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Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 99 of 2024
Date of Decision: 24.04.2024
Shri. Adelbert Nongrum
Member, Meghalaya Legislative Assembly,
R/o Jaiaw, Shillong, East Khasi Hills
:::Petitioner
-VsThe Speaker,
Meghalaya Legislative Assembly
:::Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. P. Yobin, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Ms. S. Ain, GA
Ms. R. Colney, GA.
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
1.
The petitioner who is a Member of the Meghalaya Legislative
Assembly, has filed the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, assailing the action of the Speaker, in not allowing
the petitioner to move a Special Motion under Rule 130A of the Rules of
Procedure and Conduct of Business in Meghalaya Legislative Assembly,
to raise discussion in the House during the Budget Session 2024, on the
CAG Report on the Social and Economic sectors for the year ending
31.03.2022, for the State of Meghalaya.
2.
That at the outset, as there is a restriction on Courts to inquire into the
proceedings of the legislature, as per Article 212 of the Constitution of
India, the learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to satisfy the court,
on the question of the maintainability of the writ petitioner.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. P. Yobin, while referring to
Article 212 has submitted that the writ petition has not been filed on the
ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure, which would surely bar
the jurisdiction of the Court, but the challenge he contends, is directed
against the action of the Speaker, in curtailing the right of the petitioner as
given in Article 194(1) of the Constitution. He further submits that there is
no rule regulating the procedure of the Meghalaya Legislative Assembly,
that restricts or prohibits discussion on a report of the CAG in the House,
that would qualify as a condition subjecting the privilege of the members
of the legislature, which has been guaranteed under Article 194(1) of the
Constitution, to any restriction.
4.
The further assertion of the learned counsel is that, the petitioner was
denied reconsideration by the Speaker, on the decision to disallow a
Special Motion to discuss the CAG Report, even though, Rule 130A of the
Rules of Conduct and Procedure, provides that Special Motions were to
get precedence over other motions of any matter of urgent importance.
Though, he submits, a notice of Breach of Privilege submitted by the
petitioner under Rule 159 of the Rules of Conduct and Procedure, was
admitted by the Speaker and the same was then put to vote, but was
defeated, and the decision to disallow the Special Motion, was made final,
the decision arrived at was motivated and unconstitutional. He lastly
submits that, the issue sought to be raised, in the Special Motion being of
grave public importance, the same should have been allowed by the
Speaker under Rule 130A of the Rules of Conduct and Procedure. He
therefore prays that the writ petition be admitted, and be taken up for
consideration. In support of his case, the learned counsel has relied upon
the case of Shri. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat vs. Union of India & Anr.
reported in 2016 SCC OnLine Utt 502:AIR 2016 (NOC 559) 269:2016
AIR CC 2455, wherein at Para – 82, the judgment of the Constitution
Bench rendered in the case of Raja Ram Pal vs. Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC
184, has been relied upon.
5.
Mr. A. Kumar, learned Advocate General for the respondent has
strongly refuted the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner, and
submits that the writ petitioner by way of the instant writ petition is
seeking to regulate the procedure of the legislature by the Court. Strong
emphasis has been laid on the mandate of Article 212 of the Constitution,
to drive home the point that what has been assailed in the writ petition is
the decision of the Speaker, who has made the same in the course of
business of the House, which cannot be questioned before the Courts. The
learned Advocate General has further submitted that the reason for
disallowing the discussion was that, the report in question was still under
scrutiny before the Committee on Public Accounts, which had been
constituted as per Rule 241 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of
Business, and that nothing illegal or unconstitutional can be attributed to
the action of the Speaker. In support of his arguments, reliance has been
placed on two judgments of the Supreme Court, namely (i) Satish
Chandra vs. Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors. reported in (2014) 2 SCC 178
and (ii) State of Punjab vs. Principal Secretary to the Governor of
Punjab & Anr. reported in (2024) 1 SCC 384.
6.
On hearing the parties, the question before the Court therefore, is
only limited to examining the maintainability of the writ petition, in view
of the express bar of Article 212 of the Constitution, which for the sake of
convenience, is reproduced herein below.
“212. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature.(1)The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall
not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity
of procedure.
(2)No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom
powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating
procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in
the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in
respect of the exercise by him of those powers.”
7.
As can be seen, the Article has clearly put an embargo on Courts to
look into the validity of any proceedings in the legislature of the State, on
the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. In the instant case, the
writ petitioner had invoked Rule 130A of the Rules, to press his demand
for the Special Motion before the Speaker, and the same is quoted herein
below.
“130A. Whenever any report or any matter of urgent public
importance and of recent occurrence is brought before the
House, any Member can move a motion of the discussion of
that matter. Such a motion will get precedence over motions
under Rule 131. The Speaker shall fix the time and date for
discussion of such a motion.”
8.
The above quoted Rule, no doubt, allows any Member to move a
motion for discussion on such matters of urgent public importance, and as
matter of procedure, the request had been taken up, which however, was
denied on the ground that, the subject matter was under the examination of
the Public Accounts Committee of the Meghalaya Legislative Assembly,
which is evidenced by the letter dated 19.02.2024, under the caption
‘Disallowed Motion’. Though, it is correct that the challenge is not on the
ground of irregularity of procedure, the decision of the Speaker however
on examination, cannot be said to be unconstitutional to warrant judicial
review, notwithstanding the submission that, the subject matter involves a
matter of grave public interest.
9.
Though, reference has been made to Article 194(1) of the
Constitution, to try and impress upon the Court that, the right of the writ
petitioner had been curtailed by the Speaker, thereby making the decision
unconstitutional, it is to be noted that Article 194(1), though providing for
freedom of speech in the Legislature of every State, the same is however
subject to the Constitution and to the Rules and Standing Orders regulating
the procedure of the Legislature. As such, there being no palpable denial of
the rights of the petitioner, in any manner, the decision of the Speaker
therefore, based on valid considerations and as per procedure, no illegality
or unconstitutionality can be attributed to the same.
10. Before concluding this judgment, reference can be made to the
decision in the case of Raja Ram Pal. vs. Lok Sabha(supra), cited by the
petitioner, wherein distinction has been drawn between ‘procedural
irregularity’ in contrast to ‘substantive illegality’, which assists us in
discerning the scope of Article 212 and 122 of the Constitution.
Paragraphs – 360 and 366 thereof, which are relevant are quoted herein
below.
“360. The question of extent of judicial review of parliamentary
matters has to be resolved with reference to the provision contained
in Article 122 (1) that corresponds to Article 212 referred to
in M.S.M. Sharma v. Shree Krishna Sinha AIR 1960 SC 1186 [
Pandit Sharma (2)]. On a plain reading, Article 122 (1) prohibits
'the validity of any proceedings in Parliament' from being 'called in
question' in a court merely on the ground of 'irregularity of
procedure'. In other words, the procedural irregularities cannot be
used by the court to undo or vitiate what happens within the four
walls of the legislature. But then, 'procedural irregularity' stands in
stark contrast to 'substantive illegality' which cannot be found
included in the former. We are of the considered view that this
specific provision with regard to check on the role of the judicial
organ vis-à-vis proceedings in Parliament uses language which is
neither vague nor ambiguous and, therefore, must be treated as the
constitutional mandate on the subject, rendering unnecessary
search for an answer elsewhere or invocation of principles of
harmonious construction.
***
366. The touchstone upon which parliamentary actions within the
four walls of the legislature were examined was both the
constitutional as well as substantive law. The proceedings which
may
be
tainted
on
account
of
substantive
illegality
or
unconstitutionality, as opposed to those suffering from mere
irregularity thus cannot be held protected from judicial scrutiny
by Article 122 (1) inasmuch as the broad principle laid down
in Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884) [L.R.] 12 QBD 271 acknowledging
exclusive cognizance of the legislature in England has no
application to the system of governance provided by our
constitution wherein no organ is sovereign and each organ is
amenable to constitutional checks and control, in which scheme of
things, this Court is entrusted with the duty to be watchdog of and
guarantor of the Constitution.”
11. With regard to the instant case however, as no situation exists to hold
that, there has been substantive illegality, no judicial review is called for.
The decision cited by the respondent in the case State of Punjab vs.
Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab & Anr.(supra), however is
useful, with regard to the exercise of powers by the Speaker to regulate the
procedure of the House, and the binding nature, the decision of the
Speaker has on every member of the House. Paragraphs – 40, 41 and 42
thereof of this case, are quoted herein below.
“40.
The
Constitution
and
established
legislative
practice
distinguish between adjournment sine die and prorogation of the
session of the House. In the case before us the Vidhan Sabha was
adjourned on 22-3-2023 without prorogation. Therefore, the
Speaker was empowered to reconvene the sittings of the House
within the same session.
2. Exclusive domain of the Speaker to regulate the procedure of the
House
41. Article 178 of the Constitution provides for the office of the
Speaker and Deputy Speaker of a Legislative Assembly. Article
212 of the Constitution precludes the courts from inquiring into the
proceedings of the legislature of the State. A corresponding
provision with regard to the Parliament is contained in Article
122. The decision in Ramdas Athawale is significant in that it
dwells on the role of the Speaker of the House and interprets Article
122 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench observed: (SCC pp.
12-13, para 31)
“31. The Speaker is the guardian of the privileges of the
House and its spokesman and representative upon all
occasions. He is the interpreter of its rules and procedure,
and is invested with the power to control and regulate the
course of debate and to maintain order. The powers to
regulate the procedure and conduct of business of the House
of the People vests in the Speaker of the House. By virtue of
the powers vested in him, the Speaker, in purported exercise
of his power under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and
Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha got issued Notice dated
20-1-2004 through the Secretary General of the Lok Sabha
directing resumption of sittings of the Lok Sabha which was
adjourned sine die on 23-12-2003. Whether the resumed
sitting on 29-1-2004 was to be treated as the second part of
the fourteenth session as directed by the Speaker is essentially
a matter relating purely to the procedure of Parliament. The
validity of the proceedings and business transacted in the
House after resumption of its sittings cannot be tested and
gone into by this Court in a proceeding under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India.”
42. The Court observed that under Article 122(2), the decision of
the Speaker in whom powers are vested to regulate the procedure
and conduct of business is final and binding on every Member of
the House. Hence, this Court held that the validity of the Speaker
adjourning the House sine die and the later direction to resume
sittings could not be inquired into on the ground of any irregularity
of procedure. The Court reaffirmed that the business transacted
and the validity of proceedings after the resumption of sittings of
the House pursuant to the direction of the Speaker cannot be
inquired by the courts. This follows the fundamental principle that
it is the right of each House of the legislature to be the sole Judge
of the lawfulness of its own proceedings so as to be immune from
challenge before a court of law.”
12.
As such, in view of the discussions made herein above, the decision
of the Speaker in not allowing the Special Motion, cannot be held to be
illegal or unconstitutional, notwithstanding the fact that the subject matter
involves a matter of grave public importance. Judicial review therefore,
not being available by virtue of the application of Article 212 of the
Constitution, this writ petition is not entertained and is accordingly
dismissed.
13. No order as to costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
24.04.2024
“D.Thabah-PS”
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