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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
*
Judgment reserved on: 08.01.2026
Judgment delivered on: 09.01.2026
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LPA 1199/2024 & CM APPL. 72630/2024
VIVEK RAHEJA
.....Appellant
versus
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY BOARD
OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case
For the Appellant
:
Mr. Ashish Dholakia, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Srikant Mishra,
Mr. Karan Sharma, Ms. Annanya
Tyagi and Ms. Deeksha Khurana,
Advocates.
For the Respondent
:
Mr. Sahil Monga and Mr. Shasharah
Sharma, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
JUDGMENT
TEJAS KARIA, J
1.
The present Appeal challenges the judgment dated 07.08.2024 passed
in W.P.(C) 2894/2024 (“Writ Petition”) and order dated 07.10.2024 passed
in Review Petition No. 370/2024 (“Review Petition”) (collectively
“Impugned Judgment”).
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
18:27:27
LPA 1199/2024
2.
The Writ Petition was filed by the Appellant for quashing and setting
aside the order dated 12.01.2024 (“Order”) passed by the Respondent,
whereby the Appellant’s registration to practice as Insolvency Professional
has been suspended for a period of two years effective 12.02.2024.
3.
Vide the Impugned Judgment, the Writ Petition was dismissed by the
learned Single Judge by upholding the Order on the ground that the
determination made by the Respondent that the Appellant had contravened
the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”) and
its Regulations, and observing that as the Order was passed after due
consideration of all the relevant material placed before the Respondent, no
interference was required under the writ jurisdiction of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, 1950.
4.
Being aggrieved by the Impugned Judgment, the Appellant has filed
the present Appeal.
FACTUAL MATRIX
5.
The Appellant was appointed by the National Company Law
Tribunal, New Delhi (“NCLT”) to act as the Resolution Professional of
Trading Engineers (International) Limited (“Corporate Debtor”) on
04.07.2019. On 15.02.2021, the Resolution Plan vis-à-vis the Corporate
Debtor was approved by the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”). The
Respondent had issued a show cause notice to the Appellant on 21.10.2022
(“First SCN”), which was adjudicated by the Respondent vide order dated
17.02.2023 closing the First SCN by not issuing any directions to the
Appellant.
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SHARMA
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6.
On 20.07.2023, the Respondent issued another show cause notice
(“Second SCN”), which was adjudicated by the Respondent vide the Order,
wherein it was found that the Appellant had contravened the provisions of
the Code and the Regulations made thereunder, because of the following
violations:
i.
Ineligibility of Mr. Sushant Chhabra as a Joint Resolution
Applicant along with M/s Conquerent Control Systems Pvt.
Limited (“Conquerent”);
ii.
Suppression of relevant facts from the CoC;
iii.
Discrepancy in examining financial capability of Mr. Sushant
Chhabra;
iv.
Disposal of the assets of the Corporate Debtor without the
approval of the CoC; and
v.
Executing Lease Agreement with the Prospective Resolution
Applicants with respect to assets of the Corporate Debtor without
the approval of the CoC.
7.
In view of the above, in exercise of powers conferred under Section
220(2) of the Code and the Regulations made thereunder, the registration of
the Appellant as Insolvency Professional was suspended for a period of two
years with effect from 12.02.2024.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
8.
Mr. Ashish Dholakia, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant
submitted that:
8.1. The Order passed by the Respondent has found that the
Appellant has committed five violations of the Code and the
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SHARMA
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Regulations made thereunder, however, the Impugned Judgment
does not appreciate that the Appellant had provided valid
justifications for each of the violations alleged by the
Respondent, which have not been considered in the Order passed
by the Respondent.
1st Allegation:
8.2. As regards the first allegation of ineligibility of Mr. Sushant
Chhabra as a Joint Resolution Applicant along with Conquerent,
it was submitted that as per Section 29A(g) of the Code, the
promoter of the Corporate Debtor was not eligible to be a
Resolution Applicant. However, as per Section 240A of the
Code, the prohibition under Section 29A of the Code will not be
applicable to the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
(“MSME”). Mr. Sushant Chhabra had submitted a registration
certificate dated 31.10.2017 for registration of the Corporate
Debtor as MSME since 26.11.2007, which was relied upon by
the Appellant for permitting Mr. Sushant Chhabra to be a Joint
Resolution Applicant along with Conquerent.
8.3. Reliance was placed upon Hari Babu Thota v. Pritha Srikumar
Iyer, 2023 INSC 1056, which holds that:
“16. Under the heading “exemption of Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises from Section 29-A” the discussion
begins. It is referred to the ILC report of March, 2018 and
its finding that Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises form
the foundation of the economy and are key drivers of
employment, production, economic growth, entrepreneurship
and financial inclusion. The ILC report 2018 exempted these
industries from Section 29-A (c) and (h) and the rationale for
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SHARMA
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LPA 1199/2024
the same was contained in para 27.4 of the report which
reads as under:
“27.4 Regarding the first issue, the Code is clear
that default of INR one lakh or above triggers the
right of a financial creditor or an operational
creditor to file for insolvency. Thus, the financial
creditor or operational creditors of MSMEs may
take it to insolvency under the Code. However,
given that MSMEs are the bedrock of the Indian
economy, and the intent is not to push them into
liquidation and affect the livelihood of employees
and workers of MSMEs, the Committee sought it
fit to explicitly grant exemptions to corporate
debtors which are MSMEs by permitting a
promoter who is not a wilful defaulter, to bid for
the MSME in insolvency. The rationale for this
relaxation is that a business of an MSME attracts
interest primarily from a promoter of an MSME
and may not be of interest to other resolution
applicants.”
17. The aforesaid thus, makes it clear as opined in the said
judgments also, that excluding such industries from
disqualification under 29A (c) and (h) is because qua such
industries other resolution applicants may not be
forthcoming which thus would inevitably lead not to
resolution but to liquidation.”
8.4. The Appellant had also relied upon an affidavit dated 21.08.2020
submitted by Mr. Sushant Chhabra under Section 29A of the
Code, wherein it was deposed that Sections 29A(c) and (h) were
not applicable to him inasmuch as the Corporate Debtor was an
MSME. The Appellant had also appointed a Process Advisor,
Mr. Anil Kohli, who had during the 13th Meeting of CoC,
confirmed that the Corporate Debtor was MSME.
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SHARMA
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8.5. Pursuant to notification dated 26.06.2020 issued by the Ministry
of MSME, the Appellant had obtained a fresh MSME
registration for the Corporate Debtor on 18.10.2020.
8.6. In view of the above, there was no occasion for the Appellant to
suspect that Mr. Sushant Chhabra was not eligible to become a
Joint Resolution Applicant along with Conquerent, as there was
no publicly available information indicating that the registration
of Corporate Debtor as an MSME had been cancelled. It was
only when the Respondent sent an e-mail on 31.05.2023 to the
Ministry of MSME to ascertain the veracity of the MSME
certificate issued to the Corporate Debtor, in response dated
16.06.2023 it was stated that the registration of the Corporate
Debtor as MSME was cancelled / marked as Z category on
22.12.2017.
8.7. Therefore, the Appellant had exercised reasonable due diligence
by relying upon the Registration Certificate of MSME submitted
by Mr. Sushant Chhabra, which was confirmed by Mr. Anil
Kohli, the Process Advisor during the 13th Meeting of CoC as
well as undertaking given by way of Affidavit by Mr. Sushant
Chhabra. The Resolution Professional is not an adjudicator and
only a facilitator, who is not required to do the fact-finding
exercise and check the veracity of the documents submitted. In
Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and
Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 1, it is held that:
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SHARMA
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LPA 1199/2024
“80. However, it must not be forgotten that a Resolution
Professional is only to “examine” and “confirm” that each
resolution plan conforms to what is provided by Section
30(2). Under Section 25(2)(i), the Resolution Professional
shall undertake to present all resolution plans at the
meetings of the Committee of Creditors. This is followed by
Section 30(3), which states that the Resolution Professional
shall present to the Committee of Creditors, for its approval,
such resolution plans which confirm the conditions referred
to in sub-section (2). This provision has to be read in
conjunction with Section 25(2)(i), and with the second
proviso to Section 30(4), which provides that where a
resolution applicant is found to be ineligible under Section
29-A(c), the resolution applicant shall be allowed by the
Committee of Creditors such period, not exceeding 30 days,
to make payment of overdue amounts in accordance with the
proviso to Section 29-A(c). A conspectus of all these
provisions would show that the Resolution Professional is
required to examine that the resolution plan submitted by
various applicants is complete in all respects, before
submitting it to the Committee of Creditors. The Resolution
Professional is not required to take any decision, but merely
to ensure that the resolution plans submitted are complete in
all respects before they are placed before the Committee of
Creditors, who may or may not approve it. The fact that the
Resolution Professional is also to confirm that a resolution
plan does not contravene any of the provisions of law for the
time being in force, including Section 29-A of the Code, only
means that his prima facie opinion is to be given to the
Committee of Creditors that a law has or has not been
contravened. Section 30(2)(e) does not empower the
Resolution Professional to “decide” whether the resolution
plan does or does not contravene the provisions of law.
Regulation 36-A of the CIRP Regulations specifically
provides as follows:
“36-A. (8) The resolution professional shall
conduct due diligence based on the material on
record in order to satisfy that the prospective
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SHARMA
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LPA 1199/2024
resolution applicant complies with—
(a) the provisions of clause (h) of sub-section (2)
of Section 25;
(b) the applicable provisions of Section 29-A, and
(c) other requirements, as specified in the
invitation for expression of interest.
(9) The resolution professional may seek any
clarification or additional information or
document from the prospective resolution
applicant for conducting due diligence under subregulation (8).
(10) The resolution professional shall issue a
provisional list of eligible prospective resolution
applicants within ten days of the last date for
submission of expression of interest to the
committee and to all prospective resolution
applicants who submitted the expression of
interest.
(11) Any objection to inclusion or exclusion of a
prospective resolution applicant in the
provisional list referred to in sub-regulation (10)
may be made with supporting documents within
five days from the date of issue of the provisional
list.
(12) On considering the objections received
under sub-regulation (11), the resolution
professional shall issue the final list of
prospective resolution applicants within ten days
of the last date for receipt of objections, to the
committee.”
8.8. Accordingly, there was nothing in public domain, which could
have suggested that the Corporate Debtor did not enjoy the status
of MSME. It is only because the Respondent enquired from the
Ministry of MSME, it was informed that there was cancellation /
marking as Z category of the MSME Registration obtained by
the Corporate Debtor. Even the Appellant could get the re-
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SHARMA
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registration of the Corporate Debtor as MSME on 18.10.2020,
which shows that the earlier registration was not cancelled or
marked as Z category. Hence, there was no reason to believe that
Mr. Sushant Chhabra was not eligible to become the Joint
Resolution Applicant along with Conquerent.
8.9. Further, on 21.08.2023, the Appellant had written a letter to the
Office of General Manager, District Industries Centre, Haridwar
(“DIC”) to get a clarification on the issue of validity of the
MSME certificate issued to the Corporate Debtor. In the
response dated 25.08.2023, it was confirmed by the DIC that the
Corporate Debtor was registered as MSME from 26.11.2007 and
as per the on-site inspection carried out on 14.02.2023 by the
DIC, the unit of the Corporate Debtor was found working / in
production. This shows that the allegation that the registration of
the Corporate Debtor as MSME was cancelled or put in Z
category, does not appear to be correct.
8.10.In view of the above, the allegation that the Appellant permitted
Mr. Sushant Chhabra to be a Joint Resolution Applicant along
with Conquerent despite the cancellation of the registration of the
Corporate Debtor as MSME is not correct and cannot be relied
upon for passing the Order by the Respondent.
2nd Allegation:
8.11.As regards the second allegation of suppression of relevant facts
from the CoC, there was no suppression of any fact as alleged.
The Appellant was the Resolution Professional for another
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SHARMA
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LPA 1199/2024
corporate debtor, viz., Unitech Machines Limited of which, Mr.
Sushant Chhabra was also the promoter. The Appellant had filed
an Avoidance Application against Mr. Sushant Chhabra before
the NCLT in the CIRP proceedings of Unitech Machines Limited
during the same time when the Resolution Plan submitted jointly
by
Mr.
Sushant
Chhabra
and
Conquerent
was
under
consideration before the CoC of the Corporate Debtor. However,
the adjudication of the Avoidance Application was pending
before the NCLT, and the Appellant was not under any
obligation to disclose mere filing of the Avoidance Application
in the CIRP proceedings of Unitech Machines Limited to the
CoC of the Corporate Debtor as no order was passed by the
NCLT relating to the same.
8.12.In any event, one of the members of CoC, viz., State Bank of
India, was also the creditor of Unitech Machines Limited and
was aware about the Avoidance Application filed by the
Applicant before the NCLT in relation to the CIRP proceedings
of Unitech Machines Limited.
8.13.Hence, there was no suppression of any fact from the CoC of the
Corporate Debtor. Further, the fact that the Appellant had filed
an Avoidance Application against Mr. Sushant Chhabra shows
that there was no collusion between the Appellant and Mr.
Sushant Chhabra. Accordingly, there was no question of
suppressing any fact from the CoC of the Corporate Debtor as
alleged in the Order passed by the Respondent.
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
18:27:27
LPA 1199/2024
3rd Allegation:
8.14.As regards the third allegation of discrepancy in examining
financial capability of Mr. Sushant Chhabra, the Appellant had
examined the net worth certificate of INR 9.09 crores submitted
by Mr. Sushant Chhabra along with the Resolution Plan, as
against the minimum net worth requirement of INR 1 crore.
Accordingly, Mr. Sushant Chhabra had met the criteria as per
Form G approved by the CoC to be eligible for submitting the
Resolution Plan. Therefore, there was no occasion for verifying
the financial capability of Mr. Sushant Chhabra. Mr. Sushant
Chhabra along with Conquerent had a combined net worth of
INR 12.97 crores and Conquerent had a turnover of INR 50.84
crores, as against the requirement of INR 10 crores. Accordingly,
both Mr. Sushant Chhabra and Conquerent were eligible to be
the Joint Resolution Applicants in view of the net worth and
turnover as approved by the CoC at the time of passing the
Resolution Plan.
8.15.Hence, the finding in the Order passed by the Respondent that
the Appellant accepted the net worth certificate issued by a
Chartered Accountant in a mechanical way, without application
of mind and without proper due diligence, was incorrect.
8.16.In view of the above there was no violation of any of the
provisions of the Code or the Regulations as alleged in the Order
passed by the Respondent.
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
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LPA 1199/2024
4th Allegation:
8.17.As regards the fourth allegation of disposal of the assets of the
Corporate Debtor without the approval of the CoC, the Appellant
had sold certain items of scrap and DG sets to realise the cash for
the benefit of the Corporate Debtor, as the value of such assets
were declining and it was in the best interest of the Corporate
Debtor to dispose of the said assets and convert the same into
cash. There was no allegation that such sale was undervalued,
and the amount of the said sale was received by the Corporate
Debtor and used towards its day-to-day expenses to meet the
statutory obligations. Out of INR 55.10 lakhs received, INR 8.9
lakhs were utilized towards payment of salaries, INR 33.08 lakhs
were utilized for payment of statutory dues and the balance
amount was utilized for payment of legal fees, rent, plant
expenses, insurance, electricity etc.
8.18.During the 18th Meeting of CoC held on 06.04.2023, the approval
of CoC was sought vis-à-vis the sale of old stock of Kirloskar
Gensets lying at Bhagwanpur Unit of the Corporate Debtor. At
the said Meeting, the Appellant had placed an Action Taken
Report, which specifically apprised the CoC about the sale of the
scrap and DG sets. Such sale was in the ordinary course of
business and, therefore, no approval was required from the CoC
prior to such sale and it was duly informed to the CoC during the
18th Meeting of the CoC. As regards the Kirloskar Gensets lying
at Bhagwanpur Unit of the Corporate Debtor, the permission of
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SHARMA
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CoC was obtained.
8.19.Hence, there was no violation of any provisions of the Code or
the Regulations made thereunder by the Appellant by selling the
assets of the Corporate Debtor. In any event, the sale of scrap
and DG sets had taken place prior to the amendment in
Regulation 18 of the CRIP Regulations, 2016. Prior to the said
amendment, the CoC was discharged post-approval of the
Resolution Plan and had no role in the CIRP process. Therefore,
when the sale of scrap and DG sets was undertaken, there was no
CoC in existence and no approval of CoC could have been
obtained. The sale was done in good faith and in the best interest
of the Corporate Debtor. Further, no benefit was received by the
Appellant personally.
5th Allegation:
8.20.As regards the fifth allegation of executing Lease Agreement
with the Prospective Resolution Applicants with respect to assets
of the Corporate Debtor without the approval of the CoC, the two
Leave and License Agreements dated 09.03.2021 and 18.11.2021
were respectively entered into between the Corporate Debtor and
Conquerent as a Prospective Resolution Applicant. The Order
did not appreciate that the Leave and License Agreements were
not Lease Agreements and, therefore, there was no violation of
Section 28(1)(k) of the Code, as the Leave and License
Agreements granted temporary occupation rights to a property
without transferring the ownership rights.
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8.21.Further, no physical possession pursuant to the Leave and
License Agreements was ever transferred to the Prospective
Resolution Applicants. Hence, no prejudice was caused to the
Corporate Debtor because of the Appellant entering into the
Leave and License Agreements with the Prospective Resolution
Applicants.
8.22.The Impugned Judgment failed to appreciate that none of the
allegations found in the Order passed by the Respondent had any
merit and, therefore, the Order was liable to be quashed and set
aside. The Impugned Judgment did not consider the justification
given by the Appellant for non-violation of any of the provisions
of the Code or the Regulations made thereunder.
8.23.The suspension of the practicing certificate of the Appellant for a
period of two years has caused immense prejudice to the
Appellant because of stigma on his professional career. In the
facts of the present case, no case is made out for such a harsh
punishment as there has been no infraction of any of the
provisions of the Code or the Regulations made thereunder.
8.24.Hence, the present Appeal deserves to be allowed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
9.
Mr. Sahil Monga, the learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted
that:
9.1. The submissions made on behalf of the Appellant on the factual
aspect of the matter were not made before the learned Single
Judge during the hearing of the Writ Petition and the Appellant is
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SHARMA
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not entitled to make these submissions for the first time in the
Appeal. The memo of the Writ Petition only raises an issue
regarding the disposal of the First SCN in favour of the
Appellant acting as a res judicata for issuance of the Second
SCN against the Appellant.
9.2. The Order passed by the Respondent is assailed in the Writ
Petition only on this limited ground of jurisdictional error, which
the learned Single Judge has considered and decided against the
Appellant. Therefore, the Appellant is not entitled to raise the
factual arguments on merits in the Appeal for the first time.
9.3. In any event, the Court in exercise of powers under the writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does
not sit in appeal over the decision taken by an administrative
authority unless there is an arbitrariness or perversity.
9.4. The Impugned Judgment has rightly held that the Order was
passed by the Respondent after examining all the aspects before
it and, therefore, no interference was required in the Writ
Petition. The Writ Petition is not in the nature of first appeal,
where the fact finding exercise can be undertaken by this Court.
The scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very
limited and can be exercised only if there is a perversity or
jurisdictional error in passing the Order.
9.5. In Sandeep Kumar Bhatt v. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board
of India & Ors., Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:6868, this Court
has held that:
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“14. At the outset it is pertinent to mention that this Court
while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India does not sit as an Appellate Authority.
A writ court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India does not substitute its own
conclusion to the one arrived at by any authority unless the
decision is so perverse that no authority can come to such a
conclusion or that the order is completely in contravention of
any provision of any law be it an Act or the Regulation
framed under the Act.
15. The Apex Court in Central Council for Research in
Ayurvedic Sciences & Anr. v. Bikartan Das & Ors., 2023
SCC OnLine SC 996, has held as under:
“50. Before we close this matter, we would like
to observe something important in the aforesaid
context: Two cardinal principles of law governing
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly
when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.
51.
The first cardinal principle of law that
governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, more
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of
certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High
Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate
Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the
evidence upon which the determination of the
inferior tribunal purports to be based. It
demolishes the order which it considers to be
without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but
does not substitute its own views for those of the
inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be
issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of
the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high
prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere
asking.
52.
The second cardinal principle of exercise
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of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution is that in a given case, even if
some action or order challenged in the writ
petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the
High Court while exercising its extraordinary
jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with
a view to doing substantial justice between the
parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an
extraordinary remedy, which is essentially
discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It
is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this
flexible power to pass such orders as public
interest dictates & equity projects. The legal
formulations cannot be enforced divorced from
the realities of the fact situation of the case. While
administering law, it is to be tempered with equity
and if the equitable situation demands after
setting right the legal formulations, not to take it
to its logical end, the High Court would be failing
in its duty if it does not notice equitable
consideration and mould the final order in
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any
other approach would render the High Court a
normal court of appeal which it is not.
53.
The essential features of a writ of
certiorari, including a brief history, have been
very exhaustively explained by B.K. Mukherjea, J.
in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440.
The Court held that a writ in the nature of
certiorari could be issued in ‘all appropriate
cases and in appropriate manner’ so long as the
broad and fundamental principles were kept in
mind. Those principles were delineated as
follows:
“7. … In granting a writ of ‘certiorari’,
the superior court does not exercise the
powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not
review or reweigh the evidence upon which
the determination of the inferior tribunal
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purports to be based. It demolishes the
order which it considers to be without
jurisdiction or palpably erroneous, but
does not substitute its own views for those
of the inferior tribunal …..
8. The supervision of the superior court
exercised through writs of certiorari goes
on two points, as has been expressed by
Lord Sumner in King v. Nat Bell Liquors
Limited [[1922] 2 A.C. 128, 156]. One is
the area of inferior jurisdiction and the
qualifications and conditions of its
exercise, the other is the observance of law
in the course of its exercise. …
9. Certiorari may lie and is generally
granted when a court has acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction.”
54. Relying on T.C. Basappa (supra), the
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), laid down the
following propositions as was established:
“(1) Certiorari will be issued for
correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when
an inferior court or tribunal acts without
jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to
exercise it.
(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the
court or tribunal acts illegally in the
exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as
when it decides without giving an
opportunity to the parties to be heard, or
violates the principles of natural justice.
(3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari
acts in exercise of a supervisory and not
appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of
this is that the court will not review
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findings of fact reached by the inferior
court or tribunal, even if they be
erroneous.”
55. This Court explained that a court which has
jurisdiction over a subject matter has jurisdiction
to decide wrong as well as right, and when the
Legislature does not choose to confer a right of
appeal against that decision, it would be
defeating its purpose and policy if a superior
court were to rehear the case on the evidence and
substitute its own finding in certiorari.
56. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR
1964 SC 477, P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J.,
speaking for the Constitution Bench, placed the
matter beyond any position of doubt by holding
that a writ of certiorari can be issued for
correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by
inferior courts or tribunals. The observations of
this Court in para 7 are worth taking note of:
“7. The question about the limits of the
jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a
writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been
frequently considered by this Court and
the true legal position in that behalf is no
longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be
issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or tribunals:
these are cases where orders are passed by
inferior courts or tribunals without
jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a
result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A
writ can similarly be issued where in
exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the
Court or Tribunal acts illegally or
improperly, as for instance, it decides a
question without giving an opportunity to
be heard to the party affected by the order,
or where the procedure adopted in dealing
with the dispute is opposed to principles of
natural justice. There is, however, no
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doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and
the Court exercising it is not entitled to act
as an appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact
reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal
as result of the appreciation of evidence
cannot be reopened or questioned in writ
proceedings. An error of law which is
apparent on the face of the record can be
corrected by a writ, but not an error of
fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued
if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the Tribunal had erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material
evidence, or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible
evidence
which
has
influenced the impugned finding. Similarly,
if a finding of fact is based on no evidence,
that would be regarded as an error of law
which can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In dealing with this category of
cases, however, we must always bear in
mind that a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal cannot be challenged in
proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the
ground that the relevant and material
evidence adduced before the Tribunal was
insufficient or inadequate to sustain the
impugned finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the
said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said
points cannot be agitated before a writ
Court. It is within these limits that the
jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts
under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari
can be legitimately exercised….”
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57. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai, (2003)
6 SCC 675, a Bench of two Judges held that the
certiorari jurisdiction though available, should
not be exercised as a matter of course. The High
Court would be justified in refusing the writ of
certiorari if no failure of justice had been
occasioned. In exercising the certiorari
jurisdiction, the procedure ordinarily followed by
the High Court is to command the inferior court
or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to
the High Court for its inspection so as to enable
the High Court to determine, whether on the face
of the record the inferior court has committed any
of the errors as explained by this Court in Hari
Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC
233 occasioning failure of justice.””
9.6. Even on merits, all the five allegations against the Appellant are
serious in nature as the Appellant has failed to perform the
obligations as a Resolution Professional of the Corporate Debtor
in terms of the provisions of the Code and the Regulations made
thereunder. The findings of permitting the Joint Resolution
Applicants even though the MSME registration of the Corporate
Debtor having been cancelled, suppressing material facts within
the knowledge of the Appellant from the CoC having adverse
impact on the Corporate Debtor, selling off the assets of the
Corporate Debtor without the permission of the CoC and
execution of the Lease Deeds without the sanction of the NCLT,
are clearly in violation of the provisions of the Code and the
Regulations made thereunder, and the same justified the
suspension of the registration of the Appellant as the Insolvency
Professional.
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9.7. The Impugned Judgment does not require any interference in the
Appeal, which is required to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
10.
It is trite law that the scope of interference in the writ jurisdiction of
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extremely narrow and does not
justify the exercise of the power to sit in appeal over the decision being
challenged. The High Court does not review or reweigh the evidence upon
which the determination is based in the order under challenge. In Syed
Yakub v. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 477, it is held that the
writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is supervisory rather than appellate and the finding of fact reached as a
result of appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ
proceedings. While the High Court may correct an error of law apparent on
the face of record, it cannot correct the errors of facts, however grave. It
cannot also review the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence led on a
point as these are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
administrative authority.
11.
In Afcons Infrastructure Limited v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd.,
(2016) 16 SCC 818, it is held that:
“13. In other words, a mere disagreement with the decisionmaking process or the decision of the administrative authority
is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere. The
threshold of mala fides, intention to favour someone or
arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met before the
constitutional court interferes with the decision-making process
or the decision.”
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12.
In view of the above, it is clear that the scope of interference by way
of a judicial review is limited under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
and can only be exercised if it is found that the decision by the
administrative authority was unreasonable, irrational, arbitrary or perverse.
13.
The Supreme Court in W.B. Central School Service Commission v.
Abdul Halim & Ors., (2019) 18 SCC 39, held that:
“27. It is well settled that the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not sit in appeal
over an administrative decision. The Court might only examine the
decision making process to ascertain whether there was such
infirmity in the decision making process, which vitiates the decision
and calls for intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.”
14.
The learned Single Judge in the Impugned Judgment has examined
the argument made on behalf of the Appellant with regard to the decision in
respect of the First SCN being res judicata for issuance of the Second SCN
and came to the conclusion that the foundation of the Second SCN was
based on a different issue altogether and, therefore, the principles of res
judicata would not apply. It was found that the Second SCN was not issued
on the same cause of action as the First SCN.
15.
As regards the cancellation of the MSME certificate of the Corporate
Debtor, the argument of the Appellant before the learned Single Judge that
the Appellant was not aware of such cancellation was not accepted in the
Impugned Judgment on the ground that the Appellant cannot be exonerated
of his statutory obligation under Section 30(2) of the Code read with the
Regulations made thereunder and the Code of Conduct for the Insolvency
Professionals.
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16.
Section 30(2) of the Code provides as under:
“30. Submission of resolution plan
(1)
….
(2)
The resolution professional shall examine each resolution
plan received by him to confirm that each resolution plan–
(a) provides for the payment of insolvency resolution process
costs in a manner specified by the Board in priority to the
[payment] of other debts of the corporate debtor;
[(b) provides for the payment of debts of operational creditors in
such manner as may be specified by the Board which shall not
be less than–
(i) the amount to be paid to such creditors in the event of a
liquidation of the corporate debtor under section 53; or
(ii) the amount that would have been paid to such
creditors, if the amount to be distributed under the
resolution plan had been distributed in accordance with
the order of priority in sub-section (1) of section 53,
whichever is higher and provides for the payment of debts of
financial creditors, who do not vote in favour of the resolution
plan, in such manner as may be specified by the Board, which
shall not be less than the amount to be paid to such creditors in
accordance with sub-section (1) of section 53 in the event of a
liquidation of the corporate debtor.
Explanation 1 : For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified
that a distribution in accordance with the provisions of this
clause shall be fair and equitable to such creditors.
Explanation 2 : For the purposes of this clause, it is hereby
declared that on and from the date of commencement of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019, the
provisions of this clause shall also apply to the corporate
insolvency resolution process of a corporate debtor—
(i) where a resolution plan has not been approved or
rejected by the Adjudicating Authority;
(ii) where an appeal has been preferred under section 61
or section 62 or such an appeal is not time barred under
any provision of law for the time being in force; or
(iii) where a legal proceeding has been initiated in any
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court against the decision of the Adjudicating Authority in
respect of a resolution plan;]
(c) provides for the management of the affairs of the Corporate
debtor after approval of the resolution plan;
(d) the implementation and supervision of the resolution plan;
(e) does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the
time being in force;
(f) conforms to such other requirements as may be specified by
the Board.
[Explanation : For the purposes of clause (e), if any approval of
shareholders is required under the Companies Act, 2013 or any
other law for the time being in force for the implementation of
actions under the resolution plan, such approval shall be deemed to
have been given and it shall not be a contravention of that Act or
law.]”
17.
Further, the Code of Conduct for the Insolvency Professionals
provides that:
“1.
An insolvency professional must maintain integrity by being
honest, straightforward, and forthright in all professional
relationships.
2.
An insolvency professional must not misrepresent any facts or
situations and should refrain from being involved in any action that
would bring disrepute to the profession.
3.
An insolvency professional must act with objectivity in his
professional dealings by ensuring that his decisions are made
without the presence of any bias, conflict of interest, coercion, or
undue influence of any party, whether directly connected to the
insolvency proceedings or not.
3A. An insolvency professional must disclose the details of any
conflict of interests to the stakeholders, whenever he comes across
such conflict of interest during an assignment.”
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18.
The Impugned Judgment in Paragraph No. 13 observes that:
“13. Under the scheme of the Code, Resolution Professionals play
a crucial role which includes conducting CIRP, managing
operations of corporate debtors, and preserving and protecting
assets for the benefit of all the stakeholders. Thus, the efficient
working of the Code, hinges on the functioning of Resolution
Professionals. Section 30(2) of the Code places an obligation upon
the Resolution Professional to confirm that the Resolution Plan does
not contravene any provisions of law and requires the Resolution
Professional to examine the mandatory compliances before
submitting the Resolution Plan for approval by the CoC. Section
29A aims to prevent those persons from gaining control of the
Corporate Debtor from persons who have contributed to the defaults
of the Corporate Debtor. Since there is an explicit bar under Section
29A of the Code, prohibiting the suspended board of directors of the
Corporate Debtor to submit a Resolution Plan for the Corporate
Debtor, Petitioner as a Resolution Professional cannot escape the
liability of failure to carry out due diligence. Therefore, Petitioner’s
contention before the Disciplinary Committee that due to nonavailability of complete data, he was not able to ascertain MSME
status of Corporate Debtor, cannot be accepted. Even in absence of
such information, knowing the critical consequence of registration
status of the Corporate Debtor as an MSME, Petitioner relied on the
confirmation from Mr. Sushant Chabbra, who being the suspended
director, had conflict of interest in determination of the Corporate
Debtor as an MSME. Additionally, Petitioner did not inform the
CoC that he had filed an Avoidance Application against Mr. Sushant
Chabbra before the NCLT in CIRP of Unitech Machines Limited. In
view of the same, Petitioner’s lack of due diligence in exercising its
statutory obligations ought to be dealt with in accordance with the
framework provided under the law.”
19.
In view of the statutory scheme of the Code and the Code of Conduct
for Insolvency Professionals, the Appellant was under obligation to ensure
the compliance with the provisions of the Code and the Regulations made
thereunder, including Section 29A and Section 30(2) of the Code, and the
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Code of Conduct as held in the Impugned Judgment in Paragraph No. 13
quoted above.
20.
Admittedly, the Appellant did not argue the factual aspects on merits
before the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition, which is sought to be
argued for the first time in this Appeal, which is not permissible.
21.
The Appellant filed the Review Petition, which was rejected vide
order dated 07.10.2025, as all grounds raised in the Review Petition were
found to be issues that were already considered in the Impugned Judgment
or were never raised when the Writ Petition was adjudicated.
22.
Therefore, the submissions on the merits that were not even argued
before the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition cannot be examined in
this Appeal for the first time.
23.
In any event, given the limited scope of power available under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, the learned Single Judge could not have
appreciated the finding of facts arrived at in the Order passed by the
Respondent as per the settled law discussed above. As the learned Single
Judge has found that there was no jurisdictional error or perversity in the
finding of the Order passed by the Respondent, the Impugned Judgment
does not require any interference as all the legal submissions made by the
Appellant before the learned Single Judge have been adequately dealt with
in the Impugned Judgement.
24.
The Appellant has not assailed the finding in the Impugned Judgment
on the aspect of the decision of the First SCN being a res judicata for the
Second SCN in this Appeal. Instead, the Appellant has sought to challenge
the Impugned Judgment on the factual aspects on merits, which were never
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argued before the learned Single Judge and being canvassed for the first
time in Appeal, which cannot be permitted.
25.
In view of the above, the observations and conclusions in the
Impugned Judgment are justified and do not require any interference in this
Appeal.
26.
Accordingly, the present Appeal is dismissed as being devoid of any
merit. The pending Application also stands disposed of. No order as to costs.
TEJAS KARIA, J
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ
JANUARY 09, 2026
ap
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
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