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2026:HHC:6981
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.692 of 2025
Date of Decision: 12.03.2026
__________________________________________________________________________
Vipin Kumar
……...Petitioner
Versus
Kamla Devi
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Ms. Shine Sehgal, Advocate, vice Mr. Mohar
Singh, Advocate.
For the Respondent: None.
__________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 of the
BNSS, lays challenge to judgment dated 01.11.2025, passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, Himachal
Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.48 of 2025, titled Vipin Kumar Vs. Kamla
Devi, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
17.04.2025, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, H.P., whereby learned trial Court while
holding the petitioner-accused (hereinafter, “accused”) guilty of having
committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay
compensation to the tune of Rs.4,50,000/- to the respondent-complainant.
2026:HHC:6981
2.
that
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
respondent-complainant
(hereinafter,
‘complainant’)
instituted
a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law,
alleging therein that in the year 2019, accused contacted her and stated
that he intends to develop his business of sale and purchase of plots for
which he is in dire need of money. Complainant alleged that accused
requested to lend sum of Rs.3,00,000/- as friendly loan. Complainant gave
aforesaid amount to the accused, who subsequently with a view to
discharge his liability issued Cheque bearing No.167572, dated 25.08.2021,
amounting to Rs.3,00,000/-, however, on its presentation to the Bank
concerned, the same was dishonoured vide returning memo Ex.C2/CW1
with the remarks “Funds Insufficient”. After receipt of aforesaid return
memo, complainant served accused with a legal notice (Ex.C3/CW1)
through registered post, however, since petitioner-accused failed to make
the payment good within the time stipulated in the legal notice,
respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, H.P.
3.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 17.04.2025, held the
petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of
2026:HHC:6981
the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as per the
description given hereinabove.
4.
Though, at the first instance, accused preferred an appeal in
the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rampur Bushahr, District
Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, however, same was dismissed vide judgment
dated 01.11.2025. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-accused has
approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his
acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the
Courts below.
5.
Vide order dated 11.12.2025, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
stayed the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below,
subject to petitioner/accused depositing 30% compensation amount and
furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/-, however, fact remains
that despite repeated request for extension of time, aforesaid order was
never complied with.
6.
On 26.02.2026, this Court granted three weeks’ time to the
petitioner to comply with the order dated 11.12.2025 passed in Cr.MP
No.5498 of 2025, specifically observing that in case needful is not done,
interim protection granted vide aforesaid order shall come to an end and
respondent would be at liberty to get the judgment of learned trial Court
executed in accordance with law.
2026:HHC:6981
7.
Today during proceedings of the case, learned counsel
representing the petitioner fairly stated that since petitioner/accused is not
coming forward to impart instructions and he has not complied with the
order dated 11.12.2025, this Court may proceed to decide the petition on
its own merits.
8.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with
Ms. Shine Sehgal,
learned counsel representing the petitioner that Courts below have fallen in
grave error while appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds that
both the Courts below have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect
of the matter and there is no scope left for interference.
9.
In the instant case, there is no specific denial, if any, on the
part of the accused with regard to his having issued Cheques as well as his
signatures thereupon. Complainant while examining himself as CW-1,
tendered evidence by way of affidavit EX.CW1/A, whereby she successfully
proved the contents of the complaint. She deposed that she had given sum
of
Rs.3,00,000/- to the accused as friendly loan, who with a view to
discharge his lawful liability, issued Cheque Ex.C1/CW1, but the same was
dishonoured
on
account
of
‘insufficient
funds’
vide
return
memo
Ex.C2/CW1. She also proved that she served accused with legal notice
Ex.C3/CW1, which was duly served upon him, as is evident from the postal
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receipt Ex.C4/CW1 and Ex.C5/CW1, but he failed to pay the amount. If the
cross-examination conducted upon complainant is perused in its entirety,
it cannot be said that accused was able to extract anything contrary to
what this witness stated in her examination-in-chief.
10.
In the case at hand, accused in his statement recorded under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. though denied the case of the complainant, but despite
opportunity, he failed to lead evidence. Otherwise also, pattern of crossexamination conducted upon the petitioner clearly suggests that cheque in
question was issued by the petitioner and same bears his signature. During
cross-examination, complainant stated that she is posted as Peon in private
school and she earns Rs.5,000/- per month. While stating that she knows
accused for 20-30 years, she deposed that accused used to sell and
purchase plots and she had given Rs.3,00,000/- to him in the year 2019.
She specifically denied that she had misused the cheque issued by the
accused. By putting suggestion with regard to misuse of cheque, accused
admitted factum with regard to his having issued the Cheque. Though with
a view to probabilise his defence, argument came to be raised at the behest
of petitioner/accused that accused did not issue cheque to fulfill any legal
liability, but as has been observed hereinabove, accused by way of putting
suggestion to the complainant in her cross-examination to the effect that
cheque issued by accused was misused, himself admitted factum with
regard to his having issued the cheque. Since in the case at hand, factum
2026:HHC:6981
of issuance of cheque as well as his signatures thereupon never came to be
refuted at the behest of accused, no illegality can be said to have been
committed by both the Courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139
of the Act, which speak about presumption in favour of the holder of the
Cheque that Cheque was issued towards discharge of a lawful liability.
11.
No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut
such presumption, accused either can refer to the documents and evidence
led on record by the complainant or presumption can be rebutted by
leading positive evidence, if any. However, in the instant case, neither
anything could be pointed out from the pleadings nor from the evidence
adduced on record by the accused that Cheques in question were not
issued towards discharge of lawful liability. Interestingly, accused in his
statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. stated that he has no
liability, as money was taken by some third person through him. Though by
way of making afore statement, an attempt came to be made at the behest
of respondent to prove that Cheque was issued as a security cheque and
same has been misused, however, such defence, if any, was never
probabilised by leading cogent and convincing evidence.
12.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
2026:HHC:6981
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been
included in furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While
Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to
prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court
however, further observed that it must be remembered
that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be
better described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil
wrong whose money is usually confined to the private
parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a
scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the
construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses
and the defendant accused cannot be expected to
discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court
further observed that it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139,
the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of
probabilities.
24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution
can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted
by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it
is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however,
the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises
2026:HHC:6981
a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding
commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in
order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the
NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is
called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to
arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque
and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such
a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay
the amount, that the said default would be considered a
dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But
even in such cases, the question whether or not there was
lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial
court will have to examine having regard to the evidence
adduced before it keeping in view the statutory
presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed
to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of
this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing
summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has
been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground
to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
13.
Jharkhand,
Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of
Criminal
Appeal
No.
1269-1270
of
2021,
decided
on
28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the
state of being safe and the security given for a loan is
something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited
or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to
which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a
transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to
repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a
cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan
amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if
2026:HHC:6981
there is no other understanding or agreement between the
parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is
issued as security would mature for presentation and the
drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same.
On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the
consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other
provisions of N.I. Act would flow.”
14.
Needless to say, expression “Security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather
same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on
record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable
Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a
“security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would
not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the
cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138
of the Act in case of its dishonour.
15.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the
respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section
138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheque issued by accused
towards discharge of his lawful liability was returned on account of
insufficient funds in the bank account of accused and he despite having
received legal notice failed to make the payment good within the stipulated
time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section
138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be decided by both the
2026:HHC:6981
Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
record by the respective parties.
16.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 438 of the BNSS to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of
the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction
is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional
power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court
nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross
miscarriage of justice.”
17.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
2026:HHC:6981
18.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the
process
or
miscarriage
of
justice
or
to
correct
irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its
judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel
representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity
committed by the Courts below while appreciating the evidence and as
such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned
judgments passed by the Courts below.
19.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the
Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper
appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
20.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by
the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail bonds, if any, of the
2026:HHC:6981
petitioner are cancelled accordingly. Interim order dated 11.12.2025 is
hereby vacated.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
March 12, 2026
(Rajeev Raturi)
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