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IN THE HIGH COURTOF DELHIAT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 29.04.2026
Pronounced on: 18.08.2026
#
CNR No.DLHC012681562018
+
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 252/2018
YASH KHANNA
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Girish Chander, Mr.
Vaibhav Gusain, Mr. Ashish
Kandpal, Advs.
versus
BHAWNA
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Paritosh Singh Rajput,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1.
The present appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the
Family Courts Act, 1984 assailing the Judgment and Decree dated
02.05.2018 passed by learned Principal Judge, Family Courts, East
District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in HMA No. 117/2018 (earlier
HMA No. 450/2016) titled as Sh. Yash Khanna v. Smt. Bhawna,
whereby, the divorce petition filed by the appellant herein under
Section 13(1A)and 13(1)(ib) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter
as “HMA”)was dismissed.
2.
The facts which are necessary for the decision of the appeal are
that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 20.02.2008 at
Arya Samaj Mandir, Yamuna Bazar, Delhi, in accordance with Hindu
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rites and customs. No child was born from the said wedlock. Due to
marital discord, on 10.06.2008, the respondent filed a complaint under
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter as “IPC”)
against the appellant and his family.
3.
In the year 2008, the respondent herein had also filed a petition
under Section 9 of the HMA being HMA No. 402/11/2008 seeking
restitution of conjugal rights with the appellant and vide judgment
dated 17.09.2013, the learned Additional District Judge, allowed the
same and passed a decree in favour of the respondent.
4.
Despite obtaining the aforesaid decree, the parties failed to
resume cohabitation, and a period of two years elapsed without any
resumption of conjugal rights between them. As a result thereof, on
22.04.2016, the appellant filed a petition under Section 13(1A) read
with Section 13(1)(ib) of the HMA seeking dissolution of their
marriage which was dismissed by the impugned order, under
challenge before this court in the present appeal.
5.
The primary contention raised by the learned counsel for the
appellant is that there is no valid marriage between the parties. It is
argued that despite the fact that the matrimonial ceremonies were
conducted, the appellant was under the influence of a sedative
substance at the time, thereby rendering the marriage voidable.
6.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the respondent has been living
separately from him since 17.09.2013 without any just cause and
reason. It is submitted that the respondent who, despite obtaining a
decree of restitution of conjugal rights in her favour, failed to make
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any effort to resume cohabitation with the appellant as she was
vigorously prosecuting the criminal case filed by her under Section
498A of the IPC against him.
7.
Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that under
the provisions of Section 13(1A) of the HMA, either party may
approach the Court to present a petition for dissolution of marriage on
the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights
between the parties for a period of one year or more after passing of a
decree under Section 9 HMA. It is submitted that the learned Family
Court failed to acknowledge the complete inaction on part of the
respondent to enforce the decree of restitution of conjugal rights and
thus, the appellant was entitled to the relief of divorce under Section
13(1A) HMA.
8.
It is also contended that the learned Family Court has, without
any rhyme and reason, arrived at the finding that the appellant is
taking advantage of his own wrongs for the purpose of seeking
divorce under Section 13(1A) of the HMA. It is argued that the
appellant is regularly complying with the order of maintenance by
paying a monthly sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the respondent and thus, the
appellant, cannot in any way, be said to have committed any wrong
within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the HMA. It is therefore
submitted that the impugned judgment is unsustainable in law, in as
much as mere reluctance on the part of the appellant to agree to offer a
reunion, cannot be termed as a wrongful conduct on his part when the
respondent herself is disinterested in the same. Reliance in this regard
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has been placed on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Smt.
Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha (1984) 4 SCC 90. He also
placed reliance on Ram Kali v. Gopal Dass, 1971 SCC OnLine Del 6;
T Srinivasan v. T. Varalakshmi, (1998) 3 SCC 112; Hirachand
Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda, (2001) 4SCC 125; Mita Gupta v.
Prabir Kumar Gupta, 1988 SCC OnLine Cal 144; Dharmendra
Kumar v. Usha Kumar, (1977) 4 SCC 12.
9.
Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently
opposed the instant appeal by submitting to the effect that the
respondent has always been willing to rejoin the company of the
appellant. It is argued that the appellant deserted the respondent
without any sufficient cause and reason, as a result of which, she was
constrained to file a petition under Section 9 of HMA. It is also
submitted that she could not pursue an execution petition of the decree
passed in her favour in the Section 9 proceedings due to financial
constraints and hence, it was dismissed as withdrawn. Learned counsel
for the respondent therefore, submitted that the learned Family Court
rightly arrived at its findings and accordingly, the present appeal is
liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merit. Reliance in this
regard has been placed on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court
in Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar (Supra).
10.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused
the relevant material available on record.
11.
At the outset, we find it imperative to note that the learned
counsel for the appellant has taken a plea of the marriage being void.
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It is his preliminary contention that although the marriage ceremonies
were performed, the appellant was under the influence of a sedative
substance at the said time, and thus, the marriage between the parties
is void.
12.
For examining the correctness of this submission of the learned
counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to point out that Section 5 of
the HMA provides for essential conditions for a valid Hindu Marriage,
the contravention of which, results in a marriage being void, as per
Section 11 of HMA. The case of the appellant does not relate to
contravention of any conditions stipulated under Section 5 of HMA,
so as to allege that the marriage is void.
13.
The allegations of the appellant that the marriage was
performed when he was under the influence of sedative substance, can
at the most attract the provision of Section 12(1)(c) of HMA which
declares the marriage being voidable if the consent was obtained by
force or fraud, etc., for which a petition for annulment was to be
presented in Court within one year of discovery of fraud.
14.
Further, as is the admitted position, the dispute about the
validity of marriage was challenged by the appellant in the petition
filed under Section 9 of the HMA by the respondent which issue was
decided against the appellant and has attained finality.
15.
At this stage, for proper adjudication of the present appeal qua
the dismissal of the appellant’s divorce petition, it is necessary to refer
to the relevant provisions of the HMA.
16.
Section 9 which deals with the restitution of conjugal rights,
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reads as follows:
"9. Restitution of conjugal right.— When
either the husband or the wife has, without
reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society
of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by
petition to the district court, for restitution of
conjugal rights and the court, on being
satisfied of the truth of the statements made in
such petition and that there is no legal ground
why the application should not be granted,
may decree restitution of conjugal rights
accordingly.”
17.
Furthermore, in 1964, Section 13 of the HMA was amended by
the Act 44 of 1964 and section 13(1A) was inserted, which reads as
under:
"13 (1A) Either party to a marriage, whether
solemnized before or after the commencement
of this Act, may also present a petition for the
dissolution of the marriage by a decree of
divorce on the ground:
(i) that there has been no resumption of
cohabitation as between the parties to the
marriage for a period of two years or upwards
after the passing of a decree for judicial
separation in a proceeding to which they were
parties: or
(ii) that there has been no restitution of
conjugal rights as between the parties to the
marriage for a period of two years or upwards
after the passing of a decree for restitution of
conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they
were parties".
18.
This section was further amended by Act No. 68 of 1976
whereby, the prescribed period of two years was reduced to one year.
19.
Post the amendment acts, the aforesaid provision makes it
crystal clear that after passing of a decree of judicial separation or
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restitution of conjugal rights, when the parties fail to resume
cohabitation for a period of one year or more, a decree of divorce
could be granted at the instance of either of the parties. The object of
this amendment is to enlarge the scope of the aggrieved party’s right
to prefer a divorce petition on the ground of passage of time without
resumption of cohabitation between the parties.
20.
In addition to the aforesaid, Section 23(1)(a) of the HMA
prescribes that even when a ground for relief is established, the Court
must be satisfied that the petitioner is not, in any way, taking
advantage of his or her own wrong. In other words, the Court is
empowered to examine the conduct of the party seeking divorce and if
it finds that the relief is being sought on the basis of the petitioner’s
own wrongdoing, the Court may refuse to grant such relief.
21.
Section 23 of HMA provides as under:
“23. Decree in proceedings.—(1) In any
proceeding under this Act, whether defended
or not, if the court is satisfied that
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief
exists and the petitioner [except in cases
where the relief is sought by him on the
ground specified in sub-clause (a), sub-clause
(b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (ii) of section
5] is not in any way taking advantage of his
or her own wrong or disability for the
purpose of such relief, and
(b) where the ground of the petition is the
ground specified 3 * * * in clause (i) of subsection (1) of section 13, the petitioner has not
in any manner been accessory to or connived
at or condoned the act or acts complained of,
or where the ground of the petition is cruelty
the petitioner has not in any manner condoned
the cruelty, and
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[(bb) when a divorce is sought on the ground
of mutual consent, such consent has not been
obtained by force, fraud or undue influence,
and]
(c) [the petition (not being a petition presented
under section 11)] is not presented or
prosecuted in collusion with the respondent,
and
(d) there has not been any unnecessary or
improper delay in instituting the proceeding,
and
(e) there is no other legal ground why relief
should not be granted, then, and in such a
case, but not otherwise, the court shall decree
such relief accordingly.
(2) Before proceeding to grant any relief
under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court
in the first instance, in every case where it is
possible so to do consistently with the nature
and circumstances of the case, to make every
endeavour to bring about reconciliation
between the parties:
[Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall apply to any proceeding wherein
relief is sought on any of the grounds specified
in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause
(v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section
(1) of section 13.]
[(3) For the purpose of aiding the court in
bringing about such reconciliation, the court
may, if the parties so desire or if the court
thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the
proceedings for a reasonable period not
exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to
any person named by the parties in this behalf
or to any person nominated by the court if the
parties fail to name any person, with
directions to report to the court as to whether
reconciliation can be and has been, effected
and the court shall in disposing of the
proceeding have due regard to the report.
(4) In every case where a marriage is
dissolved by a decree of divorce, the court
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passing the decree shall give a copy thereof
free of cost to each of the parties.] ”
(Emphasis Supplied)
22.
It is therefore, the duty of the Court to bear in mind the
aforesaid provision in deciding a divorce plea under Section 13(1A)
HMA. A conjoint reading of Sections 13(1A) and 23(1)(a) HMA
establishes that the petitioner does not have a vested right to obtain the
relief of divorce and a Court has to examine whether or not the
petitioner has approached it with clean hands.
23.
The aforementioned law has been clarified by the Supreme
Court in Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar (Supra), wherein, it has
been categorically held as follows:
“10. The question is: whether in a petition for
divorce filed under sub-section (1-A) of
Section 13, it is open to the court to refuse to
pass a decree on any of the grounds specified
in Section 23 of the Act, insofar as any one or
more of them may be applicable.
11. The contention that the right conferred by
sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 is absolute and
unqualified and that this newly conferred right
is not subject to the provisions of Section 23 is
fallacious. This argument appears to be based
on the erroneous notion that to introduce
consideration arising under Section 23(1) into
the determination of a petition filed under subsection (1-A) of Section 13 is to render the
amendments made by amending Act 44 of
1964 wholly meaningless. As noted earlier,
prior to the amendment under clauses (viii)
and (ix) of Section 13(1) the right to apply for
divorce was restricted to the party which had
obtained a decree for judicial separation or
for restitution of conjugal rights. Such a right
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was not available to the party against whom
the decree was passed. Sub-section (1-A) of
Section 13 which was introduced by the
amendment confers such a right on either
party to the marriage so that a petition for
divorce can, after the amendment, be filed not
only by the party which had obtained a decree
for judicial separation or for restitution of
conjugal rights but also by the party against
whom such a decree was passed. This is the
limited object and effect of the amendment
introduced by Act 44 of 1964. The amendment
was not introduced in order that the provisions
contained in Section 23 should be abrogated
and that is also not the effect of the
amendment. The object of sub-section (1-A)
was merely to enlarge the right to apply for
divorce and not to make it compulsive that a
petition for divorce presented under subsection (1-A) must be allowed on a mere
proof that there was no cohabitation or
restitution for the requisite period. The very
language of Section 23 shows that it governs
every proceeding under the Act and a duty is
cast on the court to decree the relief sought
only if the conditions mentioned in the subsection are satisfied, and not otherwise.
Therefore, the contention raised by the
learned counsel for the appellant that the
provisions of Section 23(1) are not relevant in
deciding a petition filed under sub-section (1A) of Section 13 of the Act, cannot be
accepted.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
24.
At this stage, the crucial question which arises for determination
of the instant appeal is whether the appellant committed any wrong
within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of HMA which disentitles him
for obtaining the relief of dissolution of marriage under Section
13(1A) of HMA.
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25.
The first and foremost claim of the appellant is that the
respondent, even after passing of the decree of restitution of conjugal
rights under Section 9 of the HMA, never tried to resume cohabitation
nor tried to execute the decree passed in her favour under Section 9
HMA.
26.
However, the record of the learned Family Court shows that it
was the appellant who had made no efforts to reconcile the matter
before filing the divorce petition or even after getting the decree of
restitution of conjugal rights whereas, the respondent was always
willing to join his company and to withdraw all the pending litigations
between them.
27.
In the cross-examination, the appellant admitted that before
preferring the divorce petition, he made no efforts to reconcile the
matter to bring his wife back after the judgment and decree being Ex.
PW-1/A.
28.
On the other hand, the respondent deposed that she was keen for
reconciliation with the appellant as she made phone calls to him for
the purpose of reconciliation, which were not picked up by the
appellant and that she is willing to live with the appellant husband and
if he had made any effort of reconciliation, then she would have joined
his company by giving up all the pending litigations between the
parties. The said relevant portion is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 4. I say that the deponent is still ready to
live with the petitioner/husband without any
condition of any type at any place where he
intends to keep and maintain her.
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5.
I say that the deponent is suffering great
hardships due to living at her parental home
and feels very undignified. I further say that
the petitioner has created a canard to obtain a
decree of divorce by filing the present petition
without any cause and reason and if any effort
of reconciliation could have been done by the
petitioner, then the deponent would have
joined the company of the petitioner. I further
say that the deponent is still ready to give up
all the litigations if the petitioner is still ready
to keep and maintain her. I further say that the
only motive of the petitioner is to ruin the
deponent’s matrimonial life.”
29.
Further, the respondent had filed an execution petition being
EX.P No. 223/2015 before the learned Family Court seeking
execution of the decree passed under Section 9 of the HMA, wherein
the appellant has categorically refused to join the company of the
respondent whereafter, even warrant of attachment were issued by the
executing court. The respondent has filed the copy of the orders of
executing court. The appellant has not disputed passing of the said
orders by the executing court before us.
30.
In view of the above, it is sufficient to raise an adverse
inference and to negate his averments that he was willing to resume
marital relations with the respondent, but the respondent was not
willing.
31.
Even the learned Family Court in the impugned judgment has
categorically given the findings against the appellant based on his
conduct, and we find no ground to interfere in the same.
32.
The Supreme Court in T. Srinivasan (Supra), held as below:
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“1. The finding recorded by the courts below
is that the husband obtained a decree for
restitution of conjugal rights not to act in
obedience thereof but, on the other hand, to
keep the wife deprived of her right to perform
her conjugal duties. The wife made a demand
of the husband to let her join him but he
refused to allow her enter the house, rather
he drove her away as also her relatives,
whoever attempted to rehabilitate the wife.
These acts of the husband were positive
wrongs
amounting
to
“misconduct”,
uncondonable for the purposes of Section
23(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Hence, he was rightly denied relief under
Section 13(1-A) of the said Act. The appeals,
therefore, fail and are hereby dismissed.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
33.
In the present case also, the respondent attempted to execute the
decree which was frustrated on refusal of appellant to reside with the
respondent and his admission that he never tried to bring back his wife
and rather even denying his marriage with the respondent, despite the
court decree passed against him, is squarely covered within the
meaning of word “wrong” under Section 23(1A) of the HMA.
34.
As held by the learned Family Court, after meticulous
consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the respondent
has constantly exhibited her willingness to join the company of the
appellant as she also instituted execution proceedings in furtherance of
the said decree passed on 17.09.2013, which was later dismissed as
withdrawn owing to her financial constraints. It has also been noted
that the conduct of the appellant in pursuing the petition under Section
13(1A) read with Section 13(1)(ib) HMA, without making any sincere
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effort towards resumption of cohabitation and even foreclosing the
effort of the respondent to execute the decree, clearly establishes that
his sole objective was to secure a decree of dissolution of marriage
under Section 13(1A) and (ib) of the HMA and nothing beyond it.
35.
This Court is in consonance with the findings of the learned
Family Court. It is the settled position of law that the right to obtain a
decree under Section 13(1A) HMA is subject to the conditions
stipulated under Section 23(1)(a) of the HMA. In the present case, the
appellant has pursued a course of inconsistent litigation by disputing
the factum of his marriage rather than demonstrating any positive step
towards the resumption of conjugal relation. On one hand, he disputed
the validity of the marriage itself and on the other hand, he sought
dissolution of the very same marriage under the garb of Sections
13(1)(ib) and 13(1A) of the HMA. A party cannot approbate and
reprobate simultaneously, i.e., disputing the factum of marriage while
simultaneously praying for its dissolution under the HMA. Therefore,
the said conduct of the appellant evidently falls in the category of
‘own wrong’ and is sufficient to attract the provision of Section
23(1)(a) HMA. Whereas, no positive act has been committed by the
respondent to create a situation so as to make it impossible for the
appellant to resume cohabitation.
36.
It is pertinent to note that the reliance placed by the learned
counsel for the appellant on Smt. Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar
Chadha (Supra), is wholly misplaced as the facts of the present case
are distinguishable to the extent that in the said case, the entire
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proceedings were conducted within the undisputed framework of legal
subsisting marriage which is missing in this case. The proceedings
under Section 9 were instituted by the respondent which was duly
contested by the appellant and after proper adjudication of merits, a
decree was passed in her favour. The appellant, however, neither
challenged the said decree nor made any bona fide efforts towards
resumption of conjugal rights; rather, he continued to dispute the very
validity of his marriage in multiple proceedings. The said conduct, in
our considered opinion, constitutes a grave misconduct on part of the
appellant which would make the restoration of married life,
impossible for the respondent.
37.
In view of the above observations, the plea of the appellant
regarding desertion by the respondent-wife also falls to the ground and
is not sustainable.
38.
The plea urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, to the
effect that the appellant cannot be said to have committed any wrong
within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of HMA since he has been
regularly paying maintenance of Rs. 10,000/- to the respondent, is also
devoid of any merit. As rightly observed by the learned Family Court,
the payment of maintenance by a husband is a statutory obligation
owed towards the wife. Merely because the appellant is complying
with the directions of the Court would not, by itself, entitle him to a
decree of divorce.
39.
During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the
appellant also asserted that the relationship between the parties has
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reached to such a stage where there is no possibility of reconciliation
and it would be unreasonable to maintain a union which has utterly
broken down. However, this argument also does not hold water as
though this Court is cognizant of the passing of considerable time but
a court of law cannot substitute sentiments for statutory compliance as
the settled position of law states that irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage is not a ground by itself to dissolve it and, further that the
wife till date is ready and willing to live with the husband.
40.
In view of the foregoing discussion and having perused the
material available on record, this Court finds no perversity, illegality,
or infirmity in the findings of the learned Family Court warranting
interference in the present appeal. The impugned judgment has been
passed upon due appreciation of the facts and settled principles of law.
41.
Accordingly, the present appeal, being devoid of merit, stands
dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.
RENU BHATNAGAR, J.
AUGUST 18, 2026/p/sm
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