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THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.693 of 2025
Date of Decision: 07.04.2026
_______________________________________________________
Vipin Kumar
…….Petitioner
Versus
Prittam Singh
… Respondents
_______________________________________________________
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1
For the Petitioner
:
Ms. Shine Sehgal, Advocate vice Mr.
Mohar Singh, Advocate.
For the Respondents :
Mr. Raj Negi, Advocate.
_______________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):
Instant Criminal Revision petition filed under Section 438
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
lays challenge to
judgment dated 06.11.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Rampur Bushehr, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in
Criminal Appeal No.58 of 2025, affirming judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 17.05.2025, passed by learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur Bushehr, District Shimla, Himachal
Pradesh, in Complaint No.191 of 2021 titled Prittam Singh vs. Vipin
Kumar, whereby learned trial Court, while holding petitioner-accused
( hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’) guilty of his having
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act(for short ‘Act’), convicted and sentenced him to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay
compensation to the tune of Rs.6,00,000/- to the respondentcomplainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the
pleadings as well as other documents adduced on record by the
respective parties, are that the respondent -complainant (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘complainant’) filed a complaint under Section
138 of the Act in the competent Court of law, alleging therein that in
the month of November, 2019, accused contacted him to lend sum of
Rs. 4, 00,000/-, as friendly loan. Complainant on afore request of the
accused, gave Rs. 4,00,000/- to him, who with a view to discharge
his lawful liability, issued post dated cheque No.167574 dated
10.07.2021, amounting to Rs.4,00,000/- in favour of the complainant.
However, aforesaid cheque on its presentation in the bank concerned
was dishonoured due to insufficient funds in the bank account of the
accused. Immediately, after receipt of return memo, complainant
served accused with legal notice dated 29.07.2021, thereby calling
upon him to make payment good within stipulated time, but since he
failed to make the payment good within stipulated time, complainant
had no option, but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act
in the competent Court of law, which subsequently, on the basis of
evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, held the
accused guilty of his having committed offence punishable under S.
138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per
description given herein above.
3.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid
judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial
Court, present petitioner-accused preferred an appeal in the Court of
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rampur Bushehr, District Shimla,
Himachal Pradesh, but same also came to be dismissed vide
judgment dated 06.11.2025. In the aforesaid background, petitioneraccused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings,
praying therein for his acquittal after quashing and setting aside the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by
Courts below.
4.
Vide order dated 11.12.2025, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by Court below, subject to petitioneraccused depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing
personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety in the like
amount to the satisfaction of learned trial Court within a period of six
weeks. However, fact remains that aforesaid order never came to be
complied with. Repeatedly this Court has extended the time, enabling
the petitioner to deposit the amount, but till date, no amount has been
deposited. Learned counsel representing the petitioner fairly states
that since petitioner is not coming forward to impart instructions and
he has not complied with order passed by this Court, this Court may
proceed to decide the petition on its own merits.
5.
Having heard learned counsel representing the parties
and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned
in the impugned judgments of conviction and order of sentence
recorded by Courts below, this Court is not persuaded to agree with
learned counsel for the petitioner-accused that both the Courts below
have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather
this Court finds that both the courts below have meticulously dealt
with each and every aspect of the matter and there is no scope left for
interference.
6.
Bare perusal of statement of the accused recorded under
Section 313 Cr.P.C clearly reveals that he admitted the allegation of
the complainant. He was also given opportunity to lead evidence, but
he failed to avail the same.
7.
Complainant, with a view to prove his case, examined
himself as CW-1 and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. C1/CW1-1, wherein he specifically reiterated the averments contained
in the complaint. He also tendered in evidence cheque Ex. C-2/CW-1,
cheque return memo Ex. C-3/CW-1, legal notice Ex. C-4/CW-1, postal
receipt Ex. C-5/CW-1, acknowledgment Ex.C-6/CW-1 and copy of
bank statement mark-P. In his cross-examination, this witness
specifically denied the suggestion put to him that accused had only
borrowed sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-. He also denied that accused had
returned the alleged amount to him. While admitting that accused had
given him blank cheque and he himself filled it, this witness
specifically denied that he misused the cheque. Cross-examination
conducted upon this witness, if read in its entirety, clearly compels
this Court to draw an inference that accused was unable to extract
anything contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-inchief.
8.
As has been noticed hereinabove, accused in his
statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., nowhere denied his
liability to pay the cheque amount, rather he claimed himself to be
innocent, but was unable to lead evidence despite sufficient
opportunity. Though, pattern of cross-examination suggests that
accused attempted to carve out case that cheque in question was
issued as security, but he was unable to probablize aforesaid defence
by leading cogent and convincing evidence. Since in the case at
hand, factum of issuance of legal notice as well as receipt thereof was
never disputed by the petitioner-accused, as such, no illegality
can be said to have been committed by the learned courts below,
while retuning a finding that complainant had successfully proved all
the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act.
9.
Once factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well
as signatures thereupon never came to be disputed, no illegality can
be said to have been committed by Courts below, while invoking
Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about presumption in
favour of the holder of the cheque that cheque was issued towards
discharge of lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is
rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to
the documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or
presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any.
However, in the instant case, despite sufficient opportunities,
petitioner-accused failed to lead any evidence and as such, he
otherwise failed to probablize the defence, sought to be raised by him,
while deposing under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
10.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V.
State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that
if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates
doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on
the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the
accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into
play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of
the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has
been included in furtherance of the legislative objective
of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.
While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong
criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the
cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139
is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of
litigation. The Court however, further observed that it
must be remembered that the offence made punishable
by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the
nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually
confined to the private parties involved in commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the
defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an
unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section
139, the standard of proof for doing so is all
preponderance of probabilities.
24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish
a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability,
the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on
the materials submitted by the complainant in
order to raise such a defence and it is
inconceivable that in some cases the accused
may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her
own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque
in question neither raises a probable defence nor
able to contest existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding
commission of the offence comes into play if the
same is not rebutted with regard to the materials
submitted by the complainant.
25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of
cheques in order to qualify for prosecution
under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon
by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange
the payment of the amount covered by the cheque
and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt
of such a notice and despite the opportunity to
make the payment within the time stipulated
under the statute does not pay the amount, that
the said default would be considered a dishonour
constituting an offence, hence punishable. But
even in such cases, the question whether or not
there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for
discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would
be a matter that the trial court will have to
examine having regard to the evidence adduced
before it keeping in view the statutory
presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid
consideration. In view of this the responsibility of
the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct
the trial in matters where there has been
instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient
ground to proceed in the matter, would be
extremely heavy.
11.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued
as “security” can also attract offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati
Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of
2021, decided on 28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the
state of being safe and the security given for a loan is
something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited
or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to
which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a
transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to
repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque
as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not
repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no
other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer
the payment of amount,
the cheque which is issued as security would mature for
presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to
present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section
138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
12.
Needless to say, expression “security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act,
rather same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if
any, led on record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The
Negotiable Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in
respect of a “security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of
such a cheque would not be maintainable as there is a debt existing
in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, same would
attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its dishonour.
13.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record
by the respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients
of Section 138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Similarly,
factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by the
accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
14.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially,
in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the
courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment
passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs.
Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the
jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by
the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the
said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of
an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second
appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be
appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as
well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature
is brought to the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
15.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as
fact, if any, committed by the courts below, while passing impugned
judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the
revisional power.
16.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme
Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a
failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure,
sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to
prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct
irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its
judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel
representing the accused has failed to point out any material
irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the
evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the
well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below.
17.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein
above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court
sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments
recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based
upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as
such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is
18.
dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to
surrender himself before the learned trial Court within a period of 15
days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if
not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner are cancelled. Interim
direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also
stand disposed of.
April 07, 2026
(shankar)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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