The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU &KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT Reserved on: 05.06.2026 Pronounced on:30.06.2026 Uploaded on: 01.07.2026 Whether the operative part or full judgment is pronounced: Full ABDUL REHMAN BHAT & ORS. ...PETITIONER(S)/APPELLANT Through: - Mr. Azhar-ul-Amin, Advocate, with Mr. Shahid Ashraf & Mr. Bilal Ahmad, Advocates. Vs. SHAMAS-UD-DIN HURRAN & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S) Through: - Mr. Erfan Akbar, Advocate. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE 1) The appellants/defendants have challenged order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Bandipora at Sumbal (hereinafter “the trial court”), whereby application of the respondents/plaintiffs for grant of interim injunction in terms of Order 39 Rules 1&2 of Civil Procedure Code has been allowed and the appellants/ defendants have been restrained from causing interference with the suit land. 2) It seems that the respondents/plaintiffs have filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the appellants/defendants before the learned trial court. It is case of the plaintiffs that they are absolute owners in possession of land falling under Survey No. 186/14 measuring 11 kanals and 13 marlas situated at Gund Balakh Hajin. According to the plaintiffs, the said land has been in their uninterrupted possession for several decades. It has been pleaded that the defendants in connivance with certain offi…
20. 05.2025, whereby the appellants/defendants were temporarily restrained from causing any sort of interference with the suit land falling under survey No.186/14 measuring 11 kanals and 13 marlas situated at Gund Balakh Hajin. After hearing the parties and after analyzing the pleadings on record, the learned trial court, vide impugned order dated 16.10.2025, allowed the application of the plaintiffs under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC and confirmed interim order dated 20.05.2025 passed by the said court. 5) The appellants have challenged the impugned order on the grounds that the same suffers from patent illegality and infirmity. It has been contended that impugned order dated 16.10.2025 has been obtained by the plaintiffs by suppressing material facts. It has been further contended that public road is in existence and it is in continuous use of public and, as such, inquiry with regard to the title of the land was an irrelevant factor for purpose of deciding application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC. It has been contended that no injunction could have been granted in favour of the plaintiffs in view of the provisions contained in Section 41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act, as the subject matter of the suit is a public road which is being used by the defendants and other inhabitants of the locality. The appellants have also contended that the legal representatives of the plaintiffs ha…
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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU &KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT
SRINAGAR
Reserved on: 05.06.2026
Pronounced on:30.06.2026
Uploaded on: 01.07.2026
Whether the operative part
or
full
judgment
is
pronounced:
Full
FAO No.49/2025
ABDUL REHMAN BHAT & ORS.
...PETITIONER(S)/APPELLANT
Through: - Mr. Azhar-ul-Amin, Advocate, with
Mr. Shahid Ashraf & Mr. Bilal Ahmad,
Advocates.
Vs.
SHAMAS-UD-DIN HURRAN & ORS.
…RESPONDENT(S)
Through: - Mr. Erfan Akbar, Advocate.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1)
The appellants/defendants have challenged order
dated 16.10.2025 passed by the Court of Additional District
Judge, Bandipora at Sumbal (hereinafter “the trial court”),
whereby application of the respondents/plaintiffs for grant
of interim injunction in terms of Order 39 Rules 1&2 of Civil
Procedure Code has been allowed and the appellants/
defendants have been restrained from causing interference
with the suit land.
2)
It seems that the respondents/plaintiffs have filed a
suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the
FAO No.49/2025
appellants/defendants before the learned trial court. It is
case of the plaintiffs that they are absolute owners in
possession of land falling under Survey No. 186/14
measuring 11 kanals and 13 marlas situated at Gund
Balakh Hajin. According to the plaintiffs, the said land has
been in their uninterrupted possession for several decades.
It has been pleaded that the defendants in connivance with
certain officials are attempting to forcibly interfere with the
suit land by initiating construction of a road through the
said land without any authority of law. It has been pleaded
that the defendants have damaged the gate installed by the
plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants despite
existence of a road are now attempting to encroach upon
their land and forcibly carve out a new road through it.
3)
The appellants/defendants contested the suit by filing
their written statement. In their written statement it has
been submitted that the provisions contained in Section 10
of the CPC are attracted to the instant case because the
issues involved in the suit are substantially identical to the
issue
involved
in
the
suit
already
filed
by
legal
representatives of the plaintiffs against the defendants
before the Court of Munsiff, Sumbal. The defendants have
denied the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs over
the suit land. According to the defendants, there is a public
FAO No.49/2025
road in existence on spot which has been in continuous
uninterrupted
usage
of
the
defendants
and
other
inhabitants of the locality for the last more than thirty
years. It has been submitted that the said public road has
been repaired and renovated by various State agencies from
time to time and that the plaintiffs are trying to encroach
upon the said public road by installing a gate which was
removed by the orders of SDM, Sumbal. It has been
submitted that the suit of the plaintiffs is hit by the
provisions of Section 41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act.
According to the defendants, the road is being used by the
public at large for ingress and egress towards their
respective fields and that the plaintiffs have no title over the
same. It has been submitted that even if the plaintiffs have
any title over the land on which the road has been
constructed, by their own omissions, the plaintiffs have lost
their right on account of continuous usage of the public
road by the defendants and other inhabitants of the locality.
4)
The learned trial court initially passed an exparte
interim
injunction
on
20.05.2025,
whereby
the
appellants/defendants were temporarily restrained from
causing any sort of interference with the suit land falling
under survey No.186/14 measuring 11 kanals and 13
marlas situated at Gund Balakh Hajin. After hearing the
FAO No.49/2025
parties and after analyzing the pleadings on record, the
learned trial court, vide impugned order dated 16.10.2025,
allowed the application of the plaintiffs under Order 39 Rule
1 and 2 CPC and confirmed interim order dated 20.05.2025
passed by the said court.
5)
The appellants have challenged the impugned order
on the grounds that the same suffers from patent illegality
and infirmity. It has been contended that impugned order
dated 16.10.2025 has been obtained by the plaintiffs by
suppressing material facts. It has been further contended
that public road is in existence and it is in continuous use
of public and, as such, inquiry with regard to the title of the
land was an irrelevant factor for purpose of deciding
application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC. It has been
contended that no injunction could have been granted in
favour of the plaintiffs in view of the provisions contained
in Section 41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act, as the subject
matter of the suit is a public road which is being used by
the defendants and other inhabitants of the locality. The
appellants
have
also
contended
that
the
legal
representatives of the plaintiffs have filed a similar suit
against the defendants before the Court of learned Munsiff
Sumbal and, as such, the trial court cannot proceed with
the present suit.
FAO No.49/2025
6)
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. I have
also gone through the memo of appeal and record of the
trial court.
7)
Before coming to the merits of the contentions raised
by the appellants for challenging the impugned order
passed by the learned trial court, it would be apt to
understand the scope of an Appellate Court’s jurisdiction to
interfere with an order granting or refusing an interim
injunction.
8)
The Supreme Court has, in the case of Seema Arshad
Zaheer & Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 282, while discussing the
scope of jurisdiction of Appellate Court to interfere with an
order of trial court granting or refusing an interim
injunction, observed as under:
“The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in
status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a
prima facie case….
…...appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of
discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its
own discretion except where the discretion has been
shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously
or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled
principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of
discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate
court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a
conclusion different from the one reached by the court
below if the one reached by that court was reasonably
possible on the material. The appellate court would
normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of
discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had
considered the matter at the trial stage it would have
FAO No.49/2025
come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been
exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial
manner the fact that the appellate court would have
taken a different view may not justify interference with
the trial court’s exercise of discretion.”
9)
From the foregoing legal position discussed by the
Supreme Court, it is clear that scope of jurisdiction of
Appellate Court to interfere with the discretion exercised by
trial court is limited. The Appellate Court will step in to
reverse or vary an interim injunction only if findings of fact
recorded by the trial court are manifestly unreasonable, or
based on no evidence, or that the trial court has failed to
correctly apply the foundational tripartite test, that is
establishing a prima facie case, demonstrating the balance
of convenience, and proving irreparable injury. The
Appellate Court can also interfere in an order of interim
injunction passed by the trial court if the said court has
ignored settled procedural laws or has considered irrelevant
material while excluding the relevant material. However,
the Appellate Court cannot substitute its own discretion for
that of the trial court merely because it might have reached
a different conclusion on the same facts. As long as the trial
court's view is reasonably possible based on material on
record, the Appellate Court ought not to interfere with the
exercise of discretion by the trial court.
10)
With the aforesaid legal position in mind, let us now
advert to the facts of the present case. The plaintiffs claim
FAO No.49/2025
that they are owners in possession of land measuring 11
kanals and 13 marlas in Survey No. 186/14. They have
placed on record of the trial court a copy of Khasra
Girdawari which supports their claim. The land in respect
of which the plaintiffs are seeking interim injunction
against the defendants appears to be owned and possessed
by the plaintiffs. Thus, there is a prima facie case in their
favour.
11)
The defendants claim that there is a road existing on
spot which is being blocked by plaintiffs on the basis of
their claim that the road is passing through their
proprietary land. In this regard, the defendants have relied
upon order dated 20.05.2025 issued by Sub Divisional
Magistrate, Sumbal, whereby Tehsildar, Hajin, and SHO,
Hajin, have been directed to restore the road to its original
form, ensuring all obstructions and encroachments are
removed. They are also relying upon communication dated
12.01.2026
addressed
by
Executive
Engineer,
R&B
Division, Sumbal to SDM, Sumbal, whereby it has been
brought to the notice of the SDM that the road has been
obstructed by the persons claiming to be the owner of the
land on which the road is being constructed. The appellants
have also placed on record notice dated 20.02.2026 issued
by Assistant Executive Engineer, PWD R&B, Sub Division
FAO No.49/2025
Hajin to one Nazir Ahmed Dar, who, according to the
appellants, happens to be the son of respondent No. 3. Vide
the said notice, Shri Nazir Ahmed Dar has been asked to
remove encroachment and restore the road to its original
condition.
12)
When we analyze the documents placed on record by
both the parties, it appears that while the documents
placed on record by the plaintiffs, prima facie, demonstrate
that they are owners in possession of the suit land, the
documents on which defendants have placed reliance, do
not go on to rebut the aforesaid position. These documents
do not in any manner support the assertion of the
defendants that they have been using the aforesaid land of
the plaintiffs for ingress and egress to their fields for any
length of time. What these documents tend to show is that
there is an attempt on the part of the officials of the State
to construct a road, but it is not clear whether the said road
is being constructed on the land owned and possessed by
the plaintiffs or it is being constructed on land other than
the suit land.
13)
Even if it is assumed that the officials of the State are
attempting to construct the road on the land owned and
possessed by them, the same cannot be done without
adopting due course of law. Right to Property is a
FAO No.49/2025
constitutional right and it cannot be taken away except in
due course of law. Once it is shown that the plaintiffs are
owners in possession of the suit land, they have a right to
protect their said right unless those who intend to take over
their land for the purpose of construction of the road adopt
due course of law.
14)
There is yet another aspect of the matter which needs
to be noticed. In the suit filed before the Munsiff, Sumbal,
relating to the construction of road in the same area, the
learned Munsiff had appointed Tehsildar, Hajin, as the
Commissioner to visit the spot and submit his report. The
Commissioner in his report dated 10.07.2025, has
categorically reported that Survey Nos.218/16, 180/20, 17
and 19 are proprietary land as per revenue record. He has
also reported that there is a 10 feet wide road on spot
constructed by R&B Department and the said road is kacha
with gravel and stones at some places. He has further
reported that on spot no construction is being undertaken
and that because the land in question is proprietary, the
land owners on their own can use any other ingress or
egress which seems fit to them. Thus, the Commissioner
has suggested that the land owners, for ingress and egress
to their land, can use alternate route because the land in
question is proprietary land. This supports the claim of the
FAO No.49/2025
plaintiffs that the land on which defendants are trying to
construct road with the help of the State officials is under
their ownership and possession.
15)
The learned trial court has, while passing the
impugned order, meticulously analyzed the documents on
record and reached a conclusion that there is a prima facie
case in favour of the plaintiffs. The said conclusion arrived
at by the learned trial court can, by no stretch of reasoning,
be termed as either perverse or based upon irrelevant
materials.
16)
It has been contended by learned counsel for the
appellants that because the interim injunction passed by
the learned trial court amounts to stalling construction of
a public road, as such, the same is not sustainable in law.
He has contended that individual interest has to yield to the
public interest. However, this aspect of the matter has not
been considered by the learned trial court.
17)
In the above context, it is to be noted that the
plaintiffs have sought injunction against the defendants
who are private individuals and they are not seeking an
injunction against the State. Interest of the defendants
cannot be given preference over the interest of the plaintiffs,
particularly when the defendants have not brought on
FAO No.49/2025
record anything to rebut the claim of the plaintiffs that they
are owners in possession of the suit land, which is
supported by the revenue extracts or that the pathway
through the land of the plaintiffs is under their use for any
length of time.
18)
A perusal of the impugned order would reveal that it
has been made clear by the learned trial court that passing
of the interim injunction would not prevent the Government
or any other competent authority from acquiring the suit
land for public purposes and it has also been clarified that
the said order shall have no binding effect upon the
Government or its executing agencies acting under due
legal authority, thereby safeguarding the rights of the
Government agencies to take action in accordance with law.
19)
For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any ground to
interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned
trial court. The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed
accordingly.
20)
The trial court record along with a copy of this
judgment be sent back.
(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge
SRINAGAR
30.06.2026
“Bhat Altaf-Secretary”
Whether the judgment is reportable: YES/NO
FAO No.49/2025
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