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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 10.09.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC010431342026
+
RC.REV. 338/2026, CM APPL. 61920/2026 (Ex. From filing
certified copies of annexures), CM APPL. 61921/2026 (Stay) &
CM APPL. 61922/2026 (Delay of 47 days in Re-filing the
petition)
VIKRAM SACHDEVA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Jaspreet Singh Rai, Senior
Advocate along with Ms.
Sukhdeep Kaur Rai, Ms. Jaanvi
Jolly and Mr. Rishab Gulati,
Advocates.
versus
NAVEEN KUMAR DHINGRA
.....Respondent
Through: Nemo
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 19581, challenging the Order dated
30.03.20262, passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller,
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi3, in Eviction Petition
being RC ARC 228/20234, titled “Naveen Kumar Dhingra v. A.K.S.
Enterprises”, whereby the leave to defend application filed on behalf
of the Petitioner herein was dismissed by the learned ARC and an
DRC Act
Impugned Order
learned ARC
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:05:28
RC.REV. 338/2026
Eviction Order was passed in favour of the Respondent herein with
respect to one shop, Ground Floor, 988-989, Ward No. XIV, Pan
Mandi, Sadar Bazar, Delhi - 1100065.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
2.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner
submits that the Petitioner had raised several specific pleas in the
application seeking leave to defend and the affidavit accompanying
thereto. In particular, reliance is placed upon paragraph 10 of the said
application, which reads as follows:
“10.
That the petitioner had shown three shop at ground floor of
the premises No 988-989, Ward No. 14, Pan Mandi, Sadar
Bazar, Delhi - 110006. Measurement of these shops are not
shown correctly, the shop with the respondent is of a small
size as compared to the other shops on ground floor which
are in possession of petitioner and other tenants. Besides
the three shops on the ground floor there is another shop
under the stairs leading to upper floors. The said shop under
the stairs is not disclosed by the petitioner in the site plan
and also in his present petition. It is noted herein that the
petitioner had not even disclosed the occupancy of other
two shops in premises No. 988-989, Ward No. 14, Pan
Mandi, Sadar Bazar, Delhi - 110006. The petitioner had not
specified who are occupying the other shops at the ground
floor besides the petitioner. The petitioner is suppressing
and concealing the material facts from this Hon'ble Court in
filing of the present petition that these shops are three other
shops which are in occupation and possession of the
petitioner. It is not out of place to mention herein that the
petitioner is also in occupation of First Floor and Second
Floor of the premises No. 988 - 989, Ward No. 14, Pan
Mandi, Sadar Bazar, Delhi - 110006. The First Floor and
Second floor is lying vacant. The First floor and Second
Floor was purchased under the name of wife of the
petitioner. The petitioner had himself in earlier petition
admits that her wife is housewife, this implies that the
petitioner is having alternative commercial space available
Eviction Petition
Subject Premises
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:05:28
RC.REV. 338/2026
for his son for alleged need of the business.”
3.
Learned Senior Counsel further relies upon paragraphs 21, 27
and 28 of the application for leave to defend, which read as follows:
“21.
27.
28.
4.
That the Petitioner has concealed the alternative
commercial property at Narela Industrial Area, the same is
mentioned in the Income Tax Return. The petitioner had
filed the income Tax returns in earlier petition. The
respondent had highlighted the same in previous application
filed under section 25(B)(4) of DRC Act. The petitioner
very cunningly had concealed and not filed his Income Tax
returns with the present petition. The petitioner is duty
bound to disclose the all the available properties to him in
the present petition. The petitioner is also duty bound to
disclose about non - suitability of alternative properties as
available with him in the present petition. It transpires that
in order get the eviction, the petitioner has concealed the
alternative commercial property available to the petitioner.
*****
That Petitioner also own and possess property bearing no.
1310, Pan Mandi, Sadar Bazar, Delhi which is a multi
story, ground floor having and several shops and big halls/
godowns on its first and second floor there. The son of
petitioner is presently occupying and operating business
from the above said shop. The above mentioned property is
concealed by the Petitioner in order to derive wrongful
gain.
That Petitioner had recently sold the adjoining commercial
property to Sh. Virender Kumar Arora. The petitioner had
falsely not specified the year as truth can be revealed. The
tenants of the suit premises. The present petition is not
maintainable bad mis - joiner and non- joinder of necessary
parties. They have interest and right in the suit shop as
partners in respondent firm.”
A perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs makes it apparent that,
insofar as Paragraph 10 is concerned, learned Senior Counsel submits
that the Petitioner has specifically alleged suppression and
concealment by the Respondent of various properties in his
possession, including the other shops situated on the Ground Floor as
well as the First and Second Floors of the Subject Premises. It is
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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RC.REV. 338/2026
submitted that the said properties have been specifically brought to the
notice of the learned ARC as being available with the Respondent, and
that the Respondent, in response to the said averments, has not
disclosed or explained as to why such properties would not constitute
reasonably suitable alternative accommodation for the requirement
pleaded by him.
5.
Furthermore, learned Senior Counsel submits that the Paragraph
21 of the said application refers to an alleged alternative commercial
property situated at Narela Industrial Area, which, according to the
Petitioner, has also been suppressed by the Respondent. Similarly,
Paragraphs 27 and 28 deal with the Respondent's alleged ownership
and possession of other properties and the alleged sale of an adjoining
commercial property. It is, therefore, submitted that the Petitioner had
raised triable issues which ought to have resulted in grant of leave to
defend.
6.
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the specific
averments and allegations raised by the Petitioner in the application
seeking leave to defend have not been specifically or satisfactorily
controverted by the Respondent in the reply filed thereto.
7.
Learned Senior Counsel lastly submits that, while dealing with
the aforesaid pleas, the learned ARC has effectively set up a case on
behalf of the Respondent, by relying upon considerations which were
not specifically pleaded or urged by the Respondent.
ANALYSIS:
8.
This Court has heard learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the Petitioner at length, and, with his able assistance, perused
the relevant documents as also the Impugned Order.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:05:28
RC.REV. 338/2026
9.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
10.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.6, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
Singh7, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua8, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
11.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.9, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover10.
12.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
(1998) 8 SCC 119
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:05:28
RC.REV. 338/2026
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
13.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
14.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:05:28
RC.REV. 338/2026
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
15.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
16.
In order to appreciate the challenge raised by the Petitioner, it
would be appropriate to examine the findings returned by the learned
ARC. The learned ARC has in the Impugned Order dealt with various
aspects relating to the alternate accommodation in the following
manner:
“ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION
23.
With regard to the plea of alternative accommodation, it is
contended by the respondents that the petitioner has concealed the
various alternative accommodations which are available with the
petitioner. However, it is a well settled proposition of law that it is
not sufficient that any kind of the property should be available to
the petitioner/landlord to rule out the benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C.
Act. The property available with the petitioner/landlord should also
be reasonably suitable property. In M M Quasim vs/ Manohar Lal
Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Apex Court has that the landlord
does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises but merely
showing that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his
possession may not be sufficient to negative the landlord’s claim if
the vacant premises were not suitable for the purpose for which he
required the premises.
24.
In the present matter, however, no particulars of any
purported alternative accommodation have been pleaded by the
respondent. It is trite to state that onus is upon the respondent to
show on prima facie basis that the alternate properties do belong to
the petitioner or are under the occupation and possession of the
petitioner and not for the petitioner to prove the negative assertion.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:05:28
RC.REV. 338/2026
The said plea is also a bald averment only. It is trite to state that the
burden is upon the tenant to show that other alternative suitable
accommodation is available with landlord and how the said
premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement. Reference is
made to the judgment of the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in the
case of Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita Ram, 2017 SCC Online Del
13026, wherein it was held as under: “18.
Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend
controverting the requirement pleaded by landlord on the
ground of the landlord, though at the time of
requirement having alternate premises, having not used
the same and instead having commercially exploited the
same, the tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such
premises; (b) the right/title of the landlord to the same;
(c) that the said premises were vacant and available for
use at the time of pleaded requirement of landlord; (d)
how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded
requirement; and (e) how the landlord has deprived
himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting and support the said
pleas with material on the basis whereof such pleas will
be proved.”
25.
Furthermore, it is also pertinent to note that the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6
SCC 30 has held for availing leave to defend a mere assertion by
the tenant is insufficient. Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act creates a
presumption in favour of the landlord regarding bona fide
need, which is rebuttable only with substantive material
capable of raising a triable issue. It was further held that the
burden of proof is on the tenant to demonstrate, with cogent
evidence, that the landlord’s requirement is not genuine. The
Court also reiterated the settled principle of law that leave to
defend should not be granted on mere asking but when the
pleas and contentions raise triable issues.
26.
Further, in the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm
Prem Machinery 2000 SC 534, it was observed as under: "It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge
of his requirement for residential or business purpose and
he has got complete freedom in the matter, (See: Prativa
Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353. In the
case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the
tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it
was suitable and it cannot be faulted."
27.
It is also contended that petitioner has alternative
accommodation in the subject premises itself in the form of vacant
shops at first floor and second floor. However, it is pertinent to
note that nothing has been brought on record to even prima facie
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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RC.REV. 338/2026
show that the said premises/shops are lying vacant. Therefore, it is
not the case whereby the said shops are lying vacant and available
as alterative accommodations. Besides, it is a well settled law that
the shop on the ground floor is much more suitable than a shop on
the upper floors from the perspective of both the buyer and seller.
In this regard it is pertinent to note the judgement of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen
Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503, is to be noted where it was held
that it is not for the Courts to say that the landlord should shift to
the first floor or any higher floor as it is well known that shops and
businesses are usually conducted on the ground floor, because the
customers can reach there easily. It was reiterated that the Court
cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he should use for his
business and that is for the landlord himself to decide. Thus, a
ground floor premises is more suitable for commercial purpose
than the premises on upper floor as it has more footfall of the
customers. Therefore, the shop on the upper floors cannot be
considered as a suitable alternative accommodation. Reliance in
this regard is placed upon the decision of Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi in case of Dilip Singh Kapoor & Ors Vs. Neeraj Khanna
& Anr, RC.REV. 66/2017, decided on 31.08.2022. Furthermore,
the landlord being the best judge of his own requirement is the best
person to decide as to which premises, he has to choose for
conducting his business and a tenant cannot force the landlord to
conduct his business from the basement or upper floor. It has been
held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahabhar
Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendera Kumar Tandon 72 (1998)
DLT 629 that the landlord is not disentitled from seeking recovery
of the possession of a ground floor merely on the plea that he is
also in possession of first floor and second floor so long as the
court is satisfied with respect to the Bonafide requirement of the
landlord for the tenanted premises. Similarly, in the present matter,
the tenant cannot dictate the landlord to run his business from the
first floor when it is settled law that the premises on the ground
floor are much more suitable for commercial needs.
28.
Even otherwise, it is the prerogative of the landlord to
determine which premises best suits his requirements. It is trite to
state that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of claim of
landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison
with tenanted premises, wherefrom the landlord is seeking
eviction. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court
have repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of
the landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the
landlord is to be best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute
owner of his property and is the best person to decide which
property is to be utilized in what way. The respondent cannot
dictate as to how the landlord is to utilize his property. The
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:05:28
RC.REV. 338/2026
landlord possesses the prerogative to determine their specific
requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not
within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the
landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of the
tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from prescribing
any standard or guidelines for the landlord's choices (residential or
commercial). Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon‟ble
Delhi High Court in case of Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mulak Raj &
Ors. RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard. Therefore, the said
contention is a bald averment and without any particulars of any
purported alternative accommodation, does not amount to any
triable issue.
29.
Hence, I find that the respondent has failed to raise any
triable issue on the aspect of alternative accommodation as
well.
17.
Viewed in the aforesaid backdrop, this Court finds that the
learned ARC has duly considered the plea of alternative
accommodation raised by the Petitioner and has correctly appreciated
the legal requirement governing such a defence. The mere assertion
that the landlord is in possession of, or has access to, other properties
cannot by itself constitute a triable issue. What is required to be shown
is that such premises are not only available to the landlord but are also
reasonably suitable for the purpose for which the eviction is sought. In
the present case, the allegations made by the Petitioner, even if taken
at their highest, do not disclose the necessary particulars to establish
such availability and suitability.
18.
The aforesaid principle has been elaborated by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta11,
wherein it was held that the availability of an alternative
accommodation assumes relevance only where such accommodation
is suitable and convenient in comparison with the premises from
(1999) 6 SCC 222
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 338/2026
which eviction is sought. The Court further recognised that even
where another accommodation is shown to be available, the landlord
may demonstrate that the same is of no consequence as it is not
reasonably suitable to satisfy the need objectively found to exist. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“14. The availability of an alternative accommodation with the
landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of
the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual
relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation,
suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation,
may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to the bona fides of
the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available
premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such
circumstance would enable the court drawing an inference that the
need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the
landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another
principal ingredient of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14,
which speaks of non-availability of any other reasonably suitable
residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied.
Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as
available then the court has to ask the landlord why he is not
occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need.
The landlord may convince the court that the alternative residential
accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the
same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the
landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist.
Needless to say that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial
of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously
in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the
landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the
landlord and his family members would be relevant factors. While
considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in
view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family
members, their style of living, their habits and the background
wherefrom they come.
*****
18. In M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma [(1981) 3 SCC 36 :
AIR 1981 SC 1113] this Court has held (vide para 18) that the
landlord does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises
but merely showing that the landlord has some other vacant
premises in his possession may not be sufficient to negative the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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landlord's claim if the vacant premises were not suitable for the
purpose for which he required the premises. This Court cautioned
that the court must understand and appreciate the relationship
between the legal rules and necessities of life.
19. In Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander [(1988) 3 SCC 131 : AIR
1988 SC 1422] this Court has held that: (SCC pp. 134-35, para 11)
“[T]he need of the landlord should be genuine and honest,
conceived in good faith; and that, further, the court must also
consider it reasonable to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for
possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a
subjective element in it and that, that desire, to become a
„requirement‟ in law must have the objective element of a „need‟. It
must also be such that the court considers it reasonable and,
therefore, eligible to be gratified. In doing so, the court must take
all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection
afforded by law to the tenant is not rendered merely illusory or
whittled down.”
20. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(1998) 8
SCC 119] this Court has held that the Rent Controller should not
proceed on the assumption that the landlord's requirement is not
bona fide. When the landlord shows a prima facie case a
presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide is
available to be drawn. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the
landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without giving
possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question
of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite
unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord
could have adjusted himself.”
19.
The aforesaid principle equally governs the allegation of
concealment raised by the Petitioner. In Sachin Nagpal v. Gopal
Krishan12, this Court, while considering a similar allegation that the
landlord had failed to disclose several other shops in the same
building, held that, for a premises to constitute an alternative
accommodation, it must not only be alternate but must also be actually
available and suitable. It was further held that failure to disclose a
premises which is not available to the landlord cannot, by itself, be
2025 SCC OnLine Del 1367
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 338/2026
treated as concealment. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“9. The provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 [hereinafter referred to as the “DRC Act”] have been
provided for with care by the Legislature. On the aspect of
availability of alternate suitable accommodation, it is not only that
the accommodation is to be alternate, it is also required to be
available and suitable. The Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup
Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta (Supra) has held for an eviction
petition to fail on the ground of alternate suitable accommodation
being available, the other accommodation must be suitable and
convenient in all respects as the tenanted accommodation from
which the landlord seeks eviction of. It has been held that:
“14. The availability of an alternative accommodation with the
landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation
of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual
relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation,
suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit
accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to
the bona fides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy
the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of
such circumstance would enable the court drawing an inference
that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of
mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and
natural. Secondly, another principal ingredient of clause (e) of
sub-section (1) of Section 14, which speaks of non-availability of
any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation to the
landlord, would not be satisfied. Wherever another residential
accommodation is shown to exist as available then the court has
to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available
accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may convince
the court that the alternative residential accommodation though
available is still of no consequence as the same is not reasonably
suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded
in demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an
alternative accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the
landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison
with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking
eviction. Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family
members would be relevant factors. While considering the totality
of the circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession or
vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of
living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come.”
10. The other issue that has been taken by the learned Counsel for
the Petitioner/tenant is concealment of the 25 available shops in the
same building as that of the subject premises. This submission is
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:05:28
RC.REV. 338/2026
without any merit. It is settled law that for a premises to be set out
in the eviction petition, it must actually be available. Failure to
disclose a premises which is not available to the landlord cannot be
considered as concealment.
10.1 This Court in the case of Shakuntala Devi v. Mohan Das13,
while relying on the case of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar
(Mrs) v. Traders & Agencies14 has held that mere omission to state
alternate accommodation in the pleadings cannot be regarded as
sufficient for disentitling the landlord from claiming a decree of
eviction. The relevant extract of the Shakuntala Devi case is
reproduced below:
“This evidence of the Petitioner has gone unrebutted in her
cross-examination. The responses given by the Respondent in his
cross-examination are also mostly evasive. Since, the
accommodation referred to was not suitable, it cannot be said to
be an alternate accommodation available. Given the law in this
regard, it cannot be said that the non-mention of the Vikaspuri
premises would tantamount to concealment by the Petitioner. The
finding in this regard which has been impugned is thus set aside.
In the case of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (Mrs) v. Traders &
Agencies [2024 SCC OnLine Del 8514], Supreme Court has held
that mere omission to state alternate accommodation in the plaint
cannot be regarded as sufficient for disentitling the landlord from
claiming a decree of eviction. The relevant extract is reproduced
below:
“18…It would have been better if she had referred to those facts
but mere omission to state them in the plaint cannot be regarded
as sufficient for disentitling her from claiming a decree for
eviction, if otherwise she is able to prove that she requires
reasonably the suit premises for her occupation. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the appellate bench and the High
Court clearly went wrong in holding that the said omission was
sufficient to disentitle her from getting a decree of eviction and it
also disclosed that her claim was mala fide and not bona fide as
required by law.”
[Emphasis supplied]
10.2 A similar view has been taken by a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in the case of Praveen v. Mulak Raj15, has held that it is not
necessary for the landlord to disclose the accommodations which
are not considered as alternate accommodation and such nondisclosure would not make tenant entitled for leave to defend. The
relevant extract is reproduced below:
“50. As far as the argument of the petitioners that the
respondents have failed to disclose all the accommodation
2024 SCC OnLine Del 8514
(1996) 5 SCC 344
2023 SCC OnLine Del 7721
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available with them is concerned, I am in agreement with the
submissions made by the respondents that all the alternate
accommodation has been disclosed by the respondents. The
accommodation which was not disclosed was not considered as
an alternate accommodation by the respondents. The nondisclosure of the other alternate accommodation, if any, is of no
consequence and does not make the tenant entitled to leave to
defend. The learned counsel for the respondents has rightly
placed reliance upon the judgments in this regard. This Court
in “Amolak Raj Singh v. Narender Kumar Dang” [2017 : DHC
: 6652] held that:—
“32. As far as the contention of the counsel for the
petitioner/tenant, of the respondent/landlord in the petition for
eviction having not disclosed the allotment at Holambi Kalan is
concerned. Supreme Court in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha
Rani (1999) 1 SCC 141 held that the non-disclosure of
accommodation which the Court also agrees cannot be alternate
suitable accommodation, cannot be fatal to the petition for
eviction. I have also in judgment dated 12th January, 2009 in RC
(R) No. 78-79/2005 titled Mumtaz Begum v. Mohd. Khan held
that non-disclosure of other accommodation available is not
always fatal. To the same effect are Surinder Singh v. Jasbir
Singh (2010) 172 DLT 611, Sukhbir Singh v. Dr. I.P.
Singh (2012) 193 DLT 129, Manju Devi v. Pratap Singh (2015)
DLT
260 and Hameeda
Shahzad v. Shahjahan
Khatoon 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7203. I have recently in Sunil
Kumar Goyal v. Harbans Singh 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9289,
referring to earlier judgments, also held that once the facts have
come before the Court and the Court has, after dealing therewith
held in favour of landlord, the petition for eviction cannot be
dismissed on ground of concealment.”
51. Similar is the view of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar and Har
Lal Gupta (supra).
52. Hence, keeping in view the position of law related to nondisclosure of alternate premises, the argument of the petitioners
that there is concealment of alternate accommodation by the
respondents and the Eviction Petition should be dismissed on this
ground, is hereby rejected. Even otherwise, there is no alternate
property which has been concealed by the respondents.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
10.3 Since, the accommodation referred to by the Petitioner/tenant
was not available, it cannot be said to be an alternate
accommodation. Given the law in this regard, it cannot be said that
the non-mention of these shops would tantamount to concealment
by the Petitioner.”
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20.
In the present case, the allegation of suppression appears to
relate primarily to a space/ shop under the stairs as also to alleged
shops on the first & second floors. The learned ARC has dealt with
this aspect. Furthermore, the averments themselves do not state that
these alleged other shops are alternate “suitable” accommodation.
21.
Insofar as the alleged alternative premises at Narela Industrial
Area and property bearing No. 1310, Pan Mandi, Sadar Bazar, Delhi
are concerned, the pleadings merely contain assertions regarding their
alleged ownership or possession by the Respondent. There is,
however, no material to prima facie demonstrate that the said premises
were available for the Respondent's use at the relevant time or, more
importantly, that the same were reasonably suitable for the
commercial requirement pleaded in the Eviction Petition. Similarly,
the allegation regarding the First and Second Floors of the Subject
Premises does not advance the case of the Petitioner, particularly
when there is no material on record to establish that the said premises
were lying vacant and were available for use. The learned ARC has,
therefore, rightly held that such assertions, without the requisite
particulars and supporting material, do not give rise to a triable issue.
22.
It is equally well settled that the question as to which premises
would best serve the commercial requirement of a landlord cannot be
dictated by the tenant or determined by the Court by sitting in the
proverbial armchair of the landlord. The suitability of premises has to
be assessed in the context of the nature of the requirement pleaded. In
the present case, the Subject Premises are situated on the Ground
Floor, whereas the alleged alternative premises are stated to be
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situated on the upper floors. The mere availability of premises on
another floor, without anything more, cannot compel the landlord to
shift his business thereto, particularly when the commercial suitability
of a Ground Floor premises is materially different. Viewed
cumulatively, the pleadings relied upon by the Petitioner do not
demonstrate the availability of any reasonably suitable alternative
accommodation with the Respondent.
23.
In Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari16, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that it is not for the Court to direct the
landlord to shift to the First Floor or any higher floor, particularly
when shops and businesses are ordinarily conducted from the Ground
Floor owing to the ease of access to customers. The relevant portion of
the aforesaid Judgment is reiterated hereinbelow:
“7. In our opinion, once it is not disputed that the landlord is in
bona fide need of the premises, it is not for the courts to say that he
should shift to the first floor or any higher floor. It is well known
that shops and businesses are usually (though not invariably)
conducted on the ground floor, because the customers can reach
there easily. The court cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he
should use for his business; that is for the landlord himself to
decide. Hence, the view of the courts below that the sons of
Plaintiff 1 should do business on the first floor in the hall which is
being used for residential purpose was, in our opinion, wholly
arbitrary, and hence cannot be sustained. As regards the finding
that the sons of Plaintiff 1 are getting a salary of Rs 1500 from the
firm, in our opinion, this is wholly irrelevant and was wrongly
taken into consideration by the High Court.”
24.
The learned ARC has, therefore, applied the correct legal test
and has arrived at a conclusion which is based upon the pleadings and
material before it. The finding that the Petitioner has failed to raise a
triable issue on the aspect of alternative accommodation cannot be
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said to suffer from any jurisdictional error, material irregularity or
perversity.
25.
At this stage, it bears reiteration that the jurisdiction of this
Court under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is not intended to
provide an appellate scrutiny of the order passed by the learned ARC.
Even if another view of the material on record were theoretically
possible, that by itself would not furnish a ground for interference.
The test is whether the view adopted by the learned ARC is legally
sustainable and whether the decision-making process suffers from any
error of the nature contemplated by the limited revisional jurisdiction.
In the present case, no such infirmity is discernible.
26.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
learned ARC has duly considered the material pleas raised by the
Petitioner and has returned findings which are neither perverse nor
unreasonable. No jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or error apparent on the face of the record has been
demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of
its revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the
DRC Act.
27.
For the reasons as stated above, this Court finds no merit in the
present Petition. The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
28.
The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the above terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 10, 2026/tk/ma
(2010) 1 SCC 503
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BHATIA
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