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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMP(M) No.2133 of 2024
Reserved on:30.10.2026
Date of decision: 05.11.2026
...Applicant
Yugal Kishore
Versus
Jiwan Lal
...Respondent.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the applicant
For the respondent
:
Mr.Neeraj Gupta, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Ajeet Pal Singh Jaswal, Advocate.
:
Mr.
Bhuvnesh
Sharma,
Senior
Advocate with Ms. Vishali Lakhanpal,
Advocate.
Romesh Verma, Judge
The present application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act has been filed for condonation of 7 years, 9 months and 2 days’
delay in filing the instant Regular Second Appeal.
2.
As per the averments as made in the application, the
learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., vide
judgment and decree dated 18.07.2014, in a suit filed by the
respondent for recovery of Rs.6,14,526/- on account of the capital
amount invested by the plaintiff in the partnership business run by the
parties, which stood dissolved with effect from 31.03.2005, decreed
the suit for a sum of Rs. 6,14,526/- along with interest at the rate of 9%
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the
judgment?
-2per annum from the date of institution of the suit till total realization of
the entire decretal amount.
3.
Thereafter, the defendant/present applicant preferred an
appeal in the Court of learned Additional District Judge (I), Mandi,
District Mandi on 23.08.2014. The learned first appellate Court, vide
impugned judgment dated 29.11.2016, dismissed the appeal preferred
by the present applicant and affirmed the findings returned by the
learned trial Court.
4.
The plaintiff/respondent had instituted the suit for recovery
of Rs. 6,14,526/- against the defendant on the ground that the parties
are real brothers and entered into a partnership business under the
name and style of 'Pandit Brothers', Ram Nagar, Mandi town, H.P.,
vide partnership deed dated 01.04.2001. It was contended by the
plaintiff in the suit that some dispute arose inter se the parties,
therefore, the plaintiff deemed it proper to withdraw from the
partnership business to avoid any sort of confrontation or bitterness on
account of blood relations. Consequently, the partnership business
stood dissolved between the parties through a dissolution deed dated
31.03.2005 with effect from 31.03.2005.
5.
As per the case as set up by the plaintiff before the
learned trial Court, he had invested a capital amount in the said
partnership
business
amounting
to
Rs.
5,14,526/-
plus
Rs.1,00,000/- = Rs. 6,14,526/- in total. In terms of Clause 5 of the
-3dissolution deed, the defendant had undertaken the liability of paying
back the capital amount so invested by the plaintiff in the partnership
business, as verified in the balance sheet of 'Pandit Brothers, Mandi in
the auditor’s report as on 31.03.2005. It was submitted by the plaintiff
that although a period of more than one year had elapsed since the
dissolution of the partnership business, the defendant failed to repay
the capital amount invested by the plaintiff, which upon dissolution had
been undertaken by the defendant to be repaid through bank cheques.
Despite repeated requests made to the defendant to pay the suit
amount in discharge of his liability towards the plaintiff in terms of the
undertaking, he failed to pay the same. In these circumstances, the
plaintiff instituted the suit for recovery of Rs. 6,14,526/- on account of
the capital amount invested by him in the dissolved partnership
business, along with future interest at the rate of 9% per annum from
the date of institution of the suit till realization of the entire decretal
amount.
6.
The suit was resisted by the present applicant/defendant
by filing written statement wherein preliminary objections with respect
to maintainability, enforceability, cause of action, etc. were raised. On
merits, all the averments made in the plaint were specifically refuted
and denied.
7.
The learned trial Court framed issues in the matter on
31.05.2008 and directed the parties to adduce evidence in support of
-4their respective contentions. Vide judgment and decree dated
18.07.2014, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mandi, District
Mandi, decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 6,14,526/along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of
institution of the suit till total realization of the entire decretal amount.
Thereafter, the appeal preferred by the present applicant was
dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge(I), Mandi, on
29.11.2016 in Civil Appeal No. 21/15/2014.
8.
Feeling aggrieved by the same, the applicant preferred
the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court on 30.12.2024
along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which,
as per the report of the Registry, is barred by limitation by 7 years, 9
months and 2 days.
9.
In the application filed for condonation of delay, it has
been averred that the certified copy of the judgment and decree
passed by the first appellate Court was applied on 30.11.2016, which
was prepared and delivered on 30.12.2016. It is the case of the
applicant that he intended to file an appeal and, for that purpose,
contacted his present counsel in the first week of January 2017 to
seek a legal opinion. Certified copies of the impugned judgment and
decree, along with the judgment of the learned trial Court, were
dispatched through post. Upon receipt, the counsel informed the
applicant that an appeal could be filed as it involved substantial
-5questions of law. However, since the Courts were about to close for
the winter vacation, the applicant was advised to contact the counsel
after the reopening of the Courts. Thereafter, the Courts closed for the
winter vacation and the applicant did not follow up with the learned
counsel, as he could not recall the further procedure for the
presentation of the appeal and remained under the impression that he
had in the meantime sent the case file to the learned counsel and the
appeal would be filed. According to the applicant, for a considerable
period nothing happened and even when notice of the execution
petition was received, he remained under the impression that the
appeal was pending adjudication before this Court. Subsequently, on
account of the COVID-19 pandemic, no further steps could be taken
by him. However, once the restrictions were lifted, the applicant
inquired into the matter, whereupon it transpired that no appeal had
been instituted.
10.
The applicant asserted that the delay in filing the instant
appeal occurred on account of communication gap between him and
his learned counsel, which was neither intentional nor willful, but
occurred under unavoidable circumstances. As per the applicant, the
reasons assigned in the application constitute good and sufficient
grounds for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, which deserves to
be condoned and thereafter the appeal deserves to be heard and
disposed of on its own merits. It has been prayed that the delay of 7
-6years, 9 months and 2 days in filing the appeal be ordered to be
condoned.
11.
The application has been vehemently resisted by the non-
applicant/respondent by filing a reply, wherein it is asserted that the
contents of the application are false, baseless, misleading, and
incorrect and that the applicant has concocted an imaginary and
unbelievable story. It is submitted that the statement of the applicant
was recorded on 28.11.2022 in the execution proceedings, wherein
the learned counsel for the applicant stated at the Bar that the
applicant had already deposited the amount before the High Court and
that the case was pending before this Court. The non-applicant had
instituted Execution Petition No.1-X/18 before the learned executing
Court for implementation and enforcement of the judgment and decree
passed by the learned trial Court, which had been affirmed by the
learned first appellate Court. It is further submitted that the applicant
misstated before the executing Court on 11.12.2024 that the decretal
amount had been deposited before this Court and that the case was
pending before the High Court.
12.
It is further reiterated that under the pretext of the alleged
pendency of the matter before this Court, the applicant sought
repeated adjournments, and the execution proceedings were delayed
on the strength of a false narrative set up merely to explain the
inordinate, intentional, and willful delay. It has been highlighted that the
-7execution petition had been preferred in January 2018, yet for more
than seven years, no steps whatsoever were taken by the applicant to
assail the impugned judgment passed by the learned first appellate
Court.
13.
It is also stated that the COVID-19 period came to an end
almost in the last month of 2021, yet even thereafter, no steps were
taken by the applicant for more than three years to file the appeal. The
execution proceedings have been pending before the executing Court
for more than 7 years and the applicant has been misleading the
executing Court by stating that the decretal amount has been
deposited before this Court. As per the non-applicant, since the
applicant has not approached the Court with clean hands, has
suppressed material facts and has tried to hoodwink this Court and the
learned executing Court, the application for condonation of the
inordinate and unexplained delay deserves to be rejected.
14.
Lastly, it has been contended by the learned senior
counsel for the non-applicant that no material has been placed on
record by the applicant in order to demonstrate what steps were taken
by him from the date of passing of the impugned judgment by the
learned first appellate Court on 29.11.2016. It has further been stated
that the applicant was served in the matter on 22.02.2018. Even
thereafter, no steps were taken for assailing the judgment. Therefore,
the entire averments as made in the application are a concocted story
-8and cannot be believed, being devoid of any merit and basis. The nonapplicant has prayed for the dismissal of the application as highly
belated.
15.
The applicant filed a rejoinder to the reply filed by the non-
applicant, reiterating the averments made in the application and
denying the contentions raised in the reply. It has been stated in the
rejoinder that an amount of Rs. 13,15,085/- was deposited in the
Registry of this Court on 25.02.2025.
16.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant has
contended that the applicant has made out a case for condonation of
delay in filing the appeal and, therefore, the delay of 7 years, 9 months
and 2 days deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice. He
submits that the appeal could not be filed on account of a bona fide
communication gap between the applicant and his counsel, as also
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He contends that the delay is neither
intentional nor willful and that the respondent/non-applicant can be
adequately compensated by imposing suitable costs.
17.
On the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the non-
applicant has submitted that there is a huge, unexplained and
inordinate delay in filing the present appeal and no material or
document has been placed on record to demonstrate what steps were
taken by the applicant after the passing of the judgment by the learned
first appellate Court way back in 2016. It has been submitted that, for
-9the sake of argument, even if it is presumed that on account of a
communication gap the appeal was not preferred immediately after the
judgment of the learned first appellate Court, what prevented him from
instituting the appeal when he was served in the execution petition
preferred by the non-applicant and counsel appeared for the present
applicant on 22.02.2018 before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Mandi
in the execution petition filed by the present respondent/decree holder
for enforcement of the decree.
18.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also
perused the record carefully.
19.
In the present case, the non-applicant/respondent had
instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 6,14,526/- on account of the capital
amount invested by him in the partnership business run by the parties,
which stood dissolved with effect from 31.03.2005. The suit was duly
contested by the present applicant. After evidence was adduced by the
respective parties, the learned trial Court, vide judgment and decree
dated 18.07.2014, decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 6,14,526/- along
with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of institution of
the suit till realization of the entire decretal amount.
20.
Feeling aggrieved, the applicant assailed the said
judgment and decree before the learned first appellate Court, but
remained unsuccessful.
-1021.
The impugned judgment was passed by the learned
Additional District Judge(I), Mandi, on 29.11.2016, whereas the
present appeal came to be filed on 30.12.2024, after elapse of more 7
years, 9 months and 2 days.
22.
A perusal of the application reveals that the applicant
claims to have contacted his counsel in the first week of January 2017
to seek a legal opinion and certified copies of the impugned judgment
and decree along with the trial court judgment were sent through post.
Upon receipt thereof, the learned counsel reportedly informed the
applicant that an appeal could be preferred as it involved substantial
questions of law; however, as the Courts were about to close for the
winter vacation, he was advised to contact the counsel after the
reopening of the Courts. After the reopening of the Courts, the
applicant failed to contact the learned counsel, purportedly because he
could not recall the further procedure required for the presentation of
the appeal and remained under the impression that the file had already
been transmitted and the appeal would be filed. It is further pleaded
that on account of the COVID-19 pandemic, no action was taken, and
only after the pandemic was over, he contacted the counsel,
whereupon it was revealed that the appeal had not been presented.
23.
This Court is of the considered opinion that the
explanation given in the application is vague, indefinite and cryptic.
The record shows that the judgment came to be passed by the learned
-11Additional District Judge on 29.11.2016, and the non-applicant, in
order to execute the judgment and decree passed by the courts below,
filed Execution Petition No. 1-X/18 before the learned trial Court. The
executing Court issued notices in the said execution on 03.01.2018.
The counsel for the present applicant appeared before the executing
Court on 22.02.2018 and sought time to file a reply. It can also be
gathered from the record that thereafter, on different dates, time was
sought by the learned counsel for the present applicant for filing a
reply. On 25.08.2022, warrant of attachment was issued against the
property of Jugal Kishore for recovery of the decretal amount. As on
the said date, it was observed by the learned trial court that none had
put in an appearance on behalf of the JD/applicant and since the JD
had not filed objections, the necessary warrants were issued.
24.
On 28.11.2022, learned counsel for the JD/applicant
appeared before the executing court and made a statement at the bar
that his client had already deposited the amount before the High Court,
and that the case was pending before this Court. Thereafter, the case
was listed on 28.02.2023. Subsequently, on different dates, the matter
was listed before the learned executing court and the record reflects
that thereafter the applicant/JD also changed his counsel.
25.
On 11.12.2024, learned counsel for the applicant stated
that the JD had deposited the decretal amount before the High Court,
whereupon learned counsel was directed to tender the record qua the
-12same.
A perusal of the case file shows that the conduct of the
applicant is not aboveboard and the explanation which has been given
in the application cannot be presumed to be correct. Though, the
applicant was duly served in the execution proceedings, represented
by counsel and repeated opportunities were availed to file a reply, but,
after four years from the date of filing of the execution petition, a
statement was made on 28.11.2022 that the decretal amount stood
deposited before this Court and that the case was pending before the
High Court. This demonstrates that the applicant has suppressed
material facts not only from the learned executing court but also from
this Court.
26.
The impugned judgment was passed in the year 2016 and
once the applicant was duly served in the execution proceedings in the
year 2018, there is no explanation whatsoever in the application as to
what prevented him from filing the instant regular second appeal.
Along with the application, no documentary evidence has been placed
on record to show what steps were taken by the applicant, either by
contacting
his
counsel
telephonically
or
by
sending
written
communication inquiring about the filing or pendency of the appeal.
The explanation offered in the application that certified copies of the
judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court and the learned
first appellate court were sent through post to the learned counsel,
whereafter the applicant remained under the impression that the
-13appeal had been filed is imaginary and unacceptable. It is not the case
of the applicant that he visited Shimla for the purpose of filing the
appeal and, after appending his signatures to the pleadings/power of
attorney, he was under an impression that the appeal has been filed. It
cannot be presumed that by merely dispatching certified copies of the
judgments through post, the appeal would stand filed.
27.
This Court is in agreement with the contention raised by
the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the endeavour of
the applicant is merely to prolong the litigation in perpetuity on one
pretext or the other.
28.
It has been contended by the learned Senior Counsel for
the applicant that the applicant has a strong prima facie case on merits
and while determining the application, the merits of the case would
show that he has an arguable case and in that event the application
deserves to be allowed.
29.
Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 6145 of 2024, titled Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
decided on 21.03.2025, which reads as follows:
“14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that
delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major
aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular
case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled
merely on the basis of limitation.
-14‘12. Definition.—In this part, unless the context otherwise
requires, “the State” includes the Government and Parliament
of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the
States and all local or other authorities within the territory of
India or under the control of the Government of India.”
30.
To counter the said submission of the learned Senior
Counsel, learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in Special
Leave to Appeal (C) No. 9719 of 2020, titled H. Guruswamy and
others v. A. Krishnaiah since deceased by LRs, decided on
08.01.2025, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that while
considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not
commence with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty
to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only when sufficient cause is assigned by
the litigant and the opposition from the other side is equally balanced
that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that no
court should keep the sword of Damocles hanging over the head of a
litigant for an indefinite period of time. The relevant extract of the
judgment reads as follows:
“16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which
the court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor
of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they
-15want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of
instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right
to have the matter considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must
not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a
duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered
by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the
merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not
merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of
equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.”
31.
Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP (C) No. 17575 of
2023, titled Thirunagalingam v. Lingeshwaran and another,
decided on 13.05.2025 held that while considering a plea for
condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation, rather than embarking upon the merits of the
main matter. Only when sufficient cause or plausible reasons are
assigned for the delay and the opposition from the other side stands
on equal footing, may the court consider the merits of the main matter
-16for the purpose of condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court held
as follows:
“31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is
to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by
the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the
merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or
reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of
the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the
court may consider the merits of the main matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several
cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of
generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at
the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the
present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to
demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the
matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay
remains unmet.
33. Therefore, in the case at hand, once it has been
established that the reasons provided for condoning the delay
in the application filed are not sufficient, we are not inclined to
go into the merits of the contentions raised by the learned
counsel of Respondents regarding Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, 1963.”
32.
In view of the settled dictum and exposition of law laid
down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is manifest that the court owes a
duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. As discussed hereinabove, the applicant
has failed to establish the bona fides of the explanation set forth in the
-17application. The explanation for not filing the instant appeal for more
than seven and a half years is neither plausible, reasonable nor
justifiable.
33.
As observed earlier, there is no document on record to
substantiate or establish that the applicant was vigilant while pursuing
the matter or in preparing the appeal before this Court. Save and
except the bald assertions averred in the application, no material or
document has been placed on record to demonstrate or establish the
bona fide/sufficient cause on behalf of the applicant. The explanation
that since certified copies of the judgments of the learned trial court
and the first appellate court were sent to the learned counsel, the
applicant was under the impression that the appeal had been filed, is
neither believable nor acceptable. The delay in the case in hand is
huge, inordinate, and unexplained. Therefore, this Court will not come
to the aid of a party that has not approached the Court with bona fide
reasons and sufficient cause.
34.
Learned senior counsel for the respondent has also
placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP
(Civil) Nos. 935–936 of 2021, titled Rajneesh Kumar and another v.
Ved Prakash, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that over a
period of time, a tendency on the part of litigants to blame their
advocates for negligence and carelessness in attending the court
proceedings has become prevalent. Even assuming for a moment that
-18the concerned advocate was careless or negligent, that by itself
cannot constitute a ground to condone a long and inordinate delay, as
a litigant owes a duty to remain vigilant of his own rights and is
expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending
in court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, cannot be
permitted to shift the entire blame onto the advocate and disown him
at any time to seek relief. It is well settled that an advocate is the agent
of the party, and his acts and statements made within the scope of
authority bind the principal, that is, the party engaging him. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the said judgment held as follows:
10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the
head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in
the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a
tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of
negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings
before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the
concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself,
cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as
the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is
expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings
pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant,
therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on
the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time
and seek relief.
11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this
Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd.
reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court observed as
under:“8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and
statements, made within the limits of authority given to him,
-19are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party
who engage him. It is true that in certain situations, the court
may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or
an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or
misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client
was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule
that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek
relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such
an absolute rule would make the working of the system
extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq [AIR
1981 SC 1400] must not be understood as an absolute
proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was
an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of
seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal
filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the
court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant
villager but a private limited company with its head office at
Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who
know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their
applications were not deposed of before taking up the suit
for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear
before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics
as alleged by the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear
they chose to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted
such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right
to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the
advocate and trying to make it out as if they S.L.P. (CIVIL)
NOS. 935-936 OF 2021 were totally unaware of the nature
or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot
be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
35.
Generally, the Courts have adopted a very liberal approach in
construing the phrase 'sufficient cause' used in Section 5 of the Limitation
-20Act, in order to condone delay to enable the Courts to do substantial justice
and to apply the law in a meaningful manner that sub-serves the ends of
justice. Notwithstanding the above, no matter how liberal an approach is
adopted in condoning delay, the existence of sufficient cause for not filing
the appeal in time is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary
power to condone the delay. The phrases 'liberal approach', 'justiceoriented approach', and cause for the advancement of substantial justice'
cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale
matters or, as a matter of fact, dead matters to be revived and reopened by
taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It must always be borne in
mind, while construing sufficient cause in deciding applications under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation
prescribed for filing an appeal, a substantive right accrues in favour of the
decree-holder, and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed.
36.
The Hon'ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that even after
sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within
time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of
right, as excusing the delay is within the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court. The Court, despite the establishment of sufficient cause, may for
various reasons refuse to condone the delay, depending upon the bona
fides of the party. The liberal approach in considering the sufficiency of
cause for delay should not be allowed to override the substantive law of
limitation. The concept of a ‘liberal approach’ cannot be employed to jettison
-21the substantial law of limitation. It is a well-settled principle of law that
though limitation may harshly affect a particular party, it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
37.
The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. Where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain to the court what the sufficient cause
was which means an adequate and enough reason that prevented him from
approaching the court within the period of limitation. No court would be
justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever.
38.
In this regard, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba
Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and others v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA),
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018, has observed as
follows:
“12.
In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred
after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of
the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal
is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is
peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection
regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the
pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to
dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond
limitation. This is the
general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned
only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the
courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed
period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not
-22preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the
courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal
even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed
appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within
time. The said power to condone the delay or to
admit the appeal
preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in
nature and may
not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of
other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc.
13.
It is very elementary and well understood that courts should
not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the
applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather
follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
14 to 20 xx xx xx xx
21.
In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh &
Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for
the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation
of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its
discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should
have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner.
The liberal approach in
considering sufficiency of cause for delay
should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The
Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal
‘justice-oriented
approach’,
approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be
employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
22. xx xx xx
23.
In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer
8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though
limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be
-23applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts
have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no
power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid
decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium
has to be maintained
between adopting liberal approach and in
implementing the statute as it stands, Paragraph 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing
from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting
from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands
attracted
in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience
is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”
39.
In the present case as well, the explanation and reasons
assigned in the application fail to make out a case for condonation of
delay in filing the appeal. The applicant has failed to establish
sufficient cause for condonation of delay and has equally failed to
establish bona fides in the explanation offered in the application. There
is a huge and inordinate delay of more than 7 years, 9 months and 2
days in filing the appeal. Therefore, in the absence of any sufficient or
plausible grounds, no relief can be granted in favour of the applicant/
appellant in the attending facts and circumstances of the case.
-2440.
A valuable right which has accrued in favour of the
respondent/non-applicant cannot be taken away by allowing the
application of the applicant, thereby prolonging the agony of the
respondent in perpetuity.
41.
Consequently,
in
view
of
the
observations
made
hereinabove, the present application, being devoid of any merit, is
dismissed.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
5th November, 2026.
(vt)
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