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CGHC010338932026
2026:CGHC:39253
NAFR
SUMIT
KUMAR
Digitally signed
by SUMIT
KUMAR
Date:
2026.09.09
12:10:11
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 1146 of 2026
Agriculture Insurance Company Of India Ltd. Through Regional Manager,
Address- Regional Office L I C Investment Building, Phase-2, Second Floor,
Pandri, Raipur (C.G.) Alternate Address- Office Block-1, Fifth Floor, Plate B
And C, East Kidwai Nagar, New Delhi, 110023
--- Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Branch Manager Punjab National Bank, Branch Bhandarpur, Address
Bhandarpur, Tehsil Khairagarh, District- Rajnandgaon (Present District- K.
C.G.), (C.G.)- 491414, District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.) – 491414
2 - Narendra Kumar Verma S/o Pannalal Verma Aged About 35 Years R/o
Village Banboda, Bhandarpur, Tehsil- Khairagarh, District- Rajnandgaon
(Present District- K.C.G.), (C.G.)- 491414
--- Respondent(s)
WP227 No. 1151 of 2026
Agriculture Insurance Company Of India Ltd. Through Regional Manager,
Address - Regional Office, L.I.C. Investment Building, Phase- 2, Second
Floor, Pandri, Raipur (C.G.), Alternate Address -Office Block- 1, Fifth Floor,
Plate B And C, East Kidwai Nagar, New Delhi, 110023
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Branch Manager Punjab National Bank, Branch -Bhandarpur, Address Bhandarpur, Tehsil - Khairagarh, District - Rajnandgaon (Present District K.C.G.) (C.G.), 491414
2 - Santuram Verma S/o Dasrathram Verma Aged About 41 Years R/o
Village - Karela, Tehsil - Khairagarh, District Rajnandgaon (Present District K.C.G.) (C.G.) - 491558
--- Respondent(s)
WP227 No. 1149 of 2026
Agriculture Insurance Company Of India Ltd. Through Regional Manager,
Address - Regional Office L I C Investment Building, Phase - 2, Second
Floor, Pandri, Raipur (C.G.) Alternate Address - Office Block - 1, Fifth Floor,
Plate B And C, East Kidwai Nagar, New Delhi, 110023
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Branch Manager Punjab National Bank, Branch Bhandarpur, Address
Bhandarpur, Tehsil Khairagarh, District - Rajnandgaon (Present District - K.
C. G.) (C.G.) 491414
2 - Umashankar Alias Uddelal Verma, S/o Tikam Singh Verma, Aged About
55 Years R/o Village - Banbod, Karela , Tehsil - Khairagarh, District
Rajnandgaon (Present District - K. C. G.) (C.G.)- 491558
--- Respondent(s)
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Shobhit Mishra, Advocate
For Respondent No.1 :
Mr. Sharad Mishra, Advocate
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.)
Order on Board
07/09/2026
1.
As all these three writ petitions arise from a common order passed by
the learned National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,
New Delhi, and involve common questions of fact and law, they were
heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
2.
The petitioner in all the petitions has filed the present writ petition
seeking for the following reliefs :“(i) That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
allow the writ petition and consequently, issue an
appropriate
writ/order/direction
thereby
quashing/setting aside the impugned order dated
01.10.2025 passed by the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi.
(ii) That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue an appropriate writ/order/direction thereby
staying the operation and effect of the impugned order
dated 01.10.2025, till the pendency of this writ petition.
(iii) That any other order/relief which this Hon’ble Court
may deem fit, proper and just in the facts and
circumstances of the present case may also kindly be
awarded to the petitioner in the ends of justice &
equity.
(iv) That the cost of the petition may kindly also be
awarded to the petitioner.
3.
The present writ petitions are filed by the Agriculture Insurance
Company of India Ltd. challenging the order of the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission affirming the order of the
Chhattisgarh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,
whereby the petitioner/Insurance Company and Punjab National
Bank were held jointly and severally liable to compensate the
respondent-farmers under the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana
(PMFBY). The respondent-farmers had availed Kisan Credit Card
loans, and the Bank had deducted the crop insurance premium from
their accounts and remitted the same to the Insurance Company for
Kharif-2019 in WP227 No.1146/2026 & WP227 No.1149/2026 and
Rabi 2019-20 in WP227 No.1151/2026. However, the Bank failed to
upload the farmers' particulars on the National Crop Insurance Portal
(NCIP), resulting in denial of insurance coverage despite the farmers
being otherwise eligible and similarly situated farmers having
received compensation. The District Consumer Commission initially
exonerated the Insurance Company and held only the Bank liable,
but the State Commission modified the order by holding that while the
Bank was negligent in not uploading the farmers' data, the Insurance
Company had also committed deficiency in service by retaining the
premium amount for several months without either extending
insurance coverage or refunding the premium within the prescribed
time under the applicable Government notifications. The National
Commission affirmed the said finding, holding both agencies jointly
and severally liable. Aggrieved thereby, the Insurance Company
approached this Court contending that under the PMFBY Operational
Guidelines, the responsibility for uploading farmers' data rested
exclusively with the Bank and, therefore, the entire liability ought to
have been fastened upon the Bank alone.
4.
Learned counsel appearing for the parties jointly submit that the
controversy involved in the present writ petitions is squarely covered
by the decision of this Court rendered in WP(227) No. 845 of 2026
(Agriculture Insurance Company Of India Ltd. v. Branch Manager
and another) and the connected batch of petitions vide order dated
17.07.2026. It is, therefore, prayed that the present writ petition may
also be decided in terms of the said order.
5.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents annexed to the writ petition.
6.
This Court, while deciding WP(227) No. 845 of 2026 and the
connected batch of petitions by order dated 17.07.2026, observed as
under:
“13. In the present case, the controversy does not relate
to the entitlement of the complainant/farmers to receive
compensation under the PMFBY, as the said issue has
attained finality. The limited question raised by the
petitioner/Insurance Company is with regard to the
fastening of joint and several liability upon it along with
the Respondent No. 1/Bank. The State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, upon a detailed
appreciation of the PMFBY Operational Guidelines, the
Government notifications and the material available on
record, modified the order of the District Commission by
holding both the Respondent No. 1/Bank and the
petitioner/Insurance Company liable, which has been
affirmed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission. It is well settled that while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court does not sit as a
Court of appeal over the findings recorded by the
tribunals below and interference is warranted only
where the findings suffer from patent perversity,
manifest illegality or jurisdictional error. The parameters
governing the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction stand
authoritatively
explained
by
the
Supreme
Court
in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil,
(2010) 8 SCC 329, wherein it has been held that Article
227 is intended to keep subordinate courts and tribunals
within the bounds of their authority and cannot be
invoked for re-appreciation of evidence and held that:“40. Same principles have been followed by this
Court in Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N.
Bhatena1 , wherein it has been held that in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the
High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an
inferior court or tribunal only in a case where
there is no evidence or where no reasonable
person
could
possibly
have
come
to
the
conclusion which the court or tribunal has come
to. This Court made it clear that except to this
"limited extent" the High Court has no jurisdiction
to interfere with the findings of fact (see SCC pp.
149-50, para 18). In coming to the above finding,
(1991) 3 SCC 141
this Court relied on its previous decision rendered
in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S.
Guram2. The decision in Chandavarkar is based
on the principle of the Constitution Bench
judgments in Waryam Singh3
and Nagendra
Nath4 discussed above.
41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in
Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing
Mohansingh Pardeshi5. In SCC para 9 at pp. 57980 of the Report, this Court clearly reminded the
High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot
assume unlimited prerogative to correct all
species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its
exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of
duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles
of law and justice.
42. Same views have been taken by this Court in
respect of the ambit of High Court's power under
Article 227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri
Gosavi6 (AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report)
and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao
Gajre v. Pathankhan7. The Constitution Bench
ratio in Waryam Singh8 about the scope of Article
227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Mfg. &
Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnand9.
4310*. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai 11 a
(1986) 4 SCC 447
Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215
Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. Of Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398
(1995)6 SCC 576
AIR 1968 SCC 222
(1970)2 SCC 717
Waryam singh v. Amarnath AIR 1954 SC 215
(1972)1 SCC 898
10 *ED: Para 43 Corrected vide official Corrigendum No. F.3/ED.B.J./84/2010 dated 26-08-2010.
11 (2003)6 SCC 675
two-Judge Bench of this Court discussed the
principles of interference by the High Court under
Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai this Court
held that a writ of certiorari is maintainable
against the order of a civil court, subordinate to
the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the
Report). The correctness of that ratio was
doubted by another Division Bench of this Court
in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath12 and a request
to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a
larger Bench is pending. But insofar as the
formulation of the principles on the scope of
interference by the High Court under Article 227 is
concerned, there is no divergence of views.
44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the
Report, the following principles have been laid
down in Surya Dev Rai and they are set out:
"38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
of the is exercised for keeping the subordinate
courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction.
When a subordinate court has assumed a
jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to
exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the
jurisdiction though available is being exercised by
the court in a manner not permitted by law and
failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned
thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction."
45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also
on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya
Dev Rai case SCC pp. 695-96)
"38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to
12 (2009)5 SCC 616
correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the
following requirements are satisfied: (I) the error
is manifest and apparent on the face of the
proceedings such as when it is based on clear
ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of
law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of
justice has occasioned thereby.
(6)
*
*
*
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the
supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised
sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the
judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to
act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice
should
occasion.
Care,
caution
and
circumspection need to be exercised, when any of
the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be
invoked during the pendency of any suit or
proceedings in a subordinate court and the error
though calling for correction is yet capable of
being
corrected
at
the
conclusion
of
the
proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred
there against and entertaining a petition invoking
certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High
Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early
disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High
Court may feel inclined to intervene where the
error is such, as, if not corrected at that very
moment, may become incapable of correction at a
later stage and refusal to intervene would result in
travesty of justice or where such refusal itself
would result in prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a
court of appeal and indulge in re appreciation or
evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing
inferences or correct errors of mere formal or
technical character."
49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of
this Court, the following principles on the exercise
of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
is different from a petition under Article 227. The
mode of exercise of power by the High Court
under these two articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227
cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the
conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is
substantially
different
from
the
history
of
conferment of the power of superintendence on
the High Courts under Article 227 and have been
discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in
exercise of its power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can
it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of
appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal
subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative
statutory mode of redressal has been provided,
that would also operate as a restrain on the
exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts
in exercise of their power of superintendence
have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In
this regard the High Court must be guided by the
principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in
Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by
subsequent Constitution Benches and various
other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh,
followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can
interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and
courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their
authority".
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such
tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction
which is vested in them and by not declining to
exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f),
High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of
superintendence when there has been a patent
perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to it or where there has been a gross
and manifest failure of justice or the basic
principles of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence
High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors
of law or fact or just because another view than
the one taken by the tribunals or courts
subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other
words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly
exercised.
(i) The High Court's power of superintendence
under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any
statute. It has been declared a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union
of
India13
and
therefore
abridgment
by
a
constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a
rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the
Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code
(Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut
down the ambit of High Court's power under
Article 227. At the same time, it must be
remembered that such statutory amendment does
not correspondingly expand the High Court's
jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be
exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate
case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and
unfettered power of the High Court under Article
227, it transpires that the main object of this
article is to keep strict administrative and judicial
control by the High Court on the administration of
justice within its territory.
(m)
The
object
administrative
and
of
superintendence,
judicial,
is
to
both
maintain
efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the
entire machinery of justice in such a way as it
does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of
interference under this article is to be kept to the
minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does
not come to a halt and the fountain of justice
remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain
public confidence in the functioning of the
tribunals and courts subordinate to the High
Court.
13 (1997)3 SCC 261: 1997 SCC (L&S) 577
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of
relief in individual cases but should be directed for
promotion
of
public
confidence
in
the
administration of justice in the larger public
interest
whereas Article
is
meant
for
protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the
power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its
exercise is subject to high degree of judicial
discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this
power will be counterproductive and will divest
this extraordinary power of its strength and
vitality.”
14. The same principle has been reiterated in the case
of Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423,
wherein the Supreme Court clarified that the power
under Article 227 has not been expanded and is
intended only to ensure that subordinate courts act
within the limits of their jurisdiction and that interference
is warranted only in cases of patent perversity, gross
miscarriage of justice, or jurisdictional error.
15. From the record, it is not in dispute that the
Respondent No. 1/Bank deducted the crop insurance
premium from the accounts of the complainant/farmers
and remitted the same to the petitioner/ Insurance
Company. Equally undisputed is the fact that the
particulars of the complainants were not uploaded on
the NCIP, resulting in the denial of insurance coverage.
The petitioner has attempted to contend that in the
absence of portal entry, no contract of insurance ever
came into existence and, therefore, the entire liability
must rest upon the Respondent No. 1/Bank alone.
However, the Consumer Commissions below have not
ignored this omission on the part of the Respondent No.
1/Bank; rather, they have specifically recorded a finding
that the Respondent No. 1/Bank was negligent in failing
to upload the requisite particulars despite repeated
extensions granted by the Central Government. At the
same time, the State Commission has also found that
the petitioner retained the premium amount without
either extending the benefit of insurance or refunding
the premium within the stipulated period prescribed
under the applicable Government notifications. Thus,
the finding of joint negligence is founded upon an
appreciation
of
the
obligations
cast
upon
both
implementing agencies under the Scheme and cannot
be said to be either arbitrary or unsupported by the
record.
16. This Court also finds no substance in the
submission that the State Commission misapplied the
Government Notification dated 08.07.2019 and the
communication issued by the Ministry of Agriculture
dated 08.11.2019. The State Commission has taken
note of the fact that even after reconciliation of the
premium, the petitioner neither refunded the premium
amount within the prescribed time nor ensured that the
discrepancy
was
resolved,
despite
retaining
the
premium for a considerable period. It is reflected from
paragraph 8 of the order dated 01.10.2025 passed by
the learned National Commission that the premium was
deducted on 30.07.2019 and it was refunded on
28.05.2020, i.e. after about 10 months. It is relevant
here to reproduced the paragraph 8 of the order passed
by National Commission, which reads as under:“8. Opposite party No. 1 bank reiterating its
submissions made before the District Commission
has argued that due to Aadhar mismatch in the
PMFBY portal the opposite party No. 2 insurance
company rejected the proposal of insurance and
returned the premium on 28.05.2020 after about
one year from the date of deduction. Learned
district commission has based the impugned
order upon notification dated 24.05.2017 of CG
Government, whereas the premium was deducted
on 30.07.2019 and at that time notification No.
3700/
F-02/13/
PMFBY/
2019/
14-2
dated
08.07.2019 was already issued and effective. As
per condition No. 27of the notification of the year
2019 if the concerned bank fails to provide
information/documents for rectification of defects,
it was obligatory for the insurance company to
refund the premium within three weeks, failing
which the liability to pay compensation shall lie
with the insurance company. In the instant case
premium was deducted on 30.07.2019 and it was
refunded on 28.05.2020 i.e. after about one year.
The insurance company used the amount of
premium during that period and refused the same
after payment of compensation to other farmers. It
is prayed that this appeal be allowed and the
liability of payment of compensation be shifted
upon
the
opposite
party
No.
insurance
company.”
17. The National Commission has also considered the
notification dated 08.07.2019 issued by the State
Government, and para 16 of the order passed by the
National Commission is as under:“16. Learned counsel for the opposite party No.1
Bank has drawn our attention towards Condition
No.27 of Notification No.3700/ F-02/13/ PMFBY/
2019/14-2 dated 08.07.2019 under which the
Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana for Kharif &
Rabi crop of 2019-20 were implemented in all the
27 districts of Chhattisgarh. Condition No.27 of
the said notification envisages that: यदि वित्तीय संस्था द्वारा नियत समय सिमा में जानकारी दस्तावेज
उपलब्ध नहीं कराई जाती है तो बिमा कं पनी द्वारा समबन्धित
प्रीमियम राशि तीन सप्ताह के भीतर बैंको को अनिवार्य रूप से
वापस किया जाना होगा अन्यथा कृ षको को नियमानुसार दवा
प्रतिपूर्ति को सम्पूर्ण दायित्व बिमा कं पनी की होगी"
******* From bare reading of Condition No.27 of the
relevant notification of 2019 which was applicable for
Kharif and Rabi season of 2019-20 it clearly appears
that in case of failure of the Bank/ Financial Institution in
providing information/ documents it was obligatory for
the concerned insurance company to refund the
premium within three weeks otherwise the liability of
payment of claim compensation, as per rule, would be
of the concerned insurance company. Thus, the
opposite party No.2 insurance company was duty bound
to refund the premium within three weeks at least from
the final extended cut-off date of entry in the portal or
maximum after three weeks from 18th November 2019
but the opposite party No.2 insurance company kept the
premium till 28.05.2020. But at this juncture the
negligence and deficiency in service committed by the
opposite party No.1 Bank in not entering the correct
information of the farmers in the concerned portal even
after time extensions till 14.11.2019 also cannot be
brushed aside, hence in our considered view both the
opposite parties are jointly and severally liable for
payment of compensation under the crop insurance in
question.
18. The National Commission has concurred with the
said finding by observing that the PMFBY is a welfare
scheme
requiring
coordinated
functioning
of
all
implementing agencies and that the omission on the
part of one agency cannot absolve the other from
discharging its corresponding obligations under the
Scheme. These are findings of fact based upon the
interpretation of the Scheme Guidelines and the
Government communications.
19. It is equally significant that the petitioner does not
dispute that the complainants were otherwise eligible
farmers and that similarly situated farmers received
compensation under the PMFBY. The only reason for
denial of the benefit to the complainants was the failure
of
the
implementing
procedural
agencies
requirements
to
complete
contemplated
under
the
the
Scheme. The object of the PMFBY is to provide financial
protection to farmers against crop loss arising from
natural calamities. Being a beneficial social welfare
scheme, its provisions cannot be construed in a manner
that defeats its object or leaves an innocent farmer
remediless because of lapses attributable to the
implementing agencies. The Consumer Commissions
have, therefore, rightly concentrated on ensuring that
the beneficiaries of the Scheme are compensated and
have left the question of inter se adjustment of liability
between
the
Respondent
No.
1/Bank
and
the
petitioner/Insurance Company to be worked out in
accordance with law. Such an approach is consistent
with the beneficial object of the Scheme and cannot be
characterised as suffering from any
jurisdictional
infirmity.
20. Since the petitioner/Insurance Company is claiming
the benefit of Clauses 17.2 and 35.5.13 of the
Operational Guideline of PMFBY, it is necessary to take
notice of the said provisions here, which are as under:“17.2 Consolidated declaration/ formats to be
uploaded/entered
electronically
by
Nodal
Banks/Branches shall contain details about total
insured area of the farmers, number of Loanee
and Non-loanee farmers enrolled, Total Premium
Amount remitted, premium remittance Unique
Transaction Reference (UTR no.) and Date of
remittance as per the format provided on the
NCIP. Banks are required to upload the insured
farmers' data mandatorily on the National Crop
Insurance Portal. No other platform shall be used
for uploading/submission of farmers' data. Those
farmers whose data is uploaded on the NCIP shall
only be eligible for Insurance coverage and
accordingly the premium subsidy will also be
released. In cases where farmers are denied crop
insurance due to incorrect/partial/non-uploading
of their details on portal, concerned Banks/
Intermediaries shall be responsible for payment of
claims(if any).
35.5.13 Banks should ensure that farmers are not
deprived of any benefit under the Scheme due to
errors/omissions/commissions of the concerned
branch/PACS, and in case of such errors, the
concerned agencies shall have to make good of
all such losses.”
21.
The
submission
of
the
petitioner/Insurance
Company that Clause 17.2 and Clause 35.5.13 of the
PMFBY Operational Guidelines completely exonerate
the Insurance Company also does not merit acceptance
in the facts of the present case. The Consumer
Commissions have not ignored the statutory obligations
of the Respondent No. 1/Bank under the Guidelines;
rather,
those
obligations
have
been
expressly
recognised. However, the finding of joint liability has
been recorded after considering the entire Scheme, the
State Government notification and the conduct of the
petitioner in retaining the premium without timely refund.
Such a composite appreciation of the material cannot be
substituted by this Court merely because the petitioner
seeks a different interpretation of certain clauses of the
Guidelines.
22. The submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner
that, in view of Clause 35.5.13 of the PMFBY
Operational Guidelines, it should be granted liberty to
recover
the
Respondent
amount
No.
of
1/Bank,
compensation
from
the
also
not
merit
does
acceptance. Clause 35.5.13 undoubtedly provides that
where a farmer is deprived of insurance benefits on
account of any error, omission or negligence attributable
to the concerned implementing agency, such agency
shall be responsible for making good the resultant loss.
However, the said provision cannot be invoked by the
petitioner to absolve itself of its own independent
deficiency in service. The concurrent findings recorded
by the State Commission and affirmed by the National
Commission
clearly
establish
that
although
the
petitioner had received the premium amount on
30.07.2019, it retained the same until 28.05.2020
without either extending insurance coverage to the
complainants or refunding the premium within the
prescribed period, despite being aware that the requisite
particulars had not been uploaded on the portal. Such
prolonged retention of the premium without extending
any corresponding benefit constituted an independent
deficiency in service on the part of the petitioner/
Insurance Company. Once the petitioner/Insurance
Company itself is found to have contributed to the
deprivation of the complainants' legitimate claim under
the Scheme, it cannot seek the protection of Clause
35.5.13 to shift the entire liability upon the Respondent
No. 1/Bank. The benefit of the said clause is available
only to an agency that is free from blame and has
suffered liability solely because of the default of another
implementing agency; it cannot be extended to a party
whose own negligence has concurrently caused the
loss. Consequently, no liberty, as sought by the
petitioner, deserves to be granted under Clause 35.5.13
of the Operational Guidelines of PMFBY.
23. In the present case, this Court finds that the State
Commission
and
the
National
Commission
have
assigned cogent and plausible reasons for fastening
joint and several liability upon the petitioner/Insurance
Company and the Respondent No. 1/Bank after
considering
the
relevant
Scheme
Guidelines,
Government notifications and the evidence on record.
The findings are neither shown to be perverse nor
contrary to any statutory provision. Consequently, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned
order passed by the learned National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission affirming the order of
the State Commission does not call for interference.
24. Accordingly, both the writ petitions, being devoid of
merit, deserve to be and are hereby dismissed.”
7.
Since WP(227) No. 845 of 2026 and the connected batch of petitions
have already been dismissed by this Court vide order dated
17.07.2026, and the issues involved in the present writ petitions are
identical to those involved in WP(227) No. 845 of 2026, this Court
finds no reason to take a view different from the one taken in the
aforesaid judgment.
8.
In view of the aforesaid and considering that the controversy involved
in the present writ petitions stands squarely covered by the judgment
of this Court rendered in WP(227) No. 845 of 2026 (Agriculture
Insurance Company of India Ltd. v. Branch Manager and
another) and the connected batch of petitions decided on
17.07.2026, this Court finds no reason to take a different view. The
impugned order passed by the learned National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission does not suffer from any jurisdictional error,
patent perversity or manifest illegality warranting interference in
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. Accordingly, all the writ petitions, being devoid
of merit, are hereby dismissed.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Sumit
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