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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 20.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 05.01.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 06.01.2026
W.P.(CRL) 3044/2025
VINOD @ VINODE @ BHOLE
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Zeeshan Diwan, Advocate
(DHCLSC) with Mr. Harsha,
Advocate
versus
THE STATE (GOVT OF NCT) DELHI
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Yasir Rauf Ansari, ASC
for the State with Mr. Alok
Sharma, Advocate and with SI
Upendra Pandey, PS New
Ashok Nagar
CORAM:
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
1.
By way of the present petition, the petitioner seeks issuance of
a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing rejection order No.
F.10(3489808)/CJ/Legal/PHQ/2025/5289 dated 04.09.2025, passed
by the competent authority, whereby his application for furlough was
rejected. The petitioner also seeks a writ in the nature of mandamus
directing the respondent to release him on furlough for a period of
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
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W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
three weeks.
2.
The petitioner is presently confined in Central Jail No. 8,
Tihar, New Delhi. Vide judgment dated 20.07.2013, the petitioner
was convicted for commission of offences punishable under Sections
364A/368/344/347/120B/34 of the IPC in case arising out of FIR No.
393/2007, registered at Police Station New Ashok Nagar, Delhi, and
was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. His appeal against
conviction, being CRL.A. 1492/2013, was dismissed by this Court
vide judgment dated 25.02.2016.
3.
The record reveals that on 19.07.2025, the petitioner had filed
an application seeking grant of first spell of furlough, inter alia, on
the grounds of maintaining family relations and social ties, and to
alleviate inner stress arising from long incarceration. Pursuant
thereto, verification of the facts and contents of the application was
sought from the concerned Police Department vide letter dated
21.07.2025, and a Social Investigation Report was called for from the
Chief Probation Officer by the jail authorities. The Social
Investigation Report dated 01.08.2025 was thereafter received. The
petitioner‟s application, along with all requisite documents, was then
forwarded to the competent authority for consideration vide letter
dated 18.08.2025. However, the said application was rejected by the
competent authority vide the impugned order dated 04.09.2025, on
the ground that the petitioner is a habitual offender, rendering him
ineligible for furlough under Rule 1223(ii) of the Delhi Prison Rules,
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W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
2018. The impugned order records as under:
“ The convict is a Habitual Offender having convicted in
more than 06 different cases apart from life Imprisonment in
case FIR No. 393/2007, hence he is not eligible for grant of
furlough in view of Rule 1223( ii) of Delhi Prison Rules-2018
is reproduced as under:“In order to be eligible to obtain furlough, the prisoner must
fulfil the following criteria: - “The prisoner should not be a
habitual offender”
The convict may
acknowledgement…”
4.
be
informed
under
proper
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that
furlough has been denied to the petitioner solely on the ground that
he has been termed a habitual offender, despite the petitioner
otherwise fulfilling all eligibility criteria under Rule 1220 of the
Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 [hereafter „DPR, 2018‟]
5.
It is contended that the petitioner has been in custody for more
than 16 years and 11 months in actual incarceration, and for more
than 20 years including remission. It is argued that the impugned
rejection is based on an erroneous understanding of the expression
“habitual offender”. The learned counsel draws this Court‟s attention
to the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sukanya Shantha
v. Union of India, wherein the Supreme Court struck down varying
definitions of “habitual offender” across prison rules in different
States and directed the Union of India to prescribe a uniform
definition. Pursuant thereto, the Government of India issued a
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W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
circular dated 30.12.2024 (No. V-17014/1/2024-PR), amending the
definition of “habitual offender” as follows:
“Habitual offender means a person who during any continuous
period of five years, has been convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment on more than two occasions on account of any
one or more of the offences committed on different occasions
and not constituting parts of the same transaction, such
sentence not having been reversed in appeal or review.
Provided that in computing the continuous period of five years
referred to above, any period spent in jail either under sentence
of imprisonment or under detention shall not be taken into
account.”
6.
It is submitted that the petitioner does not fall within the
aforesaid definition, as he was already incarcerated since 2007, and
the subsequent convictions were recorded while he continued to
remain in custody. Therefore, there does not exist any continuous
period of five years of liberty during which he was convicted and
sentenced on more than two occasions.
7.
The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that
Serial No. 20 of the nominal roll reflects the satisfactory conduct of
the petitioner. The petitioner has been granted parole on five
occasions, furlough on seven occasions, and emergency parole twice
during the COVID-19 period. It is contended that the petitioner has
not misused parole or furlough, except during emergency parole in
2021 when he was re-arrested in FIR No. 210/2021 under Section 25
of the Arms Act, registered at Police Station Special Cell, Delhi. It is
pointed out that despite the said FIR, this Court granted parole to the
petitioner on three subsequent occasions in the years 2023, 2024, and
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W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
2025, which itself demonstrates that the petitioner‟s conduct has not
been found to be such as to disentitle him from parole or furlough. It
is also argued that denying furlough to the petitioner in the year 2025
on the basis of cases registered between 1995 and 2007 would
amount to continued punishment, ignoring the object of furlough and
the fact that no offence has been committed by the petitioner for
nearly 18 years, save and except the pending case of 2021.
8.
The learned ASC appearing for the State, on the other hand,
argues that the impugned order dated 04.09.2025 does not suffer from
any infirmity and has been passed strictly in accordance with the
DPR, 2018. It is contended that the Government of India, vide
circular dated 30.12.2024, has clearly specified the definition of
“habitual offender”, and the expression “on account of any one or
more of the offences committed on different occasions” makes it
abundantly clear that the relevant consideration is the time of
commission of the offence, and not the date of conviction. The
learned ASC contends that the petitioner has committed one offence
in 1994, one in 1995, two in 2001, one in 2003, two in 2007, and one
in 2021, for which he has been convicted by the concerned Courts,
and thus, his conduct clearly reflects habitual criminality, and he
would fall within the meaning of “habitual offender”. It is urged that
the period of counting has to be done taking into account the time of
the offence committed, and the petitioner‟s contention that he was
incarcerated at the time of conviction is illogical, as the determination
of habituality cannot be made contingent upon the time taken by
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W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
courts to conclude trials.
9.
It is also argued on behalf of the State that the petitioner has
misused the liberty earlier granted to him, as while on emergency
parole, he was re-arrested in FIR No. 210/2021 under Section 25 of
the Arms Act, and therefore, the competent authority was justified in
declining furlough. On the aforesaid grounds, it is prayed that the
present petition be dismissed as being devoid of merit.
10.
This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of the
petitioner as well as the State, and has perused the material available
on record.
11.
The issue before this Court is as to whether the impugned
rejection of the petitioner‟s furlough application on the ground of his
being a “habitual offender” is sustainable in law.
12.
The records of petitioner‟s criminal cases wherein he has been
convicted by the concerned courts, to the extent they are relevant, are
as under:
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
16:46:38
●
FIR No. 44/1994 – conviction dated 04.08.2014
●
FIR No. 22/1995 – conviction dated 12.01.2024
●
FIR No. 111/2001 – conviction dated 21.12.2013
●
FIR No. 128/2001 – conviction dated 03.02.2023
●
FIR No. 121/2003 – conviction dated 20.07.2016
●
FIR No. 295/2007 – conviction dated 30.11.2013
●
FIR No. 393/2007 – conviction dated 30.08.2013
W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
13.
It is an admitted position that the petitioner has been
continuously in judicial custody since 05.10.2007. The first
conviction recorded against him after his incarceration was on
30.08.2013, and all subsequent convictions were also recorded while
he continued to remain in custody.
14.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that in view
of the new definition of “habitual offender”, the petitioner cannot be
so classified since all convictions relied upon by the competent
authority were recorded while the petitioner was already in judicial
custody, and consequently, there does not exist any continuous period
of five years, excluding jail period, during which he was convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment on more than two occasions.
Conversely, the learned ASC for the State argues that the definition
refers to offences committed on different occasions, and therefore,
the relevant consideration is the time of commission of offences and
not the date of conviction; and therefore, since the petitioner
committed three offences in the period 2003 to 2007 for which he has
been convicted eventually, he would fall within the ambit of
“habitual offender”.
15.
In this regard, it would be apposite to notice the definition of
the expression “habitual offender” as it presently stands. Pursuant to
the directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and the subsequent
circular issued by the Government of India dated 30.12.2024 (No. V17014/1/2024-PR), the definition of “habitual offender” reads as
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
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W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
under:
“Habitual offender means a person who during any continuous
period of five years, has been convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment on more than two occasions on account of any
one or more of the offences committed on different occasions
and not constituting parts of the same transaction, such
sentence not having been reversed in appeal or review.
Provided that in computing the continuous period of five years
referred to above, any period spent in jail either under sentence
of imprisonment or under detention shall not be taken into
account.”
16.
This definition, having been adopted uniformly, now governs
the consideration of eligibility for furlough as it has replaced the
earlier sub-Rule 20 of Rule 2(1) of the DPR, 2018, which provides
the definition of habitual offender.
17.
A plain and careful reading of the aforesaid definition makes it
clear that a person can be termed a “habitual offender” only if all the
following essential conditions are cumulatively satisfied:
(i) the person has been convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment on more than two occasions;
(ii) such convictions and sentences have occurred within a
continuous period of five years;
(iii) while computing the said five-year period, any time spent
in jail, either under sentence or detention, is to be excluded;
(iv) the convictions must arise from offences committed on
different occasions, and not from the offences forming part of
same transaction; and
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(v) the convictions relied upon must be final and subsisting,
and not reversed in any appeal or review.
18.
In this Court’s opinion, the amended definition of “habitual
offender” places clear emphasis on the expressions “has been
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment”. The definition does not
provide that a person who has merely committed offences on more
than two occasions within five years would become a habitual
offender. What is material under the definition is the fact of
„conviction and sentence‟, and not the mere commission of offences
or registration of FIRs.
19.
Further, the words “during any continuous period of five
years” preceede the phrase “has been convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment”, and therefore, the five-year period contemplated
under the definition is linked to the convictions and sentences. This
position is further clarified by the proviso, which mandates that while
computing the said period of five years, any time spent in jail,
whether under sentence or detention, must be excluded. Once the
proviso is applied, it becomes evident that the definition envisages a
situation where a person, while at liberty, is convicted and sentenced
to imprisonment on more than two occasions within a span of five
years.
20.
This Court is also of the view that the words “on account of
any one or more of the offences committed on different occasions”
serve a limited and specific purpose. They clarify that the convictions
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W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
relied upon must arise from offences committed on distinct occasions
and must not form part of the same transaction. This expression does
not relate to the computation of the five-year period, which the
definition expressly links to the stage of conviction and sentence.
Therefore, the said phrase cannot be construed as shifting the point of
reference from the date of conviction to the date of commission of
offences, as suggested on behalf of the State.
21.
Also, if the interpretation suggested by the State is accepted, it
would lead to results that are not supported by the plain language of
the definition. For instance – if the interpretation advanced by the
State is adopted – it would mean that if a person commits offences in
the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, but is convicted in the years 2005,
2012 and 2018 respectively, he would be treated as a habitual
offender on the basis of the dates of commission of offence, even
though the convictions are spread over several years, and not a period
of five years. On the other hand, if a person commits offences in the
years 2000, 2007 and 2008, and is convicted in the years 2011, 2012
and 2013, he would not be treated as a habitual offender, even though
the convictions are recorded within a period of five years. In the
considered opinion of this Court, such an interpretation would be in
direct contradiction to the clear wording of the definition of „habitual
offender‟, which clearly emphasises on “conviction and sentence”
within a continuous period of five years.
22.
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
16:46:38
Applying the definition – as it stands – to the facts of the
W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
present case, this Court finds that the petitioner has been in judicial
custody since 05.10.2007, and all the convictions relied upon by the
respondent authority were recorded thereafter. Once the period spent
in jail is excluded, as mandatorily required by the proviso, there does
not exist any continuous period of five years during which the
petitioner was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment on more
than two occasions.
23.
In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the petitioner does not satisfy the statutory requirements of being
a “habitual offender” under the amended definition. Consequently,
the impugned rejection of the petitioner‟s furlough application on the
said ground cannot be sustained in law.
24.
In view thereof, the impugned rejection order is set aside.
25.
However, the matter is remanded back to the competent
authority for reconsideration of the petitioner‟s furlough application
afresh, in accordance with the DPR, 2018. It is clarified that the
petitioner‟s application shall not be rejected on the ground of his
being a “habitual offender”. The competent authority shall pass an
order thereto within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of
a copy of this order, with intimation to the petitioner.
26.
In above terms, the petition is disposed of.
27.
Let a copy of this order be forwarded to the concerned Jail
Superintendent for necessary information and compliance.
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
16:46:38
W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
28.
The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
JANUARY 05, 2026/zp
TD
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
16:46:38
W.P.(CRL.) 3044/2025
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