The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
8. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, clearly, the order dated 13.08.2019 passed by the learned Special Judge is liable to be set aside. Consequently, the order dated
13. 08.2019 as well as the order dated 16.04.2022 passed by learned Special Judge, and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom, are quashed and set aside.
9. The petition, alongwith pending application, is disposed of.
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Date of Decision: 20.01.2026
CRL.M.C. 6275/2024 & CRL.M.A. 24023/2024
VISHAL CHANDRA GUPTA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Shrutanjaya Bhardwaj
along with Mr. Bhaskar
Bhardwaj, Mr. Vakeel Ahmed,
Ms. Siddhi Nagwekar and Mr.
Yash Tayal, Advocates.
versus
REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES THROUGH DY
REGISTRAR NCT OF DELHI HARYANA .....Respondent
Through:
Mr.
Sandeep
Kumar
Mahapatra, CGSC with Ms.
Mrinmayee Sahu, and Mr.
Tribhuvan, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J (Oral)
1.
By way of this petition, the petitioner has assailed the orders
dated 13.08.2019 and 16.04.2022 passed by the learned ASJ-03 &
Special Judge (Companies Act), Dwarka Courts, Delhi [hereafter
„Special Court‟] in CC/439/2019 titled „ROC vs. Vishal Chandra
Gupta‟.
2.
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
15:38:53
It is stated on behalf of the petitioner that the learned Special
CRL.M.C. 6275/2024
Court vide orders dated 13.08.2019 had directed restoration of
complaints filed by respondent, i.e CC/438/2019 and CC/439/2019
(present case) in relation to M/s
Tarini International Limited
(CC/438/2019 was filed against the Directors
and Company
Secretary, and CC/439/2019 was filed against the Petitioner who was
auditor of M/s Tarini International Limited.). It is stated that the
restoration orders and consequently, the summoning orders passed in
both complaints suffers from an error apparent on the face of the
record as the same have been passed without any authority of law. It
is apposite to note that by way of order dated 16.04.2022, which has
also been assailed in the present petition, the petitioner herein was
summoned for offence under
Sections 447/448 Companies Act,
2013.
3.
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that the
learned Special Court has passed orders in direct contravention of the
settled law that the criminal court does not have the inherent power to
restore a complaint after its dismissal. It is pointed out that the
Coordinate Bench of this Court, in CRL.M.C. 2372/2022, vide
judgment dated 15.05.2024, has already set aside the order dated
13.08.2019 as well as 16.04.2022 passed in CC/438/2019. As a
result, the proceedings in CC/439/2019 are an abuse of process and
are in violation of the petitioner‟s fundamental right under Article 21
and are liable to be declared a nullity.
4.
The learned CGSC appearing for the respondent, on the other
hand, opposes the petition and argues that there is no infirmity in the
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
15:38:53
CRL.M.C. 6275/2024
impugned orders passed by the learned Sessions Court. He however
does not dispute the fact that similar orders passed by the learned
Special Court in the connected case have already been quashed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court.
5.
This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of the
petitioner as well as the respondent, and has pursued the case file.
6.
This Court notes that the Coordinate Bench, vide judgment
dated 15.05.2024 passed in CRL.M.C. 2373/2022, has referred to the
decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in case of Maj. Gen. A.S
Gauraya & Anr. v. S.N. Thakur & Anr.: (1986) 2 SCC 709 and held
that the order dated 13.08.2019 – restoring the complaints dismissed
earlier due to non-prosecution – was without jurisdiction and could
not be sustained.
7.
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in
answering the question as to “Whether a Subordinate Criminal Court
has any inherent jurisdiction outside the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code?”, and in similar fact situation where the complaint
dismissed due to the absence of the complainant therein has been
restored by the learned Magistrate, had observed as under:
“9. Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code enables a
Magistrate to discharge the accused when the complainant is
absent and when the conditions laid down in the said section
are satisfied. Section 256 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code
enables a Magistrate to acquit the accused if the complainant
does not appear. Thus, the order of dismissal of a complaint by
a criminal court due to the absence of a complainant is a proper
order. But the question remains whether a Magistrate can
restore a complaint to his file by revoking his earlier order
dismissing it for the non-appearance of the complainant and
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
15:38:53
CRL.M.C. 6275/2024
proceed with it when an application is made by the
complainant to revive it. A second complaint is permissible in
law if it could be brought within the limitations imposed by this
Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar [AIR
1962 SC 876] . Filing of a second complaint is not the same
thing as reviving a dismissed complaint after recalling the
earlier order of dismissal. The Criminal Procedure Code does
not contain any provision enabling the criminal court to
exercise such an inherent power.
10. In B.D. Sethi v. V.P. Dewan [1971 DLT 162] a Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court held that a Magistrate could
revive a dismissed complaint since the order dismissing the
complaint was not a judgment or a final order. In para 9, the
court observes as follows:
“9. As long as the order of the Magistrate does not
amount to a judgment or a final order there is nothing in
the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibiting the
Magistrate from entertaining a fresh application asking
for the same relief on the same facts or from
reconsidering that order. During the course of the
proceedings, a Magistrate has to pass various
interlocutory orders and it will not be correct to say that
he has no jurisdiction to reconsider them….”
We would like to point out that this approach is wrong. What
the court has to see is not whether the Code of Criminal
Procedure contains any provision prohibiting a Magistrate from
entertaining an application to restore a dismissed complaint,
but the task should be to find out whether the said Code
contains any provision enabling a Magistrate to exercise an
inherent jurisdiction which he otherwise does not have. It was
relying upon this decision that the Delhi High Court in this case
directed the Magistrate to recall the order of dismissal of the
complaint. The Delhi High Court referred to various decisions
dealing with Section 367 (old Code) of the Criminal Procedure
Code as to what should be the contents of a judgment. In our
view, the entire discussion is misplaced. So far as the accused
is concerned, dismissal of a complaint for non-appearance of
the complainant or his discharge or acquittal on the same
ground is a final order and in the absence of any specific
provision in the Code, a Magistrate cannot exercise any
inherent jurisdiction.
11. For our purpose, this matter is now concluded by a
judgment of this Court in the case of Bindeshwari Prasad
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
15:38:53
CRL.M.C. 6275/2024
Singh v. Kali Singh (1977) 1 SCC 57. We may usefully quote
the following passage at p. 126 of the Reports: (SCC pp. 59-60,
para 4)
“Even if the Magistrate had any jurisdiction to recall this
order, it could have been done by another judicial order
after giving reasons that he was satisfied that a case was
made out for recalling the order. We, however, need not
dilate on this point because there is absolutely no
provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898
(which applies to this case) empowering a Magistrate to
review or recall an order passed by him. Code of
Criminal Procedure does contain a provision for inherent
powers, namely, Section 561-A which, however, confers
these powers on the High Court and the High Court
alone. Unlike Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code,
the subordinate criminal courts have no inherent powers.
In these circumstances, therefore, the learned Magistrate
had absolutely no jurisdiction to recall the order
dismissing the complaint. The remedy of the respondent
was to move the Sessions Judge or the High Court in
revision. In fact, after having passed the order dated
November 23, 1968, the Sub-divisional Magistrate
became functus officio and had no power to review or
recall that order on any ground whatsoever. In these
circumstances, therefore, the order even if there be one,
recalling order dismissing the complaint, was entirely
without jurisdiction. This being the position, all
subsequent proceedings following upon recalling the said
order, would fall to the ground including order dated May
3, 1972, summoning the accused which must also be
treated to be a nullity and destitute of any legal effect.
The High Court has not at all considered this important
aspect of the matter which alone was sufficient to put an
end to these proceedings. It was suggested by Mr D.
Goburdhan that the application given by him for recalling
the order of dismissal of the complaint would amount to a
fresh complaint. We are, however, unable to agree with
this contention because there was no fresh complaint and
it is now well settled that a second complaint can lie only
on fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a
special case is made out. This has been held by this Court
in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar [AIR
1962 SC 876] . For these reasons, therefore, the appeal is
allowed. The order of the High Court maintaining the
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
15:38:53
CRL.M.C. 6275/2024
order of the Magistrate dated May 3, 1972 is set aside and
the order of the Magistrate dated May 3, 1972
summoning the appellant is hereby quashed.”
8.
In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case,
clearly, the order dated 13.08.2019 passed by the learned Special
Judge is liable to be set aside. Consequently, the order dated
13.08.2019 as well as the order dated 16.04.2022 passed by learned
Special Judge, and all consequential proceedings emanating
therefrom, are quashed and set aside.
9.
The petition, alongwith pending application, is disposed of.
10.
It is, however, clarified that this judgment shall not have any
effect on the respondent adopting proper remedy for seeking
restoration of the complaint in accordance with law, if so advised.
11.
The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
JANUARY 20, 2026/vc
T.D.
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
15:38:53
CRL.M.C. 6275/2024
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