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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Before:
The Hon’ble Justice Anuj Singh.
W.P.A. No. 25801 of 2023
Abu Naser Gharami& Ors.
v.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Arka Pratim Chowdhury
Ms. Puja Rajbhor
Mr. Swattik Batabyal
……… Advocate.
For the State
: Mr. Goutam Misra
……… Advocate
Heard on
: 28.09.2026
Judgement on
:09.10.2026
Anuj Singh, J:.
1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the writ petitioners
inter alia, praying for expunging their names from the Park Street
Police Station Case No. 78 of 2023, registered for investigation
into
the
offences
punishable
under
sections
145/147/149/143/341/342/353and 332 of Indian Penal Code.
2. The Petitioners herein are a group of persons, who at all material
times, were aggrieved by the manner of recruitment by School
Service Commission. The writ petitioners contend that in order to
express their grievance against improper recruitment procedure
adopted by the School Service Commission, the Petitioners
started peaceful protest on 28.09.2021.
3. The said petitioners further contend that the Petitioners wanted
to express their grievances in front of the MLA Hostel, to protest
against hunger, unemployment and illegal recruitment. However,
Park Street Police Station Case No. 78 of 2023, registered for
investigation
into
the
offences
punishable
under
sections
145/147/149/143/341/342/353and 332 of Indian Penal Code.
The investigation of the case is said to be pending.
4. The complaint was lodged by Sg. G. Lama. A perusal of the
complaint, which led to registration of the FIR, reveals that:
a. On 02.08.2023, while the Legislative Assembly was in session
and members were to leave the MLA Hostel at 2, Kyd Street at
about 10:00 to 10:30 hours, a mass of men and women
describing themselves as SLST 2016 job seekers arrived,
shouting slogans against the Government.
b. It is alleged that they blocked the main gate and wrongfully
prevented members of the Legislative Assembly from leaving,
so that the MLAs were confined inside the Hostel, and on being
asked to refrain, they became violent and misbehaved with the
police and assaulted police personnel physically, including the
complainant; and that the complainant and others received
injuries.
c. The above acts constituted the offense punishable under
sections 145/147/149/143/341/342/353and 332 of Indian
Penal Code
5. By way of the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the writ petitioners have sought for Writ in the
nature of mandamus to strike off the name of petitioners from
Park Street Police Station Case No. 78 of 2023, registered for
investigation
into
the
offences
punishable
under
sections
145/147/149/143/341/342/353and 332 of Indian Penal Code.
6. Ld. Advocate for the Petitioners submits that the Petitioners were
exercising their right to assemble peacefully and voice their
grievances under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution
of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance
upon the decision of the Madras High Court in J. Jayaraj v. The
Chief Educational Officer, W.P.(MD) Nos. 13409 to 13415 of
2022, in support of the arguments that petitioners have a right to
protest peacefully. It is further submitted that the police
authorities were not authorised by Respondent No. 1 to take
action against the Petitioners, as no notification/notice was
issued in 2021 authorising such action against peaceful assembly
and protest.
7. Reliance has been also placed on the Supreme Court‟s decision in
Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of
India, 2012 AIR SCW 2660, to contend that an order under
Section 144 Cr.P.C. requires urgency necessitating immediate
and speedy intervention and must disclose the material facts
warranting such intervention, whereas no grave or severe offence
was made out from the Petitioners‟ protest.
8. It is further submitted that this Court, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may prevent
abuse of process and quash proceedings where the allegations do
not disclose a prima facie offence. The Learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance on State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga
Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 AIR 604.
9. It is further submitted that the Petitioners have sought quashing
of the investigation arising out of Park Street Police Station Case
No. 78 of 2023, registered for investigation into the offences
punishable under sections 145/147/149/143/341/342/353and
332 of Indian Penal Code, as continuation thereof would amount
to an abuse of process of law and cause serious prejudice to the
Petitioners by saddling them with a criminal record and adversely
affecting their prospects of employment.
10.
Learned Advocate representing this State has opposed the
instant writ petition. Ld. Advocate has argued that the petition is
not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed.
11.
I have heard the learned advocates representing the
petitioner and the State.
12.
The power of the High Court to quash an FIR may be
exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well as
under its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which
itself arose from a proceeding under Article 226, the Supreme
Court, after considering R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960
SC 866, laid down in paragraph 102 the following categories of
cases in which such power may be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order
of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support
of
the
same
do
not
disclose
the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint
are
so
absurd
and
inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding
is instituted) to the institution and continuance of
the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
13.
In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 (paragraphs 8 to 11), the Court
reiterated that the inherent power is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice. The Court would be
justified in quashing a proceeding if its initiation or continuance
amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; and that, when
a proceeding is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into
the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto. At the same time, the Court cautioned that the
High Court ought not to embark upon an enquiry into the
reliability of the allegations, nor analyse the case in the light of
probabilities to determine whether a conviction would be
sustainable.
14.
In
Neeharika
Maharashtra,
(2021)
Infrastructure
SCC
(P)
401,
Ltd.
the
v.
State
Supreme
of
Court
summarised the position in paragraph 33. The police have the
statutory right and duty to investigate a cognizable offence and
courts would not thwart any investigation into cognizable
offences. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence
of any kind is disclosed in the FIR that the Court will not permit
the investigation to go on. The Court, having regard to the
parameters in R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal, has the jurisdiction to
quash the FIR but, while examining an FIR, it has to consider
only whether the allegations disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence, and not the merits of the allegations.
15.
It is a well-settled principle of law that if the FIR does not
disclose the commission of an offence, the Court would be
justified in quashing the proceedings to prevent the abuse of
process of law (Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P., (2012) 10 SCC
741).
16.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Chanchalpati Das v. State
of West Bengal, 2023 INSC 554, in paras 12, 13, observed that
except for bald allegations made in the complaint, no material
was produced by the complainant to substantiate the allegations
and considered it rightly to quash the proceedings to prevent the
abuse of process of law and to secure ends of justice.
17.
Further, when it is alleged that the proceedings are
vexatious or frivolous or instituted with an ulterior motive, then it
is the duty of the court to look at the attending circumstances
and read between the lines with due care and circumspection,
and not confine itself merely to the bare words of the FIR
(Mohammad Wajid v. State of UP, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951,
paras 36-38; Mahmood Ali v. State of UP, (2023) 15 SCC 488,
paras 12, 13).
18.
In
Tukaram v. State, 2025:BHC-GOA:432-DB, in a
similar factual scenario, where the crowd of 300 people were
protesting against establishing an IIT in Valpoi and were charged
under Sections 143, 145, 147, 186, 353,120-B and 149 of the
IPC, the Bombay High Court at Goa, quashed the FIR, holding
that the crowd was without weapons, and the allegations were not
clear as to whether there was any unlawful object, and said that
on reading the entirety of the FIR, no prima facie case was made
out against the Petitioners.
19.
Thus, this Court is empowered under Article 226 to quash
the proceedings in cases where there are mere bald allegations,
which do not disclose the commission of an offence. It is the duty
of this Court to have a meaningful reading of the FIR as a whole,
and the Court must be able to find who is alleged to have
committed the act, what was the act, and how it satisfies each
ingredient of the offence charged.
20.
In light of the above settled position of law with regard to
quashing of investigation of a case, it is necessary to examine the
allegations which are forming the subject matter of Park Street
Police Station Case No. 78 of 2023, registered for investigation
into
the
offences
punishable
under
sections
145/147/149/143/341/342/353and 332 of Indian Penal Code.
The allegations contained in the FIR must be examined and
accepted on their face value and believed to be true. This court is
not required to look into the defense of the petitioners. The
limited question that may be looked into is whether the conduct
attributed to the petitioners discloses the essential ingredients of
the offences charged.
21.
The FIR proceeds on the allegations that on 02.08.2023,
when the Legislative Assembly was in session and the members
were about to leave the MLA Hostel, a mass of men and women
describing themselves as SLST 2016 job seekers arrived, shouting
slogans against the Government. It is further alleged that they
blocked the main gate, wrongfully preventing members of the
Legislative Assembly from leaving, confining them inside the
Hostel. It is further alleged that when they were asked to refrain,
they became violent and misbehaved with the police and
assaulted police personnel physically, injuring the complainant
and others.
22.
In order to attract the penal provision of Section 143 of the
Indian Penal Code, it must be alleged that the accused was a
member of an unlawful assembly. An unlawful assembly is
defined under Section 141 IPC as an assembly of five or more
persons only if its common object is one of the five objects
enumerated therein, namely: to overawe by criminal force, or
show of criminal force, the Government or any public servant in
the exercise of his lawful power; to resist the execution of any law
or legal process; to commit any mischief, criminal trespass or
other offence; to take or obtain possession of property by criminal
force; or to compel any person by criminal force to do what he is
not legally bound to do. Further, to attract the penal provisions of
section 145 of the Indian Penal Code, the accused must join or
continue in an unlawful assembly knowing that it has been
commanded to disperse in the manner prescribed by law.
Furthermore, to attract the provision of section 147 IPC, it must
be alleged that the unlawful assembly, or any member of it, uses
force or violence, prosecution of the common object of that
assembly. Moreover, section 149 of the Indian Penal Code creates
rule of constructive liability, which requires the existence of an
unlawful assembly, the commission of an offence by a member of
that assembly in prosecution of its common object, and that the
accused was a member of the assembly at the time of its
commission. Thus, on perusal of the afore-mentioned provisions,
it is clear that the existence of an unlawful assembly is a sine qua
non.
23.
Even if the allegations in the present FIR are accepted in
their entirety, they fall short of the requirements to be considered
as an unlawful assembly. The FIR does not disclose the common
object with which the assembly was formed, and unless the
common object is one of the five objects enumerated under
section 141, it cannot be held as an unlawful assembly. In
Association for Protection of Democratic Rights v. State of
West Bengal, 2007 (4) CHN 842, in para 82, Calcutta High
Court observed that:-
“82. … Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India confers upon all
citizens of India to right to assemble peaceably. Therefore, any
large assembly of demonstrator would not per se be either illegal or
unconstitutional…”
Thus, mere protest and raising slogans cannot be said to be an
unlawful common object under section 141. Hence, the conduct
described, therefore, does not attract section 143. Since, there
exists no unlawful assembly, sections 145, 147 and 149 are also
not attracted.
24.
It is a well-settled position of law that right to assemble
peaceably and without arms, and to express their voice, is
guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), subject to reasonable
restrictions. In plethora of judgements, including the decision of
the Madras High Court in J. Jayaraj (supra) and the Supreme
Court in Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, (2024)
4 SCC 156, it was held that the right to dissent, criticise and
peacefully protest against the Government, in a legitimate and
lawful manner is integral and essential part of democracy in view
of
Articles
19(1)
and
of
the
Constitution.
Thus,
a
demonstration does not become an offence merely because it was
unwelcome to those in authority.
25.
In order to attract the penal provisions of Section 341 of the
Indian Penal Code, it must be alleged that the accused voluntarily
obstructed a person so as to prevent that person from proceeding
in any direction in which he had a right to proceed. In Keki
HormusjiGharda v. Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC
475, the Supreme Court, held that for an offence of wrong
restraint, the word “voluntary” is essential and the obstruction
should be restriction on the normal movement of a person.
Further, there must be an identifiable person who was so
obstructed. In Arjun v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl. O.P.(MD) No.
21582 of 2025, the Madras High Court observed that there was
no specific allegation as to who was restrained, in what manner,
and for what duration, thus offence of wrongful restraint was not
attracted. The FIR merely alleges that the petitioners blocked the
gate, but does not disclose how the MLAs were wrongfully
restrained. Further, the FIR does not name any MLA who was
prevented from proceeding in any direction, thus the conduct
described does not attract section 341 of IPC.
26.
Further, to attract the penal provision of section 342 of the
Indian Penal Code, it must be alleged that there was a wrongful
restraint of a person in such a manner as to prevent that person
from
proceeding
beyond
certain
circumscribing
limits.
It
presupposes wrongful restraint, and requires an identifiable
person who was confined. Since it has been analysed hereinabove
that the offence of wrongful restraint is not made out. Similarly,
the offence of wrongful confinement is not made out because the
FIR does not disclose whether any MLA who was prevented from
proceeding in any direction or in what manner or for what
duration. Thus, section 342 IPC is not attracted.
27.
In order to attract the penal provisions of Section 353 of the
Indian Penal Code, it must be alleged that the accused has
assaulted or used criminal force on a public servant while such
public servant was executing its duty, or such assault must be
with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty.
„Assault‟ isa gesture or preparation made, intending or knowing it,
to be likely that it will cause a person present to apprehend that
criminal force is about to be used against him. "Criminal force"
under Section 350 requires the intentional use of force on a
person.
In B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 INSC 4, the
Supreme Court has held that when no assault or criminal force is
disclosed, and there is mere allegation of “disturbance” without
any specific act of assault or criminal force, the same does not
attract Section 353 IPC. The allegations in the FIR do not describe
the act of assault, nor does it name or identify the persons who
actually assaulted the complainant or any other officer. The
petitioners are not specifically accused of voluntarily assaulting or
using criminal force to deter the officers from discharging their
duties in the FIR. Thus, section 353 is not attracted.
28.
It is further necessary to examine whether the essential
ingredients of section 332 IPC are attracted on the above
allegations. In order to attract the penal provision of section 332
of the Indian Penal Code, it must be alleged that the accused
voluntarily caused hurt to a public servant in the discharge of his
duty, or with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his
duty. "Hurt" under Section 319 IPC means bodily pain, disease or
infirmity, and it is caused "voluntarily" under Section 321 IPC
when the accused intends, or knows it to be likely, that he will
thereby cause hurt. In the FIR, the petitioners are not specifically
accused of voluntarily causing hurt to officers to deter them from
discharging their duties. The Punjab & Haryana High Court, in
Bhagwant Mann V. U.T. Chandigarh, in CRM-M-15706-2023,
vide order dated 29.11.2025, observed that in case of protests,
the offence of section 332 IPC would not be attracted if the
petitioners are
not specifically accused of voluntarily causing
hurt. It was also observed that there were no allegations that
petitioners were carrying sticks or stones and the nature of
injuries suffered by the officials were also not very intense and
were mere result of gappling and pushing. Thus, in the present
case, the FIR does not specifically accuse the petitioners of
voluntarily causing hurt, and that the nature of injuries to the
officials were superficial in nature, the offence of section 332 IPC
is not attracted.
29.
Thus, a bare reading of FIR does not disclose the
ingredients of any of the offences invoked in the FIR, and no
prima facie case is made out against the Petitioners. It is an
unavoidable inference that the Petitioners are being punished for
the protest, making it a vexatious and frivolous proceeding. Thus,
the present case clearly falls within the category (1), (3) and (7) of
Bhajan Lal (supra).
30.
In view of the settled principle of law that when commission
of any offence is not disclosed on a careful and constructive
reading of the FIR as a whole, the court is empowered to quash
such proceedings to prevent any further abuse of process of law
and in order to meet the ends of justice.
31.
In view of the foregoing, Park Street Police Station Case No.
78 of 2023 dated 2nd August, 2023, registered for investigation
into the offences punishable under sections 143, 145, 147, 149,
341, 342, 353 and 332 IPC, and all consequential proceedings
arising therefrom, including G.R. Case No. 875 of 2023 pending
before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, are
hereby quashed.
32.
Let a copy of this judgement be communicated forthwith to
the concerned criminal court and the Officer-in-Charge, Park
Street Police Station.
33.
WPA 25801 of 2023 is allowed. There shall be no order as
to costs.
34.
Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgement if applied
for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite
formalities.
(Anuj Singh J.)
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