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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 4678 of 2024
Ajay Kumar Bardia & Ors.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners
: Mr. Moyukh Mukherjee,
Mr. Keshav Daruka,
Mr. Koustav Lal Mukherjee,
Ms. Sagnika Banerjee,
Ms. Sarmistha Basak.
For the Opposite Party No. 2
: Mr. Soumya Nag,
Mr. Aditya Tiwari,
Ms. Debanjana De,
Mr. Arijit Basu Mullick.
For the State
: Mr. Sagar Saha.
Judgment reserved on
: 30.06.2026
Judgment delivered on
: 14.07.2026
SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. :
1.
The revisional application has been preferred praying for
setting aside of the order dated 27.08.2024 passed by learned
Additional
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Bidhannagar
in
connection with Bidhannagar Electronics Complex Police
Station Case No. 299 of 2021 dated 15.12.2021 under
Sections
420/406/464/467/468/469/471/120B
of
the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 now pending before the Additional
Page 2
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar, North 24 Parganas
(Corresponding to GR Case No. 1515 of 2021; CIS:120 of
2023).
2.
Vide the impugned order, the learned Magistrate while
considering an application dated 02.05.2024 filed by the
accused persons under Section 239 Cr.P.C. praying for
discharge from the case, considered an application submitted
by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and relying upon a
judgment of the High Court, allowed the application filed by
the Additional Public Prosecutor and thereby directed reinvestigation in the said case.
3.
Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the revisional
application, praying for quashing of the said order, and other
reliefs.
4.
Heard learned counsels for the parties including the learned
public prosecutor.
5.
Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. provide as follows:“173……………………………………………………………
….
(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to
preclude further investigation in respect of an offence
after a report under sub-section (2) has been
forwarded to the Magistrate and, wherein upon such
investigation, the officer in charge of the police station
obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he
shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or
reports regarding such evidence in the form
prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to
(6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such
Page 3
report or reports as they apply in relation to a report
forwarded under sub-section (2).”
6.
In Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya Vs The State of Gujarat on
16.10.2019 in Original Appeal 478-479 of 2017, a Three
Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held:“9. The question of law that therefore arises in this
case is whether, after a charge-sheet is filed by the
police, the Magistrate has the power to order further
investigation, and if so, up to what stage of a criminal
proceeding.
38. However, having given our considered thought to
the principles stated in these judgments, we are of
the view that the Magistrate before whom a report
under Section 173(2) of the Code is filed, is
empowered in law to direct “further investigation”
and require the police to submit a further or a
supplementary report. A three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Bhagwant Singh [Bhagwant Singh v. Commr.
of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] has,
in no uncertain terms, stated that principle, as
aforenoticed.
40. Having analysed the provisions of the Code and
the various judgments as aforeindicated, we would
state the following conclusions in regard to the
powers of a Magistrate in terms of Section
173(2) read with Section 173(8) and Section 156(3) of
the Code:
40.1. The Magistrate has no power to direct
“reinvestigation” or “fresh investigation” (de
novo) in the case initiated on the basis of a
police report.
40.2. A Magistrate has the power to direct
“further investigation” after filing of a police
report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code.
40.3. The view expressed in Sub-para 40.2 above is
in conformity with the principle of law stated in
Page 4
Bhagwant Singh case [Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of
Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] by a
three- Judge Bench and thus in conformity with the
doctrine of precedent.
40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific
provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by
the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot
be construed so restrictively as to deprive the
Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the
provisions of Section 156(3) and the language
of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would
have to be read into the language of Section 173(8).
40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it
must receive a construction which would advance the
cause of justice and legislative object sought to be
achieved. It does not stand to reason that the
legislature provided power of further investigation to
the police even after filing a report, but intended to
curtail the power of the court to the extent that even
where the facts of the case and the ends of justice
demand, the court can still not direct the investigating
agency to conduct further investigation which it could
do on its own.
40.6. It has been a procedure of propriety that
the police has to seek permission of the court to
continue “further investigation” and file
supplementary charge- sheet. This approach
has been approved by this Court in a number of
judgments. This as such would support the view
that we are taking in the present case.”
xxx xxx xxx
48. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the
expression “fair and proper investigation” in criminal
jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose: Firstly, the
investigation must be unbiased, honest, just and in
accordance with law; secondly, the entire emphasis
on a fair investigation has to be to bring out the truth
of the case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
Once these twin paradigms of fair investigation are
satisfied, there will be the least requirement for the
court of law to interfere with the investigation, much
Page 5
less quash the same, or transfer it to another agency.
Bringing out the truth by fair and investigative means
in accordance with law would essentially repel the
very basis of an unfair, tainted investigation or cases
of false implication. Thus, it is inevitable for a court of
law to pass a specific order as to the fate of the
investigation, which in its opinion is unfair, tainted
and in violation of the settled principles of
investigative canons.
49. Now, we may examine another significant aspect
which is how the provisions of Section 173(8) have
been understood and applied by the courts and
investigating agencies. It is true that though there is
no specific requirement in the provisions of Section
173(8) of the Code to conduct “further investigation”
or file supplementary report with the leave of the
court, the investigating agencies have not only
understood but also adopted it as a legal
practice to seek permission of the courts to
conduct
“further
investigation”
and
file
“supplementary report” with the leave of the
court. The courts, in some of the decisions, have also
taken a similar view. The requirement of seeking prior
leave of the court to conduct “further investigation”
and/or to file a “supplementary report” will have to
be read into, and is a necessary implication of the
provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine
of contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid
of such interpretation as the matters which are
understood and implemented for a long time, and
such practice that is supported by law should be
accepted as part of the interpretative process.
50. Such a view can be supported from two different
points of view: firstly, through the doctrine of
precedent, as aforenoticed, since quite often the
courts have taken such a view, and, secondly, the
investigating agencies which have also so understood
and applied the principle. The matters which are
understood and implemented as a legal practice and
are not opposed to the basic rule of law would be
good practice and such interpretation would be
permissible with the aid of doctrine of contemporanea
expositio. Even otherwise, to seek such leave of the
Page 6
court would meet the ends of justice and also provide
adequate safeguard against a suspect/accused.
51. We have already noticed that there is no
specific embargo upon the power of the learned
Magistrate to direct “further investigation” on
presentation of a report in terms of Section
173(2) of the Code. Any other approach or
interpretation would be in contradiction to the very
language of Section 173(8) and the scheme of the
Code for giving precedence to proper administration
of criminal justice. The settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence would support such approach,
particularly when in terms of Section 190 of the Code,
the Magistrate is the competent authority to take
cognizance of an offence. It is the Magistrate who has
to decide whether on the basis of the record and
documents produced, an offence is made out or not,
and if made out, what course of law should be
adopted in relation to committal of the case to the
court of competent jurisdiction or to proceed with the
trial himself. In other words, it is the judicial
conscience of the Magistrate which has to be satisfied
with reference to the record and the documents
placed before him by the investigating agency, in
coming to the appropriate conclusion in consonance
with the principles of law. It will be a travesty of
justice, if the court cannot be permitted to direct
“further investigation” to clear its doubt and to order
the investigating agency to further substantiate its
charge-sheet. The satisfaction of the learned
Magistrate is a condition precedent to commencement
of further proceedings before the court of competent
jurisdiction. Whether the Magistrate should direct
“further investigation” or not is again a matter which
will depend upon the facts of a given case. The
learned Magistrate or the higher court of competent
jurisdiction would direct “further investigation” or
“reinvestigation” as the case may be, on the facts of a
given case. Where the Magistrate can only direct
further investigation, the courts of higher
jurisdiction can direct further, reinvestigation
or even investigation de novo depending on the
facts of a given case. It will be the specific
order of the court that would determine the
nature of investigation. In this regard, we may
Page 7
refer to the observations made by this Court
in Sivanmoorthy v. State [(2010) 12 SCC 29: (2011) 1
SCC (Cri) 295].”
34. ………………………..
“10. However, considering the observations made by
the learned Magistrate and the deficiency in the
investigation pointed out by the learned Magistrate
and the ultimate goal is to book and/or punish the
real culprit, it will be open for the investigating officer
to submit a proper application before the learned
Magistrate for further investigation and
conduct fresh investigation and submit the
further
report
in
exercise
of
powers
under Section 173(8) CrPC and thereafter the
learned Magistrate to consider the same in
accordance with law and on its own merits.”
38. There is no good reason given by the Court in
these decisions as to why a Magistrate‟s powers to
order further investigation would suddenly cease
upon process being issued, and an accused
appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly,
the power of the police to further investigate the
offence continues right till the stage the trial
commences. Such a view would not accord with the
earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri
(supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay
Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep
Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial
does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only
after charges are framed. What is not given any
importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court
is Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that the
Article demands no less than a fair and just
investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation
would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the
power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate‟s nod
under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence
till charges are framed, but that the supervisory
jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases midway through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount
to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out
Page 8
for further investigation so that an innocent person is
not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima
facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no
warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the
powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such
powers
are
traceable
to Section
156(3) read
with Section
156(1), Section
2(h),
and Section
173(8) of the CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove,
and would be available at all stages of the progress
of a criminal case before the trial actually
commences. It would also be in the interest of justice
that this power be exercised suo motu by the
Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each
case. Whether further investigation should or
should not be ordered is within the discretion of
the learned Magistrate who will exercise such
discretion on the facts of each case and in
accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts
come to light which would lead to inculpating or
exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and
doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more
important than avoiding further delay being caused
in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in
Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the
extent that the judgments in Amrutbhai Shambubhai
Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan
Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand
overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v.
State
(Delhi Administration)
(1997)
SCC
361 and Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Ors.
(2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.”
7.
By a Judgment dated 12.10.2022 the Supreme Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2022 (Devendra Nath Singh Vs
State of Bihar & Ors.) relying upon several precedents
including Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya Vs The State of
Gujarat (Supra) held:“12.5. The case of Divine Retreat Centre (supra)
has had the peculiarity of its own. Therein, the
Criminal Case bearing No. 381 of 2005 had been
Page 9
registered at Koratty Police Station on the allegations
made by a female remand prisoner that while taking
shelter in the appellant-Centre, she was subjected to
molestation and exploitation and she became
pregnant; and thereafter, when she came out of the
Centre to attend her sister‟s marriage, she was
implicated in a false theft case and lodged in jail.
Parallel to these proceedings, an anonymous petition
as also other petitions were received in the High
Court, which were registered as a suo motu criminal
case. In that case, the High Court, while exercising
powers under Section 482 CrPC, directed that the
said Criminal Case No. 381 of 2005 be taken away
from the investigating officer and be entrusted to the
Special Investigating Team („SIT‟). The High Court
also directed the said SIT to investigate/inquire into
other allegations levelled in the anonymous petition
filed against the appellant-Centre. However, this
Court did not approve the order so passed by the
High Court and in that context, while observing that
no unlimited and arbitrary jurisdiction was conferred
on the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, explained
the circumstances under which the inherent
jurisdiction may be exercised as also the
responsibilities of the investigating officers, inter alia,
in the following words: “27. In our view, there is nothing like unlimited
arbitrary jurisdiction conferred on the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code. The power has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution only
where such exercise is justified by the tests laid
down in the section itself. It is well settled that
Section 482 does not confer any new power on the
High Court but only saves the inherent power which
the Court possessed before the enactment of the
Code. There are three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to
give effect to an order 29 under the Code, ( ii ) to
prevent abuse of the process of court, and ( iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice.”
8.
Thus as the impugned order dated 27.08.2024 passed by the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar,
Page 10
directs re-investigation and not further investigation, the same
being not in accordance with the direction of the High Court in
CRR 245 of 2020 dated 24.02.2022, is quashed and set aside.
9.
The learned 2nd Additional Judicial Magistrate, Basirhat shall
hear the application under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. afresh, by
following the guidelines in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya
(Supra), and decide the application by passing a reasoned
order in accordance with law within 30 days from the date of
communication of this order.
10. CRR 4678 of 2024 is disposed of.
11. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.
12. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
13. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for
necessary compliance.
14. Urgent certified website copy of this order, if applied for, be
supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal
formalities.
[Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]
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