grave magnitude.
24.
It is further contended by the Learned Public Prosecutor that the
averments made in paragraph 22 of the petition are matters of record, yet the
petitioner seeks to distort their import to his advantage. The order dated
18.11.2025 of this Hon’ble Court in the writ petition filed by the petitioner’s wife
was a limited direction permitting the trial court to independently adjudicate the
bail application on its own merits, without prejudice to the pending writ. The
prosecution respectfully submits that such directions cannot be construed as a
blanket protection or immunity from investigation. The trial court, in faithful
compliance with the mandate of this Hon’ble Court, heard the bail application
expeditiously and dismissed it by a detailed order dated 08.12.2025. Thus, the
petitioner’s attempt to rely upon the writ proceedings as a shield against his
own complicity is misconceived, untenable, and contrary to the spirit of the
judicial directions issued. The prosecution therefore asserts that the petitioner
cannot derive any benefit from the pendency of the writ petition, and his
present plea for bail is wholly unsustainable.
25.
It is further contended that the petitioner’s repeated evasions during
investigation, his failure to produce the mobile phone and other electronic
devices used during the relevant period, and his deliberate withholding of
crucial records, all point to a conscious effort to obstruct justice. The
prosecution submits that such conduct cannot be condoned by granting bail,
for it demonstrates a propensity to tamper with evidence and frustrate the
ongoing investigation. The petitioner’s non-cooperation is not a mere
procedural lapse but a deliberate stratagem to conceal incriminating material,
which necessitated his custodial interrogation.
26.
Mr. P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor argues that
the petitioner’s arrest on 07.11.2025 was not arbitrary but was made strictly in
accordance with law, after credible material indicated his role in the conspiracy.
The remand order passed by the Hon’ble Special Judge for SPE & ACB
Cases-cum-II Additional District & Sessions Judge, Nellore was based on due
consideration of the gravity of the offence and the material on record. The
rejection of bail by the trial court on 08.12.2025 was by a detailed and
reasoned order, which itself demonstrates that the petitioner’s case does not
merit indulgence.
27.
It is urged that the offences alleged are of grave economic and social
consequence. The petitioner’s conduct has not only defrauded a religious
institution but has also endangered public health and hurt the sentiments of
crores of devotees. The conspiracy is wide-ranging, involving multiple entities
and individuals across states, and the investigation is still at a crucial stage.
Grant of bail at this juncture would seriously prejudice the investigation,
embolden other conspirators, and undermine public confidence in the justice
system. The prosecution, therefore, prays that this Court may be pleased to
dismiss the present petition, affirm the order of the learned Trial Court, and
direct that the petitioner remain in judicial custody until the investigation
reaches its logical conclusion.
28.
Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by
the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.
29.
In view of the rival submissions advanced by both the learned Counsel
and upon a perusal of the prosecutorial narrative, the pivotal point now
meriting for consideration is:
“Whether the Petitioner is entitled for grant of bail?”
30.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor3, at para No.9, held that while exercising discretion in bail matters,
courts are entitled to consider the potential risk of the accused obstructing the
course of justice. The examination of criminal antecedents is a rational
exercise, particularly to gauge the propensity of reoffending during the period
of bail. The Court affirmed that reliance on criminal history in determining bail
is a relevant and justified safeguard to protect societal interests.
31.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi4, at para
No.8 held that the grant of bail must be exercised judiciously, guided by
settled principles and the facts of each case, and not in an arbitrary manner.
The Court emphasized that relevant considerations include the nature of the
accusation and supporting evidence, the severity of the punishment, the
character of the accused, the risk of absconding or tampering with witnesses,
and the larger public interest. At the stage of bail, the inquiry is confined to
whether reasonable grounds exist for believing that a prima facie case is
made out.
(1978) 1 SCC 240
(2001) 4 SCC 280
32.
The Hon’ble Supreme Apex Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh5, at para No.3 held that held that the power to grant bail is
discretionary but must be exercised judiciously and supported by cogent
reasons. The Court clarified that bail decisions are fact- specific, and the social
status of the accused is not determinative. The nature and gravity of the
offence remain paramount considerations, with heinous crimes warranting
heightened caution in the exercise of bail discretion.
33.
In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chattergee6, the Hon’ble Apex
Court at paragraph No.9 held that while ordinarily it does not interfere with
High Court orders on bail, the High Court must exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously, and in line with settled principles. The relevant factors
include: (i) existence of a prima facie case, (ii) nature and gravity of the
accusation, (iii) severity of punishment, (iv) risk of absconding, (v) character
and antecedents of the accused, (vi) likelihood of reoffending, (vii)
apprehension of witness tampering, and (viii) danger of justice being thwarted.
34.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central
Bureau of Investigation7 at para Nos.34 and 35 held that economic offences
constitute a distinct class requiring a stricter approach to bail, given their
serious impact on public funds and the national economy. Such offences,
often involving deep- rooted conspiracies, pose grave threats to financial
stability. Accordingly, while considering bail, courts must weigh the nature of
(2002) 3 SCC 598
(2010) 14 SCC 496
(2013) 7 SCC 439
the accusations and supporting evidence, the severity of punishment, the
character of the accused, the risk of absconding or witness tampering, and the
overarching public interest.
35.
In this regard, it is apposite and profitable to refer to the landmark
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Chidambaram v. CBI8, where the
entire law on grant of bails was discussed. At paragraph Nos.16, 17, 22 to 25,
it is held as under:
“16. Expression of prima facie reasons for granting or refusing to grant
bail is a requirement of law especially where such bail orders are
appealable so as to indicate application of mind to the matter under
consideration and the reasons for conclusion. Recording of reasons is
necessary since the accused/prosecution/victim has every right to know
the reasons for grant or refusal to grant bail. This will also help the
appellate court to appreciate and consider the reasonings for grant or
refusal to grant bail. But giving reasons for exercise of discretion in
granting or refusing to grant bail is different from discussing the merits
or demerits of the case. At the stage of granting bail, an elaborate
examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching upon the merit
of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be avoided.
Observing that “at the stage of granting bail, detailed examination of
evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case should
be avoided”, in Niranjan Singh [Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram
Kharote, (1980) 2 SCC 559), it was held in para No.3 as under:
“3. … Detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate
documentation of the merits should be avoided while passing
orders on bail applications. No party should have the
impression that his case has been prejudiced. To be satisfied
about a prima facie case is needed but it is not the same as an
exhaustive exploration of the merits in the order itself.”
17. In the present case, in the impugned judgment, paras 52 to 75
relate to the findings on the merits of the prosecution case. As
discussed earlier, at the stage of considering the application for bail,
detailed examination of the merits of the prosecution case and the
merits or demerits of the materials relied upon by the prosecution,
should be avoided. It is, therefore, made clear that the findings of the
High Court in paras 52 to 75 be construed as expression of opinion only
for the purpose of refusal to grant bail and the same shall not in any
way influence the trial or other proceedings.
(2020) 13 SCC 337
22. There is no hard-and-fast rule regarding grant or refusal to grant bail.
Each case has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each
case and on its own merits. The discretion of the court has to be
exercised judiciously and not in an arbitrary manner. At this stage itself,
it is necessary for us to indicate that we are unable to accept the
contention of the learned Solicitor General that “flight risk” of economic
offenders should be looked at as a national phenomenon and be dealt
with in that manner merely because certain other offenders have flown
out of the country. The same cannot, in our view, be put in a straitjacket
formula so as to deny bail to the one who is before the court, due to the
conduct of other offenders, if the person under consideration is
otherwise entitled to bail on the merits of his own case. Hence, in our
view, such consideration including as to “flight risk” is to be made on
individual basis being uninfluenced by the unconnected cases, more so,
when the personal liberty is involved.
23. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528, it was held as under :
(SCC pp. 535-36, para 11)
“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very wellsettled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in
a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at
the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence
and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not
be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders
reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted
particularly where the accused is charged of having committed
a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would
suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the
court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the
following factors also before granting bail; they are:
(a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in
case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.
(b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or
apprehension of threat to the complainant.
(c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
(See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC
598 and Puran v. Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338)”
24. Referring to the factors to be taken into consideration for grant of
bail, in Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N. [Jayendra
Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N., (2005) 2 SCC 13: it was held as
under: (SCC pp. 21-22, para 16)
“16. … The considerations which normally weigh with the
court in granting bail in non-bailable offences have been
explained by this Court in State v. Jagjit Singh [State v. Jagjit
Singh, AIR 1962 SC 253 and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi
Admn.) (1978) 1 SCC 118 and basically they are — the
nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the
evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused;
a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not
being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of
witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the
public or the State and other similar factors which may be
relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
25. After referring to para 11 of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528, in State of U.P. v.
Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21, it was held at para 18 as under:
“18. It is well-settled that the matters to be considered in an
application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv)
danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on
bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being
thwarted by grant of bail [see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State
(NCT of Delhi) [Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2001) 4 SCC 280 : and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi
Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118. While a vague allegation that the
accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not
be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character
that his mere presence at large would intimidate the
witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his
liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then
bail will be refused.””
36.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar9, at
para No.35 held that while individual liberty is of paramount importance,
Courts must equally weigh the seriousness of the accusations when
supported by adequate material. The grant of bail must be founded on a
reasoned prima facie assessment of the essential facts on record. The Court
emphasized that the nature of the offence, the criminal antecedents of the
accused, and the severity of punishment upon conviction are crucial
considerations in the exercise of bail discretion.
(2022) 4 SCC 497
37.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Manoj Kumar Khokhar v. State of
Rajasthan10 at para Nos.37 and 38 held that bail discretion must be exercised
judiciously, balancing the nature of the alleged crime with the need to secure a
fair trial. While elaborate reasoning is not required, a bail order must disclose
relevant reasons and cannot be unreasoned. A perverse order or one ignoring
material facts is open to appellate challenge or cancellation upon subsequent
developments.
38.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jaibunisha v. Meharban11, at paragraph
No.25 held that bail cannot be granted without due regard to material aspects
of the case. The Court emphasized that relevant considerations include the
nature of allegations, severity of punishment upon conviction, risk of witness
influence or evidence tampering, frivolity of prosecution, criminal antecedents
of the accused, and the Court’s prima facie satisfaction supporting the charge.
39.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar12, at
paragraph No.16 held that bail adjudication, including cancellation, depends
on the unique facts of each case. It observed that interference with or
attempts to obstruct the administration of justice, or evasion of due process,
amount to abuse of the concession of bail.
40.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohit Bishnoi v. State of Rajastan13 at
para Nos.24 and 25 held that while individual liberty is fundamental, bail
(2022) 3 SCC 501
(2022) 5 SCC 465
(2023) 13 SCC 549
(2023) 18 SCC 753
decisions must reflect a reasoned prima facie assessment of the accusations
supported by material on record. Elaborate reasoning or detailed examination
of merits is unnecessary at the initial stage; however, bail orders must
consider key factors such as the gravity of the offence, severity of punishment,
risk of witness influence or evidence tampering, criminal antecedents, and
overall prima facie satisfaction.
41.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi)14,
held while culling out the principles for grant of bail at paragraph No.19 it is
held that that at the bail stage, courts must not undertake a detailed evaluation
of prosecution evidence or adjudicate its merits. A bail order must reflect due
application of mind and consideration of relevant factors laid down by this
Court. An appeal against grant of bail may be entertained only on grounds
such as perversity, illegality, inconsistency with law, or failure to consider
material aspects like gravity of the offence and impact of the crime. The
subsequent conduct of the accused is relevant only in cancellation
proceedings, not in appeal, which must not be used as a retaliatory measure.
42.
In State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan15, the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
after extensively examining the principles governing grant and cancellation of
bail, set aside the bail granted to the accused. The Court underscored that bail
orders must conform to established legal norms and cannot be sustained
where they disregard material considerations or result in miscarriage of justice.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690
2025 INSC 979
43.
In Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh16, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at
para Nos.67 and 78 held that, given the gravity of the offence and the
accused’s modus operandi, the High Court erred in granting bail in a
perfunctory manner without adequate safeguards, which enabled the accused
to abscond and jeopardize the trial. The Court emphasized that the High Court
failed to balance the accused’s right to personal liberty with the societal
interest by not imposing essential conditions such as periodic reporting to the
police. It reiterated that the true test of judicial discretion in bail matters lies in
striking a fair equilibrium between individual rights and societal concerns,
based on the facts of each case.
44.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki supra at para No.63 held that
individual liberty, though fundamental, cannot be exalted to the extent of
causing disorder or undermining law and order. Bail decisions must embody a
reasoned application of mind and adherence to established legal principles,
rather than mechanical or formulaic approaches. The Court emphasized that
liberty functions within the bounds of law and carries with it the responsibility
to safeguard social tranquillity and public safety.
45.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pinki supra at para No.64, relying on its
earlier decision in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh17, held that personal
liberty, though precious, is neither absolute nor unrestrained. It must operate
within limits so as not to imperil the life or liberty of others, and society cannot
countenance conduct that is anti- social or detrimental to the collective good.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 781
(2012) 9 SCC 446
46.
Upon careful consideration, this Court is of the considered view that the
allegations against the petitioner are of grave magnitude, involving deliberate
adulteration of ghee intended for sacred prasadam of Lord Sri Venkateswara
Swamy. The material collected during investigation, including falsified invoices,
possession of prohibited chemical substances, and collusion with principal
conspirators, clearly discloses a prima facie case of conscious participation in
a criminal conspiracy. In offences of such seriousness, where public health
and religious sentiments are directly endangered, the grant of bail would send
a deleterious message and undermine the sanctity of the judicial process.
47.
The petitioner’s role is not peripheral but central. He knowingly supplied
monoglycerides and acetic acid esters under the guise of edible oils, which
were subsequently used in adulteration. The deliberate falsification of invoices
demonstrates mens rea and conscious participation. The petitioner cannot
claim innocence when the very documents emanating from his firm conceal
the true nature of the substances supplied. Such conduct is not a mere
irregularity in trade but a deliberate fraud, thereby disentitling the petitioner
from the discretionary relief of bail.
48.
The petitioner’s conduct during investigation has been evasive and
obstructive. Inspite of repeated notices, he failed to produce his mobile phone
and other electronic devices used during the relevant period, and he gave
evasive replies when questioned. Such behaviour demonstrates a deliberate
attempt to suppress evidence and obstruct the investigation. In these
circumstances, custodial interrogation was not only justified but necessary to
unravel the larger conspiracy. This Court is of the considered view that
releasing the petitioner at this stage would seriously prejudice the ongoing
investigation.
49.
The fact that the petitioner was first treated as a witness does not, by
itself, bar his subsequent arraignment as an accused. It is well settled that a
person may be summoned as a witness, but upon emergence of incriminating
material, he may lawfully be made an accused. The investigation has revealed
fresh material, financial trails, and witness statements disclosing the
petitioner’s active role.
50.
The petitioner cannot claim entitlement to bail solely on the ground that
other accused have been released, as the principle of parity is not
determinative in his case. Bail is not a matter of parity but of role-specific
consideration. The petitioner’s conduct, unlike certain other accused,
demonstrates deliberate falsification of invoices and supply of prohibited
chemicals. Petitioner’s custodial interrogation was necessary, and his role is
distinct and more culpable. The principle of parity cannot be invoked to dilute
the seriousness of his involvement.
51.
The
remand
order
dated
07.11.2025
was
passed
after
due
consideration of the material on record and cannot be said to be mechanical
or perverse. The learned Trial Court, upon examining the gravity of the offence
and the petitioner’s conduct, rightly remanded him to judicial custody. The
subsequent rejection of bail on 08.12.2025 was by a detailed and reasoned
order. The orders suffer from no infirmity, and the pendency of the writ petition
filed by the petitioner’s wife cannot be invoked to claim immunity from
investigation or arrest.
52.
In conclusion, the Court holds that the offences alleged are of grave
economic and social consequence, involving fraud upon a religious institution
and endangering public health. The conspiracy is wide-ranging, involving
multiple entities and individuals across states, and the investigation is still at a
crucial stage. Grant of bail at this juncture would seriously prejudice the
investigation, embolden other conspirators, and undermine public confidence
in the justice system.
53.
In view of above facts and circumstances of the case, nature and
gravity of the allegations levelled against the petitioner, this Court is not
inclined to consider request of petitioner for enlarging the petitioner on bail at
this point of time. Accordingly, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
54.
In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.
_________________________
DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Date: 23.01.2026
VTS
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