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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No. 41 of 2022
Date of Order: 01.03.2023
Shri Abhishek Agarwala & Anr.
Vs.
Smti Komal Poddar
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. K.Ch. Gautam, Adv. with
Ms. C.B. Sawian, Adv.
Mr. S. Sen. Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
1.
The petitioner has come before this Court with this petition under
Section 482 Cr.PC with a prayer to quash the criminal proceedings in CR
Case No. 110 (T) of 2021 under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act,
(D V Act ), 2005 pending before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class at Shillong.
2.
Heard Mr. K.Ch. Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that the petitioner and the respondent were married in accordance
with their personal law. However, after the marriage, the relationship
between the two ran into rough waters and the marriage failed leading to
them living separately. The respondent thereafter filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage before the Court of the Deputy Commissioner
(Judicial), Shillong registered as (Mat) Div. Case No. 45(T) 2018, which
case is still pending. Another case has also been filed by the respondent
being CR Case No. 330 (S) 2019 pending before the court of the learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong.
3.
The learned counsel has also submitted that the respondent, two
years after filing of the said complaint case against the petitioner has
approached the court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong with
an application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, claiming
reliefs, provided under Section 18, 19, 20 & 23 of the said Act.
4.
The learned counsel then submits that there is no substance in the
allegation made by the respondent in the said petition under Section 12 and
even on merits, the case of the respondent will surely fail as the same was
filed without any factual or legal foundation.
5.
However, the main ground raised by the petitioner while assailing
the impugned proceedings is that the Trial Court has approached the case
without any application of mind and has exercised criminal jurisdiction
where none is required.
6.
In this regard the learned counsel has submitted that proceedings
under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act are civil in nature and the
procedure to be adopted by the court on receipt of an application filed by
the aggrieved party is firstly to cause issue of notice upon the respondent.
However, the learned Magistrate has instead issued summons upon the
petitioner to appear before the court and in course of proceedings, has also
issued a bailable warrant of arrest.
7.
The learned counsel has submitted that this is contrary to the
procedure that is envisaged under the Domestic Violence Act and even if
the said application is, according to the court, deemed to be a complaint, the
learned Magistrate has failed to take recourse to the provisions of Section
202 Cr.PC to postpone the issue of process against the petitioner, who
apparently is residing outside the jurisdiction of the court and as submitted
above, has even caused issue of a bailable warrant of arrest against the
petitioner on his being absent on the date fixed for the case.
8.
This is clearly an abuse of the process of the court as the learned
Magistrate has exercised powers without jurisdiction and accordingly, the
proceedings is liable to be set aside and quashed by this Court on this ground
alone.
9.
In support of his case, the learned counsel has cited the following
cases:(i) State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992) Supp.(1) 335 para
102(7).
(ii) Davindra v. State of UP; (2009) 7 SCC 495, para 24.
(iii) Pepsi Food Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate; (1998) 5 SCC
749, para 28.
10.
Per contra, Mr. S. Sen, learned counsel for the respondent has
submitted that in response to the argument raised by the petitioner, seeking
quashing of the proceedings before the court of the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Shillong, on the ground that non-compliance of the
provisions of Section 202 Cr.PC has vitiated the proceedings, the response
of the respondent would be that the procedure laid down under chapter XV
of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to proceedings under the
Domestic Violence Act.
11.
It is also submitted that the scheme of the DV Act only contemplates
grant of civil reliefs to an aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 23 and an
offence is contemplated only under section 31 when the directions issued
under Sections 18 to 23 are violated. It is reiterated that an application under
Section 12 does not seek to prosecute the respondent for any penal offences,
rather it contemplates only civil reliefs such as prohibition order, residence
orders, monetary orders and custody order for children etc.
12.
The learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that
under Section 13 of the DV Act, what is provided is that only a notice of
the date of hearing is to be served upon the respondent in the prescribed
form. Issuance of a summons under the provisions of the code of criminal
procedure is not the proper procedure for proceedings under Section 12 of
the DV Act and as such, there is no requirement on the part of the Magistrate
to resort to the procedure laid down in Section 202 Cr.P.C.
13.
To support this contention, the learned counsel has cited the case of
Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan 2022 SCC Online SC 446, para 21,28,29
and 31.
14.
On the second aspect of the dispute between the parties, the learned
counsel has submitted that admittedly, the respondent has indeed filed a suit
for dissolution of her marriage with the petitioner, the second case is a
criminal case which arose as a consequence of an incident which occurred
close to the court premises after a reconciliation proceedings between the
parties and the third case is the one which is presently being pursued by the
petitioner before this Court.
15.
Briefly stated, the case under the Domestic Violence Act preferred
by the respondent is an application under Section 12 of the said DV Act,
primarily aimed at the failure of the petitioner to maintain the respondent
and their minor child. Such allegation comes within the fold of ‘economic
abuse’ as defined under Explanation I of clause (d) of Section 3 of the Act
and the learned Magistrate may be allowed to dispose of the application as
per the procedure laid down in the DV Act for which the exercise of the
inherent power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may not be called
for at this juncture, submits the learned counsel.
16.
This Court after giving considerable thought to the submission and
contention of the parties, is of the opinion that the dispute in question is
indeed of a two-fold nature, the first is with regard to the procedural aspect
while the second deals with the merits of the application filed by the
respondent under Section 12 of the DV Act.
17.
As for the procedure to be adopted for proceedings under the DV
Act, Section 28 provides as follows:
“28. Procedure.(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings
under sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences
under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from
laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application
under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23.”
18.
The said section has emphasized that save as otherwise provided in
the said Act, all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and
23 and offences punishable under Section 31 of the D.V Act, 2005 shall be
governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It
means that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable
to all proceedings under the aforesaid sections of the D.V Act, 2005 and
wherever the Act itself provides a procedure then the same shall govern the
proceedings under the said sections and wherever the Act is silent then the
procedure with regard to the proceedings under the said sections shall be
governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 31
of the said Act provides that a breach of protection order or of an interim
protection order is a criminal offence, which is cognisable and non-bailable
and which will invite a penalty of imprisonment which may extend upto
one year or a fine of ₹ 20,000/- or both. This is the only penal provision in
the DV Act.
19.
However, this Court is in agreement with the learned counsel for the
respondent that a proceeding under Section 12 of the DV Act is not an
offence coming within the purview of Section 31 of the said Act. The case
of Kamatchi(supra) cited by the respondent though dealing with the issue
of limitation, however as pointed out, at para 28 of the same, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has noticed the relevant point set out in the case of Dr. P.
Padmanathan (Order passed by a Single Judge of the Hon’ble Madras High
Court) at para 19 and 20 of the same, which is also relevant for the purpose
of the discussion herein and which portion is reproduced herein as :
“ 28. The special features with regard to an application under
Section 12 of the Act were noticed by a Single Judge of the High
Court in Dr. P.Padmanathan as under:
“19. In the first instance, it is, therefore, necessary to
examine the areas where the D.V. Act or the D.V. Rules have
specifically set out the procedure thereby excluding the
operation of Cr.P.C. as contemplated under Section 28(1) of
the Act. This takes us to the D.V. Rules. At the outset, it may
be noticed that a “complaint” as contemplated under the
D.V. Act and the D.V. Rules is not the same as a “complaint”
under Cr.P.C. A complaint under Rule 2(b) of the D.V.
Rules is defined as an allegation made orally or in writing
by any person to a Protection Officer. On the other hand, a
complaint, under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. is any
allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a
view to his taking action under the Code, that some person,
whether known or unknown has committed an offence.
However, the Magistrate dealing with an application under
Section 12 of the Act is not called upon to take action for the
commission of an offence. Hence, what is contemplated is
not a complaint but an application to a Magistrate as set out
in Rule 6(1) of the D.V. Rules. A complaint under the D.V.
Rules is made only to a Protection Officer as contemplated
under Rule 4(1) of the D.V. Rules.
20. Rule 6(1) sets out that an application under Section 12
of the Act shall be as per Form II appended to the Act. Thus,
an application under Section 12 not being a complaint as
defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C, the procedure for
cognizance set out under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code
followed by the procedure set out in Chapter XV of the Code
for taking cognizance will have no application to a
proceeding under the D.V. Act. To reiterate, Section
190(1)(a) of the Code and the procedure set out in the
subsequent Chapter XV of the Code will apply only in cases
of complaints, under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C, given to a
Magistrate and not to an application under Section 12 of the
Act.”
20.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court at para 29 of the said Kamatchi case
has then observed that the High Court has wrongly equated filing of an
application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or
initiation of prosecution.
21.
On the authority of the decision cited above, this Court can also say
that an application under Section 12 of the DV Act is not a complaint and
the procedure and proceedings cannot be pursued by the parties or by the
Magistrate under Sections 200, 202 and 204 of the Cr.P.C. respectively.
On an application under Section 12 being filed, the Magistrate has to cause
issue of Notice under Section 13 and to call for response from the
respondent.
22.
Under the circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that
Section 202 Cr.P.C. was not taken recourse to by the Magistrate becomes
unnecessary. It is however noticed that the petitioner has appeared before
the learned Magistrate and has taken part in the proceedings. Similarly, the
action of the learned Magistrate in the issuance of a warrant against the
petitioner/respondent is also uncalled for, though the same was cancelled
on the same day itself on appearance of the counsel for the petitioner/
respondent later in the day.
23.
The prayer of the petitioner for quashing of the proceedings under
the DV Act pending before the learned Magistrate at Shillong on this
ground therefore cannot be allowed simply for the fact that an application
under Section 12 of the DV Act is not a ‘complaint’ as defined under
Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., but an ‘application’ and as such, proceedings
under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and other relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. are
not to be followed.
24.
The petitioner has contended that there is no substance in the
allegations made in the said complaint filed by the respondent before the
learned Magistrate, as no offence under Section 12 of the DV Act is even
remotely attracted and the complaint was filed only to harass the petitioner
herein.
25.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that even
if the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted that
an application under Section 12 before the Magistrate is civil in nature, the
fact that the learned Magistrate has caused issuance of summons and in
course of the proceedings has issued a bailable warrant of arrest against the
petitioner has clearly exhibited the abuse of the process of the court
committed by the learned Magistrate for which on an application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C, the whole proceedings ought to be quashed. The
authority of the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335 para 102 has been cited in this regard to bring home this point.
26.
The learned counsel for the respondent has however submitted that,
notwithstanding the other two proceedings initiated by the respondent
before the competent court, the application under Section 12 of the DV
Act, was filed inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner has failed to
provide maintenance to the respondent and their minor child which comes
within the fold of ‘economic abuse’ as defined under Explanation I of
clause (d) of Section 3 of the DV Act and as such, the proceedings before
the learned Magistrate must be allowed to come to its logical end.
27.
Without looking into the other authorities cited by the parties, an
observation as was held in the case of Bhajan Lal(supra) at para 102 and
103 would be sufficient to understand whether the petitioner has made out
a case of interference by this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the paras
reads as follows:
“102.
In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.
103.
We also give a note of caution to the effect that the
power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest
of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise
of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the
extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary
jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.
28.
The allegation of non-payment of maintenance for the upkeep of the
respondent and their minor child is certainly a matter to be looked into by
the Trial court and for this, the parties have to prove their respective case.
This would thus not qualify as satisfaction of any of the guidelines laid
down at para 102 of the Bhajan Lal case. It is also not one of the rarest of
rare cases for this Court to take notice and invoke the powers under Section
482. The petitioner on this front too, cannot convince this Court to decide
in his favour.
29.
For the reasons stated above, this petition lacks merits and the same
is hereby dismissed.
30.
However, before parting, this Court is made to understand that the
petitioner is willing to continue in the proceedings before the learned
Magistrate provided that he is not made to appear personally before the
court on each and every date the matter is fixed, but to cause appearance
only through counsel and that steps like issuance of a warrant of arrest may
not be taken against him. The learned counsel for the respondent has fairly
conceded to this and has even submitted that though the manner in which
the Magistrate proceeds is not in within the control of the respondent, time
and again, the learned counsel has impressed upon such courts to take
proper recourse in such cases.
31.
Accordingly, the learned Magistrate(s) dealing with cases under the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence, Act, 2005 would take note
that proceedings initiated under Section 12 seeking reliefs under Sections
18 to 23 are civil in nature.
32.
When an application seeking one or more reliefs that are
found under Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, upon service of notice as
required under Section 13 of the said Act and upon making appearance by
the respondent either in person or through his counsel is filed, the court
shall not insist for their personal appearance for each and every
adjournment.
33.
With the above, this petition is hereby disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
01.03.2023
“N.Swer, Stenographer”
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